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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction and overview
This thesis is about the trading behavior of various participants in equity markets, how
they trade in various settings, their transactions costs and how their trading activity
affect prices.
Vast amounts of financial assets are exchanged between various participants every
day. Whether these assets are stocks, bonds, futures or options this exchange of as-
sets reflects the trading needs of a whole range of participants. These trading needs
may be related to investments, hedging, diversification, speculation/gambling or deal-
ing, and the exchange may occur between large institutional investors, dealers, small
private investors or the issuing firms themselves. The characteristics of each participant
is to a great extent reflected in his trading strategy and portfolio choice. However, all
participants are subject to the same question: What is the correct price of the asset?
One fundamental characteristic of most financial assets is that they represent a claim
on uncertain payments. Since generally a large part of these payments will occur some-
time in the future, the asset price depends on the participants expectations about these
future payments, and on average, the price today should equal the expected discounted
payments in the future. Standard asset pricing theory assumes that information about
these future payoffs and their probability of occurring is equally dispersed across all
market participants, and when there are no frictions, the revision of demand and sup-
ply of rational participants occur instantaneously when new information about these
payoffs arrives such that the equilibrium price of the asset is determined. This ensures
that prices efficiently reflect all relevant information and that it is impossible, with the
information set available to all participants, to make economic profits based on any part
of this information.
Although the notion of a fully efficient market is unrealistic, and infeasible in prac-
tice, it creates a useful benchmark case. As a result of this, much of the theoretical
and empirical research in finance the last few decades has addressed the importance
of asymmetric information, liquidity and investor heterogeneity in the pricing of assets
as well as to examine the relative efficiency of markets. For example, when informa-
tion is unevenly distributed among participants and/or they interpret the information
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differently when forming their expectations about future payoffs, this is likely to have
implications for the cost of transacting, how different participants choose to transact
as well as how fast and to what degree prices reflect full information. Furthermore,
when some investors have superior information, deviations from the equilibrium price
may reflect a required compensation for the potential loss from trading with better in-
formed investors. Although these issues affect observed market prices, markets may still
be informationally efficient in the sense that deviations from the full information price
may be due to information gathering costs such that abnormal returns relative to what
would be expected in a frictionless equilibrium may merely reflect a compensation for
these costs.
The general topic of this thesis is to study the trading behavior of various participants
transacting in equities markets and how differential information among these affect
their transaction costs, their choice of trading strategies and the implications for price
discovery. Several of the essays examine how and to what degree information move
prices. None of the essays are attempts to test an equilibrium model or determine
whether markets are informationally efficient. Moreover, the scope of the thesis is to
provide useful inputs to the literature by examining detailed datasets that may improve
our understanding of how investors behave in equity markets.
I study issues related to equity trading in two main settings which constitute the
two main parts of the thesis, each containing two chapters. The first part consists
of two essays in which I examine transactions costs, liquidity and price volatility in a
market microstructure setting. In the first chapter the trading decision and execution
costs of one particular, large institutional, investor trading outside regular exchanges
is examined. The second essay examines the trading activity of all participants in an
electronic limit order market and how their order submission strategies affect trading
volume and volatility. The second part of the thesis examines asymmetric information
between the managers of the firm and the market in a corporate finance setting where
the issuing company, which potentially is the ultimate informed participant, is an active
trader in its own stock. The first essay in the second part examines the price effect of
open market share repurchase announcements and actual repurchase executions. Since a
repurchase is an event that potentially changes each shareholders ownership proportion,
the second essay in the second part examines the ownership structure of firms that
repurchase their own shares to obtain insights into the decision of why firms choose trade
their own stock. Moreover, this last essay is a preliminary study aiming at motivating
further research on the relationship between ownership structure and firms choice of
repurchasing shares. To give a general overview of the different chapters of the thesis
I will first briefly summarize each chapter below. In each of the subsequent sections of
the introduction I will give a more detailed discussion of the separate chapters. These
discussions will give the reader some background information about the markets and
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questions examined and try to motivate why the different questions justify a closer
investigation.
Microstructure essays In the first chapter, I ask whether the costs of trading equity
outside the regular exchanges (i.e. trading in crossing networks) in the US is cheaper
than trading the same stocks on a regular exchange. I also examine whether the stocks
that are easier to obtain outside the exchange have different characteristics than stocks
that are more difficult to trade off-exchange. This is an interesting question motivated
by the fact that regular exchanges, especially in the US, have experienced increased
competition from so-called alternative trading systems (ATS). Regulators are concerned
that these systems fragment liquidity in the same securities across several trading venues
which lacks transparency. From the exchanges point of view, they are concerned that the
ATS “cream-skim” their order-flow by removing large uninformed investors as well as
free riding on the price discovery process in the primary exchanges. From the investors
point of view this competition may constitute both benefits and costs. While investors
have obtained new venues where they can execute trades at very low commissions,
the costs may be related to liquidity being dispersed across several markets affecting
price discovery and costs in the primary markets. In addition, their trading interest is
potentially exposed to fewer participants decreasing the execution probability of their
orders. The main objective of the paper is to examine to what degree the cost of
trading in an ATS is lower and whether the benefit of trading in these systems is related
to certain types of securities. By using information on all trades executed by a large
institutional investor that implemented a large portfolio during the first half of 1998
through an ATS in the US, I try to cast light on these issues. One of the arguments for
why large institutional investors may benefit from trading in these systems is that their
potentially large trades do not result in adverse price movements that would increase
their transaction costs. For these types of investors, the alternative trading systems is a
welcomed alternative. Since there is no price discovery in crossing networks, the direct
price impact costs are mitigated. However, for an investor that is pre-committed to
trade, as the investor in our dataset, the cost of non-execution and delay in the crossing
network may potentially be large. Thus, the implicit costs by trading in these networks
is difficult to estimate without detailed data on the entire submission strategy as well
as the actual executions of the different parts of the portfolio. This essay contributes
to the literature by being able to estimate these costs more precisely.
In the second chapter, I examine the relationship between volume and volatility in
the Norwegian stock market. More specifically, the study examines a detailed dataset
containing all order submissions and trade executions that occurred on the Oslo Stock
Exchange (OSE) from the beginning of 1999 through June 2001. A variety of studies
document that there is a positive correlation between price volatility and trading vol-
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ume. The main proposed explanation for this relationship is the mixture of distributions
hypothesis (MDH) which states that both volume and price changes are driven by the
same, unobservable, information arrival process which correlates trading volume and
volatility. Thus, when new information hits the market, this increases trading volume
and moves prices. However, there is also a part of the market microstructure litera-
ture that suggest that dispersion of beliefs and strategic trading behavior by economic
agents affect volatility as well as trading volume above what would be expected in
equilibrium. Thus, the relationship between information arrivals and volatility may not
necessarily only reflect the arrival of new information, but in addition reflect uninformed
traders strategically trying to extract information from the order flow (Shalen, 1993).
The paper documents a similar volume-volatility relation as found in other studies that
examine the MDH, where the number of trades explain a large part of the volatility.
However, the main contribution of the study is that it documents several relationships
between the shape of the order book, trading volume and volatility. The paper measures
the order book shape by the average elasticity of the supply and demand schedules in
the book. The lower the elasticity (steeper the slope), the less dispersed are the bid
and ask prices in the order book.1 To examine the effects of the order book slope on
volume and volatility, the slope measure is included as an independent variable in a
cross sectional time series version of the standard regression model used to examine the
volume-volatility relation. A systematic negative relation between the average slope of
the order book and the price volatility is documented. In addition, the results indicate
that a ”wider“ order book (more gentle slopes) coincide with a higher trading volume.
The results are also shown to be robust to the choice of time period and slope measure.
One proposed interpretation of these results is that the dispersion of reservation prices
in an electronic limit order market may contain information about valuation uncertainty
and dispersion of beliefs about asset values (Shalen, 1993). When orders are submitted
close to the inner quotes, it may be interpreted as there being more agreement about
the valuation of the security compared to cases where investors submit orders across a
wider range of prices.
Corporate finance essays The second part of the thesis contains two essays in cor-
porate finance, where I examine a specific corporate event in which the issuing firm itself
is an active participant in the market for its own stock (open market share repurchases).
In many markets firms have not had the opportunity to repurchase their own stock. A
recent trend has been that an increasing number of countries allow firms to distribute
cash in this way. In the US, where repurchases has been allowed for several decades,
the cash distributed through repurchases has steadily increased through the years, and
today firms distribute as much cash through repurchases as through dividends. In 1999
1This is in the case of direct demand and supply curves (prices on the x-axis and accumulated volume
on the y-axis). In the case of inverted demand and supply curves, the relationship would be opposite.
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repurchases also became allowed for Norwegian firms, giving firms an additional instru-
ment for conducting their financial policy. Both the academic literature as well as the
popular press provide a vast amount of suggestions for why firms initiate repurchases.
Some proposed reasons are mitigation of agency costs, takeover defense, to counter dilu-
tion effects of management and employee options, to increase the value of management
options, capital structure adjustments, personal taxes, manipulating earnings-per-share
(EPS) figures as well as minority shareholder expropriation, to mention a few. How-
ever, the most prevalent explanations relate to mispricing. Several studies argue that a
repurchase announcement contains valuable information about current and future earn-
ings. Assuming that the managers of firms have private information about their firms
future prospects, a repurchase may be used to convey firm specific information that
is not yet reflected in prices (the signalling hypothesis). Empirical evidence support-
ing the signalling hypothesis is accumulating across several countries and time periods.
However, an emerging body of empirical literature also suggests that the market under-
reacts to new information related to firms current and future cash flows. Events that
are a priori likely to contain cash-flow-relevant information, such as earnings surprises
and dividend initiations, as well as the announcements of repurchase programs, are fol-
lowed by an abnormal stock-price drift in the same direction as the price effect from
the initial announcement. Given a model for expected returns, this is often referred to
as underreaction. In an efficient market, the initial reaction should be complete and
unbiased. However, empirical results indicate that this is not the case. Whether this is
because of mispricing or misspecification of the expected returns model is still an open
question. In this study I investigate whether a similar underreaction is observed in the
Norwegian market. Since the repurchase announcement itself is no commitment by the
firm to actually execute repurchases, I provide evidence on the market impact of actual
repurchase executions and examine how this relates to the underreaction hypothesis.
Previous empirical studies on open market share repurchases have been limited to ex-
amining actual repurchase activity to annual, quarterly or monthly frequencies since
firms in the markets that has been studied are not required to report their transac-
tions to the marketplace in a readily fashion. However, firms in Norway are required
by law to report their transaction immediately or at least before the trading session
starts the following day. This provides us with an new and interesting dataset which
can be used to obtain a better understanding about how markets respond to the infor-
mation inherent in the actual repurchases. Furthermore, since the initial announcement
of the repurchase plan in many cases is a weak signal about undervaluation, it may be
argued that the actual repurchases are stronger indications that the managers of the
firm perceives the firm as being mispriced. At least, the actual repurchases informs
the market that the firm follow up on their initial announcement. Further, if immedi-
ate disclosure of actual repurchases are important to pricing, strict requirements may
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help price discovery and improve market efficiency. In fact, one concern both in the
academic literature and public press in the US is that many firms announce that they
are planning on repurchasing, but that a relatively low fraction actually goes through
with any repurchases. In addition, the marketplace, as well as academics, is to a large
degree kept in the dark with respect to the repurchase activity and must infer this from
the public press, changes in outstanding shares or changes in treasury stock from the
balance sheets. Thus, due to the strict requirements for Norwegian firms to report their
repurchases immediately, a detailed examination of how the repurchases affect prices
and whether the repurchases provide useful information to the market.
The fourth essay is a continuation of the third essay examining the characteristics of
repurchasing firms in more detail. Initially, dividends and repurchases are two alterna-
tive ways of disgorging free cash. However, there is one major issue that differentiate the
two. While a dividend payment reduces the cash of the firm, a repurchase also revises
each remaining shareholder’s ownership proportion in the repurchasing firm. Thus, in
addition to being used as a means for changing the capital structure, paying out cash
or signal private information, it may also be used by the firm to strategically change
the ownership structure and potentially improve corporate governance within the firm.
Although there is a large empirical and theoretical literature trying to explain why
firms repurchase shares, few studies examine how this relates to ownership structure
and corporate governance. For example, in firms with potentially high agency costs
of free cash, a repurchase may be a way to trim the cash holdings as an alternative,
or in addition, to dividends. On the other hand it may also be used by managers to
expropriate outside shareholders when the firm is undervalued. Thus, the essay tries to
argue why ownership considerations may be an important reason for why firms choose
to repurchase, and examine whether there are systematic patters in the ownership struc-
ture of repurchasing firms in Norway. The main objective of this study is to highlight
some interesting ownership patterns to lay the groundwork for further research on the
question of why firms repurchase shares.
Since the two main parts of the thesis concerns two different areas in financial
economics, I will in the rest of this introduction divide the discussion in two parts. In
the next section, I will discuss the two essays in market microstructure before I continue
to discuss the two essays in corporate finance.
1.1.1 Essays in market microstructure
Market microstructure concerns how the market structure, trading rules and the interac-
tion between various participants can explain the nature of short term price adjustments
and how transaction prices relate to the long-term equilibrium values of assets. Since
this is a very general definition of the area, it is useful to place the two microstructure
essays in this thesis relative to the main areas of the literature. For that purpose I
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apply the categorizations provided by Madhavan (2000). He divides the literature on
market microstructure into four main areas: (1) price formation, (2) market structure
and design, (3) transparency and (4) applications to other areas in finance. Although
these areas to a large degree are interrelated, my first essay concerns mainly the implica-
tions of market structure (alternative trading systems/crossing networks) on transaction
costs (area 2) and the second essay relate to how price volatility and price discovery is
affected by differences in beliefs among various economic agents in an electronic limit
order market (area 1).
Essay 1: Equity trading by institutional investors: Evidence on order sub-
mission strategies
During the last decade there has been a growth in the number of venues at which equi-
ties can be traded. Generally, this has increased competition for order-flow, where new
trading venues try to attract traders through lower commissions and better services.
Thus, markets has moved from being consolidated to becoming more fragmented.2 This
increased competition has also raised concerns that liquidity has become more dispersed
across various trading centers at the loss of execution probability and price discovery.
In the US, this fragmentation has been especially strong, and today regular exchanges
experience competition from a plethora of new venues. Figure 1.1 gives a non-exhaustive
overview of the different types of equity trading venues in the US. At a general level
it is useful to distinguish between two classes of market centers. The first group of
trading venues may be characterized as regular exchanges. This group consists of pri-
mary listing markets and regional exchanges.3 The primary markets are market centers
where company issues are primarily listed (New York Stock Exchange, American Stock
Exchange and Nasdaq). These issues are also traded at one or more of the regional
exchanges. In addition, some Nasdaq stocks are traded under unlisted trading privileges
on the regional exchanges. The Nasdaq Stock Market consists of basically four parts,
where the largest and most visible is the Nasdaq National Market. A fundamental dif-
ference between NASDAQ and the other regular exchanges is that Nasdaq is a dealer
market where market participants buy and sell from the dealers (market makers), while
the markets for listed securities (NYSE, AMEX and the regional exchanges) are auction
markets where participants trade between eachother, and the dealers (specialists) are
required to ensure an orderly market as well as providing liquidity. In addition to the
liquidity provided by the specialist, a large part of the orders coming into the NYSE is
routed through an electronic system to the specialist. This system is called the DOT,
2Harris (2003) defines market fragmentation as when people can trade essentially the same thing in
different market centers, while consolidation is when all traders trade in the same market center.
3At some point in the 19th century the US had more than 100 stock exchanges. These exchanges
generally specialized in local/regional companies and facilitated the listing and trading of these (Harris,
2003).
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which is an acronym for Designated Turnaround System. An additional development
with respect to NASDAQ is that it also connects alternative trading systems into the
market, such as Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs). Thus, the Nasdaq market
is no longer a pure dealer market, as it was originally, but has become a hybrid mar-
ket (a mixed dealer and auction market) where the dealers compete with the incoming
orders from the ECNs.
Figure 1.1 Equity trading venues in the US
An overview of equity trading centers in the US. A general distinctions can be made between ”Regular exchanges”
and ”Alternative trading systems”. The arrows reflect the markets examined in the essay.
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This brings us to the other main group of trading venues which falls into the category
alternative trading systems (ATS). These markets can be split further into Electronic
Communication Networks (ECNs) and other alternative trading systems. An ECN is
essentially an electronic system into which buyers and sellers enter orders that are auto-
matically matched by the system. Thus, ECNs provide electronic facilities that investors
can use to trade directly with each other. Another characteristic of these systems is that
there are generally no physical marketplaces, but rather virtual meeting places facili-
tated by the improvements in electronic communication and the Internet. The largest
and fastest growing ECN in the US is the Island ECN4 which is essentially an electronic
limit order market in which buyers and sellers of NASDAQ securities can meet directly
without using intermediaries (market makers). Additionally, they provide investors with
an anonymous way to enter orders into the marketplace. Unlike market makers, ECNs
operate simply as order-matching mechanisms and do not maintain inventories of their
4The Island ECN and Instinet was combined into INET ATS in February 2004. The remaining part
of the discussion as well as chapter 3 is related to the period before these two were combined into one
entity.
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own. According to Island, one out of every eight trades (in 2002) in NASDAQ secu-
rities are executed through Island. Furthermore, they argue that they provide greater
access to the market, increased transparency, stronger technological services, and lower
transaction costs.
The other group of ATS are called crossing systems (crossing networks). These sys-
tems are also referred to as derivative markets because there is no direct price discovery
in these systems. Instead, the price is determined in another market (the securities
primary listing market). In a crossing network traders submit the quantity (number of
shares) that they want to buy or sell without specifying any price. These orders are
submitted electronically and are not visible to any other market participants. At fixed
points in time (either intra-daily as on POSIT, or after hours as in INSTINET and the
NYSE crossing sessions) the aggregate buy and sell volumes are matched at the most
recent price (or VWAP) available from the stocks primary market. Thus there are no
active trading session, but rather a passive matching of orders.
The large and increasing number of trading venues has spurred an growing interest
both from regulators, practitioners as well as researchers, with respect to the effect of
this fragmentation on inter-market competition, and how they affect transaction costs
both in the primary markets as well as in the crossing networks. Most of the alterna-
tive trading systems remove the need for intermediaries, which reduces the commissions
(direct transaction costs) paid in these systems. On the other hand, due to the fragmen-
tation of liquidity across several markets, this may affect other cost components such
as opportunity costs when execution is not obtained, or costs related to delay of trades
while searching for liquidity. In addition, since the crossing systems derive the price
from the primary market, there may be an indirect effect on the quality of the price
since liquidity potentially is removed from the primary market in the same securities.
This essay relates to a the last group of market system discussed above called ”cross-
ing systems” and how trading in these systems compares with trading at the NYSE and
the regional exchanges (reflected by the arrows in figure 1.1). While these system,
because of their passive matching of orders without any intermediaries, reduce commis-
sions, and reduce implicit transaction costs such as price impact costs and spread costs,
they may on the other hand increase costs related to opportunity loss and execution
delay. Depending on the type of investor and stocks to be traded, different investors
prefer different types of systems when implementing their trading decisions, and weight
these costs against the benefits when deciding how and where to trade. At a general
level, whether markets will stay fragmented or consolidate over time is still debated
(Madhavan, 1995). Thus, studies addressing what type of securities that are traded and
which investors that prefer to trade off-exchange is an important step towards under-
standing why these off-exchange systems exists and if they are likely to persist into the
future.
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In information based models focusing on the importance of asymmetric information
(e.g. Easley et al. (1996)), uninformed investors that are concerned about trading with
informed investors may prefer the anonymity and the ability of crossing networks to
screen out informed investors. Thus, the anonymity and batch nature of crossing net-
works is argued to attract uninformed order-flow (“cream skimming” the order-flow)
from the primary market which may impede the price discovery in the primary market.
On the other hand, as discussed in Fong et al. (1999), a batch market is also an efficient
way of concentrating liquidity for illiquid securities to one point in time, increasing the
execution probability for traders and reducing the potential price impact costs asso-
ciated with low liquidity stocks. In addition, these systems may attract traders that
would otherwise not trade, increasing overall liquidity (Hendershott and Mendelson,
2000).
Institutions account for a major part (over 70%) of the trading volume worldwide,
and crossing networks are to a large degree used by institutional traders with large
liquidity needs. Thus, a relatively large part of the (potentially uninformed) order-flow
goes through these markets. Despite this, relatively little academic research has been
done on institutional trading strategies and costs, especially related to their trading in
crossing networks. This is to a large part due to the proprietary nature of these data
and that the users of crossing networks generally value anonymity and are reluctant to
give out transaction data. This essay asks the following two basic questions:
• Are stocks supplied in the crossing networks more/less liquid and actively traded
than stocks not easily obtainable in these systems?
• What are the implicit transaction costs of executing a portfolio in a crossing
network relative to implementing the same portfolio through regular exchange
transactions?
Much of the current research on institutional investors’ in the US equity market
has aimed at answering similar questions to those stated above mainly by using data
provided by the Plexus Group.5 These studies include Keim and Madhavan (1995, 1997),
Jones and Lipson (1999a,b) and Conrad et al. (2001a,b). Overall, these studies find that
there seem to be quite large cost advantages to using alternative trading systems relative
to trading on regular exchanges. Although, these studies examine very large datasets,
with many orders from many investors, the datasets have two main weaknesses. First
of all, they do not know the ex ante trading strategy of the investors they are observing
the trade executions from. Thus, their sample may be biased in the sense that certain
orders in certain securities are submitted to alternative trading systems. It may be that
the trader has decided to send the most difficult orders to brokers and the least difficult
orders to crossing networks. This relates to the first bullet point above. Secondly, they
5The Plexus Group is a consulting firm that monitors the costs of institutional trading.
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do not know the complete history of the implementation and actual executions of the
underlying portfolio. This may bias their findings towards very low transaction costs
in these systems since they do not properly account for costs of non-execution which
may be a significant cost component for investors that are pre-committed to trade. This
relates to the second bullet point above.
Our dataset, on the other hand, includes all orders from the establishment of a US
equity portfolio worth USD 1.76 billion over a 6-month period from January 1998 to
June 1998. The portfolio was tracking the US part of the FTSE All World index6,
which consists of about the 500 largest stocks in the US, and has a very high correlation
with the S&P 500 index. The data set is unique in that it contains information on the
investors’ complete order submission strategy, including the ex ante trading strategy, the
dates on which the decision to trade was made, and the resulting fill rates of each order
for different trading venues. Hence, the data set is close to a “controlled experiment”
which is quite rare when studying institutional trading behavior.7 Although, our dataset
also has a weakness in that it is from one trader’s buy orders only and covers a limited
period of time, we argue that the dataset is representative for institutional traders in
the US market.
The main contribution of the paper is twofold offering evidence on each of the
questions in the bullet-points above. The first part of the essay, examines whether stocks
that are ”easily” obtained in the crossing network has a different characteristic than
stocks that are difficult or impossible to obtain in the crossing network. Compared to
the previously mentioned studies, we are able to do this due to the nature of the dataset.
The ex-ante trading strategy of the investor for which we have data was essentially to
first try to execute as much of the portfolio as possible in the crossing network. The
orders that were not filled, or only partially filled, were then executed in the primary
market. By observing which securities was obtained during each session we split the
sample securities into groups based on the fill rate in the crossing network, and examine
the liquidity characteristics of these securities in the primary market on the same dates.
The results indicate that the stocks supplied in the crossing network8 are the most liquid
and actively traded securities, in a sample of the largest (and potentially most liquid)
securities in the US market. Thus, this result suggests that crossing networks facilitate
trading in liquid stocks, and that these markets offer cost-efficient trading possibilities
for large liquidity traders.
The second part of the paper provides results on the relative costs on trading in
6The FTSE All-World index includes 49 different countries and about 2300 stocks. The aim of the
index is to capture up to 90% of the investible market capitalization of each country.
7In many other studies, the exact investment strategy of a trader has to be estimated from the
sequence of trades. This induces a selection bias in the data. It might be that the trader has decided
to send the most difficult orders to brokers and the least difficult orders to crossing networks. We are
not facing a selection bias problem in our data set.
8Proxied by the fill rate of the order in the crossing network.
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the two systems. More specifically, the paper simulates alternative trading strategies in
the primary market for the same portfolio that was traded in the crossing network by
the investor under study. These simulations assume that the decision to trade is the
same as in the actual trading strategy, but that the orders are submitted directly to the
primary market as limit orders instead of first being submitted to the crossing network.
Various limit order strategies are simulated, and the results suggest that the crossing
strategy was inexpensive relative to trading the stocks directly in the primary market.
Even with respect to the simplest strategy where the size of the orders are ignored, the
limit order strategy does not outperform the crossing strategy with respect to implicit
costs. Taking into account also the much lower commissions in the crossing network the
difference becomes even larger.
Essay 2: Order Book Characteristics and the Volume-Volatility Relation:
Empirical Evidence from a Limit Order Market
A variety of studies document that there is a positive correlation between price volatility
and trading volume for most types of financial contracts. The main theoretical expla-
nation for this is known as the mixture of distributions hypothesis (MDH), originally
proposed by Clark (1973). The main intuition behind the MDH is that new information
about asset values acts as the driving force (mixing variable) for both price movements
and volume. Since the mixing variable affects both trading volume and price movements
(volatility) contemporaneously, these two variables are correlated. The MDH also pro-
vides an explanation for why the sample distribution of daily returns is leptokurtic.
The MDH suggest that if the arrival rate of information is time varying, periods with
a high amount of new information would contribute to the tails of the return distribu-
tion as well as high trading volumes, while periods with less information arrivals would
contribute to the center of the returns distribution as well as low trading volumes.
Although the MDH helps explain some stylized facts about financial markets it is
not necessarily the case that the arrival of new information is the only component that
drives volume and volatility. As suggested by Shiller (1981), the movements in prices
seem far too high relative to the movements in the fundamental values of the underlying
securities. In addition, French and Roll (1986) find evidence that asset prices are much
more volatile during exchange trading hours than during nontrading hours. They argue
that this is evidence that trading is self-generating indicating that information is not
necessarily the only factor driving trading volume and price volatility. In other words,
trading volume and price volatility may have more than one common cause resulting in
their positive correlation (Harris, 1987).
One limitation of the MDH is that it does not say anything about the type of in-
formation that drives prices, how this information is revealed to investors or the role of
economic agents in determining the price. In standard asset pricing models the trading
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process itself does not convey information which is relevant for price determination, but
rather that prices adjusts immediately when new information arrives. This is plausible
for some kinds of information, but other types of information may not be easily obtain-
able or are costly to gather. Thus, some information may not be readily available to all
investors. Although markets may still be efficient in the sense that the marginal cost of
gathering information is reflected in the price (compensating information gatherers for
their cost) it may have implications for relative efficiency. For example, as suggested
in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium model by Shalen (1993), if uninformed in-
vestors act strategically and try to extract new information about asset values from the
order-flow, they may contribute to increasing both trading volume and price volatility
above what would be expected in the case when price variations and volume are only
driven by the arrival of new information. In Shalen’s model, uninformed investors are
faced with a signal extraction problem where they are unable to distinguish informed
trades from liquidity demand as well as the trades of their own type. Due to this, they
react to all trades as informative and generate excess volatility and volume above what
would be expected if only new information (the mixing variable) was driving these vari-
ables. This hypothesis is called the “dispersion of beliefs hypothesis” (DBH). In the
MDH setting, strategic trading by uninformed investors would imply that not only the
information arrival rate is important for volume and volatility, but also that the amount
of uninformed traders in the trader population. As the fraction of uninformed traders
increases the dispersion of beliefs about the true value of the asset increases together
with excess volume and volatility, also correlating the two. Thus, “dispersion of beliefs”
about fundamental value may be important for explaining the observed high volatility
and trading volume in financial markets above what is expected in standard equilibrium
models.
The main objective of the paper is to broaden our knowledge about the volume-
volatility relation in electronic limit order markets. Since the demand and supply
schedules in a limit order book represent the prices at which the liquidity suppliers
are willing to trade, it is interesting to study whether the book contains information
about the volume-volatility relation. The paper exploits an exceptionally rich dataset
from the Norwegian equity market containing all submitted orders and trade executions
for the period from February 1999 through June 2001. The Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE)
operates as a fully automated limit order-driven trading system, and the data set makes
it possible to rebuild the full order book at any point in time.
The first topic of the paper is to examine the traditional volume-volatility relation
(MDH) in the Norwegian stock market. One motivation for this is that few studies on
the MDH has been done on an electronic limit order market. Similar to other studies,
the number of trades is found to be the important factor for explaining volatility, while
the size of trades is less important. Thus, relative to the MDH, this suggests that the
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number of trades is the appropriate proxy for the mixing variable.
The second part of the the paper examines in more detail how the limit order book
relates to the contemporaneous volume and volatility. This is done by rebuilding the full
order book at hourly snapshots for each company every day. The rebuilt order book is
used to calculate the average slope of the supply and demand schedules in the book. The
main contribution of the study is that it documents several relationships between the
average slope of the order book and volume and volatility. To examine the effect of the
order book slope on volume and volatility, the paper first includes the slope measure as
an independent variable in a cross sectional time series version of the standard regression
model used to study the volume-volatility relation. A systematic negative relation
between the average slope of the order book and the price volatility is documented in
a daily time series cross-sectional analysis. This indicates that the a more gentle slope
coincide with higher volatility. To investigate the relationship between the slope of the
book and the trading volume, a similar model is estimated, with the number of trades
as the dependent variable. Similarly, a significantly negative relationship between the
slope measure and the daily number of trades is found, indicating that a more dispersed
order book coincide with a high number of trade executions. These results are also
shown to be robust to the choice of time period. Interestingly, the relationship between
the slope and the number of trades seems to depend on what fraction of the order book
is used when calculating the slope. When only the inner part of the order book is used,
the relationship is reversed, consistent with studies that find that thick books result in
trades (Biais et al., 1995).
The relationships documented in the study are interesting in several respects. First,
although most of the activity occur at the inner part of the order book, the order
book data shows that the liquidity provided at the inner quotes in many cases reflect
only a modest part of the total liquidity supplied in the full order book. Second, the
characteristics of the order book vary systematically over the trading day as well as
across firms. Third, as far as I know, no previous studies have examined in detail the
relationship between the characteristics of the full order book and volume and volatility
in a cross-sectional time series setting.
One interesting interpretation of the findings is that the characteristics of the or-
der book may reflect dispersion of beliefs among liquidity suppliers. More specifically, a
“wide” limit order book (more gentle slope) may reflect that there is a stronger disagree-
ment among investors about the value of the security as orders are submitted across
a greater range of prices around the midpoint price. Alternatively, when orders are
submitted on average closer to the midpoint price, making the limit order book more
concentrated around the inner quotes, this may indicate less uncertainty about asset
values. If the slope is interpreted as a proxy for dispersion of beliefs, greater dispersion
is reflected in higher volume and volatility across stocks and time. Furthermore, larger
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stocks are found to have on average steeper slopes than smaller stocks. Initially, this
may be expected in the sense that larger stocks are more liquid. On the other hand, it
is not clear why large firms have a greater fraction of the order book volume closer to
the inner quotes. One interpretation may be that larger stocks have a lower valuation
uncertainty. This because they are more frequently followed by analysts and the public
press, and have a longer track record, making these stocks potentially easier to value
than smaller stocks.
One problem is however, that there are no models that relate the full limit order
book to volume and volatility. In fact, we do not know how the limit order book
would look like with investors with dispersed beliefs. Although the paper does not aim
at testing the dispersion of beliefs hypothesis, the empirical results may provide an
interesting interpretation of how the limit order book may capture some of the aspects
of dispersion.
There are several empirical studies that examine the importance of dispersion of be-
liefs about asset values, using various proxies for dispersion. Bessembinder and Seguin
(1993) suggest that the volume-volatility relation in financial markets may depend on
the type of trader. Motivated by this Daigler and Wiley (1999) perform an indirect test
of the DBH where they proxy for the degree of dispersion in beliefs by the fraction of
uninformed traders in futures markets. As their proxy for uninformed investors they
differentiate traders by how close they are to the trading floor. Their main findings
suggest that the general public, outside the trading floor, increase volatility, while floor
traders decrease volatility. Ghysels and Juergens (2001) measure dispersion of beliefs di-
rectly by dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Their results suggest that dispersion
is significantly and positively related to both returns and volatility.
Future research on limit order markets
Relative to the mixture of distribution hypothesis as well as the dispersion of beliefs
hypothesis, one interesting trend in the Norwegian market, as in many other markets, is
that online trading has become more popular and available to investors. These systems
generally have much lower commissions and have given small private investors direct
access to the marketplace. To illustrate this development, figure 1.2 shows the total
number of trades executed in the Norwegian market that was initiated by different
groups of trader. The type of trader is proxied by the trading house from which the
initiating order originates. “Institutional trades” reflect the number of trades in which a
customer in trading houses that mainly trade for institutional traders are the initiating
party in the trade, “retail trades” report the number of trades from trading houses that
specialize in facilitating trading for small private investors (phone based) where the
broker submit the order to the market for the customer, “online trades” reflect trades
that are initiated through online brokerage houses where the investor submit orders
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through the internet and the order is routed directly to the limit order book.9
Figure 1.2 Trading activity by different trader types in Norway
The figure shows the total number of trades executed for different types of traders in Norway. “Institutional
trades” reflect the number of trades that are initiated by customers in trading houses that specialize in facilitating
trading for institutions and large investors, “retail trades” report the number of trades from trading houses that
specialize in facilitating trading for small private investors (phone based) where the broker submit the order to
the market for the customer, “online trades” reflect trades that are initiated through online brokerage houses
where the investor submit orders through the internet and the order is routed directly to the limit order book.
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As can be seen from the figure, the number of trades initiated by online traders
has grown to become a significant fraction of the total number of trades at the OSE.
Although the volume from online traders constitute a much smaller fraction of total
number of shares, this may be an important structural change in financial markets. Es-
pecially with respect to the mixture of distributions hypothesis, the increased trading
activity from potentially the most uninformed investors, may affect the volatility and
transaction volume observed in equity markets. Furthermore, one interesting observa-
tion with respect to the online traders is that their trading activity is to a large degree
concentrated in the most volatile stocks on the exchange. Whether their trading con-
tributes to the volatility or they are attracted to volatile stocks (due to e.g. day trading)
will be subject to future research. There is also some indications that the former retail
traders, has moved to the online group. The increase in trading activity from the online
9These data is not examined in the essay, but motivate why trader heterogeneity may be important,
and will be used in a future examination of the effect of trader type on volatility and volume.
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trader group may therefore partly be because retail traders has switched to this way
of trading, that online trading attract new traders to the market, or that former retail
traders trade more when it is easier and cheaper for them to execute trades. Another
interesting issue relating to the DBH is that the online traders may potentially be those
traders that has the least precise information. If these traders react more frequently
to recent order flow, they may also be the group that contributes the greatest excess
volume and excess volatility in a DBH setting. More specifically, as suggested by the
DBH, the more uninformed traders, the higher the excess volatility and volume is ex-
pected to be. How and whether the increase in online trading has affected the volume
and volatility in the Norwegian market, and whether this can be related to the mixture
of distributions hypothesis as well as the dispersion of beliefs hypothesis, will be subject
to further research.
1.1.2 Essays in corporate finance
One important question in corporate finance is how firms distribute profits back to their
owners. The most common way firms do this is through regular cash dividends and open
market share repurchases. Although the most frequently studied, and historically most
common cash distribution, is regular cash dividends, several studies on the US market
show that repurchases have become increasingly important over the years. Compared
to dividend distributions, an open market share repurchase is an event where the issu-
ing firm trades its own stock. Thus, compared to a pro-rata dividend distribution, a
non-proportional repurchase changes the ownership- and capital structure in the firm.
In addition to being a more flexible payout method, a repurchase may also convey in-
formation to the market about the value of the firm. However, as discussed in Brav
et al. (2003), the motives behind different types of payout policy as well as recent shifts
in payout policy is not well understood. For example, Fama and French (2001) find ev-
idence that dividend payments by US firms has decreased significantly over time. Also
Grullon and Michaely (2002) find that there has been decrease in dividend paying firms
through time, but also find evidence that many firms substitute repurchases for divi-
dends and that US firms now distribute as much cash through repurchases as through
dividends. In the study by Brav et al. (2003) they note that despite the fact that there
is a lot of research available on firms payout policy, the most fundamental issues remains
unanswered:
• Why do both dividends and repurchases exist?
• Why is there such a large penalty for dividend cuts, but no analogous penalty for
not completing a repurchase program?
In addition, there are also unresolved issues with respect to how the market responds to
repurchase announcements and how repurchases may be used to e.g. signal mispricing
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or as a mechanism for ensuring that managers don’t use excess cash to engage in value
destroying projects and increase their private benefits.
In this second part of the thesis, I examine detailed repurchase data from Norway
which may cast some light on the questions mentioned above. A dominating part of
the available empirical research on open market share repurchases is on data from the
US and Canada. The main reason for this is that repurchases has been legal in these
markets for several decades, while many other countries has allowed repurchases more
recently, one of which is Norway. One interesting aspect of the Norwegian repurchase
data is that firms in Norway are subject to a legal requirement to report their actual
repurchase activity immediately. Comparably, US firms are not required to report their
repurchase activity. In Canada, the requirement is stricter than in the US as firms
are required to report their accumulated repurchases on a monthly basis. Thus, the
Norwegian data may help us examine some questions in more detail that are difficult
to study using aggregate data.
In contrast to the two first essays of the thesis, these two last essays relate to the
trading decisions by corporations that trade in their own stock. In addition to being a
way for firms to conduct their payout policy, a repurchase may also contain important
information since the managers of the firm potentially is the ultimate informed partici-
pant in the market for its own securities. Thus, in the essays I examine how this activity
relates to asymmetric information between the firm and the market and to what extent
this information is reflected in prices. In addition, since a special feature of repurchases
(compared to cash dividends) is that it changes the ownership composition of the firm,
I examine whether there are systematic patterns in the ownership composition in these
firms, and whether there are certain ownership characteristics that may constitute an
underlying motivation for why firms repurchase shares.
As summarized in Allen and Michaely (2003), there are five potential imperfections
relative to the Miller and Modigliani (1961) framework that may be important consid-
erations when choosing dividend policy:
1 Taxes - if dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains, minimizing divi-
dends is optimal
2 Asymmetric information - if managers have private information they can use pay-
out policy to signal this to the market
3 Incomplete contracts - payout policy can be used to discipline management and
reduce agency costs of free cash
4 Institutional constraints - if various institutions prefer dividends, the firm may
find it optimal to pay dividends although this imposes a tax burden on individual
investors
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5 Transaction costs - if dividends minimize transaction costs to equity holders, then
dividend payout may be optimal.
The two essays in the last part of the thesis are related to several of these imperfec-
tions. In the first essay I examine whether asymmetric information and signalling may
be an explanation for the markets reaction to the announcements of repurchase plans
and the actual repurchase executions. In the last essay, the main focus is related to
incomplete contracts and institutional constraints in the sense that ownership composi-
tion and corporate governance may be a motivation for why firms initiate a repurchase
program.
Essay 3: The market impact and timing of open market share repurchases
in Norway
An emerging body of empirical literature suggests that the market underreacts to new
information about firms’ cash flows. Public announcements that are likely to contain
information about current and future cash-flows, such as earnings surprises and dividend
initiations and omissions as well as the announcements of repurchase plans, are followed
by an abnormal return drift in the same direction as the initial announcement return.
This suggests that the market does not react in a complete and unbiased fashion to
this information which is inconsistent with market efficiency in its weakest form. In
other words, the direction of the price impact of the initial announcement (historical
returns) can be used to predict future returns, using old information. Investors should
not be able to earn superior returns by exploiting these systematic features without
bearing additional risk since the mispricing should be mitigated through arbitrage. At
a fundamental level, these findings may be related to misspecification of the benchmark
model for expected returns rather than mispricing. To explain the underreaction, the
literature suggests several reasons for why these patterns are observed. Fama (1999)
argue that the empirical findings of over- and underreaction in various settings are
sample specific and appear by chance. He also points to the fact that the long term
abnormal return drifts are sensitive to the model specification, such that when taking
account of size and value factors these patterns are mitigated. On the other hand, the
increasing amount of studies providing new empirical evidence on these issues, applying
different model specifications and samples, suggest that alternative explanations may
be required. One strand of the literature propose behavioral models to explain the
anomalies. One recent example is Barberis et al. (1998) who proposes that investor
sentiment is important with respect to how investors form expectations about future
earnings, and that investors are expected to overreact and underreact to different types
of announcements due to psychological biases when interpreting new information. Other
studies propose extensions to the existing paradigm, where additional risk factors may
help explain the patterns.
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This paper examines a detailed dataset on announcements of open market share
repurchase program announcements and actual repurchases conducted by Norwegian
firms during the period 1998-2001.10 The first purpose of the paper is to study whether
there is an announcement effect related to when firms announce repurchase plans in
Norway. In addition, the paper examines whether this initial effect is complete and
unbiased relative to the long term performance of announcing firms. Essentially, the
main result from this part of the analysis is that Norwegian firms also experience a
positive price impact of about 2.5% when announcing a repurchase plan, in line with
models where the market interpret the announcement as positive information about
future profitability. In addition, I find that these firms show a long term abnormal
performance after the announcement of about 0.9% per month or 11% a year when
controlling for size, book to market and momentum factors. These results line up with
studies from the US and Canada suggesting that the market reaction to the initial
announcement is incomplete with respect to the full signal value proxied by the post-
announcement abnormal return.
These results contribute to the existing literature in the sense that the study adds
an observation to the cross section of countries with additional evidence on the mar-
ket reaction to repurchase announcements as well as the performance of these firms.
However, the most interesting part of the Norwegian data is the detailed knowledge
about the firms actual repurchases. The paper exploits this unique feature of the data
to further investigate the underreaction of announcing firms and examine how the post-
announcement performance relates to whether the firm actually repurchase shares or
not. More specifically, by creating two portfolios conditional on whether the firms re-
purchase or not, an interesting pattern is observed. Those firms that do not repurchase
experience a long term abnormal performance, while the portfolio of firms that actually
repurchase shares (and are included in a second portfolio the month after they have
conducted their first repurchase) perform as expected relative to several model specifi-
cations. In addition, when examining the excess return related to actual repurchases,
the results indicate that the first repurchase executed by a firm after it has announced
a repurchase plan has the strongest abnormal price effect, while subsequent repurchases
has a decreasing impact.
The paper suggests several explanations for this finding. One interpretation for the
difference in long-term abnormal performance between repurchasing and non-repurchasing
firms may be that the market reacts in a complete fashion at the announcement of the
program for firms that later repurchase shares, while there is an underreaction for
non-repurchasing firms. This may be because the repurchasing firms are able to more
credibly signal undervaluation at the announcement of the program. However, I do
10Firms where first allowed to actually execute repurchases from 1999, but were allowed to announce
the repurchase plan earlier.
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not find a different announcement effect for announcements that result in subsequent
repurchases relative to announcements that do not result in subsequent repurchases.
Another explanation focuses on the signal conveyed to the market when the firm
choose to actually execute a repurchase. One of the most prevalent explanations for
why firms experience a positive price effect when announcing a repurchase plan is the
signalling hypothesis. The hypothesis assumes that there is asymmetric information
between the managers of the firm and the market. By announcing a repurchase plan,
the manager implicitly conveys to the market that he assess the current market price to
be too low relative to the true value of the firm. However, since the announcement of
a repurchase plan is no commitment by the firm to actually repurchase any shares the
signal may be argued to be very weak.11 On the other hand since the actual repurchases
involves real transactions, the actual repurchases may be argued to be stronger signals of
undervaluation, or a confirmation of the initial announcement. Thus, one interpretation
of the finding may be that when the firm executes its first repurchase, the market react
to the information implicit in this action, increasing the price closer to the true value,
such that subsequent returns evolve as expected. When examining the price impact of
subsequent repurchases, the results suggest that the first repurchase by a firm, has the
greatest abnormal price impact, while subsequent repurchases has a decreasing price
effect. This may indicate that the first repurchase by a firm is the most informative in
the sense that it resolves the uncertainty with respect to whether the firm will repurchase
or not.
For the group of firms that do not repurchase there may be many reasons for why
they do not execute any repurchases. One reason may be that these firms experience a
price increase before the firm is able to execute any repurchases, such that the manager
assess the firm to no longer being undervalued. An additional explanation may be that
these firms are unable to execute repurchases simply because they are less liquid. When
examining measures of liquidity (quick ratio and current ratio), the results indicate that
non-repurchasing firms are significantly less liquid than repurchasing firms. Thus, the
non-repurchasing firms may for this reason be unable to signal undervaluation through
actual repurchases. If this is the case, the price of these firms remains too low and
information surprises in later periods contribute to the long term abnormal drift for these
companies. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that these firms are exposed to
risks that are not captured by the market, book/market and momentum factors.
In a broader perspective, the findings relate to a concern that has been raised in
the popular press as well as by researchers in the US. It has been argued that the
11For a signal to be credible, the action must incur some costs to the manager if he signals falsely. For
example, if the manager in addition to announcing a repurchase plan or repurchase shares commit to
retaining his shares, the signal would become much stronger because he then would reduce his wealth
by repurchasing at a high price. However, such commitments are rarely observed in connection to open
market share repurchases.
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announcement of a repurchase plan is a way for the management to raise the stock
price at little or no cost in the short run. In fact Kracher and Johnson (1997) argue
that many firms in the US announce repurchase plans with no intention of repurchasing
at all. One of their arguments is that since the reporting standards in the US, with
respect to open market repurchases, are very loose, it is difficult for investors to actually
know whether announcing firms under normal circumstances are actually going through
with the repurchase plan. Their main suggestion is that US firms should be required
to report the progress of the repurchase plan such that they are motivated to only
announce a repurchase plan when their intentions are true.
The results in the present paper may contribute to the discussion about disclosure
requirements in the US. Although the paper does not resolve the underreaction puzzle,
the results may indicate that by requiring firms to report their transactions immediately
to the market, this may improve price discovery.
Essay 4: The ownership structure of repurchasing firms
As expressed by Schleifer and Vishny (1997);
Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. How
do the suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the profits to
them? How do they make sure that managers do not steal the capital they
supply or invest in bad projects? How do suppliers of finance control man-
agers?
While a dividend payment reduces the cash of the firm, a repurchase also poten-
tially revises each remaining shareholder’s ownership proportion in the repurchasing
firm. Thus, in addition to being used as e.g. signal private information, as examined in
the previous essay, it may also be used by the firm to change the ownership structure
of the firm or as a disciplinary mechanism when the corporate governance is weak. For
example, in firms with potentially high agency costs of free cash (liquid firms with no
profitable investment opportunities, low concentration and low insider ownership), a
repurchase may be a way to trim the cash holdings as an alternative or in addition to
dividends. Since a repurchase is more flexible than dividends12 it may be attractive to
firms with volatile cash flows. A repurchase may also be used by managers as an effec-
tive measure against takeovers which would threaten the position of the managers, by
removing shareholders with the lowest valuations ((Bagwell, 1991)) as well as increasing
the ownership proportion of the insiders and the most loyal owners.
In a recent study, based on interviews with corporate officials, Brav et al. (2003) find
that financial executives believe that the ownership structure of their firm is important.
12Flexible in the sense that the market expects firms to keep their dividend payments at the new level
if increased (Lintner, 1956; Brav et al., 2003), and punish firms that decrease their dividend payment.
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In addition they also believe that retail investors have a strong preference for dividends
(despite a tax disadvantage) while institutional investors have no strong preference
between dividends and repurchases. Despite this, a large fraction of the executives
(57%) stated that institutions are important with respect to establishing a repurchase
program. In addition, the results from the interviews suggest that payout initiations
are to a certain degree motivated by firms to avoid possible agency costs that could
occur in the future if excess cash should accumulate within the firm. As suggested by
Jensen (1986), payout policy may be used as a mechanism to mitigate agency costs
of free cash. Interestingly, when the executives are asked whether they would initiate
payouts to discipline themselves only 10% respond positively.13 Another interesting
finding, which relates to the previous essay, was that most executives answered that
changes in payout policy conveyed their confidence about the firm’s future prospects.
About 85% of the executives believed that repurchase decisions revealed information to
the market about mispricing.
Overall, the interviews conducted by Brav et al. (2003) provide a motivation for
examining the ownership structure of repurchasing firms. This may provide additional
evidence on the motivations for why managers initiate repurchases that are difficult to
obtain through interviews such as e.g. shareholder expropriation and insider trading
around repurchase events. An additional motivation is that there is a large empirical
and theoretical literature aimed at explain why firms repurchase shares. However, few of
these studies examine how this relates to ownership structure and corporate governance,
mainly due to the lack of detailed ownership data.
Having access to detailed monthly ownership data, for all firms listed on the Oslo
Stock Exchange, makes it possible to conduct a detailed examination of the ownership
structure of repurchasing firms. The ownership data contains information on the number
of shares owned by each owner as well as information with respect to the type of owners.
In addition, we have data on the insider ownership in all listed firms. The essay provides
an examination of the ownership structure of repurchasing firms, and tries to reconcile
these findings with available theory.
The paper finds some interesting patterns in the data. The main results indicate that
firms that announce a repurchase plan have a significantly lower ownership concentration
than non-announcing firms. In addition, firms that announce repurchase plans have on
average twice as many shareholders as non announcing firms, while the size of the
firms in the two groups are similar. This would be in line with an agency theoretical
prediction that firms with dispersed ownership may be more exposed to agency problems
since there are less incentives to monitor management. Thus, if managers want to
convey to the market that they are committed to not wasting cash, the initiation of a
13As noted by Brav et al. (2003), the managers may be reluctant to admit (even to themselves) that
they may need to be monitored or impose disciplining mechanisms on themselves.
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repurchase plan may be one way of sending this message. In addition, firms with many
small shareholders may want to reduce the number of shareholders to concentrate the
ownership and thereby reduce the probability of successful hostile takeover attempts
that could result in the replacement of the managers. The results also indicate that the
insider ownership is much higher in announcing firms, and that the insider ownership
is the highest in firms that actually repurchase shares. With respect to the agency
cost motivation, this result point in the opposite direction in the sense that agency
theory predicts that high insider ownership aligns the interests of inside- and outside
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) such that additional mechanisms to mitigate
agency costs are not needed. The high insider ownership in these firms may instead
indicate that takeover defense, outside shareholder expropriation, or entrenchment may
be reasons for why managers choose to repurchase shares.
The paper also examine how the ownership characteristics change through time when
firms execute repurchases. As expected, the concentration increases, mainly due to an
increased ownership by the largest owner, and the number of shareholders decreases. In
addition, the ownership of institutional and personal owners decreases, while the state
ownership increases. This may be because institutional and personal investors are those
that trade more actively in the market, and thereby are more likely to sell shares back
to the firm. On the other hand the decrease may also reflect a that these two groups of
investors have a preference for dividend paying firms, and reduce their ownership if the
repurchasing firms substitute repurchases for dividends. The reduction in institutional
ownership is interesting since a study by Grinstein and Michaely (2001) find an opposite
trend in the US. They argue that firms attract institutions through their payout policy,
and find that institutions increase their holding in repurchasing firms.
The final part of the study applies a binary regression method to examine whether
the ownership at the beginning of each sample year can explain the propensity for firms
to initiate a repurchase program. The findings is similar to the descriptive part of
the study, but some additional results appear. First, insider ownership increases the
probability of announcement, while concentration is insignificant for all years. However,
the existence of a large controlling shareholder reduces the propensity to announce,
while the identity of the largest shareholder is unimportant. In addition, the results
strongly suggest that firms that paid dividends in the previous year, are less likely to
initiate a repurchase program, while larger firms are more likely to announce repurchase
plans. This is probably related to dividend smoothing, and that firms are reluctant to
cutting dividends as suggested in studies by Lintner (1956) and Brav et al. (2003). In
addition, large firms often has a higher number of small shareholders, which may be one
motivation for these firms to initiate a repurchase program.
Overall, although the findings in the paper does not strongly favor one interpretation
over the other, the results are in line with an interpretation where insiders have incen-
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tives to support the initiation of a repurchase program either to maximize the future
value of their wealth (Isagawa, 2000), expropriate outside shareholders or to entrench
themselves. On the other hand the finding that a controlling shareholder decreases the
probability of observing an announcement, may also suggest that controlling sharehold-
ers oppose the initiation of a repurchase program. Alternatively, a large shareholder
may have stronger incentives to monitor, such that an additional mechanism to re-
duce agency costs of free cash is not needed. Interestingly, this finding is the opposite
of what is the prediction in the model by Brennan and Thakor (1990) where, large
shareholders prefer repurchases to dividends, while small shareholders prefer dividends.
Thus, relative to their model, one would expect large shareholders to increase the firms
propensity to initiate a repurchase program since they would use their voting rights to
force a repurchase plan into place.
Future research on repurchases
The two essays on open market share repurchases provide some interesting results both
with respect to the announcement effect, the underreaction hypothesis, the price effect
of actual repurchases as well as on the ownership structure in repurchasing firms. Al-
though, the two essays are separated in this thesis, they may be linked in several ways,
which may motivate future research on this topic.
First, a critical question with respect to the signalling ability of open market re-
purchase announcements is whether the announcement is a credible signal. As will be
discussed in chapters 4 and 5, relative to the signaling hypothesis the announcement
of an open market share repurchase plan is not a commitment by the firm to actually
repurchase any shares, neither does it impose any cost on the manager of the firm if
it is a false signal aimed at temporarily increasing the stock price. As suggested by
Isagawa (2000), the announcement of a repurchase plan may be credible if the manager
has a stake in the firm through stock ownership or options, such that his future wealth
depends on the value of the firm. In that case the announcement of a repurchase plan,
as well as repurchase executions, signals information about the private benefits for the
manager to indulge in suboptimal investments. If the private benefit from using cash on
negative net present value projects is lower than his benefit from increasing the value
of the firm, he will support the initiation of a repurchase program as well as execute
repurchases instead of wasting cash that would lower the value of the firm and his own
wealth. Thus, future research may try to examine more closely the relationship between
the ownership composition in firms as well as how this relates to the signalling effect of
repurchase announcements, and the future value of the firm.
A related issue which is not studied in the repurchase essays is whether the re-
purchase executions that are observed ex post were intended ex ante. In other words,
firm specific or market wide events occurring after the announcement of the program
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may change the motivation for why firms in general execute repurchases. One example
are large negative market movements that induce firms to repurchase to e.g. stabilize
their stock prices. On recent example was the large drop in prices after the terrorist
attacks in the US in 2001 which spurred a huge increase in the initiation of repurchase
programs as well as actual repurchases. Although the huge increase in repurchases dur-
ing this period was partly due to the Securities and Exchange Commission suspending
regulations with respect to daily volume restrictions on repurchases, similar bursts in
repurchase activity is found for Norway as well. In addition, findings in other studies
(Stephens and Weisbach, 1998) suggest that negative price movements seem to trigger
repurchases. However, more interestingly, firm specific events which were not antici-
pated by the managers at the announcement date may also affect whether the firm go
through with repurchases or not. This is an important and interesting issue since an-
nouncing firms are likely to “self select” into being repurchasers or non-repurchasers. In
the paper I find that the time between the announcement of the program and the initial
repurchase executed by the firm is on average about 200 days (median 169 days). This
indicates that the initiation of the program is not intended for immediate use, but rather
to provide an option to the managers to execute repurchases when the circumstances
are favorable or help provide liquidity to the marketplace. On the other hand, some
firms execute repurchases very soon after the program announcement while about 40%
of the firms do not repurchase at all. Thus, an interesting extension of the project would
be to try to model the repurchase decision after the announcement of the repurchase
programs to determine what are the main decision variables.
Second, several studies suggest that ownership structure may be important for eco-
nomic performance and the value of the firm. Although the empirical results on this
issue are ambiguous, several studies find that ownership structure matters for economic
performance. In a study for the Norwegian market, Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) find
that insider ownership creates value while ownership concentration destroys value. Thus,
if open market repurchases change the ownership composition in firms, or firms with
certain ownership constellations are more likely to initiate repurchase programs, this
may be important for the economic performance of these firms.
A final research topic with respect to repurchases relates the two last papers to
microstructure issues. As suggested by Barclay and Smith (1988), the initiation of
a repurchase program may increase the spread in the market since the probability of
trading with an informed investor increases. Initially, this may be related to a higher
probability of trading with the firm itself which increases the adverse selection compo-
nent of the spread. An interesting topic for future research would be to combine the
detailed intraday data used in chapter 3 with the data used in the two last essays to
examine whether there is a effect on the adverse selection component of the spread after
a firm announces a repurchase plan. In addition, it may be possible to track the actual
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repurchase executions in the intraday data to examine in more detail how the market
reacts to the trading activity of an potentially informed trader, the firm.
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Chapter 2
Equity Trading by Institutional
Investors: Evidence on Order
Submission Strategies
Written with Randi Næs 1
Abstract
The trading volume channelled through off-market crossing networks is growing.
Passive matching of orders outside the primary market lowers several components
of execution costs compared to regular trading. On the other hand, the risk of non-
execution imposes opportunity costs, and the inherent “free riding” on the price
discovery process raises concerns that this eventually will lead to lower liquidity
in the primary market. Using a detailed data set from a large investor in the US
equity markets, we find evidence that competition from crossing networks is con-
centrated in the most liquid stocks in a sample of the largest companies in the US.
Simulations of alternative trading strategies indicate that the investor’s strategy of
initially trying to cross all stocks was cost effective: in spite of their high liquidity,
the crossed stocks would have been unlikely to achieve at lower execution costs in
the open market.
1The article is published in Journal of Banking & Finance 27 (2003) 1779-1817.
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2.1 Introduction
There is currently a plethora of venues for trading US equities. Some fit the needs of
small retail investors while others are more suited for the needs of large institutional
investors and portfolio managers.2 Using a detailed data set from a large institutional
investor, we investigate the nature of competition between a principal exchange and
one particular type of alternative trading system, the crossing network. A crossing
network is a satellite trading place: it uses prices from the primary market and merely
matches quantities. Passive matching of orders implies that several components of
execution costs are low compared to regular market trading: commissions are lower and
there are no spread costs or direct price impact costs. On the other hand, traders are
not guaranteed execution in the network, and this may lead to significant opportunity
costs. In addition, the execution probability may or may not be associated with adverse
selection costs, depending on the type of traders in the crossing network.3 Finally,
because crossing networks compete for order flow, crossing participants may eventually
incur implicit price impact costs as a result of reduced primary market liquidity. The
largest crossing markets in the US include POSIT (ITG), NYSE crossing session I and
II, and Instinet Global Crossing. In addition, there are less public internal crossing
networks, many of which are the exclusive domains of institutional investors.4
Investigating execution costs associated with different trading methods is of obvious
interest to investors seeking cost effective ways to trade. However, the functioning of
alternative trading systems should also be of interest to academics, regulators and policy
makers responsible for the design of securities markets. The recent success of electronic
2The trading venues can be broadly classified into four groups: (i) the principal exchanges, (ii) the
“over the counter” (OTC) markets, (iii) other exchanges and (iv) alternative trading systems (ATS).
The principal exchanges include the NYSE and the NASDAQ/NNM. The OTC markets includes the
OTC bulletin board and the ”pink sheet” market. The OTC bulletin board is for companies too small to
list on the NNM, and the ”pink sheet” market is an internet quotation service for very small companies
operated by Pink Sheets LLC. Other exchanges include the AMEX, the regional exchanges in Boston,
Philadelphia, Pacific, and Chicago(Midwest), and the Cincinnati Stock Exchange. Finally the ATSs
include Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs), the Arizona Stock Exchange, and external and
internal crossing networks.
3A stated goal of many crossing networks is to keep the identities and trades of their participants
anonymous, both before and after the trades. The following example is taken from the Instinet home-
page: ”With Instinet Global Crossing, the process is anonymous. Pre-trade or post-trade, neither your
trading partner nor other market participants will know your identity, strategy, order size, or residual
size.”
4POSIT is by far the largest crossing market and facilitated the crossing of 7.8 billion shares in 2000
and 9.3 billion shares in 2001. POSIT performs eight daily matches at the price equal to the bid-ask
midpoint of the stock’s primary market at fixed times which are randomized within 5 minutes to avoid
manipulation. The NYSE after hours crossing session I allows participants to submit orders until 5pm
when the orders are matched using the NYSE closing price for each stock. The NYSE crossing session
II is designed to facilitate trading of baskets of at least 15 NYSE securities valued at USD 1 million or
more. Instinet Global Crossing began in 1986 as the first electronic crossing service in the US. Currently,
its operations facilitate “end-of-day crossing” and “VWAP crossing”. The “end-of-day crossing” crosses
orders at the closing price in the primary market, while the “VWAP crossing” is settled before the
opening of the primary market and the participants are guaranteed the VWAP price during the day.
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trading venues has intensified the competition for order flow faced by the traditional
markets. In general, the increase in competition is positive because it lowers execution
costs. Several empirical studies find that transaction costs decreased over the recent
past.5 However, increased competition for order flow has also raised some concerns
related to potentially negative effects from market fragmentation. Mendelson (1987)
shows that market fragmentation has both costs and benefits. The costs are related to
reduced liquidity and increased volatility in each “sub-market”, while the benefits are
related to increased quality of the market price signals. Because crossing networks do
not contribute to price discovery, the potential benefits from better price signals are lost
and only the potential costs from low liquidity and high volatility are left. These costs
might also eventually harm participants in crossing networks through their reliance
on primary market prices. A better understanding of the nature of the competition
between crossing networks and primary markets is clearly called for, including under
what circumstances and for which types of assets crossing networks will coexist with
other markets.
Three recent empirical papers on alternative trading systems are Fong et al. (1999),
Næs and Ødegaard (2000), and Conrad et al. (2001b). Fong et al. (1999) use detailed
data from the Australian stock exchange (ASX) to study the competition between
exchanges and different off-market trading mechanisms, including crossing networks
(POSIT Australia). Off-market trading is found to be concentrated in the most liquid
stocks. The cross-sectional differences in off-market trading seem to be driven by in-
stitutional trading interest (trading volume, index inclusion), primary market liquidity
(spreads, market depth, introduction of closing auction market), and the existence of
a derivative market. Conrad et al. (2001b) study explicit and implicit execution costs
on externally crossed orders, orders sent to ECNs, and broker-filled orders based on
a large data set from the US equity market provided by the Plexus Group.6 Conrad
et al. (2001b) also find that the most liquid stocks are the ones underlying the orders
sent to external crossing systems. Moreover, the average total trade cost is found to
be substantially lower for orders sent to external crossing systems and ECNs than for
orders filled by traditional brokers.
Both papers suggest that crossing networks provide significant competition for order
flow, especially in highly liquid stocks, and considerably lower execution costs than other
trading methods. On the other hand, as hypothesized in Keim and Madhavan (1998)
and Hendershott and Mendelson (2000), informed traders may be present in crossing
networks, offsetting their explicit cost advantage. The existence of adverse selection
costs is hard to detect based on the cost measures used in the empirical literature and
the data typically available to researchers, such as the data from the Plexus Group
5For a survey on research on transaction costs, see Keim and Madhavan (1998).
6The sample consist of 797,068 orders submitted by 59 institutions between the first quarter of 1996
and the first quarter of 1998.
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used in Conrad et al. (2001b). Using a special data set, the relation between execution
probability and adverse selection is studied in Næs and Ødegaard (2000). They find
that, over the month following an attempt at crossing, there is a one percent difference
in risk adjusted returns between stocks that were successfully crossed and stocks that
had to be purchased in the market. This finding is interpreted as evidence that the
benefits of lower costs in crossing networks are mitigated by costs related to adverse
selection.
In this paper, we extend the analysis of Næs and Ødegaard using the same data set.
The data set includes all orders from the establishment of a US equity portfolio worth
USD 1.76 billion over a 6-month period from January 1998 to June 1998. The portfolio
was tracking the US part of the FTSE All World index7, which consists of about 500
stocks, and has a very high correlation with the S&P 500 index. The data set is unique
in that it contains information on the investors’ complete order submission strategy,
including the ex ante trading strategy, the dates on which the decision to trade was
made, and the resulting fill rates of each order for different trading venues. Hence, the
data set is close to a “controlled experiment” which is quite rare.8 The weakness of the
data set is that it is from one trader’s buy orders only and covers a limited period of
time. Both Fong et al. (1999) and Conrad et al. (2001b) have access to huge data sets
on orders and trades and their results are therefore more robust than ours. However,
we show that the investor in our study is quite representative for large institutional
investors in the US markets.
First, we try to investigate the evidence of adverse selection more closely. On the
one hand, the available empirical evidence suggest that crossing networks are competing
in the most liquid stocks. If stocks that are not supplied in crossing networks are less
liquid in general, then these stocks may require a higher return to induce investors to
hold them, and the abnormal performance of the non-crossed stocks found in Næs and
Ødegaard (2000) might be explained (or partly explained) by a liquidity premium.9 On
the other hand, a liquidity and an information story need not be mutually exclusive.
First, in addition to being a proxy for differences in liquidity, a wider spread may also
capture a higher adverse selection component. Furthermore, other measures of liquidity,
such as depth, may also capture the effect that uninformed investors withdraw from the
market if they are worried about being picked off by better informed investors. Thus, a
difference in liquidity between the two groups of stocks may capture the same effect as
7The FTSE All-World index includes 49 different countries and about 2300 stocks. The aim of the
index is to capture up to 90% of the investible market capitalization of each country.
8In many other studies, the exact investment strategy of a trader has to be estimated from the
sequence of trades. This induces a selection bias in the data. It might be that the trader has decided
to send the most difficult orders to brokers and the least difficult orders to crossing networks. We are
not facing a selection bias problem in our data set.
9Amihud and Mendelson (1986) show that risk-adjusted returns for stocks and bonds are increasing
in their illiquidity, where liquidity is proxied by the spread.
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found in Næs and Ødegaard (2000), but by using different proxies for adverse selection.
An interesting question in this respect, is whether the liquidity characteristics are tem-
porary or more systematic over time. Because information asymmetries are expected to
vanish relatively quickly, it would be harder to interpret a systematic liquidity difference
as a sign of adverse selection, especially for the largest companies in the US market. On
the other hand liquidity differences may be more permanent in nature.
We investigate these questions by calculating a whole range of liquidity and activity
measures in the primary market across the groups of stocks that were supplied/not
supplied in the crossing network.10 Our results indicate that the difference in abnormal
return between the two groups of stocks may be explained by both liquidity differences
and private information. On the one hand, we find support for the earlier finding that
crossing networks are competing in the very liquid segment of listed US equities. Stocks
that are successfully crossed are significantly more liquid and more actively traded in
the primary market than stocks that are not crossed. Moreover, we also show that
the differences in liquidity and activity between the two groups of stocks are not date
specific, but rather systematic throughout the entire period examined. On the other
hand, the difference in spread between the groups of stocks is sometimes significant
even though the measures of activity are equal. Following Easley et al. (1996b), this
is evidence of informed trading in the stocks that could not be crossed. In addition,
we show that the stocks in our sample have a very high correlation with the S&P 500
index. It is hard to believe that liquidity differences between the 500 largest and most
liquid companies in the US can explain a difference in abnormal performance between
the two groups of stocks of 1 percent over 20 days.
Second, we want to investigate the costs of following alternative submission strate-
gies. This is done by simulating the set of equilibrium order submission strategies for
liquidity traders in the Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) model. Our simulated strate-
gies are based on real historical price/volume paths of the stocks traded. This is possible
to do because we know the dates when the decision to trade was made in addition to
the desired quantities. The simulations confirm the result that crossed and non-crossed
stocks have different liquidity characteristics. The stocks that are not obtained through
crossing are also the most difficult and expensive stocks to acquire in the market. More
interestingly, we find that the actual crossing strategy was inexpensive. Even though
the crossed stocks were among the most liquid stocks on the NYSE, it would have been
very hard to achieve lower execution costs by submitting limit orders for the same stocks
on the same dates that they were first tried to be crossed.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we describe our data set. We
first give a short description of the investor and the crossing strategy. Then we provide
some descriptive statistics establishing that the investor is indeed representative for the
10We use the crossing success of the Fund as a proxy for supply in the crossing network.
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group of large institutional traders in the US equity market. In section 2.3, we discuss
the relationship between execution probability and several measures of primary market
liquidity. Section 2.4 contains a description of the methodology and results from the
simulation approach. Section 2.5 provides our conclusions.
2.2 The data
Our data set contains transactions data from an actual submission strategy carried out in
the US equities market by a large institutional investor, the Government Petroleum Fund
in Norway (hereafter “the Fund”). To construct liquidity measures and simulate other
submission strategies, we use additional transaction data from the NYSE Trades and
Quotes database (TAQ), which contains all the trades and quotes for stocks listed on the
NYSE, American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and NASDAQ’s National Market System.
In this section, we first give a short description of the Fund and explain the opportunis-
tic crossing strategy in some more detail. We then provide some descriptive statistics
to establish that the Fund is representative for the group of large institutional traders
in the US equity market.
2.2.1 The trading strategy
The Fund is a vehicle for investing the Norwegian Government’s income from petroleum-
related activities in international capital markets. Initially, the Fund was invested in
foreign government securities only. However, new criteria, applying from January 1998,
stated that between 30 and 50 percent of the Fund portfolio was to be invested in
equities. The composition of the Fund portfolio was changed to include equities during
the first half of 1998. We use transaction data for the part of the portfolio that was
invested in US equities during this “buildup”/transition period.
The investment universe for the equity portfolio includes at present 28 countries in
Europe, America, and Asia. US stocks represent around 29 percent of the total stock
portfolio. Benchmark portfolios consist of the companies in the FTSE All-World index
for these countries.11 The US part of the index currently consists of about 480 different
securities. The constituents of this index are the largest companies in the US market,
and the index has a very high correlation with the S&P 500 index.
The equity portion of the total benchmark portfolio was set to 8 percent at the end
of January 1998, and was then increased by another 8 percentage points at the end of
each subsequent month until it reached the benchmark weight of 40 percent in June.
The maximum tracking error restriction implied that the Fund was pre-committed to
buy most of the stocks in the index every month.
11These indices used to be called the FT/S&P’s Actuaries World Index.
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The Fund employed four index managers to establish the portfolio. One of the
index managers was chosen as “transition manager”. The order submission strategy
was as follows: First, try to find sellers among the customers of the transition manager
(internal crossing). If this is not possible, search for counterparties among the customers
of the other three index managers or send the order to an electronic crossing network
(external crossing). Finally, purchase residual orders that cannot be crossed (if any) in
the primary market. According to the discussion in Ruyter (1999), this is the typical
order submission strategy large index managers follow for their customers. Figure 2.1
illustrates the actual implementation of the Fund’s order submission strategy.
Figure 2.1 Implementation of the Fund’s Order Submission Strategy
The Fund’s order submission strategy was as follows: First, try to find sellers among the customers of the
transition manager (internal crossing). If this is not possible, search for counterparties among the customers of
the other three index managers or send the order to an electronic crossing network (external crossing). Finally,
purchase residual orders that cannot be crossed (if any) in the primary market. The figure illustrates the actual
implementation of the order submission strategy followed by the Fund. The overall part of the orders were
crossed internally. All orders were executed within two days after the decision to trade. At some occasions
market trades happened on the same date as internal crosses. We do not know if these orders were sent to
external crossing before they were sent to the market. Hence, it might be that the submission strategy was not
strictly followed with respect to the stage with external crossing. The numbers in parentheses are percent of
total portfolio investment (USD 1 751 billion).
Decision to trade
Day 1
Internal cross
(77%)
External
Cross (8%)
444 8444 76444 8444 76 444 8444 76
Day 2 Day 3
Market trades/
residual orders
(10 %)
Market trades/
residual orders
(5 %)
The total portfolio investment was USD 1751 million. The Fund went to the primary
market with USD 250 million, or 14 percent, of this investment. We do not know what
part of the externally crossed orders that were sent to an electronic crossing network
rather than being crossed with one of the Fund’s index managers. The majority of the
crossed orders, USD 1356 million of USD 1501 million, was executed internally. Market
trades to complete the desired portfolio were needed on three of a total of sixteen trading
dates. Looking at the transactions data, it turns out that at some occasions market
trades happened on the same date as internal crosses. According to the order submission
strategy, these orders should be sent to external crossing before they were sent to the
market. We do not know if this was done. Hence, it might be that the submission
strategy was not strictly followed with respect to the stage with external crossing. The
highest trading volume on one date amounted to USD 300 million, or 17.1% of the total
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portfolio investment. Note that for the period we are considering the Fund was only
buying, not selling securities. For the first two months, crossing prices were set as the
primary market (NYSE/NASDAQ) closing prices that day. For the remainder of the
period, prices were set as the volume weighted average price (VWAP) of trades in the
primary market during the day.
2.2.2 Robustness
Our study is based on the trades of only one institution. It is therefore of crucial
importance that the investor is representative for the group of institutional investors
used in other studies dealing with similar issues.
The Fund used Barclay Global Investor (BGI) as a transition manager. According
to Harris (2002), BGI’s internal crossing network is “probably the largest in the world”.
Hence, both the manager and the private network, where most of the actual crossing
was performed, are representative for the US market.
Most recent empirical studies of institutional investors’ in the US equity market use
data provided by the Plexus Group. These studies include Keim and Madhavan (1995,
1997), Jones and Lipson (1999a,b) and Conrad et al. (2001a,b). The Plexus Group is
a consulting firm that monitors the costs of institutional trading. The data sets used
in Jones and Lipson (1999a,b) are limited to trades executed in some specific firms.
The most relevant samples of institutional investors with which to compare the Fund’s
trades are therefore the ones used in Keim and Madhavan (1995, 1997) and Conrad
et al. (2001b).
Keim and Madhavan (1995, 1997) use data on all equity transactions of 21 insti-
tutional investors from January 1991 through March 1993. This data set contains a
total of 62,333 orders. The institutions vary in size. For fundamental value managers,
the mean dollar value of assets under management was USD 4.8 billion, ranging from
a low of USD 0.7 billion to a high of USD 12.9 billion. For index managers and tech-
nical traders, the mean dollar value of assets under management was USD 3.2 billion
and USD 5.3 billion respectively.12 In the period we are examining, the Fund was an
index tracker, and, at the end of June 1998, the US equity portfolio was worth USD 1.7
billion. Conrad et al. (2001b) have a larger data set from a more recent time period.
Their sample consists of 797,068 orders submitted by 59 institutions between the first
quarter of 1996 and the first quarter of 1998.
If we first look at order size, our median order is for USD 174,000. As table 2.1 shows,
this is slightly larger than the median buy order of USD 138,000 in Keim and Madhavan
(1995, 1997), and much larger than the crossed and ECN filled orders in Conrad et al.
12Fundamental value managers are defined as managers whose investment strategies are based on as-
sessment of long-term fundamental values, technical managers are defined as managers whose strategies
are based on capturing short-term price movements, and index managers are defined as managers who
seek to mimic the returns of particular stock indexes (Keim and Madhavan, 1997).
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Table 2.1
Descriptive statistics for traded securities
In this table, we make a comparison of the data used in this study and in Keim and Madhavan (1995, 1997) and
Conrad et al. (2001b). In our study and in Keim and Madhavan (1995,1997), the numbers are for buyer-initiated
trades only. “Multiple mechanism orders” in the Conrad et al. (2001b) paper are orders in which more than one
of the three trading mechanisms (brokers, ECNs or external crossing systems) are used to fill the order. Market
cap values are in USD billion. “Listed%” is the percentage of total orders that is in listed stocks. “n” is the total
number of orders.
Order size Liquidity
Dollar value No. of shares Market cap Listed n
mean med. mean med. mean med. %
Our study
All orders 386 174 6 898 3 800 16.9 7.5 100 4 200
- Cross 396 177 7 013 3 800 17.6 7.8 100 3 494
- Market order 339 157 6 329 3 550 13.6 6.1 100 706
KM [1995,1997]
All orders 138 4 800 1.1 82.6 36 590
Conrad et al. (2001b)
All orders 723 998
- External cross 187 45 12.8 >90.0 112 159
- ECN’s 194 53 3.0 51 127
- Broker filled 1474 137 11.1 560 712
(2001b). One of the reasons for this may be that the orders routed through ECNs
are generally much smaller than orders routed through crossing networks. The average
dollar value of the Fund’s orders of USD 386,000 is also higher than the average dollar
value of the orders sent to external crossing and ECNs, but considerably lower than the
average dollar value of the orders filled by brokers and multiple order mechanisms.
Since the Fund was tracking the US stocks included in the FTSE All-World index,
the stocks in the sample are obviously the more liquid stocks in the market. The most
liquid stocks in Conrad et al.’s study are the ones underlying the orders sent to external
crossing systems. These securities have an average market cap of USD 12.7 billion,
while the average market cap for the stocks purchased by the Fund was USD 16.9
billion. Hence, the Fund was clearly trading in the larger companies.
One more characteristic with our data set is worth noting. Unlike most other studies,
there is no selection bias in our data set. The Fund did not select what orders to send
to the crossing network and what orders to send to the market based on a perception
of trade difficulty.
2.3 Execution probability and primary market liquidity
In this section, we analyze in detail the relation between the probability of getting a
stock crossed and the liquidity and trading activity in the primary market. This is
possible because we know that the Fund initially tried to cross all the stocks. The data
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set therefore reveals the date and identity of stocks that could not be crossed. Using a
choice theoretic (probit) model on the probability of seeing a stock being crossed, Næs
and Ødegaard (2000) find some evidence that the crossing network is removing trading
volume from the primary market. However, in their model, market liquidity is only
captured by company market values. This is not a particularly informative proxy for
liquidity in our case, since all the stocks in the sample are relatively large.
We find that there are indeed significant differences in liquidity and activity between
the two groups of stocks based on a wide range of liquidity and activity measures.
Moreover, most of the liquidity and activity measures we calculate are significantly
different across the groups of stocks, both on the days when they were first crossed and
for the month prior to and after the actual trading dates. These results are confirmed
in a probit model. After a proper orthogonalization of the independent variables, the
probability of a successful cross is shown to be higher the lower the effective spread,
the higher the liquidity ratio, and the higher the dollar trading volume in the primary
market.
2.3.1 Liquidity measures
Market liquidity is a comprehensive concept that covers several transactional properties
of the marketplace. Harris (1990) defines four interrelated dimensions of the concept:
width, depth, immediacy and resiliency. Width is defined as the bid-ask spread for a
given number of shares, and measures the cost per share of liquidity. Depth is defined
as the number of shares at the bid-ask quotes, immediacy describes how fast a trade for
a given number of shares can be executed, and resiliency describes how fast the price
reverts to its ”true” value after order flow imbalances caused by liquidity trading that
has moved prices temporarily away from the ”true” level. We try to capture the width,
depth and resiliency dimensions by calculating several spread, volume, and volatility
measures.13
Spread measures We consider three measures of the spread to capture the width of
the market. The most commonly used spread measure is the quoted dollar spread. It
measures the average difference between the inside quoted ask and bid for a stock over
the trading day and can be thought of as the absolute ”round trip” cost of trading a small
amount of shares at the inner quotes. The quoted percentage spread is calculated as the
quoted spread relative to the spread midpoint, or the ”true” value, at each trade time.
The effective spread takes into account the fact that trades are often executed inside
(price improvement) or outside the spread (”walking the book”), and is often considered
a more appropriate measure of trading costs than are quoted spreads, especially for large
13A discussion of data issues and the formulas for calculating the different liquidity and activity
measures are provided in appendix A.
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trades.14 The effective spread is calculated as the average absolute dollar difference
between the execution price and the bid/ask midpoint multiplied by two. The spread
measures the handling of a single trade, and does not capture the ability of a market
structure to absorb a series of trades without perturbing prices excessively. We therefore
need to supplement the spread estimates with measures of depth and volatility.
Depth and resiliency To capture market depth and resiliency, we calculate the
average quoted number of shares at the inner quotes and the daily and intraday Amivest
liquidity ratio.15 The daily liquidity ratio reflects the average trading volume that would
be needed to move the price by one percent during a trading day, while the average
intraday liquidity ratio measures the same relationship over 15 minute intervals. A high
liquidity ratio indicates ability of the market to absorb large trades without affecting
the price.16 To get a broader picture of the volume and trading activity in the primary
market across the groups of stocks, we also calculate total shares traded, the dollar
value of shares traded, and the average trade size.
Volatility As an additional liquidity measure we calculate two measures of volatility.
Volatility captures a dimension of liquidity in the sense that high depth at the inner
quotes makes the trade prices less volatile since there is more depth to absorb the liquid-
ity demand. The first volatility measure we calculate is the standard deviation of daily
returns over the 10 days prior to the date when the Fund was trying to cross the stock.
The other measure tries to capture the intraday volatility (15 minute return standard
deviation) in each stock. When interpreting short term volatility, it is important to
keep in mind that the sources of volatility may vary. From the viewpoint of a trader,
high volatility can increase the probability of filling a limit order. This could attract
liquidity suppliers to volatile stocks. However, high volatility may also be associated
with news and informed trading so that the risk of an adverse price movement after
a fill is higher (”pick off risk”). Furthermore, informed trading would also induce the
specialist to increase his spread which would make the trading costs higher. From a
liquidity perspective, high volatility may also be a sign of low liquidity in the sense that
the market is unable to absorb large trades without excessive price movements.
2.3.2 Results
In order to investigate whether stocks that are easy/hard to cross have different liquidity
and activity characteristics, we split the orders into three categories on each sample date:
(i) Crossed stocks: orders in this group were fully crossed, (ii) Cross/Market : orders in
this group could not be fully crossed, and the residual order was purchased in the open
14See for example Angel (1997) and Bacidore et al. (1999).
15Amivest Capital Management introduced this measure of liquidity.
16This ratio is applied in several studies (see e.g. Khan and Baker (1993), Amihud et al. (1997)).
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market the next day, and (iii) Market stocks: orders in this group could not be crossed
at all, and the whole order was therefore purchased in the open market the next day.
A market trade means that the Fund was either “crowded out” by other traders who
wanted to buy the stock or (the rather unlikely case) that the supply of the stock in the
network was less than the size of our order.
Table 2.2 shows the different liquidity measures for the three order categories on
two of the three dates when the Fund was not able to obtain all the required stocks in
the crossing network.17 In table 2.3 we have averaged the liquidity measures in table
2.2 according to the number of stocks traded by the Fund on each date. To examine
whether our sample of stocks differs from the stocks in the S&P 500 index, we calculate
the average liquidity measures for the S&P 500 index over the same dates as well as
for the entire period when the Fund was trading (first half of 1998). For each liquidity
measure, we perform tests for differences in means between the S&P 500 index stocks
and the stocks purchased by the Fund. Except for the quoted percentage spread and the
volatility measures, none of the liquidity measures are significantly different at the 1%
level. Hence, the two samples have quite similar liquidity and activity characteristics.
We also find that the S&P 500 stocks average for the entire half-year is not significantly
different from the S&P 500 stocks average on the particular dates when the Fund was
trading.
The numbers in both tables strongly indicate that stocks that were easy to cross had
lower spread costs than stocks that were hard to cross. The average spread difference
is 22%, which is both economically and statistically significant. Interpreting spreads as
a proxy for liquidity, this means that stocks that could not be crossed were less liquid
than the stocks supplied in the crossing network. The group of non-crossed stocks was
also less liquid measured by the intraday and daily liquidity ratios. Moreover, measured
by the number of trades, the trading volume, and the number of shares traded, the
trading activity was lower in the non-crossed stocks over the entire sample.18 Stocks
that were hard to cross were also more volatile than stocks that were easy to cross. As
we would expect, the liquidity of the stocks underlying the group of orders that were
partly crossed and partly filled in the market lies in between the two other groups.
Using the result in Easley et al. (1996b) that higher spread for stocks with similar
trading volume is an indication of informed trading, our results give some support to
the evidence of informed trading in the crossing network found in Næs and Ødegaard
(2000). On the other hand, if there are systematic differences in liquidity between the
two groups of stocks also on other dates, this would be less supportive to an informed
trading story. To check this, we calculate the liquidity measures on each date across
17We do not report the liquidity measures separately for one of the three days because the number
of orders purchased in the market on this day was too small to perform reliable statistical tests of the
differences between the two groups.
18This difference was insignificant for one of the trading dates, however.
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Table 2.2
Liquidity in the primary market on the trading dates
The table shows different measures of liquidity and activity in the primary market on the dates when the Fund
did not fill all orders in the crossing network. “Crossed stocks” means that the whole order of a stock was crossed.
“Crossed/Market” means that part of the order was crossed and part of the order had to be purchased in the
open market. “Market stocks” means that the stock could not be crossed at all. The calculation and explanation
of the different measures are found in Appendix A. The t-stat and p-value are the test statistics of a two-sided
t-test, where the null is that the mean for the ”Crossed stocks” and ”Market stocks” are equal. Similarly, for
the “Crossed/Market” group, the null is that the mean for the “Crossed stocks” and ”Crossed/Market” stocks
are equal. The test depends on whether the population variances of the two groups are equal or not. If the
variances are equal, then the t-stat is calculated as t = (x¯c − x¯m)/
√
s2(1/nc + 1/nm) where x¯c and x¯m are
the means for the two groups respectively, nc and nm are the number of stocks in each group while s2 is the
pooled standard deviation calculated as s2 = [(nc− 1)s2c +(nm− 1)s
2
m]/[nc+nm− 2], where s
2
c and s
2
m are the
standard deviation of measure for the cross and market stocks respectively. We use the SAS package to perform
all tests. If the variances are significantly different, the standard approximation supplied in SAS is used. For the
Daily volatility measure, we use an F-test to test for differences in variance between the two groups, where the
null is that the ratio of the two sample variances is equal to 1.
DATE 1 S&P 500 Fund Crossed Market Diff. test Crossed/ Diff. test
stocks stocks stocks stocks p-value Market p-value
Spread measures
Effective spread 0.1112 0.1063 0.0931 0.1118** 0.0103 0.0893 0.6514
Quoted USD spread 0.1322 0.1315 0.1135 0.1395** 0.0069 0.0910 0.0969
Quoted% spread (midp.) 0.3270 0.2566a 0.1916 0.2852** <.0001 0.1200* 0.0111
Volume measures
Trades 807 861 1317 575** 0.0002 4985** <.0001
Shares traded (1000) 1180 1274 2039 868** 0.0001 5487** 0.0007
Volume (USD mill.) 61 67 116 39** <.0001 434** <.0001
Trade size (USD 1000) 79 85 88 67** 0.0011 103 0.6159
Liquidity ratios and depth
Daily LR (USD mill.) 117 148 293 76** <.0001 785 0.1221
Intraday LR (USD mill.) 13 16 28 8** <.0001 103 0.0576
Depth at quotes (shares) 1198 1841 2126 1692 0.0965 3351 0.1942
Volatility and return
Daily volatility 0.0275 0.0256a 0.0225 0.0265** <.0001 0.0342** <.0001
Intraday volatility (%) 0.2601 0.2367a 0.2573 0.2296* 0.0307 0.2044* 0.0361
N stocks 454 368 100 261 7
DATE 2 S&P 500 Fund Crossed Market Diff. test Crossed/ Diff. test
stocks stocks stocks stocks p-value Market p-value
Spread measures
Effective spread 0.1174 0.1139 0.1027 0.1327** 0.0082 0.1039 0.7636
Quoted USD spread 0.1396 0.1420 0.1299 0.1605* 0.0445 0.1326 0.5257
Quoted% spread (midp.) 0.3903 0.3375a 0.3255 0.3724* 0.0380 0.3136 0.5391
Volume measures
Trades 737 678 515 692 0.1830 763* 0.0447
Shares traded (1000) 1015 929 847 875 0.8390 1025 0.2390
Volume (USD mill.) 53 48 40 46 0.5469 54 0.1914
Trade size (USD 1000) 68 67 78 66** 0.0065 67 0.0917
Liquidity ratios and depth
Daily LR (USD mill.) 100 101 81 92 0.5182 120 0.0598
Intraday LR (USD mill.) 10 9 8 8 0.9397 11 0.2481
Depth at quotes (shares) 1572 1506 1524 1464 0.7546 1532 0.9676
Volatility and return
Daily volatility 0.0220 0.0263a 0.0250 0.0271** 0.0025 0.0263* 0.0449
Intraday volatility (%) 0.3494 0.3217a 0.3298 0.3220 0.6551 0.3167 0.4233
N stocks 454 478 114 171 193
a Equality of the measure between the S&P 500 and Fund stocks is rejected at the 5% level.
∗ Equality of the measure between the Crossed and Non-crossed stocks (Market stocks) is rejected at the 5% level.
∗∗ Equality of the measure between the Crossed and Non-crossed stocks (Market stocks) is rejected at the 1% level.
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a window stretching from 20 business days before to 20 business days after the actual
trading date. The results are shown in figure 2.2 with the values and tests in table 2.4.
As can be seen from the figure and table there are systematic differences in most of the
liquidity and activity measures. A notable exception is the intraday volatility measure
which is quite similar between the two groups, except on the actual trade date when it
is significantly higher for the crossed stocks. If a market cannot absorb trades without
large price movements, the intraday volatility increases. If this is the reason for the
change in intraday volatility on the trade dates, the stocks that were supplied in the
crossing network did experience a decline in primary market liquidity. Note also that
the quoted depth is significantly higher for the crossed stocks than for the non-crossed
stocks during the days prior to the crossing date, but not significantly different on the
actual crossing dates. These findings are in line with a story where crossing networks
remove order-flow from the primary market.
To investigate the relationship between primary market liquidity and the outcome
of the attempt at crossing the stocks more formally, we estimate a probit model of the
probability of getting a stock crossed as a function of various liquidity measures. More
specifically, we assume that the probability of observing a cross is given by the model
y = Pr (cross) = F (β0 + β1eff spreadi + β2depthi + β3LRi + β4volumei + β5volai + i)
(2.1)
where F(·) is the cumulative normal distribution function, and the β’s are coefficients of
the explanatory variables. Explanatory variables include the effective spread (“eff spread”),
the average depth at the inner quotes (“depth”), the intraday liquidity ratio (“LR”),
the trading volume measured in USD (“volume”), and the standard deviation of daily
returns measured over the last 10 days (“vola”). The total data set contains 646 trans-
actions, of which 214 were crosses.19
The model is estimated on all orders that were either fully crossed or fully filled in the
primary market. The explanatory variables capture many dimensions of primary market
liquidity and trading activity. The effective spread is considered the most appropriate
measure of trading costs or market width. Average depth at the inner quotes is a
frequently used depth measure, see for example Chordia et al. (2001). The intraday
liquidity ratio captures part of the market resiliency dimension, and dollar trading
volume and return volatility capture different aspects of the trading activity.20 The
estimation results are presented in table 2.5.
When interpreting the model, we calculate slope estimates (marginal effects) at the
19We use STATA 7 to estimate the model. The intraday liquidity variable is highly correlated with the
dollar volume of trading. We therefore use orthogonal versions of these two variables in the regression
model.
20We also estimate a multinomial logistic regression model using the same set of explanatory variables,
but with an additional category consisting of the partly crossed orders. Because the results from this
model do not provide any additional insight, we only report the results from the probit model.
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Figure 2.2 Time series average of liquidity and activity measures
The figures show average time series plots of the different liquidity and activity measures. The actual trading
days are aligned at t=0. From the figures there seem to be a systematic difference in both liquidity and activity
over time between the group of stocks that were fully crossed and those that were not crossed at all. Similar
plots of the measures around the separate dates show the same systematic patterns.
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Table 2.5
Probit model estimating determinants of probability of a cross
We estimate a probit model of the probability that a given order is successfully crossed. The probability of
observing a cross is assumed to be given by the model
y = Pr (cross) = F (β0 + β1eff spreadi + β2depthi + β3LRi + β4volumei + β5volai + i)
where F(·) is the cumulative normal distribution function, and the β’s are coefficients of the explanatory variables.
Explanatory variables include the effective spread (“eff spread”), the average depth at the inner quotes (“depth”),
the intraday liquidity ratio (“LR”), the trading volume measured in USD (“volume”), and the standard deviation
of daily returns measured over the last 10 days (“‘ vola”). The total data set contains 646 transactions, of which
214 were crosses. The intraday liquidity variable is highly correlated with the dollar volume of trading. We
therefore use orthogonal versions of these two variables in the regression model. dy
dx
is the slope estimates
(marginal effects) at the means of the regressors. These estimates predict the effects of changes in one of the
explanatory variables on the probability of belonging to a certain trade category.
coefficient std deviation pvalue dy/dx
β0: constant 0.0888 0.1887 0.6380 -
β1: eff spread -4.8483 1.4834 0.0010 -1.7173
β2: depth -0.0002 0.0314 0.9940 -0.0001
β3: LR 0.1926 0.0528 0.0000 0.0682
β4: volume 0.2424 0.5630 0.0000 0.0858
β5: vola -1.4638 3.3163 0.6590 -0.5185
n 646
Wald χ2(5) 27.94
Prob > χ2 0.00
Log likelihood -389.08
pseudo R2 0.05
Observed P 0.33
Predicted P 0.31
(at means)
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means of the regressors (dydx in table 2.5).
21 These estimates predict the effects of changes
in one of the explanatory variables on the probability of belonging to a certain trade
category. Note also that our estimation is simplified by the fact that our data only
contains buy orders; we need not adjust for the direction of trade.
The estimated probit model in table 2.5 confirms the result in 2.3 that the probability
of finding a counterparty in the crossing network is positively related to the liquidity
of the stock in the primary market. The probability of a cross is higher the lower the
effective spread, the higher the intraday liquidity ratio, and the higher the dollar trading
volume in the primary market. This implies that stocks that are easy to cross are also
highly traded in the market and have low costs measured by the effective spread.22
To sum up, our results indicate that the most liquid and actively traded stocks in the
primary market also have the highest probability of being crossed. Our results indicate
that both liquidity differences and private information may explain the difference in ex
post abnormal return between the crossed and non-crossed stocks found in Næs and
Ødegaard (2000). A significant difference in liquidity between the two groups of stocks,
also on other dates than the trading dates, may indicate that investors need a higher
return to hold the non-crossed stocks. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that
liquidity differences between the 500 largest and most liquid companies in the US can
explain a difference in abnormal performance between the two group of stocks of 1
percent over 20 days as found in Næs and Ødegaard (2000).
2.4 Limit order simulation
To judge whether trading in the primary market is more expensive than crossing, we
need additional information on the costs of obtaining the stocks directly in the market.
Since the Fund was trading in the 500 largest and most liquid companies in the US
market, it could well be that a strategy of buying them directly in the market would
have been less expensive than the crossing strategy followed by the Fund.
In this section, we examine the cost of the opportunistic crossing strategy relative
to alternative submission strategies. In addition to a cost comparison, the simulations
allow us to obtain a measure of immediacy. This is an important dimension of liquidity
which is crucial for transaction costs, and which is not directly captured by the measures
used in the previous section.
21For non-linear probability models such as the probit and the logit model, we have that the effects
of changes in one of the explanatory variables will vary with the value of the regressors.
22Market depth and return volatility do not have significant effects on the probability of getting a
stock in the crossing network.
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2.4.1 Literature
Crossing networks There are two theoretical papers on crossing networks; Hender-
shott and Mendelson (2000) and Do¨nges and Heinemann (2001). There is also closely
related literature on the ability of multiple competing trading venues to coexist, see for
example Chowdhry and Nanda (1991), Easley et al. (1996a) and Seppi (1990).23
Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) develop a complex model where different types
of heterogenous liquidity traders and informed traders choose between a competitive
dealer market and a crossing network. There are two types of informed traders: one
type with short-lived information and one type with long-lived information. Short-lived
information cannot be exploited in the crossing network, but traders with long-lived
information can first try trading in the crossing network and then go to the dealer
market if they are not able to cross. Trader strategies are modeled as Nash strategies:
each trader chooses his or her best response given her expectation of all other traders’
strategies.24 The model solution consists of multiple equilibria. All equilibria are char-
acterized by three cutoff values that segment liquidity traders into the following four
(some possible empty) sets of strategies:
• do not trade,
• trade exclusively on the crossing network,
• trade opportunistically in the crossing network, i.e. attempt to trade in the cross-
ing network, and then go to the dealer market if you cannot get an execution in
the crossing network, and
• trade only in the dealer market.
The implications on dealers’ spread from the introduction of a crossing network are
shown to depend on the types of traders in the market. With no informed trading,
the negative “cream-skimming” effect dominates the positive effect of attracting new
order flow. This is because the crossing network has a negative impact on the dealers’
inventory and fixed costs, and because orders going first to the crossing network impose
higher costs on the dealer market than those going directly to the dealer market.25 With
short-lived information, the low order-submission costs ensure that the introduction of
a crossing network will always raise the dealers’ spread. This is because the crossing
network reduces the order flow from liquidity traders without affecting the order flow
23There is an extensive literature on related subjects such as (i) the costs of using electronic com-
munication networks (ECNs) (see Barclay et al. (2001), Barclay and Hendershott (2002), Coppejeans
and Domowitz (1999), Domowitz and Steil (1998)), and Hasbrouck and Saar (2001) and (ii) why some
traders may want to trade outside the primary market (see Easley et al. (1996a) and Seppi (1990)).
24Trading decisions are based on the trader’s reservation value, the spread cost, a crossing commission,
the probability of getting a cross executed, and an impatience factor.
25Order flow sent to the crossing network leaves the dealers with fewer orders to cover the inventory
and fixed costs, leading to higher average costs per order.
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from informed traders. Under most circumstances, the crossing network will also in-
crease dealer spreads when information is long-lived. However, this can be offset if the
crossing network manages to attract sufficient new liquidity traders.
The Do¨nges and Heinemann (2001) model is considerably simpler than the Hen-
dershott and Mendelson (2000) model. Competition for order flow is modeled as a
coordination game. The central variable is the value of trading, or, equivalently, the
disutility from non-executed orders in the crossing network. Three different settings are
analyzed. In the first setting all traders face an identical and certain cost of not getting
an order executed in the crossing network. In this case, there are multiple equilibria
as in the Hendershott and Mendelson model. In the second setting, all traders face an
identical, but unknown cost of non-execution. By introducing private signals on the
value of this cost, a unique equilibrium with market consolidation is shown to exist. Ac-
cording to Dønges and Heinemann, assets with low price volatility and large turnovers
will be traded at a crossing network, while assets with high volatility or small volumes
will be traded at dealer markets. In the third setting, the cost of non-execution is no
longer assumed to be common among the traders. In this case, and provided that the
disutility from non-execution differs sufficiently, there exists a unique equilibrium with
market fragmentation. The two models provide few unambiguous implications. Rather,
they form a framework for discussing important questions.
Limit order simulations The probability of non-execution is a central variable for
both limit orders and orders submitted to a crossing network, especially for investors who
are precommited to trade. Much cited papers on the modeling of execution probability
and execution time of limit orders are Angel (1994), Lo et al. (2002), and Hollifield et al.
(1999).26 Angel (1994) derives closed form solutions for the probability of limit order
execution when orders arrive according to a Poisson process and prices are discrete.
Lo et al. (2002) develop an econometric model of limit order execution times using
survival analysis and estimate it using actual limit order data. Hollifield et al. (1999)
also develop, estimate, and test an econometric model of a pure limit order market.
Their model describes the tradeoff between the limit order price and the probability of
execution.
There are also several interesting empirical papers on the use of limit orders. Cho
and Nelling (2000) investigate the probability of limit order executions for a selection of
stocks at the NYSE. They find that the probability of execution is higher for sell orders
than for buy orders, lower when the limit price is farther away from the prevailing
quote, lower for larger trades, higher when spreads are wide and higher in periods of
26There is also an extensive theoretical literature on the effect of limit orders on the price discovery
process as well as the relative profitability of limit orders compared to market orders. Important contri-
butions include Foucault (1999), Glosten (1994), Easley and O’Hara (1992), Parlour (1996), Chakrevarty
and Holden (1995), Seppi (1997).
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higher volatility. In addition, they find that the longer a limit order is outstanding,
the less likely it is to execute, and that limit orders tends to be submitted at the bid-
ask midpoint. Examining order flow and limit order submission strategies in a pure
limit order market (the Paris Bourse), Biais et al. (1995) find that traders’ limit order
strategies depend on the market conditions: traders submit more market orders when
spreads are narrow and submit more limit orders when spreads are wide, as shown by
Angel (1994). Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) compare the performance of limit orders
relative to market orders using the TORQ database. They find that limit orders placed
at the quotes or further into the market outperform market orders when the spread is
larger than the tick size. They therefore argue that limit orders in some cases can reduce
execution costs compared to market orders. Handa and Schwartz (1996) approach the
problem from a different angle by examining the performance of limit orders versus
market orders by “submitting” hypothetical limit orders on the actual price paths of the
thirty Dow Jones Industrial firms traded on the NYSE. Since they are using simulations,
they can also evaluate the cost of non-executed limit orders. Their main finding is that
non-execution costs are positive, but not always significant.
2.4.2 Simulation design
We base our simulations on the strategies followed by the liquidity traders in the Hender-
shott and Mendelson (2000) model, ignoring the ”no trade” category. The first strategy,
opportunistic crossing, is the actual strategy followed by the Fund. The second strategy,
pure cross, is the case where the trader only submit orders to the crossing network. In
this case, the trader has a low demand for immediacy/liquidity.
The third strategy is the case where the orders are only submitted to the market.
Orders submitted to the market can be market orders or limit orders. An uninformed
investor such as the Fund would generally prefer the lower costs and lower execution
probability associated with limit orders to the immediacy provided by market orders. On
the other hand, orders that are worked into the market may help reducing transactions
costs. Domowitz (2001) shows that when the trader is ”monitoring the book”, and
thus strategically searching for liquidity and favorable execution possibilities, a market
order strategy (working the order) may reduce transaction costs considerably and reduce
the price impact cost for large orders. Angel (1997) shows that about 30 percent of the
market orders submitted through the SuperDot system experienced a price improvement
of about USD 0.04 per share.
The best way to simulate a market order strategy would probably be to set up and
estimate a dynamic model that minimizes transaction costs given the stock and market
characteristics at the time of submission, such as the order flow, the depth of the limit
order book, the volatility etc. The realism of such an ex post optimized strategy would
be very hard to judge, however. Moreover, an “in sample” optimized strategy based on
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data from a limited period of time have restricted interest “out of sample”. Due to the
obvious difficulties in constructing a market order simulation taking into account the
plethora of strategic decisions involved, we restrict our analysis to simulating different
limit order strategies. In this way, we get an interesting additional liquidity statistic
and a realistic “lower bound” on the implicit execution costs of alternative submission
strategies in the primary market.27
The closest proxy to a market order strategy in our simulations is a marketable limit
order strategy (MLO). A MLO strategy is a limit order strategy that is more aggressive
(”in to the market”) than an ”at the quote” (ATQ) limit order strategy. The main
difference between an ATQ and MLO strategy is that the limit price is set at the bid
and ask prices respectively. The higher limit price of the MLO strategy increases the
execution probability and speed relative to an ATQ strategy. However, this increased
immediacy may come at a cost.28
Note that both limit orders and crossing orders have a potentially costly adverse
selection component. From the buyer’s perspective, a limit order is filled when there is
adverse price movement and not filled when the stock value increases. Both cases may
or may not be due to new information. Similarly, the probability of being a successful
buyer in a crossing network increases with the number of investors on the selling side
of the market. As for limit orders, if there are informed investors (with long-lived
information) in the crossing network, the execution probability of a buy order decreases
if the information is positive.29
Limit order simulations All limit order submissions are simulated using the same
stocks and dates that applied when the Fund first tried to cross the orders. The first
limit order simulation (LO1) is identical to the simple simulation strategy in Handa and
Schwartz (1996), i.e. we do not take into account the actual order sizes traded by the
Fund. In other words, we assume that only one share is traded in each stock. At the
beginning of each crossing date, a limit order is submitted with a limit price equal to
the opening bid-quote (”at the quote” limit order strategy) for each stock that the Fund
tried to cross. If a trade with a price lower than the limit order price is observed during
the day, the order is assumed to be filled. If an order is not filled, we assume that it
is executed at the opening price the next day. Thus, we implicitly assume an investor
27As noted by Lo et al. (2002), there will be a general bias in favor of early execution of simulated
limit orders compared to actual limit orders. Moreover, the simulation does not track where in the
limit order queue our order is at any point in time, only the price priority. This probably affects the fill
rate and execution time of the orders in favor of the simulated orders compared to actual limit order
execution.
28The cost differential between the two types of strategies may vary over time depending on market
conditions. The execution probability of a marketable limit order is likely to be lower in a bear market
relative to a bull market.
29Næs and Ødegaard (2000) find evidence that the Fund was “crowded out” by informed investors on
the same side of the market.
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who is pre-committed to trade the stocks. During the transition period, the Fund was
tracking an index with a limit on the relative volatility between the transition portfolio
and the benchmark. Thus, even though the trades probably could have been worked
more carefully into the market the next day, the penalty for unexecuted orders which
follow from our assumptions is not completely unrealistic. Because we are ignoring order
size, the first limit order simulation constitutes a lower bound on transaction costs.
In the second simulation (LO2), we split the actual order size into suborders. The
number and size of the suborders are determined by the average order size traded in the
stock at t−1. In addition, we have one residual suborder of a smaller size (if necessary).
All the suborders are assumed to be submitted sequentially. Thus, at the beginning of
the trading day, the first suborder is submitted as an ”at the quote” limit order. A
suborder is assumed filled if the observed execution price is less than the limit-price
without taking into account the size of the suborder. When a suborder is filled, the
next suborder is submitted at the bid quote following the fill (”chasing the market”).
Unfilled orders are assumed to be executed at the opening price the next day.30
The third limit order simulation (LO3) is the most realistic because here we also
take into account the size of the suborders. The strategy is similar to LO2 except
that we also examine whether the size of the suborder is less than or equal to the size
of the actual order executed in the market. A suborder is only assumed filled if the
observed execution price is less than the limit price and the size is equal to or larger
than the size of our order. Due to price priority, our hypothetical order would under
most circumstances execute before the observed trade since our order would be the last
in the queue at our limit price.
A problem with this type of simulation is that the hypothetical orders most likely
would have changed the structure of the market in the stocks if they had actually
been submitted. Furthermore, Lo et al. (2002) note than the results from simulations
with actual limit-order data underestimate the execution times in a real world trading
situation. The execution time for a real limit order is a function of the order size,
the limit price and the current market conditions, and a trader would generally vary
the order submission strategy based on current and expected market conditions. Such
factors are obviously very hard to capture in a simulation approach like ours. On the
other hand, we do know the order sizes of the actual strategy and we do take these into
account in the LO2 and LO3 simulations, which probably reduces the bias.
Pure crossing simulation A pure crossing strategy is defined as a strategy where the
trader only trades in the crossing network. According to Hendershott and Mendelson
(2000), the low liquidity preference traders who would follow this type of strategy are
most likely to benefit from the existence of a crossing network. To simulate this strategy
30The unexecuted orders are assumed submitted to the pre-trade auction without affecting the opening
price.
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we use the actual price data for the stocks that the Fund was able to cross. For the
stocks that the Fund was not able to cross, we assume crossing over the next 10 days.
Hence, the opportunity costs are simulated, but the identity of stocks that could not be
crossed are not. The choice of a 10-day trading window for calculating the opportunity
costs is based on the statistics on order fills in Conrad et al. (2001b): the 95th percent
confidence interval for getting an order filled in an external crossing system is reported
to be 10 days. Thus, on each crossing date we take the stocks that did not cross and
assume that they were crossed over the next 10-day period to the equally weighted close
price over the 10-day period.
2.4.3 Measuring trading costs
In order to compare the performance of different submission strategies we must apply a
measure of transaction costs. Current empirical academic literature on transaction costs
are to a large degree based on versions of a theoretical measure which was first proposed
by Treynor (1981) and which Perold (1988) later called the implementation shortfall.
The implementation shortfall is defined as the difference in performance between the
portfolio of actual trades and a matching paper portfolio in which the stock returns are
computed assuming that the trades were executed at the prices prevailing on the date
of the decision to trade. In this way, both explicit cost components such as brokers fees,
and implicit components such as spread costs, price impact costs, and costs related to
delayed or uncompleted trading (opportunity costs) are captured. The approach also
overcomes the problem of measuring costs on an individual trade basis when the order
consists of a package of sub-trades 31. Keim and Madhavan (1998) and Conrad et al.
(2001b) suggest an empirical version of the implementation shortfall approach:
total cost = explicit cost+ implicit cost
=
{
commission per share
Pd
}
+
{
[αPaPd + (1− α)
Pd+x
Pd
] − 1
} (2.2)
where Pd is the closing price for the stock on the day before the decision to trade, Pa
is the average price for all the executed trades in the order, α is the fill rate, and Pd+x
is the closing price x number of days after the decision date, i.e. the unfilled portion of
an order is assumed settled x days after the decision date.
We use the same measure as in Conrad et al. (2001b), except that we assume that
the non-crossed orders in the pure crossing strategy are settled at the average of the
closing prices over the x days after the decision date. In addition, since we cannot easily
get good estimates for the explicit costs related to the trades that we simulate, the cost
31Much of the relevant research on the measurement of transaction costs is summarized in Keim and
Madhavan (1998)
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comparison is made on the basis of implicit costs only. Thus, our cost comparison is not
based on total execution costs. A more serious problem is related to the limited number
of trading days in our data set. The implicit cost estimate is intended to account for
the price impact of orders. However, the price difference between Pa and Pd will also be
affected by general market movements between the two observation times. Essentially,
the measure assumes that the main source of price impact is our order. When we look
at averages for trades on many different dates, this is not a big problem, because the
market movement will tend to wash out in the average32. However, if we look at trades
concentrated on a few dates, the general market movements at these dates will affect
the measured costs. As we shall see, this is a particular problem for the market orders
in our data set because they are concentrated on only three days.
Empirical studies document that the magnitude of different cost components vary
with factors such as order size, intraday timing of the trade, stock liquidity, market
design and investment style. Hence, to measure costs properly, detailed data on the
entire order submission process is required. For the actual submission strategy followed
by the Fund, we have access to such data. For the simulated strategies, however, the
results will necessarily be driven to some extent by our own assumptions.
2.4.4 Results
For the orders that were executed on the day following the initial attempt at internal
crossing, the total cost should be decomposed into one component associated with the
delay of the order in the internal crossing network, and one component associated with
the final execution in an external crossing network or in the primary market. Table 2.6
decompose the implicit costs for the Fund’s order submission strategy into these two
components.
Including the delay costs, the average implicit cost for all crossed orders was 0.11
percent, and the average implicit cost for all market orders was -0.74 percent. This
implies an average implicit cost for all orders of -0.03. Some care should be taken
when interpreting the negative implicit costs for the market orders. Because the orders
purchased in the primary market are concentrated on three trading days only, the cost
estimates are quite sensitive to the market movements on these days. Ignoring the delay
component, the average implicit cost for all market orders was about 0.25 percent. The
Fund incurred delay costs for market orders on one occasion. The market went markedly
down on this day, leaving the Fund with an implicit delay cost for the non-crossed orders
of -1.79 percent. Because the non-crossed orders had to be bought in the market on the
following day, an average additional cost of 0.48 percent was incurred, giving a total
implementation shortfall cost of -1.31 percent.
32Keim and Madhavan (1997) show that the average daily return on stocks is small compared to the
price impact from a trade.
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Measured over some time, the daily market movements are small compared to the
price impact costs, as shown in Keim and Madhavan (1997). Hence, for large samples,
adjusting for daily market returns does not make much difference. However, in our
case, the cost measure is likely to be largely driven by the market movement. Keim and
Madhavan (1997) argue that one should not try to adjust for market movements because
they are a part of the timing cost for the order submission strategy. If so, the average
implicit cost associated with the delay of orders in the private internal crossing network
of -0.121 percent should be interpreted as a negative timing cost. On the other hand,
the fact that the drop in market values on one of the trading days was large enough to
have a significant effect on the total implementation shortfall cost of the actual strategy,
suggests that the true costs of opportunistic crossing may be underestimated.
What the discussion above highlights most of all is that cost measures based on
the implementation shortfall over a few days should be interpreted with great caution.
Due to the non-synchronous nature of the Fund’s market trades relative to the close-
to-close returns on the SP 500 index, a correct adjustment for the market movement
would involve the actual timing of the trades during the day as well as the intraday
SP 500 returns. None of which are easily obtainable. What we want is to set up a
horse race between the opportunistic crossing strategy and certain alternative order
submission strategies. If the alternative strategies cannot beat the strategy when the
negative delay costs are excluded, they surely cannot beat the strategy when these costs
are included. In Table 2.7, we have therefore compared the estimated execution costs
for the simulated strategies with the actual average execution costs excluding the delay
costs.33 That is, all cost estimates in the table are in percent of the closing price on the
day before the trade.34
Examining the execution costs for the simulated strategies in table 2.7, we find
that neither the pure crossing strategy nor the two first limit order strategies (LO1
and LO2) have significantly different execution costs from the opportunistic crossing
strategy. Thus, not even the most simplistic and unrealistic limit order simulation
(LO1), which constitute our ”lower bound” on primary market execution costs, is able
to significantly beat the opportunistic crossing strategy. The most realistic limit order
strategy (LO3) is significantly more expensive than the opportunistic crossing strategy,
with costs of about 0.24 percent. In addition, we have not taken into account that the
explicit costs in crossing networks are lower than in the primary market. Hence, the
total execution costs would overwhelmingly favor the opportunistic crossing strategy, or
potentially the pure crossing strategy.
33What we ignore, however, is that the high volatility in the market at this particular day may have
affected the outcome with respect to what stocks we were able to achieve in the crossing networks, as
suggested in Domowitz (2001).
34Næs and Ødegaard (2000) also estimate the explicit costs for the Fund’s strategy. The equally
weighted average explicit costs for all orders were 3 percent. For the crossed orders and the non-crossed
orders, the explicit costs were 3 percent and 5 percent respectively.
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Table 2.6
Decomposition of the implicit costs for the opportunistic crossing strategy
Estimates of the average implicit costs for the opportunistic crossing strategy are decomposed into (i) the average
implicit cost excluding the costs associated with the delay of orders, (ii) the average delay cost, and (iii) the
average implicit cost including the delay cost, i.e. the average implicit implementation shortfall cost. The two
last columns show respectively the number of trading days and the number of stocks traded for each type of
orders.
Average implicit costs Costs ex delay Delay costs Impl. shortfall Days Stocks
All orders 0.088 -0.121 -0.033 16 4 517
Crossed orders 0.055 0.056 0.111 15 3 767
Non-crossed orders 0.254 -0.998 -0.744 3 750
Delayed orders:
All delayed orders 0.018 -0.620 -0.603 3 865
Delayed crossed orders -0.415 0.465 0.049 2 447
Delayed non-crossed orders 0.483 -1.787 -1.304 1 418
Table 2.7
Estimates of implicit costs for different trading strategies - pre-trade benchmark
The table shows the execution cost estimates for four alternative submission strategies in addition to the original
strategy (Opportunistic Cross). The estimates are based on the implementation shortfall methodology. The
second strategy in the table, Pure cross, is the result of a hypothetical strategy where we assume that the entire
residual order would have been crossed in equal amounts over the 10 days after the decision to trade. We split the
non-crossed part of the order into 10 equal orders, each one of which is assumed crossed at the closing price each
of the 10 days. The three last strategies in the table show the implicit cost estimates for the three submission
strategies in the primary market. The first limit order strategy (LO1) is the most passive strategy which assumes
that limit orders are submitted at the opening bid (”At-the-quote” limit order strategy), ignoring order sizes
(no sub orders) as in Handa and Schwartz (1996). Whenever we observe a trade at our limit price or better,
we assume the entire order is filled at that price. The second limit order strategy (LO2) assumes that limit
orders are submitted sequentially at the prevailing bid following the filling of a suborder (”chasing the market”).
However, in this case we ignore the size of each suborder. The third limit order strategy (LO3) is the most
realistic strategy where all limit orders (also suborders) are submitted sequentially at the prevailing bid following
the filling of a suborder as for LO2, but this simulation also takes the size of each suborder into account when
evaluating the fill. If we observe a trade that is larger or equal in size to our order, we assume that our order
would have been filled at that price. If there is a fill, the next suborder is submitted at the following bid. For all
strategies, we assume that the remaining/unfilled part of an order is bought at the opening price the next day.
Numbers in bold are estimates that are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. For each strategy and
original group of stocks, tests of difference in means between the original submission strategy and the respective
strategies are performed where ∗∗ indicates a significant difference in implicit costs at the 1% level.
Implicit costs Opport. Cross Pure Cross LO 1 LO 2 LO 3
EW
All orders 0.0879 0.1443 0.0626 0.1303 0.2435∗∗
Crossed orders 0.0553 0.0553 -0.0147∗∗ 0.0520 0.1729∗∗
Non-crossed orders 0.2536 0.5867 0.4317∗∗ 0.5048∗∗ 0.6143∗∗
VW
All orders 0.2028 0.2534 0.0836 0.2849 0.3885
Crossed orders 0.1837 0.1837 0.0141 0.2007 0.3025
Non-crossed orders 0.3101 0.5867 0.4298 0.6615 0.7892
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An additional choice variable for an investor is the aggressiveness of the limit order.
In figure 2.3, we have plotted the implicit costs for the three limit order strategies
LO1, LO2 and LO3 assuming more or less aggressive limit prices. In addition, the
figure includes the implicit cost (ex delay costs) of the opportunistic crossing strategy
(straight line across all aggressiveness levels). The ATQ limit order strategy is at 0 on
the x-axis (indicating that the limit price is 0 ticks away from the opening bid). The
MLO strategy is located between 1 to 3 ticks away from the bid, depending on the
spread and tick sizes of the different stocks at the time of submission. An interesting
observation in figure 2.3 is that the LO1 line forms a lower bound on execution costs.
In addition, we see that the implicit costs across all strategies and aggressiveness levels
reaches a minimum around 0 and 1 ticks away from the opening bid. This is in line
with the results in Harris and Hasbrouck (1996), that limit orders generally are cheaper
than market orders. More specifically, they find that when the spread is larger than one
tick, limit orders placed in the market (improving the best bid or ask) perform better
with respect to costs. Furthermore, Cho and Nelling (2000) show that the majority of
limit orders are in fact submitted at the bid-ask midpoint.
Figure 2.3 Limit order simulation for varying aggressiveness levels.
The figure shows the implicit costs of the three types of limit order simulations we perform (LO1, LO2 and LO3)
for varying aggressiveness levels, where aggressiveness is measured in ticks relative to the ”at the quote” limit
order strategy. A limit order aggressiveness of 0 indicates that the limit order price is set at the opening bid
price. An aggressiveness larger (lower) than 0 means that the limit order price is set x number of ticks higher
(lower) than the opening bid price. The horizontal line shows the implicit cost of the opportunistic crossing
strategy excluding delay costs.
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By looking more carefully at the crossed/non-crossed groups, we find that the non-
crossed stocks have the highest execution costs regardless of submission strategy. In
the previous section, we found that stocks that are not supplied in the crossing network
are less liquid than stocks that are easily crossed. The higher execution costs for these
stocks support this finding: these stocks are also the most difficult to fill in the primary
market. Note also that the opportunity costs constitute a large part of the execution
costs for orders in these less liquid stocks. Since unfilled limit orders generally are for
stocks that rise in value, these orders are penalized by the execution at the opening
price the next day. This result, together with the high costs found for the pure crossing
strategy, supports the finding in Næs and Ødegaard (2000) that the stocks bought in
the market had a high ex post return.
Overall, our results strongly favor the opportunistic crossing strategy as a cost-
effective submission strategy, especially when the difference in explicit costs between
the crossing network and primary market is taken into account. Furthermore, it is
important to recognize that the orders examined here are for the most liquid and largest
companies in the US. Thus, even the stocks with the potentially lowest execution costs
in the primary market would have been cheaper to obtain in the crossing network.
In table 2.8, we have calculated the fill rates for all orders in panel (a), and the
fill rates across groups of orders in panel (b). The execution times (in minutes since
open) for the simulated strategies are shown in panel (c). As expected, the fill rate
decreases and the execution time increases as we impose more restrictions on the limit
order strategy. It is interesting to note that the fill rates across groups of stocks in panel
(b) are higher for the non-crossed orders than for the crossed orders. Thus, even though
the fill rate is higher for the non-crossed stocks, the execution costs are higher. This
indicates that the stocks in the non-crossed group that were not filled in the limit order
simulation had a very high opportunity cost. This result provides further support to
the information hypothesis in Næs and Ødegaard (2000).
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we use data from an actual order submission strategy using crossing
networks to investigate execution costs and primary market liquidity. The data includes
all orders from the establishment of a US equity portfolio worth USD 1.76 billion in the
period from January 1998 to June 1998. The investor in our study was following an
“opportunistic” crossing strategy, meaning that an attempt was made to cross all stock
orders initially, and residual orders were purchased in the open market. Because we know
the identity of stocks and timing of stock orders that failed to be executed in the crossed
network, we can investigate whether stocks that are supplied in crossing networks and
stocks that can only be traded in the market have systematically different characteristics.
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Table 2.8
Fill rates and order execution time for different trading strategies
Panel (a) shows the fill rates for the different strategies with respect to the total number of shares and the number
of orders filled. Panel (b) shows the fill rates across the groups of crossed/non-crossed stocks. Panel (c) shows
the average execution time (in minutes) for the entire strategy with respect to the opening time of the market
(minutes since open). The numbers in parenthesis are the average execution time of the orders (minutes since
submission). For the opportunistic and pure crossing strategies these numbers are ignored since they are over
several days. For LO1, the measure of ”minutes since open” and ”minutes since submission” is equal because
only one order is submitted for each stock.
(a) Fill rates for submission strategies
Opport. Cross Pure Cross LO1 LO2 LO3
Orders
Filled (%) 83.2% 100.0% 85.6% 71.9% 65.1%
Not filled (%) 16.8% 0.0% 14.4% 28.1% 34.9%
Submitted orders 3909 3909 3909 11864 11289
Filled orders 3316 3909 3346 8528 7347
Unfilled orders 594 0 563 3336 3942
Shares
Filled (%) 84.8% 100.0% 88.5% 49.7% 42.5%
Not filled (%) 15.2% 0.0% 11.5% 50.3% 57.5%
Shares in submitted orders 26776710 26776710 26776710 26776710 26776710
Shares in filled orders 22714683 26776710 23693158 13303893 11372729
Shares in unfilled orders 4070060 0 3083552 13472817 15403981
(b) Fill rates across groups
Opport. Cross Pure Cross LO1 LO2 LO3
Orders
Cross group:
Filled (%) 83.2% 100.0% 84.8% 70.9% 64.0%
Not filled (%) 16.8% 0.0% 15.2% 29.1% 36.0%
Non-crossed group:
Filled (%) 100% - 89.7% 76.3% 70.2%
Not filled (%) 0 - 10.3% 23.7% 29.9%
Shares
Cross group:
Filled (%) 84.8% 100.0% 88.1% 48.9% 41.5%
Not filled (%) 15.2% 0.0% 11.9% 51.1% 58.5%
Non-crossed group:
Filled (%) 100% - 90.5% 53.6% 47.7%
Not-filled (%) 0 - 9.6% 46.4% 52.3%
(c) Execution time (minutes)
Opport. Cross Pure Cross LO1 LO2 LO3
Mean - - 30 (30) 42 (22) 71 (38)
Median - - 7 (7) 9 (5) 24 (10)
Minimum - - 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Maximum - - 389 (389) 390 (390) 390 (390)
First quartile - - 3 (3) 4 (1) 7 (1)
Third quartile - - 19 (19) 31 (14) 80 (34)
Standard deviation - - 67 (67) 80 (56) 102 (73)
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In addition, the costs of alternative, more traditional, submission strategies can be
estimated and compared.
By calculating several measures of liquidity for the different groups of stocks in the
data set, we show that there are significant differences in liquidity between stocks that
are crossed and stocks that have to be bought in the market. For one trading date,
spreads were significantly different even though the trading volume in the two groups of
stocks was similar. According to the market microstructure literature, this might be an
indication of informed trading in the stocks that could not be executed in the crossing
network, a result which is also suggested in Næs and Ødegaard (2000). We also find,
however, that there are systematic differences in liquidity between the two groups of
stocks on other dates than the trading dates of the actual crossing strategy. This result
suggests that there are systematic differences in the characteristics of the two groups of
stocks that are not related to private information.
To evaluate the performance of the actual crossing strategy against other submission
strategies, we perform limit order simulations on transactions data from the NYSE. The
simulations can also be viewed as an additional measure of trading difficulty. The non-
crossed orders turn out to be significantly more expensive than the crossed orders across
all simulations. Hence, the stocks that the Fund could not get in the crossing network
would also have been the most difficult to buy in the market. We also show that it
would have been very hard to beat the actual opportunistic crossing strategy. The
only simulation which gives us a lower implicit cost estimate is when we completely
ignore the size of our orders. However, the explicit cost differential between the crossing
network and regular market would probably even this difference out. Finally, it should
be stressed that the significant differences found in crossing probability, liquidity and
primary market execution costs are for the 500 largest and most liquid stocks in the US
market.
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2.A Data issues and variable description
Calculation of liquidity and activity measures
To calculate the liquidity statistics in the primary market for all securities traded by the
fund we use the TAQ database (NYSE Trades and Quotes database). However, before
we perform the calculations, the data has to be filtered to remove erroneous records
both in the quotes file and the trades file.
Data issues and filtering
Quotes data
All the spread measures are calculated with respect to the inside quotes (best bid and
ask) reported in the TAQ database between 9:30 and 16:00. There are several filters
applied to ”clean” the data. We mainly use the quote conditions (MODES) in the TAQ
data35 to do this. An observation is removed if one of the following conditions applies;
• Closing quote The last quote from a participant during the trading day (Mode=3)
• News disseminationA regulatory halt when price sensitive news arrives (Mode=4)
• Fast trading Indicating that there is extreme activity (quotes are entered on a
”best efforts” basis) making the time stamps unreliable (Mode=5)
• Order imbalance A non-regulatory trading halt due to large order imbalances
(Mode=7)
• Non-firm quote A regulatory halt when the Exchange is unable to collect, pro-
cess and disseminate quotes that accurately reflect market conditions (Mode=9)
• News pending A regulatory trading halt or delayed opening due to an expected
news announcement (Mode=11)
• Trading halt due to related security A non-regulatory halt used when there
is news related to one security which will affect the trading and price in another
security (Mode=13)
In addition we remove quotes where the bid price is larger than the ask price, quotes
are negative, or the average quoted spread is zero over the trading day. Also quotes
with a price higher than USD 10,000 are removed both due to possible errors as well
as to remove securities with extreme prices which could affect our statistics. Lastly,
when quotes from several different exchanges are reported at the same time (down to
35A more detailed description can be found in the TAQ User Guide which can be downloaded from
the NYSE homepage at http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/marketinfo.html
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the second), we use the lowest ask or highest bid among these as a proxy for the NBBO
(National Best Bid and Offer).
Trades data
The trades reported in TAQ may contain corrections and errors. If so, the record has
a Correction Indicator (Corr) attached to it. The requirement is that a trade must
have a correction value less than 2 (Corr < 2). If Corr=0, then the trade record is a
regular trade that was not corrected, changed, cancelled or was erroneous. If Corr=1,
then the observation was later corrected, but the record contains the original time and
the corrected data for the trade. If Corr > 2, then the record is either out of time
sequence, cancelled due to error or cancelled due to wrong timestamp. Thus, we remove
all records with Corr ≥ 2.
There are also Sale Conditions (Corr) connected to each trade. We apply a filter
removing records with conditions that make the timing and reliability of the records
questionable. A record is removed if one of the following conditions applies;
• Bunched sold A bunched trade not reported within 90 seconds of execution
(Cond=G)
• Sold last A trade reported later than the actual transaction time (Cond=L)
• Opened last An opening trade with delayed reporting (Cond=O)
• Sellers option Delivery date is between 2 and 60 days after the trade (Cond=R)
• Pre- and Post-Market Close Trades A trade that occurred within the current
trading day, but is executed outside of the current market hours (Cond=T)
• Sold sale A transaction that is reported to the tape at a time later than it
occurred and when other trades occurred between the time of the transaction and
its report time (Cond=Z)
• Crossing session NYSE Crossing Session matches (Cond=8 and 9)
After the filtering is performed, we use the remaining quotes and trades to calculate the
following liquidity and activity measures.
Spread measures
Effective spread
The effective spread takes into account the transaction prices (and accounts for the fact
that many trades are executed within the quoted spread due to price improvement).
The number of trades in the security, i, on date, t, is denoted by Ni,t. The index τ
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defines the time of the day when a trade is observed, Pi,τ is the trade price, and bidi,τ
and aski,τ is the bid and ask, respectively, at the time of the trade. The first valid trade
is normalized to τ = 1. Then, for security i on date t, the average effective spread is
calculated as,
ESi,t =
1
Ni,t
Ni,t∑
τ=1
{
2 | Pi,τ −
aski,τ + bidi,τ
2
|
}
The effective spread takes into account the relationship between execution price and
quoted spread, and is often considered a more appropriate measure of trading costs
than quoted spreads, especially for large trades.
Quoted dollar spread
The average quoted dollar spread is defined as the average difference between the inside
quoted ask and bid for a firm over the trading day. The quoted dollar spread is calculated
with respect to each trade observed at time τ. The inner ask and bid is defined as aski,τ
and bidi,τ respectively, and Ni,t is the total number of trades in security i during the
trading day t. Thus, the quoted dollar spread is calculated as,
QSi,t =
1
Ni,t
Ni,t∑
τ=1
(aski,τ − bidi,τ)
Quoted percentage spread
The quoted percentage spread calculates the absolute spread relative to the spread
midpoint at each valid trade record τ. Thus,
RSi,t =
1
Ni,t
Ni,t∑
τ
{
aski,τ − bidi,τ
(aski,τ + bidi,τ)/2
}
Volume and depth measures
It is widely argued that spreads should not be examined in isolation when using it as a
liquidity measure. This is because liquidity shocks both widen spreads as well as reduce
depths. Furthermore, spreads may also widen as a response to adverse selection without
liquidity necessarily decreasing. Therefore, we also look at volume and depth measures.
Trading Volume (Shares)
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The total number of shares traded in security i during day t.
VOL sharesi,t =
Ni,t∑
τ=1
Qi,τ
Trading volume (USD)
The total dollar value of trades during day t in security i.
VOL USDi,t =
Ni,t∑
τ=1
Qi,τ · Pi,τ
Trades
The total number of trades during day t in security i.
Tradesi,t =
Ni,t∑
τ=1
τi
Trade size
The average trade size in USD 1000 on day t in security i.
Trade sizei,t =
VOL USDi,t
Tradesi,t · 1000
Quoted depth
The quoted depth is calculated as average of the quoted bid and ask depths during the
day t in security i,
QDi,t = (q¯
bid
i,t + q¯
ask
i,t )/2
where q¯bidi,t and q¯
ask
i,t is the average depth on the bid- and the ask-side respectively in
security i on day t.
Liquidity ratios and volatility measures
Daily Liquidity Ratio
The Amivest Liquidity Ratio is one type of liquidity measurement which represents the
dollar value of trading associated with a one percent change in the share price. The
liquidity ratio measures the average trading volume necessary to move the price by one
percent during a trading day. We calculate the average daily liquidity ratio over the
10-day period prior to the Fund’s trading date, t0. The daily liquidity ratio for security
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i on date t is thus calculated as,
LR(D)i,t =
1
10
t0−1∑
t=t0−11
VOL USDi,t
|%ri,t|
/1000
where |%ri,t| is the absolute ”midpoint return” over day t calculated using the bid-ask
midpoints at opening and closing to avoid biases with respect to the bid-ask bounce.
VOL USDi,t is the total USD trading volume in security i on date t.
Intraday Liquidity Ratio
To measure liquidity on one date, we also calculate the liquidity ratio using intraday
data. To do this, we first discretisize the data to get a common time frame. Consis-
tent with several other studies we use 15-minute windows, starting from 9:30am until
16:00pm. Thus, we have 26 15-minute intervals during each trading day. During each
interval, denoted by ω, we calculate the midpoint returns using the bid-ask midpoint
price at the beginning (or closest to the beginning) of each window. Thus, ω ∈ [1, 26],
and the average ratio for security i on date t is calculated as,
LR(I)i,t =
1
26
26∑
ω=1
VOL USDi,ω
|%ri,ω|
/1000
where VOL USDi,ω is the total USD volume traded in security i in window ω, and
|%ri,ω| is the 15-minute absolute midpoint return over window ω. Generally, the liq-
uidity ratio measure assumes that there is a linear relationship between the trade size
and price change which is not necessarily the case. In addition, the ratio is positively
correlated with the general price trend in the market and negatively correlated with
volatility.
Average 10-day volatility
Calculates the 10-day average volatility prior to the actual trading date (t0) as,
V(D)i,t =
√√√√ 1
10
t0−1∑
t=t0−11
(ri,t − r¯i)2
where ri,t is the return on day t and r¯i is the average return over the 10-day period
prior to the actual crossing date.
Intraday volatility
When calculating intraday volatility, we use the same discretization as for the intraday
liquidity ratio calculations described above. Thus, we calculate the volatility of 15-
minute returns over the trading day, using the bid-ask midpoint price at the beginning
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of each window, such that,
V(ID)i,t =
√√√√ 1
26
26∑
ω=1
(ri,ω − r¯i,t)2
where ri,ω is the midpoint return over 15-minute window ω, and r¯i,t is the average
return over all windows during trading day t in security i.
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Chapter 3
Order Book Characteristics and
the Volume-Volatility Relation:
Empirical Evidence from a Limit
Order Market
Written with Randi Næs
Abstract
We examine empirically the relationship between the demand and supply schedules
in a limit order book and the volume volatility relation. Several empirical studies
find support for the hypothesis that the volume-volatility relation is driven by the
arrival rate of new information, proxied by the number of transactions. Our results
show that the number of trades and the price volatility are also related to the slope
of the order book. One possible interpretation for this finding is that the slope of
the book is proxying for dispersed beliefs among investors. If so, this would support
models where investor heterogeneity intensifies the volume-volatility relation.
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3.1 Introduction
In this paper, we examine empirically the relationship between the demand and supply
schedules in a limit order book and the volume volatility relation.
A variety of studies document that there is a positive correlation between price
volatility and trading volume for most types of financial contracts including stocks,
Treasury bills, currencies and various futures contracts. The main theoretical explana-
tion for this phenomenon is that new information about asset values acts as the driving
force (or mixing variable) for both market prices and trading volume. Harris (1986) links
this “mixture of distributions hypothesis” to asset pricing theory, and suggests that the
mixing variable is the process that directs the rate of flow of information from system-
atic risk factors into prices and trading volume. However, for many types of financial
contracts, movements in prices seem much “too large” to be attributed to movements
in the fundamental values of the underlying securities.1 A suggested explanation for
this puzzle is that prices do not change merely because of changes in systematic risk
factors and asset payoffs but also because investors have dispersed beliefs about asset
values. This dispersion may be due to asymmetric information or to differences of opin-
ion about symmetric information. In any case, theoretical models by Shalen (1993)
(asymmetric information) and Harris and Raviv (1993) (symmetric information) show
that dispersion of beliefs will intensify the volume-volatility relation, by increasing both
trading volume and volatility.
The theoretical explanations for the volume-volatility relation are hard to test. The
essence of the mixture of distributions hypothesis is that prices adjust to new equilibria
over time as new information is being reflected through trades. Since the arrival rate
of information is unobservable, it is difficult to set up an alternative hypothesis. Sev-
eral empirical studies find support for the explanation under the assumption that the
arrival rate of information can be proxied by the daily number of transactions.2 Since
the daily number of transactions may be driven by factors other than new information,
these studies do not rule out the other explanations for the volume-volatility relation.
Specifying data implications from the models with dispersed beliefs is also very chal-
lenging. Daigler and Wiley (1999) perform an indirect test of Shalen (1993)’s model
and find evidence that uninformed traders contribute to price volatility. Ghysels and
Juergens (2001) measure dispersion of beliefs directly by dispersion of analysts’ earnings
forecasts. They also find that dispersion is positively related to volatility.
The objective of this paper is to broaden our knowledge about the volume-volatility
relation in an electronic limit order market. Since the demand and supply schedules in a
limit order book represent the reservation prices of the liquidity suppliers in the market,
it is interesting to study whether the book contains additional information about the
1A standard reference for the stock market is Shiller (1981).
2See Harris (1987) and Jones et al. (1994)
3.1 Introduction 75
volume-volatility relation. We have access to exceptionally rich transactions data from
the Norwegian equity market in the period from February 1999 through June 2001. The
market operates as a fully automated limit order-driven trading system, and our data
sample enables us to rebuild the full order book at any point in time. We are not aware
of anyone who has investigated this issue with a data set as rich as ours.
Several papers investigating order book data are relevant for our work. Biais et al.
(1995) analyze in detail the interaction between the order book and order flow on the
Paris Bourse. One relevant finding is that the status of the order book is important for
order flows and trading volume. Biais et al. (1995) only have data on the cumulative
trading interest near the inner quotes. We show that the whole order book contains
additional, interesting information. Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000) provide evidence of
a negative relation between the shape of the order book and volatility during a case
of an extreme market movement. However, they do not attempt to investigate this
relation over a longer time period with varying trading conditions. Our data set spans
a relatively long period which included the boom and burst of the internet bubble.
Kalay et al. (2003) estimate the demand and supply elasticities for stocks on the Tel
Aviv Stock Exchange. Their main findings are that the order book is more elastic at
the beginning of the day, and that the demand side is more elastic than the bid side.3
Kalay et al. (2003) only have data for order placements at the opening of the market.
Our estimates of supply and demand schedules are also based on the continuous trading
session.
We first establish that the standard volume-volatility relation exists in a limit order
market, and investigate in detail the composition of the order book at the intra-day level.
This exercise documents that the trading structure on the Norwegian Stock Exchange
exhibits the same features as are found in empirical studies of other countries’ stock
markets. The features suggest that: informational asymmetries are more pronounced
at the beginning of the trading day, there is competition among informed traders, and
uninformed traders require a compensation for the higher pick-off risk at the beginning
of the day.4 These results are systematic across sub-periods, firm sizes, and tick-sizes.
The main contribution of our study is that we are able to document several rela-
tionships between the volume-volatility relation and the shape of the order book. We
measure the order book shape by the average elasticity of the supply and demand sched-
ules in the book. The lower the elasticity (steeper the slope), the less dispersed are the
bid and ask prices in the order book.5 To examine the effects of the order book slope on
3The first result is interpreted as supportive to sequential trading models with asymmetric informa-
tion which predict higher adverse selection at the opening (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). The second
result is interpreted as supportive to the empirical finding that buy orders have larger price impacts
than sell orders.
4Our results are in accordance with the results in Kalay et al. (2003) as well as with the results in
several studies of time-of-day effects in spreads and price impacts, for example French and Roll (1986),
Harris (1986), and Niemeyer and Sandas (1995).
5This is in the case of direct demand and supply curves (prices on the x-axis and accumulated volume
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volume and volatility, we first include the slope measure as an independent variable in
a cross sectional time series version of the standard regression model used to document
the volume-volatility relation. To investigate the relationship between the slope of the
book and the trading activity, we estimate a cross-sectional time series regression with
the number of trades as the dependent variable. A systematic negative relation between
the average slope of the order book and the price volatility is documented in a daily
time series cross-sectional analysis. These results are also shown to be robust to the
choice of time period. Similarly, we find a significant and robust negative relationship
between our slope measure and the daily number of trades.
If the slope of the book is essentially a liquidity measure, most of the information
contained in the slope should be reflected by the volume close to the inner quotes. To
check this, we calculate the slope measure based on different fractions of the order book
and re-estimate all the regression models. When we investigate the relation between
different slope measures and trading activity, an interesting pattern emerges. In line
with the findings in Biais et al. (1995) that thick books at the inner quotes result in
trades, we find a significant positive relationship between the slope of the book and the
number of trades when the slope is calculated based on the volume at the inner quotes.
This result is the opposite of what we get when we use a slope measure based on the
full order book. Thus, the slope of the book provides different information depending
on what fraction of the book we use in the calculation.
A possible interesting interpretation of the full order book slope is related to the
dispersion of beliefs hypothesis. Harris (1987) notes that, if trades are self generating,
the number of daily transactions will be the true mixing variable rather than a proxy
for the arrival rate of new information. It could be that the slope of the limit order
book capture dispersion of beliefs about asset values, i.e. steep slopes of the supply and
demand schedules indicate that there is a high degree of agreement among investors
about the fair value of the security, while gentle slopes indicate that there is greater
disagreement among investors about the value of the security. If so, our finding that
there is increased trading activity when slopes are more gentle (greater disagreement
about valuation) could reflect a situation of self generating trades, i.e. that the volume-
volatility relation is not merely driven by new information. This interpretation would
be in line with models where heterogeneity among investors contributes to the volume-
volatility relation.
On the other hand, our results can also be explained within a Glosten (1994) type
of model where all liquidity suppliers are homogeneous: for a given level of liquidity
motivated trading and a given probability of informed trading, the slopes will be more
gentle the more volatile assets are, while a positive relation between the slope at the
on the y-axis). In the case of inverted demand and supply curves, the relationship would be opposite.
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inner quotes and trading activity could be explained by price sensitive liquidity traders.6
However, the results from the test of the Glosten model in Sand˚as (2001) do not provide
empirical support for a model with homogeneous liquidity suppliers.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 3.2 surveys the relevant liter-
ature. Section 3.3 describes our data sample. Section 3.4 examines in detail the order
flow and order book on an intra-daily basis. Section 3.5 provides the results from our
analysis of the volume-volatility relation in the Norwegian equity market. Section 3.6
concludes the paper.
3.2 Literature
The mixture of distributions hypothesis The early research into the volume-
volatility relation is reviewed in Karpoff (1987). The main theoretical explanation from
this period is known as the “mixture of distributions hypothesis” (hereafter the MDH).
According to the MDH, there is a positive correlation between daily price changes
and trading volume because both variables are mixtures of independent normals with
the same mixing variable. Originally, the MDH was suggested by Clark (1973) as
an alternative explanation for the observed leptokurtosis in the distribution of log price
changes.7 The basic idea underlying the hypothesis is that prices and trading volume are
driven by a time-varying arrival rate of information.8 Let ∆pi,t and vi,t be respectively
the intraday price change and volume of trade resulting from information event number
i on date t, and let nt be the total number of information events during day t. Assume
that (i) the number of events each day, nt, varies across days, and that (ii) the intraday
price changes, ∆p, and trading volumes, v, are jointly independently and identically
distributed with finite variances. Our explanation of the MDH is largely based on
Harris (1987). The daily price change and trading volume are equal to the sum of
respectively the intraday price changes and trading volumes, i.e.
∆Pt =
nt∑
i=1
∆pi,t and Vt =
nt∑
i=1
vi,t (3.1)
6We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
7Mandelbrot (1963) and Fama (1963) showed that the return distributions of commodity and stock
prices were leptokurtic, and well approximated by symmetric stable distributions with characteristic
exponents between 1 and 2 (the normal distribution has a characteristic exponent equal to 2). An
examination of the stable distributions hypothesis for the Norwegian market is provided in Skjeltorp
(2000) who shows that a characteristic exponent between 1.6 and 1.7 best characterizes the Norwegian
data.
8Copeland (1976, 1977)’s “sequential arrival of information” model which is later extended by Jen-
nings et al. (1981) and Jennings and Barry (1983) also predicts a positive relationship between volume
and absolute price changes. The main feature of the model is that information is disseminated to only
one trader at a time, and the main criticism of the models is that traders cannot learn from the market
prices as other traders become informed.
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where ∆Pt is the daily price change and Vt is the daily trading volume. Given equa-
tion (3.1), and provided that nt is large, the joint distribution of the daily price change
and volume of trade will be approximately bivariate normal conditional on nt.9 The
volume-volatility relation arises because both price changes and trading volume are
likely to be large when the number of information events is large and small when the
number of information events is small.10
Harris (1986) finds empirical support for the MDH based on cross-sectional tests of
common stocks continuously traded on the NYSE or one of the regional exchanges in
the period 1976-1977. The critical assumption behind the tests is that the distribution
of the mixing variable is not identical for all securities. Assuming that transactions take
place at a uniform rate in event time, Harris (1987) finds both theoretical motivation
and empirical support for the use of the daily number of transactions as a proxy for
the time-varying unobserved information evolution rate.11 However, since the arrival
rate of new information is unobservable, we do not know whether a part of the volume-
volatility relation may be a result of the actions of heterogeneous traders. As suggested
by Harris (1987), if trading is self-generating, the daily number of transactions would be
the true mixing variable rather than a proxy for the unobserved information evolution
rate.
Using a simple regression approach for daily data on Nasdaq-NMS securities over
the 1986-1991 period, Jones et al. (1994) find that both volatility and trading volume
are positively correlated with the number of daily transactions. However, the average
size of trades contains no additional information about volatility beyond that contained
in the number of transactions. If the number of transactions is a good proxy for the
mixing variable, this result is supportive of a pure MDH; “..volatility and volume are
positively correlated only because both are positively related to the number of daily
information arrivals (the mixing variable).” The problem caused by a lack of ability
to interpret the mixing variable can be further illustrated by this study. If informed
traders camouflage their information, for example by splitting their orders into medium
sized trades as suggested by the “stealth trading hypothesis” of Barclay and Warner
(1993), the number of daily transactions would be the true mixing variable and the
results in Jones et al. (1994) would also support explanations of the volume-volatility
relation based on heterogeneous traders.12
9See Harris (1987), page 129.
10The variation in the daily number of information events implies that the expectation of the uncon-
ditional distribution is a weighted average (or “a mixture”) of the conditional distributions.
11Harris (1987) derives and tests several implications of the MDH for transactions data on a sample
of 50 NYSE stocks that traded between December 1, 1981 and January 31, 1983. The results from the
tests are supportive of the MDH.
12In addition, in order-driven markets, a large order is often automatically executed against many
smaller orders by the automatic matching system. Thus, even though the original order is large, it may
show up as many small trades as it is matched against several smaller orders rendering the average daily
trade size unimportant in explaining volatility.
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Dispersion of belief The MDH simply states that price changes and trading volume
are directed by the flow of new information. It does not say anything about what type of
information or how this information is revealed to investors. Hence, an important limi-
tation of the hypothesis is that it does not address the role of economic agents or market
structure for prices and trading volume. Later theoretical work on the volume-volatility
relation centers around these issues. Harris (1986) links the MDH to asset pricing the-
ory by suggesting that the mixing variable directs the rate of flow of information from
systematic risk factors. A problem with this interpretation is that the movements in
prices for many types of financial contracts seem much “too large” to be attributed to
movements in the fundamental values of the underlying securities only. This fact sug-
gests that prices are not merely driven by changes in systematic risk factors and asset
payoffs, but also by changes in the expectations of heterogeneous agents. Figure 3.1
illustrates the information structure in a standard asset market for the two main types
of such models. Panel (a) in the figure describes a “differences in opinion” model, while
panel (b) describes a market microstructure model with asymmetric information.
Figure 3.1 (a) illustrates a “differences of opinion” model. In this model, investors
are assumed to act differently on the same news, i.e. trading is induced by differences
of opinion about publicly available information. Beliefs are updated using Bayes rule.
All traders are rational, but they view others as having irrational models. Harris and
Raviv (1993) explain the volume-volatility relation by a model of this kind. Two groups
of risk-neutral speculators receive the same information but disagree on the extent to
which it is important (but agree to disagree). As long as one of the groups remains
more optimistic than the other, there is no trading. Trading occurs only and whenever
the cumulative information for one of the trader groups switches from favorable to
unfavorable, or vice versa.13
In the standard asset pricing models, the trading process itself does not convey
information which is relevant to price determination. Prices adjust immediately as a
result of new information. This is a plausible assumption for some kind of news. Other
types of news are likely to be dispersed and not immediately available to all investors
in aggregated form.14 Modelling dispersed information is the essential feature in the
market microstructure models illustrated in figure 3.1 (b). In these models, there is a
group of investors who trade on the basis of private information. The market maker and
the uninformed investors can only infer this information from trades and order flows.
The room for strategic behavior among agents differs in different models.15 Shalen
13Prices change every period whether or not trading occurs. The volume-volatility relation arises
because the price changes are larger on average when trading occurs.
14Evidence of the existence of dispersed news is given in French and Roll (1986) who document
empirically that asset prices are much more volatile during exchange trading hours than during non-
trading hours. This phenomenon cannot be reconciled with a standard asset pricing model unless there
is a systematic tendency for price-relevant information to arrive during normal business hours only.
15In Kyle (1985), informed investors attempt to camouflage their trades by spreading them over time.
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Figure 3.1 The Information Structure
The figure illustrates the assumed information structure in a “differences in opinion” model (panel a) and a market
microstructure model (panel b). From the fundamental asset pricing equation, Pi,t = Et[
∑∞
j=0Mt+jXi,t+j],
we know that relevant information about the price, P, of an asset, i, may come from either news about the
stochastic discount factor, Mi, or news about the payoff, Xi. In the “differences in opinion” model in panel a,
all news arrives as public information. Some types of information are immediately incorporated into the asset
price. For other types of information, traders disagree on the effects on the valuation of the underlying assets.
Trading occurs whenever the cumulative information for a particular type of trader switches from favorable to
unfavorable. In the market microstructure model in panel b, new information arrives as either public or private
information. Public information is immediately incorporated into the asset price. Informed traders trade on the
basis of private information. Uninformed investors are either liquidity traders or speculators. The uninformed
investors are trying to infer the private information from the trades, Nt. However, they are not able to separate
informed and uninformed trades.
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(1993) uses a market microstructure model to study the volume-volatility relation. In
her model, both trading volume and price volatility increase with the dispersion of
traders’ expectations about fundamental values. This is called the “dispersion of beliefs
hypothesis”(hereafter the DBH). In this version, dispersion of beliefs about the value
of a security is assumed to be wider the larger the share of the traders in the security
that consists of uninformed investors. Uninformed traders cannot distinguish informed
trades from liquidity trades. Instead they react as if all trades were informative, and
thus they increases both volatility and volume relative to equilibrium values.
Daigler and Wiley (1999) perform an indirect test of the DBH. Facilitating the possi-
Kyle’s model implies that larger volumes support more informed traders. In Admati and Pfleiderer
(1988), a certain amount of the uninformed investors are allowed to act strategically by having the
discretion to time their trading. This is shown to imply that within-day trading becomes concentrated.
Hence, price changes and transactions are bunched in time, and the effect of volume on price movements
will depend on recent volume levels.
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bility of distinguishing traders with different types of information in the futures markets,
they test whether uninformed traders contribute to volatility. The results of their study
support Shalen (1993): “..uninformed traders who cannot differentiate liquidity demand
from fundamental value increase volatility.” In a similar study, Bessembinder and Seguin
(1993) examine the relation between the volume-volatility relation and market depth,
proxied by open interest, in eight physical and financial futures markets. Unexpected
volume is found to have a larger effect on volatility than expected volume, and large
open interest is found to mitigate volatility.
Limit order markets In this paper, we investigate the information about trading
volume and price volatility contained in the slope of a limit order book. In an electronic
limit order market, liquidity is not supplied by designated specialists or market makers,
but rather by the traders themselves. The majority of trades are first submitted to the
market as limit orders, which accumulate into the limit order book. Hence, at any point
in time, the limit order book reflects an aggregate of buying and selling interests at
various prices. Each ask (bid) price reflects the lowest (highest) price at which different
investors are willing to sell (buy) the security.16
Theoretical models of limit order markets differ in their assumptions about investor
heterogeneity. In Glosten (1994), privately informed investors are assumed to submit
market orders while homogeneous uninformed investors provide the limit order book.
Hence, the shape of the limit order book reflects the information characteristics of the
incoming market flow. In the dynamic model proposed by Parlour (1998), all traders
are assumed to have different valuations for the traded asset. Parlour shows that, when
the choice between a limit order or a market order depends both on the past (through
the state of the order book) and the future (through expected subsequent order flow),
then systematic patterns in order placement strategies will be generated even in the
absence of asymmetric information. Moreover, both sides of the book will matter for
optimal order placement strategies. Foucault et al. (2003) model a limit order market
where liquidity suppliers have asymmetric information on the risk of being picked off by
traders with superior information. This feature is shown to affect the shape of the order
book. When the book is thin, uninformed liquidity traders are reluctant to add depth
because it may be an indication of high pick-off risk. The informed liquidity traders
exploit this by bidding less aggressively than in the case where the liquidity traders have
symmetric information. Sand˚as (2001) tests a version of Glosten (1994) empirically.17
16Biais et al. (1995) note that the shape of the order book may reflect the competition among buy-
ers/sellers as well as the correlation in their valuations. If the supply and demand curves are inelastic
and volume is concentrated around the inner quotes, this may reflect that the valuations among various
investors are correlated on each side of the market relative to the case where the valuations are more
dispersed and the order book is more elastic.
17The tests are based on updating restrictions that link the market order flow to the order book
dynamics and break-even conditions for the marginal bid and offer prices that define the price schedule.
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The results do not lend support to the model. Relative to the theoretical predictions,
the empirical price schedules of the limit order book offer insufficient depth.
3.3 The Data
3.3.1 The Norwegian Stock Market
Our data set is from the the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) in Norway.18 Norway is
a member of the European Economic Area, and its equity market is among the 30
largest world equity markets by market capitalization.19 Table 3.1 reports some general
statistics for all the companies listed on the OSE. At the end of 2001, 212 firms were
listed on the exchange with a total market value of about NOK 657 bill. The OSE is
the only regulated marketplace for securities trading in Norway. Since January 1999, it
has operated as a fully computerized centralized limit order book system similar to the
public limit order book systems in e.g. Paris, Toronto, Stockholm and Hong Kong.
The OSE allows the use of limit orders, market orders, and various customary order
specifications. Participants can also submit hidden orders. When an order is submitted
as a hidden order, only a specified fraction of the underlying order is visible to the
market. As is normal in most electronic order-driven markets, the order handling rule
follows a strict price-time priority.20 All orders are submitted at prices constrained by
the minimum tick size for the respective stocks which is determined by the price level
of the stock. For prices lower than NOK 9.99 (Norwegian kroner) the tick size is NOK
0.01, between NOK 10 and NOK 49.9 the tick size is NOK 0.1, between NOK 50 and
NOK 999.5 the tick size is NOK 0.5 and for prices above NOK 1000 the tick size is
NOK 1.
The trading day of the OSE comprises two sessions: the “pre-trade” session starting
at 9:30 and ending with an opening auction at 10:00, and the “continuous trading”
session from 10:00 until the trading closes at 16:00. During the pre-trade session, brokers
can register trades that were executed after the close on the previous day as well as new
orders. At the opening auction at the end of the pre-trade session, all orders registered
in the order book are automatically matched if the prices are crossing or equal. The
quoted opening price is thus the price that clears the market. During the continuous
trading session, electronic matching of orders with crossing or equal price generates
transactions. Orders without a limit price (market orders) have automatic price priority
and are immediately executed at the best available prices. At the OSE, market orders
18We obtained the data directly from the exchange’s surveillance system. The SMARTS c© system
is the core of the exchange’s surveillance operations. Through access to the SMARTS c© database, we
obtained all the information on orders and trades in the market
19Source is FIBV (International Federation of Stock exchanges). Notable Norwegian listings include
Norsk Hydro, Telenor, and Statoil.
20In the case of hidden orders, when the visible part of the order is executed, it loses time priority.
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Table 3.1
Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) - General statistics
Descriptive statistics for the Oslo Stock Exchange for the period 1999 to 2001. All numbers in the table are
official statistics obtained from the OSE annual reports (available at www.ose.no).
1999 2000 2001
Number of listed firms 215 214 212
Market capitalization (bill. NOK) 582.94 637.86 677.03
NOK/USD exchange ratea 7.81 8.81 8.99
Turnover velocityb 88.6 96.7 86.4
Total dividends (mill. NOK) 14443 12194 13767
Market development
Market index level (TOTX) 1153.74 1366.05 933.22
OSE benchmark index 189.76 195.79 167.18
OSE benchmark index return (%) 48.45 3.18 -14.61
aAverage midpoint rate for the respective year. bTurnover velocity: Average of annualized turnover per month
divided by market value at the end of each month. Only capital registered in the VPS.
are allowed to “walk the book” until they are fully executed. Any remaining part left of
the market order is removed from the order book. This is different from the treatment
of market orders on e.g. the Paris Bourse, where any remaining part of an unfilled order
is automatically converted to a limit order at the current quote. The difference implies
that market orders on OSE are more aggressive than market orders at the Paris Bourse.
On the Paris Bourse, market orders are essentially marketable limit orders.
3.3.2 The data sample
The dataset consists of every order and trade that occurred on the OSE in the period
from February 1999 through June 2001.
The trade data contains, quantity transacted, a time stamp, brokerage house ID on
each side, and an ID for the house that initiated the trade as well as whether the house
was the buyer or a seller in the transaction. Every trade is linked to the underlying
orders through an order ID. Thus, if a large order is executed against many smaller
orders resulting in several smaller trades, we can trace each executed part back to the
initial order. There are also additional flags attached to each trade that identify special
features of the trade such as whether it was an odd-lot trade, an off-exchange trade, a
cross (within the same or different brokerage houses), and whether a trade results from
a market order or a limit order. The order data contain all order entries as well as all
deletions and amendments of orders already in the order book.
In table 3.2 we provide some descriptive statistics of the trade data throughout our
sample period. A large part of the listed firms are traded quite infrequently. Since
we examine intraday data, including infrequently traded firms would introduce a large
amount of noise into our analysis. We therefore filter the firms based on their trading
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activity through the sample period. The first filtering criterion is that the firm must
have been traded in at least 400 out of 597 days, or about 70 percent of the trading
days, and the second criterion is that the firm must have an average of 5 trades per day
to be included in our sample. Once the first criterion is applied, the second criterion
only removes a few companies from our sample. After the filtering we are left with
108 firms, which constitute our sample throughout the paper. Note that there were
215, 214 and 212 listed firms at the end of 1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively. Table 3.2
shows that there has been increasing trading activity during the sample period with
the total number of trades having tripled and the volume in Norwegian kroner (NOK)
having doubled. Further, the average number of daily trades across firms has more than
doubled from 32 in the first half of 1999 to 79 in the first half of 2001.21 The increase
in activity has also been accompanied by a decrease in the average percentage spread.
As found in most markets, the average effective spreads are lower than the average
quoted spreads. To give a better picture of the diversity of the sample, we divide the
sample into four portfolios based on their market capitalization value. The firms are
assigned to a market capitalization group based on their market capitalization value
at the beginning of each year. The general picture is that the number of trades, the
trading volume (both in shares and NOK), the prices and the quoted spread increase
across firm size portfolios, while the average daily volatility, the average trade size and
the quoted percentage spread decrease.
We also report the average correlations between the trading volume, the trade size
and the number of transactions. The correlation structure in our sample is quite similar
to the one documented for the US market in Jones et al. (1994). The correlation between
the average trade size and the number of trades is low, and both the average trade size
and the number of trades have high positive correlations with share volume. Hence, the
two components of share volume seem to contain different information about volume.
The same structure is evident when we calculate correlations over sub-periods of half a
year.
3.3.3 Composition of orders
Our order data are quite rich. For each order, we have a time stamp, a unique order ID,
the disclosed/hidden orders as well as flags indicating whether the order was a buy or
sell order, whether the order is a new order, a deletion of an order or an amendment to
an existing order (price change and/or volume change). In addition, a unique brokerage
house ID is attached to each order. Moreover, compared to the Paris Bourse data in
Biais et al. (1995), our data are not restricted to include placements, amendments and
21At the same time, the average trade size has gone down from 3429 shares to 2648 shares. This
decline is most likely related to the introduction and growth of online trading in the sample period,
since these traders generate a lot of trades of small sizes. During our period, the fraction of total trades
coming from pure online brokerage houses has increased from 0% to almost 10%.
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deletions of orders within the 5 best quotes. We have access to all orders, which makes
it possible to reconstruct the full order book at any point of time. The descriptive
statistics discussed in this section are based on 6 hourly spaced snapshots of the entire
order book during each trading day for each listed company during our sample period.
The order book is rebuilt at 10:30, 11:30, 12:30, 13:30, 14:30 and 15:30 each trading
day for each firm. We exclude order volume above/below 100 ticks away from the inner
quotes. For a stock trading at NOK 100 with a minimum tick size of NOK 0.5 this
would mean that orders above NOK 150 and below NOK 50 are excluded from our
calculations. The limit on 100 +/- ticks means that we disregard less than 5 percent of
our sample.
To get a general view of the composition of the order-flow, we group the orders into
four types based on their trading aggressiveness. “Market orders” are orders with no
limit price. “Aggressive limit orders” are orders that are placed at the opposite quote
(marketable limit order) or at a price further away from the best quote on the opposite
side. “Quote improving orders” are orders that are placed in between the inner quotes,
and “Passive orders” are orders that are placed at the best (same side) quote or further
away from the market. Panel A in table 3.3 shows the composition of orders and the
order book activity for our data sample. The numbers in the table are daily cross-
sectional time series averages of order volumes (in shares), and the number of orders
submitted. The numbers are averaged over each of the three years in the sample as well
as over market capitalization quartiles. Each firm is assigned to a market capitalization
quartile at the beginning of each year.
The table shows the distribution of order placements in the market. The use of
market orders is modest. However, market orders and aggressive limit orders together
constitute around 40 percent of the average daily number of submitted orders. Measured
in number of shares, there is considerable variation in the size of the submitted orders
across order groups. A part of this variation can probably be explained by differences
in the price level of the stocks, both over time and over firm size. Quote improving
orders are the largest order group, while market orders are the smallest order group.
This holds for the entire sample as well as for each market capitalization group, and is
also a systematic pattern across sub-periods (not shown in the table). Measured over
the whole sample, on average 94 orders are submitted during a trading day for one
firm. The activity is considerably higher for the largest firms than for firms in the other
three groups. The average daily number of orders submitted for the largest firms was
224, while the similar average for the three other groups ranged from 45 to 53. For
comparison, Biais et al. (1995) report an average of 160 orders for the Paris Bourse in
1995.
In Panel B in table 3.3, we show the distribution of volume in the order book averaged
across all firms and dates. At each tick level, the fraction of total shares in the order
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Table 3.3
Descriptive statistics of the order book
Panel A shows the daily average number of submitted orders and the daily average order size for different types
of orders. The numbers are averaged over companies and time. We also report averages over the four market
capitalization groups. Group 1 consists of the 25% smallest firms while group 4 consists of the 25% largest firms.
Some firms have experienced large changes in capitalization value during the sample period. To take account of
this, we re-sort the market capitalization groups at the beginning of each year. Limit orders are classified into
three different types based on their aggressiveness. Passive orders are orders that are submitted at the best (same
side) quote or further away from the market. Quote improving orders are orders that are submitted in between
the inner quotes prevailing at order submission, and aggressive orders (Aggr.) are orders that are submitted at
the opposite quote (marketable limit order) or at a price further away from the market on the opposite side.
Market orders (MO) constitute a separate group. The numbers in parentheses are each order class’ fraction of
total orders. Panel B provides descriptive statistics on the distribution of order book volume. The numbers are
daily average fractions of accumulated volume, and are reported for all firms, for the bid and ask side separately,
for minimum tick sizes, and for the four market capitalization groups.
PANEL A: Order types and order sizes
Submitted orders Order sizes
Total Quote Quote
Firms orders Passive impr. Aggr. MO Passive impr. Aggr. MO
All firms 108 94 42 (0.44) 15 (0.16) 34 (0.36) 4 (0.04) 6428 7063 5882 1715
Market capitalization quartiles
1 (small) 27 45 22 (0.45) 10 (0.21) 14 (0.31) 3 (0.06) 10708 11501 9824 4341
2 27 52 23 (0.43) 10 (0.19) 18 (0.34) 3 (0.05) 6244 7460 5634 1382
3 27 53 22 (0.41) 10 (0.19) 19 (0.37) 3 (0.05) 3437 3900 3038 531
4 (large) 27 224 100 (0.45) 31 (0.14) 87 (0.39) 7 (0.03) 5324 5392 5032 605
PANEL B: Order book volume distribution (normalized)
Minimum tick size ATQ +/- 1 tick +/- 5 tick +/- 10 tick +/- 20 tick +/-50 tick +/-100 tick
All firms 20.9% 34.7% 56.8% 69.4% 78.4% 88.6% 100.0%
Bid side 23.0% 40.0% 62.9% 73.8% 81.4% 89.7% 100.0%
Ask side 20.8% 29.3% 50.8% 64.9% 75.5% 87.4% 100.0%
Minimum tick size
0.01 20.2% 30.8% 37.8% 49.0% 60.1% 82.2% 100.0%
0.1 22.2% 34.2% 53.2% 67.4% 79.4% 91.7% 100.0%
0.5 22.3% 39.1% 65.8% 78.4% 88.1% 95.5% 100.0%
1 7.0% 10.7% 17.6% 25.1% 38.8% 70.0% 100.0%
Market capitalization quartiles
1 (small) 19.1% 29.7% 45.2% 56.6% 68.2% 84.0% 100.0%
2 21.6% 34.9% 56.3% 69.6% 79.9% 91.1% 100.0%
3 23.6% 38.3% 62.7% 75.5% 83.8% 92.6% 100.0%
4 (large) 19.3% 34.6% 62.9% 75.9% 84.3% 91.0% 100.0%
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book is averaged over the 6 order book snapshots.22 The table shows the order book
distribution across minimum tick sizes and market capitalization quartiles.23 Around
35 percent of the order book depth is concentrated at the quotes or plus/minus one
tick from the quotes. This is quite stable both across tick sizes and across market cap
quartiles. However, when we separate the bid and ask sides, we find that the volume on
the bid side is more concentrated at the inner quotes than the volume on the ask side.
This is in line with the findings in several other empirical papers, and is consistent with
the interpretation that the price impact is larger for buy orders than for sell orders.24
Note that the depth within +/- 5 ticks, which is what Biais et al. (1995) investigate,
only includes 56 percent of the total order book depth in our sample. There does not
seem to be large differences in order depth across market capitalization quartiles. The
largest tick size category is special in that it only contains one, highly volatile and very
actively traded, company.25 One interesting thing to note about this firm is that as
much as 30 percent of the order book depth lies between 50 and 100 ticks away from
the quotes, even though it has been one of the most heavily traded companies at the
exchange during our sample period.
3.4 Intraday analysis of the order book
In this section, we discuss how to measure the shape of the order book, and present
statistics on the limit order book at an intraday level.
3.4.1 The shape of the order book
Figure 3.2 shows the average order books for two companies listed on the OSE. The or-
der books are averaged over the five last trading days in May 2001, and are normalized
in the sense that they show the percentage of shares in all orders within an increas-
ing/decreasing number of ticks away from the quotes (zero in the figure is the best
quote on each side of the market). The upper graph shows the average order book for
Norsk Hydro (NHY) while the lower graph shows the average order book for Opticom
(OPC). Both companies are among the most liquid on the exchange.26 Norsk Hydro
22For instance, on the ask side of the book for one company/snapshot, we divide the aggregate number
of shares at each tick by the total number of shares supplied (offered) at that time/snapshot. We do
this for each snapshot, and average across all snapshots on the particular date to obtain the average
fraction supplied on each tick for the security. Since we limit the order book to orders within +/- 100
ticks from the bid/ask midpoint, the fraction of aggregate volume at +/- 100 ticks is 100%.
23If a firm trades across two minimum tick size regimes on the same day, we remove that company
for that day from the sample. The results do not change if we include these observations.
24See Chan and Lakonishok (1993), Chan and Lakonishok (1995), and Kalay et al. (2003)
25The company is Opticom (OPC).
26During the period illustrated in the figure, both companies traded in prices around NOK 400-500
and had a tick size of NOK 0.5. For Norsk Hydro the calculated average order book is based on around
2000 orders with a share volume of around 400 000 shares. For Opticom the similar calculations are
based on around 4000 orders with a share volume of around 200 000 shares.
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Figure 3.2 Average order books for Norsk Hydro and Opticom
The figure illustrates the order books for two different companies listed on the OSE. The upper graph shows the
average normalized (with respect to the total number of orders in the order book) order book for Norsk Hydro
(NHY), a large Norwegian blue chip company, and the lower picture shows the average normalized order book for
Opticom, a Norwegian IT company. The order books are averaged over the last five days of May 2001. (For each
day the average order book is calculated from hourly snapshots of the book.) The picture shows the percentage
of shares in all orders within varying ticks away from the quotes. Zero represents the best quote on each side of
the market.
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is a leading energy, aluminium and fertilizer company, based in Norway. It has 50,000
employees in 60 countries worldwide. The company’s operations are well known and
there is a a large amount of available information about the company, including experts’
analysis. Opticom, on the other hand, is a relatively new IT company which currently
has under 100 employees. The company describes its business concept as pioneering
research and development in new technology in electronics. The company has no cash
flow and very uncertain future income possibilities. Discussions in the popular press
have been largely focused on how difficult it is to value the company, and there have
been large differences in analysts’ valuations. The picture shows that the order book of
the two companies are quite different: while on average about 50 percent of the orders
for Norsk Hydro has limit prices which lie within 5 ticks from the quoted spread, the
similar percentage for Opticom is only about 10 percent.
This difference in the average shape of the order book results from the fact that
traders systematically submit orders further away from the midpoint in Opticom than
in Norsk Hydro. One possible reason for this is that investors are more uncertain about
the true value of Opticom than Norsk Hydro, and that this higher valuation uncertainty
in Opticom is reflected in orders being submitted across a wider range of prices than
in Norsk Hydro. The difference in the order book shapes may also come from pick-off
risk, i.e. the reservation prices reflect a compensation for the risk of being picked off by
better informed traders. Probably both effects contribute to explaining the pictures we
see in figure 3.2. However, while it is obvious that there are huge differences in valuation
uncertainty between the two companies, it is not so obvious that there should be such a
big difference in pick-off risk. More importantly, pick-off risk should mainly concern the
orders submitted close to the midpoint price. Thus, pick-off risk should affect the spread
and volumes at the inner ticks, not the distribution of orders across the the entire order
book. The figure also illustrates the difference in order book liquidity between the bid
and the ask side, which we documented for the whole sample in panel B in table 3.3.
Although it is more pronounced for Norsk Hydro, both pictures indicate that the ask
side of the book is more elastic than the bid side.
Measuring the order book slope To capture the shape of the order book, we use
the average elasticity/slopes of the supply and demand schedules in the order book.
The more gentle (steeper) the slope, the more widely distributed (concentrated) are the
bid and ask prices in the order book. Note that we use the inverse of the elasticity, with
prices on the x-axis and accumulated volumes on the y-axis, as in Biais et al. (1995).
To obtain an average slope of the order book, we divide the trading day into hourly
spaced intervals. At the end of each interval, we take a snapshot of the order book.
These snapshots occur at 10:30, 11:30, 12:30, 13:30, 14:30 and 15:30 each trading day
for each firm. Note that the first snapshot is half an hour after the regular trading
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session starts. Alternatively, we could end the last snapshot at 16:00, but then the
order book would be affected by the large amount of order cancellations at the end of
the trading day. To rebuild the order book we start at the beginning of the trading day
with the orders still remaining after the opening auction has been executed at 10:00.
Then we track all types of orders being submitted throughout the day, and update the
order book accordingly. Thus, all deletions and/or amendments of earlier orders as
well as new orders are accounted for when we update the order book.27 After having
obtained the full order book for each snapshot we calculate our slope/elasticity estimate
for each company of the order book in the following steps:
1. First, for each side of the order book, and each snapshot, we accumulate the
aggregate number of shares supplied/demanded at each price level, such that at
each price level we get the total volume supplied (demanded) at that price or lower
(higher).
2. To account for large differences in liquidity between firms, we normalize the ac-
cumulated shares at each tick level (on the ask and bid side separately) relative
to the total number of shares supplied/demanded at the relevant snapshot. Thus,
the percentage of the shares in the order book supplied (demanded) at the highest
(lowest) ask (bid) price/tick is 100 percent.
3. Next, we calculate the “local” elasticity at each price level (illustrated in equa-
tion 3A.2 and equation 3A.3 in the appendix).
4. Then, we average across all price levels (local slopes) to obtain an average elastic-
ity/slope for the bid and ask side for that snapshot.
5. Finally, we take the average of the bid and ask slope to get one slope measure
for the snapshot and average across all the snapshots during the trading day to
obtain the average slope for each company on that day.
We normalize the order book because we want to take into account that there is a close
relationship between our slope measure and the liquidity of the underlying stock. Less
liquid firms generally have a higher volatility since the order book does not contain
enough volume to absorb large trades without moving prices too much. In addition,
less liquid stocks generally have a higher spread since investors require a discount when
buying and a premium when selling the stock. Thus, a positive relationship between
order book elasticity and volatility is expected a priori. By normalizing the order book,
we get the fraction of total shares supplied/demanded at each price level regardless of
27The original dataset from the Oslo Stock Exchange includes order book data for the best 5 quotes
on each side whenever a new order is submitted or there is a deletion or amendment of an existing order.
We use this information to check that our order book is correct for these 5 levels of the book.
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the total volume in the order book. This makes the order books more comparable across
firms and time.
In addition to the equally weighted slope of the order book (across tick levels), we
calculate a slope measure where we weight each local slope by its distance (in ticks)
from the inner quote. The tick-weighting implies that local slopes further out in the
book have a lower impact on the average slope than local slopes closer to the midpoint
price. The main reason for doing this is to reduce the effects that “stale” orders may
have on the “tails” of the order book.
Figure 3.3 illustrates how the local elasticities, ∆Aτ and ∆
B
τ , are calculated. For
illustrative purposes, the order book in the figure stretches only across 4 price levels on
each side. In the figure, pA1 is the best available ask price (inner ask quote) with volume
fraction of vA1 supplied at that ask price. The volume fraction at the next tick level
(vA2 ) is thus the accumulated volume supplied at price p
A
1 and p
A
2 relative to the total
volume in the order book on each side. The local elasticity of the supply curve at pA1
would thus be the slope ∆A2 in the figure. A more specific explanation of the calculation
is provided in the appendix.
When we normalize the order book, the slope measures the average percentage
change in normalized volume when the price level changes by one percent. For example,
suppose that the current bid price is 49 (ask price is 50), the normalized depth is 10
percent and the slope is 10. If the bid-price decreases by 1 percent to 48.5 (or the ask
price increases by 1 percent to 50.5), the normalized depth will increase by 10 percent
to 11 percent.
3.4.2 Intraday Statistics
Table 3.4 shows intraday statistics for our slope measure (calculated at the end of each
time interval), the price volatility (measured as the absolute hourly return between
midpoint prices closest to the end of each time interval), the quoted and the effective
spread, the number of trades executed during the time interval, the trade and order
sizes measured in shares, and the number of orders submitted during the time interval.
All numbers are daily averages across all firms in the sample, and the time intervals
correspond to those used for rebuilding the order book.
Notable characteristics of the intraday statistics in table 3.4 are;
• The average slope increases at a decreasing rate throughout the day.
• The quoted and the effective spread both have a U-shape, with the highest spread
at the beginning of the day.
• The average trade size is smallest at the beginning of the day, and increasing
throughout the trading day.
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Figure 3.3 Calculation of the demand and supply elasticities
The figure illustrates how the local slopes/elasticities on the bid and ask side of the order book are calculated
for one ”snapshot” time on one date for one company. There are only 4 price levels on both sides of the book.
The left y-axis shows the fraction of aggregate share volume on the demand (bid) side of the order book at each
tick level. Similarly, the right y-axis shows the fraction of aggregate share volume on the supply (ask) side of the
order book at each tick level. The solid step-line is the supply (right) and demand (left) curves over the various
price levels. On the x-axis, we have the various price levels. pM is the bid/ask midpoint. Prices greater than
pM are ask prices and prices below pM are bid prices. The difference between pB1 (best bid) and p
A
1 (best ask)
is the quoted spread. The dotted line-segments connecting each level of the order book have local slopes denoted
by ∆s. These are the normalized local elasticities of the demand and supply curves calculated in equation 3A.2
and equation 3A.3 in the appendix.
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Table 3.4
Intraday statistics
The table provides intraday statistics for the data sample, including the slope measure, the volatility (the absolute
hourly return between trade prices closest to the end of each interval), the quoted spread, the effective spread,
the number of trades executed during the time interval, the trade size (in shares), the number of orders submitted
during the time interval, and the order size (in shares). All numbers are daily averages across all firms in the
sample. Note that the first and last time windows are half an hour while the rest of the time windows are hourly.
The slope is calculated at the end of each interval.
Time window
10:00 to 10:30 to 11:30 to 12:30 to 13:30 to 14:30 to 15:30 to
10:30 11:30 12:30 13:30 14:30 15:30 16:00
Slope (end of time window) 30.51 34.37 35.78 36.34 36.80 36.97 -
Volatility (absolute return) - 1.34% 0.81% 0.72% 0.74% 0.88% 0.86%
Quoted spread 2.36 1.73 1.47 1.37 1.33 1.31 1.39
Effective spread 1.79 1.27 1.05 1.00 0.95 0.95 1.05
Trades 10.38 11.81 9.38 9.05 9.52 10.81 10.40
Trade size (shares) 2314 2653 2759 2774 2834 3027 3123
Orders 15.45 18.16 13.10 12.36 12.47 14.02 11.66
Order size (shares) 6858 6385 5723 5818 5795 6383 6706
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• The average number of orders and trades both follow a U-shape, with fewer orders
being placed and trades being executed in the middle of the day, and most orders
being placed and trades being executed at the beginning of the day.
These regularities are also systematic across sub-periods.28 Similar systematic intraday
regularities have been found in other markets (e.g. US, France, Hong Kong, Sweden).29
Following the sequential trading model in Glosten and Milgrom (1985), these data
features can be explained by higher uncertainty about other traders’ valuations at the
beginning of the trading day than during the day. If this explanation is correct, a patient
liquidity trader who fears being picked off by informed investors at the beginning of the
day has two main options. If she believes that the probability of trading with informed
traders will diminish during the day, she can act strategically and delay her trading.
Alternatively, she can submit her orders at the beginning of the day and take account
of the increased probability of incurring a loss by placing them at prices including
a discount (buys) or a premium (sells). This can explain the higher spread at the
beginning of the trading day. The increase in spreads towards the end of the day may
be due to higher liquidity demand and possibly more cancellation of orders just before
the close. Assuming that the informed traders are trying not to reveal their information
too quickly, we would also expect to see a higher number of small trades at the beginning
of the trading day (stealth trading).
To obtain a measure of order aggressiveness during the trading day, we calculate a
separate index similar to Harris and Hasbrouck (1996), where the aggressiveness of an
order is measured by the average number of ticks the order is placed away from the best
quote (on the same side). Thus an index number of zero means that the average order
is placed at the quote, a positive index number means that the order is placed above
(below) the bid (ask), and a negative number means that the average order is placed
below (above) the bid (ask).30 Formally, for an order of type k, the aggressiveness of a
buy order with a limit price pB is calculated as,
λ
buy
k = (p
B − bid)/ticksize (3.2)
Similarly, a sell order with a limit price pS is calculated as,
λsellk = (ask− p
S)/ticksize (3.3)
where bid and ask are the best bid quote and best ask quote, respectively, when the
28We also calculate the statistics across sub-periods of years, half-years and quarters and find that
the results are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar.
29For the US, see French and Roll (1986) and Harris (1986). For Sweden, see Niemeyer and Sandas
(1995).
30We cannot calculate the aggressiveness for market orders since these orders do not have a price
limit.
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order is submitted.
Table 3.5 shows the intraday pattern in order aggressiveness, average number of
orders, fraction of order types, and order sizes. Figure 3.4 illustrates graphically the
intraday patterns in order aggressiveness, order size, order book slope, quoted and
effective spread, and fraction of order types.
If uninformed investors believe that there is more asymmetric information at the
beginning of the trading day, we would expect to see that they place orders at limit prices
further away from the midpoint price at the beginning of the trading day, and then,
closer to the midpoint prices later in the day, as the market price adjusts to reflect the
private information. This is consistent with a Glosten and Milgrom (1985) type of model
where trading is sequential and uncertainty is greatest at the opening of the trading
session. Moreover, we would expect that the orders placed by better informed investors
were most aggressive at the beginning of the day, especially if informed investors are
competing to extract profits from the same information. This is exactly what is indicated
in our data sample. Table 3.4 and figure 3.4 show that there are systematic differences
in the aggressiveness of different types of orders in the course of the trading day.
“Away from market” orders, which make up a large part of the order book, are
placed further away from the inner quotes at the beginning than at the end of the day.
If this type of order is mainly submitted by uninformed traders, it indicates that they
require a higher compensation for trading early in the day relative to later in the day.
Another interpretation is that uninformed traders have not yet processed all publicly
available information (e.g. newspapers, new analyzes, gossip etc.), and are more pas-
sive when submitting their orders before they have been able to read and interpret this
information. Orders that are more aggressive, and likely to stem from better informed
investors or pre-committed liquidity traders, are relatively more aggressive at the be-
ginning of the day than later in the day. Thus, a pre-committed trader or informed
trader, demanding liquidity, needs to be relatively more aggressive at the beginning of
the day to get his order executed since the liquidity suppliers submit their orders rel-
atively much further away from the midpoint. At the end of the trading day all types
of orders are submitted closer to the inner quotes, indicating that the adverse selection
cost is reduced. Assuming that all other cost components of the spread, except the
adverse selection component, are fixed through the day, the decrease in spreads may
also reflect that the adverse selection cost is the largest at the beginning of the day and
smaller at the end of the day.
The average number of passive orders (“away from market”) and market orders
decreases throughout the day, while the average number of quote-improving orders and
aggressive orders has a U-shape. The intraday pattern in the relative fraction of each
order type indicates that more orders are submitted closer to the midpoint at the end
of the day. “Away from the market” orders are the largest at the open and close, while
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Table 3.5
Order aggressiveness
In the table, all orders within each time interval are decomposed into four groups based on their aggressiveness.
The least aggressive orders, ”away from market”, are orders placed at or away from the quote on the same side of
the book. This would be e.g. a buy order with a price (bid) equal to or lower than the current best bid, or a sell
order with a price (ask) equal to or higher than the best ask price. The second type of orders, ”quote-improving
orders”, are orders that improve the best quotes. This would be e.g. a buy order with a price higher than the
current best bid, but lower than the best ask quote. The third type of orders, ”aggressive orders”, are orders
placed at the opposite quote or higher(buys)/lower(sells). The table reports the average number of orders of each
type within each time window, the percentage of all orders of each type, and the average order size in shares and
NOK. For each type of order we also calculate an aggressiveness index equal to the average number of ticks away
from the best quote (on the same side) that an order is submitted. Thus an index number of zero means that
the average order is placed at the quote, a positive index number means that the order is placed above/below
the bid/ask, and a negative index number means that the average order is placed below/above the bid/ask. We
do not calculate the aggressiveness for market orders since these by definition do not have any limit price. Note
that the first and last time windows are half an hour while the rest of the time windows are hourly.
Time window
10:00 to 10:30 to 11:30 to 12:30 to 13:30 to 14:30 to 15:30 to
Order type 10:30 11:30 12:30 13:30 14:30 15:30 16:00
Aggressiveness
(avg. ticks away from best quote)
Passive orders -12.81 -9.96 -8.45 -8.02 -7.44 -6.90 -5.87
Quote-improving orders 6.90 5.30 4.65 4.17 4.16 3.94 3.96
Aggressive orders 9.36 7.46 6.82 6.68 6.17 6.29 6.29
Average aggressiveness (weighted) -1.69 -1.00 -0.25 -0.06 0.20 0.52 1.11
Average number of orders
Passive orders 8.2 9.1 6.4 5.9 5.7 6.2 5.0
Quote-improving orders 3.3 3.4 2.7 2.6 2.7 3.0 2.5
Aggressive orders 5.4 6.9 5.5 5.3 5.5 6.3 5.6
Market orders 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3
% of orders of type
Passive orders 44.2% 43.4% 39.9% 38.7% 37.2% 36.7% 34.6%
Quote-improving orders 17.7% 16.3% 17.1% 17.3% 17.6% 17.7% 17.4%
Aggressive orders 29.4% 32.9% 34.2% 34.7% 36.2% 37.3% 39.0%
Market orders 8.6% 7.4% 8.8% 9.3% 9.0% 8.3% 8.9%
Order size (shares)
Passive orders 7202 6548 5716 5557 5938 6370 7317
Quote-improving orders 7793 6568 6486 6470 6561 6915 7294
Aggressive orders 5461 5301 5498 6008 5649 6569 7239
Market orders 1412 1576 1855 1751 1795 1678 2281
Order size (1000 NOK)
Passive orders 275 235 222 221 242 267 346
Quote-improving orders 274 253 258 265 274 290 328
Aggressive orders 188 204 204 214 227 376 307
Market orders 36 39 46 42 40 43 69
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Figure 3.4 Intraday characteristics of the order book
The figures shows cross-sectional averages across 7 intraday windows for various measures. The windows and
numbers correspond to those in tables 3.4 and 3.5. Note that windows 1 and 7 are half-hour intervals from
10:00 to 10:30 and 15:30 to 16:00 respectively, while windows 2 to 6 are hourly intervals starting every half hour.
Figure (a) shows the average aggressiveness of different order types. The first type of orders, ”passive orders”,
are placed at or away from the quote on the same side of the book. This would be e.g. a buy order with a price
(bid) equal to or lower than the current best bid, or a sell order with a price (ask) equal to or higher than the
best ask price. The second type of orders, ”quote-improving orders”, are orders that improve the best quote (on
the same side). This would be e.g. a buy order with a price higher than the current best bid, but lower than
the best ask quote. The third type of orders, ”aggressive orders”, are orders placed at the opposite quote or
higher(buys)/lower(sells). Figure (b) shows the average order size within each limit order group and the average
order size of market orders. Figure (c) show the average slope on the left axis and the average quoted and
effective spreads on the right axis. Note that the slope is calculated from the order book snapshot taken at the
end of each window. Figure (d) shows the fraction of each order category which is placed within each window.
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the most aggressive limit orders and market orders are the smallest and increase in size
throughout the day. If informed investors mainly use aggressive limit orders and market
orders, this may indicate that they submit smaller orders when their information is the
most valuable (stealth trading).
The evidence that there is more asymmetric information at the beginning of the
trading day is also captured by the intraday pattern of our slope estimate. The slope
increases (at a diminishing rate) across the day, with a minimum at the beginning of
the day and a maximum at the end of the day, which indicates that the order book is
more dispersed in the morning relative to later in the day. Note that the average slope
is calculated from the normalized order book, i.e. the slope does not merely reflect that
there are fewer orders in the order book early in the day, but rather that orders are
submitted across a wider price range.31 Over time windows, the average slope increases
at a diminishing rate as the order book becomes more concentrated and inelastic at the
end of the day.
3.5 The Volume-Volatility Relation
In this section, we first document that there exist a volume-volatility relation in the
Norwegian equity market as has been found for the US by e.g. Jones et al. (1994) and
in the UK by Huang and Masulis (2003). When we decompose volume into trades and
order size, and interpret the number of trades as a proxy for the mixing variable, we find
support for the MDH. We then investigate the relationship between volume, volatility
and the slope of the order book.
3.5.1 The Volume-Volatility Relation in a Limit Order Market
To investigate if there is a volume-volatility relation in our data sample, we follow the
regression approach in Jones et al. (1994). First, we measure the daily return volatility
using the standard procedure in similar empirical studies,32 by running the following
regression for each firm i,
Ri,t =
5∑
k=1
αi,kDk,t +
12∑
j=1
βi,jRi,t−j + ^i,t (3.4)
where Ri,t is the return of security i on day t, and Dk,t is a day-of-the-week dummy for
day k. To avoid measurement errors due to the bid-ask bounce, we calculate returns
from the average of bid-ask prices at the close. The 12 lagged return regressors esti-
mate short-term movements in conditional expected returns. The residual, ^i,t, is our
31A lower average slope reflects that the order book is more elastic, which implies that a lower fraction
of the order volume is close to the inner quotes relative to further out in the book.
32See Schwert (1990), Bessembinder and Seguin (1993), Jones et al. (1994), and Daigler and Wiley
(1999).
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estimate of the unexpected return of security i on date t. The absolute value of this
measure constitute our measure of volatility. Next, we estimate the regression equations
suggested in Jones et al. (1994) to determine the relative effects of number of trades
(N) and trade-size (AV) for volatility,
Model I: |^t,i| = αi + αi,mMt + βiAVi,t +
12∑
j=1
ρi,j|^i,t−j| + ηi,t (3.5)
Model II: |^t,i| = αi + αi,mMt + γiNi,t +
12∑
j=1
ρi,j|^i,t−j| + ηi,t (3.6)
Model III: |^t,i| = αi + αi,mMt + βiAVi,t + γiNi, t+
12∑
j=1
ρi,j|^i,t−j| + ηi,t (3.7)
The ρi,j’s measure the persistence in volatility across 12 lags. Mt is a dummy variable
that is equal to 1 for Mondays and 0 otherwise, AVi,t is the average trade size (total
number of shares traded divided by the number of transactions for stock i on date t),
and Ni,t is the number of transactions in security i on date t. The regressions are run
for each firm and then the parameter estimates are averaged across firms.
The first part of table 3.6 provides the results from the estimation of regression
equations 3.5-3.7 using daily returns for all companies in our filtered sample. Overall,
our results are very much in line with the results in Jones et al. (1994). The explanatory
power of model 2 (with respect to the adjusted R-squared), where volume is measured
by the average number of daily trades, is almost the double of the explanatory power
of model 1, where volume is measured by the average trade size. Moreover, the average
trade size has little marginal explanatory power when volatility is conditioned on the
number of transactions in model 3. These results are further supported by the char-
acteristics of the sampling distributions of individual-firm coefficients and t-statistics
of the two variables. In model 3, 95.4 percent of the coefficients for the average num-
ber of trades are statistically significant, and 99.1 percent of the average number of
trades coefficients were greater than zero. Similar numbers for the average trade size
are respectively 24.1 percent and 57.4 percent.
As a robustness check we also estimate the equations for sub-periods of half-years.
Although not reported in a table, the results from the whole sample regression are
confirmed in the sub-sample regressions. Most notably, the γ^ estimates of the effect of
trades (N), as well as their distributional properties, are very stable across sub-periods.
The β^ estimates, however, vary considerably across sub-periods and are less significant
than γ^ for model 1 relative to model 3.
Jones et al. (1994) find that trade size has some information content for some of
the smaller Nasdaq-NMS firms. This finding is interpreted as supportive of the notion
that private information based trading is important only for the smallest firms on the
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stock market. To check for similar features in our data sample, we re-estimate the
three regression models on the four size portfolios. The results from these estimations
are presented in the second part of table 3.6. In general, the results from estimating
separate regression models for each size portfolio are similar to the results from running
one regression for the whole sample. However, we find the opposite result from Jones
et al. (1994) that the explanatory power of trade size is the strongest for the largest
firms. On the other hand, only about half of the parameter estimates for trade size in
the single firm regressions are greater than zero, indicating that the effect may not be
very systematic across firms.
3.5.2 Volume, volatility and the limit order book
We now turn to the question whether the slope of the order book affect volatility and
trading activity. The reported results are based on the equally weighted slope calcu-
lated from the normalized order book. As discussed in section 3.4 and appendix 3.A,
we also calculate a tick-weighted slope measure. The two slope measures are highly
correlated (0.98), and the results from using the weighted slope measure are quite sim-
ilar to those obtained using the equally weighted measure.33 The correlations between
the equally weighted slope and the other variables used in our analysis are reported in
table 3.7. Table 3.8 provides some descriptive statistics on the distribution of the daily
slope estimate over the whole sample, for the separate years, and for the four market
capitalization groups.
Table 3.7 shows that the slope measure has the expected close relationship to mea-
sures of liquidity such as market capitalization (positive correlation of 0.44) and quoted
percentage spread (negative correlation of -0.32). Thus, larger firms are generally more
liquid, with a smaller spread and a steeper slope. One reason for this may be that
larger firms generally are easier to value, making the dispersion of prices in the order
book more concentrated around the midpoint price. In addition, we see that there is
a positive correlation of 0.13 between the slope and the number of trades. Further,
table 3.8 shows that larger and more liquid stocks have a higher fraction of the order
book volume concentrated at or around the best quotes, while smaller firms have more
elastic order books. This is also evident from panel B in table 3.3.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the relationship between the daily slope and the contempora-
neous daily price changes at an aggregate level. Daily price changes are measured as the
average daily absolute return over the trading day.34 Both variables are daily equally
weighted averages across all traded securities. Interestingly, even at this aggregate level
the figure indicates that the price volatility is higher (lower) when the average daily
slope of the order book is low (high). Another notable feature is that the average slope
33Estimation results for when we use the weighted slope version are reported in appendix 3.C.
34cf equation 3.4.
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Table 3.6
A volume-volatility regression model
The table reports the results from the estimation of three regression models of the volume/trade size -volatility
relation. The models are estimated on the whole data sample and separately for each market capitalization
group. The models are based on Jones et al. (1994):
Model I: |^t,i| = αi + αi,mMt + βiAVi,t +
12∑
j=1
ρi,j|^i,t−j| + ηi,t
Model II: |^t,i| = αi + αi,mMt + γiNi,t +
12∑
j=1
ρi,j|^i,t−j| + ηi,t
Model III: |^t,i| = αi + αi,mMt + βiAVi,t + γiNi, t +
12∑
j=1
ρi,j|^i,t−j| + ηi,t
Using the Jones et al. (1994) notation we have that |t,i| is the absolute value of the return of security i in
period t, conditional on its own 12 lags and day-of-week dummies, Mt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1
for Mondays and 0 otherwise, AVi,t is the average trade size, Ni,t is the number of transactions for security i
on day t, and the coefficients ρi,t measure the persistence in volatility. Column 3-5 show parameter estimates
averaged across all individual firm regression equations, while columns 6-9 show the parameter distribution across
firms. β^ is the average parameter estimate for the average trade size variable (AV), γ^ is the average parameter
estimate for the number of trades variable (N). In the distribution of estimates column we report, respectively,
the percentage of β^ and γ^ estimates over all single firm regression equations that are significant. In the last two
columns we report the percentage of parameter estimates that are greater than zero. The first part of the table
shows the results from running the regression equations over the whole sample. The second part of the table
shows the similar results when we split the sample into four size portfolios.
Parameter estimates Distribution of estimates
Model Firms β^ (AV) γ^ (N) adj. R2 %t(β^)>2 %t(γ^)>2 %β^>0 %γ^>0
Model I (AV) 108 0.145 - 0.057 26.9% - 81.5% -
Model II (N) 108 - 0.031 0.145 - 95.4% - 100.0%
Model III (AV,N) 108 0.053 0.031 0.149 22.2% 94.4% 58.3% 100.0%
Model I (AV)
1 (small) 27 0.145 - 0.080 16.2% - 78.4% -
2 27 0.219 - 0.055 18.2% - 77.3% -
3 27 0.274 - 0.048 19.0% - 64.3% -
4 (large) 27 1.021 - 0.038 30.8% - 79.5% -
Model II (N)
1 (small) 27 - 0.052 0.174 - 89.2% - 97.3%
2 27 - 0.028 0.147 - 75.0% - 95.5%
3 27 - 0.036 0.136 - 81.0% - 95.2%
4 (large) 27 - 0.014 0.174 - 79.5% - 92.3%
Model III (AV,N)
1 (small) 27 0.079 0.053 0.175 10.8% 86.5% 64.9% 97.3%
2 27 0.076 0.030 0.148 4.5% 75.0% 54.5% 95.5%
3 27 0.075 0.036 0.140 16.7% 78.6% 45.2% 95.2%
4 (large) 27 0.237 0.014 0.179 30.8% 82.1% 35.9% 94.9%
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Table 3.7
Variable correlations
The table shows Pearsons’ correlation coefficients between our elasticity variable (SLOPE) and various trading
activity and liquidity variables.
Trade size Order
Trades (N) shares (AV) MCAP SPREAD SLOPE volume (OV)
Trade size shares (AV) -0.02
MCAP 0.25 -0.04
SPREAD -0.20 0.16 -0.17
SLOPE 0.13 -0.08 0.44 -0.32
Order volume shares (OV) 0.19 0.16 0.06 -0.06 0.04
Trade volume shares (V) 0.43 0.33 0.14 -0.13 0.08 0.45
is steeper in the first half of the sample, with an average slope of about 41, than during
the second part of the sample when the average slope drops to about 35. These two
periods coincide quite well with the boom and burst of the internet bubble. It is not
obvious that increased trading activity due to arrival of new information can explain
the volatility pattern during this period. If the slope proxies for valuation uncertainty,
the pattern in the figure reflects greater agreement among traders about asset values
during the build-up of the bubble than during the subsequent market down-turn.
3.5.3 Daily volatility and order book shape
To examine whether our slope measure can explain the contemporaneous volatility
across firms and time, we estimate modified versions of the volume-volatility regres-
sion equations in section 3.5.1. More specifically, we estimate 3 different versions of the
following cross-sectional time-series regression model with one-way fixed effects,
| it |=
K∑
k=1
Xitkβk + ηi,t (3.8)
where | it | is the daily volatility estimate from equation 3.4, Xitk is the matrix of
explanatory variables (k) across time (t) for each company (i) and ηi,t = νi + εi,t
defines the error structure with νi as the non-random fixed, firm-specific, effect. Since
we use one-way fixed effects specification, the estimation is analogous to a least-squares
dummy variable (LSDV) regression with firm-specific constants νi. Since not all firms
are traded every day, our sample is unbalanced35. However, results from estimating the
same models on a balanced sample are quantitatively similar.36
35We use the TSCSREG procedure supplied with SAS v.8.2 for estimating the models. The procedure
is capable of processing data with different numbers of time-series observations across different cross
sections.
36In the unbalanced sample, all firms with 400 trading days or more throughout the sample period of
597 days are included. In the balanced sample, we filter out all firms which are not traded every day
during the sample period. This filter reduces the sample to 25 firms. See appendix 3.B for estimation
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Table 3.8
Distribution of slope estimates
The table shows the distribution of the slope estimates where each local slope is equally weighted, and each
side of the order book is normalized with respect to the total number of shares on each side. Panel A report
the estimates for the entire sample and across minimum tick sizes. Panel B report the estimates across market
capitalization groups and years. Each company is assigned to a market capitalization quartile at the end of every
trading day. N reflects the number of firm/date observations, MCAP is the average market capitalization in
NOK millions, price is the average price, P5, P10, P25, P75, P90, and P95 are the 5th, 10th 25th 75th, 90th and
95th percentiles respectively.
PANEL A
Distribution of daily SLOPE estimates
N MCAP Price P5 P10 P25 Median Mean P75 P90 P95
All firms 51015 7294 145 9.1 11.9 18.3 29.2 37.2 46.7 70.9 91.5
1999 16968 5948 110 9.4 12.6 20.3 33.2 41.4 53.0 79.2 101.3
2000 23853 7737 180 9.6 12.2 18.0 27.6 35.3 43.5 66.3 86.0
2001 10194 8498 122 7.8 10.6 16.5 27.0 34.7 43.4 65.2 85.7
PANEL B
Distribution of daily SLOPE estimates
N MCAP Price P5 P10 P25 Median Mean P75 P90 P95
MCAP Q1 (small) 12532 259 21 5.7 7.4 11.4 17.2 20.9 25.9 38.2 47.9
1999 4163 213 19 5.9 7.5 11.4 17.5 21.2 26.7 39.3 48.2
2000 5864 282 22 6.3 8.2 12.1 17.6 20.9 25.7 36.6 45.9
2001 2505 283 22 4.6 6.0 10.0 15.9 20.5 25.2 40.4 50.9
MCAP Q2 12828 1005 64 10.6 12.9 18.1 26.3 31.8 39.0 56.4 70.9
1999 4264 869 50 11.3 14.0 19.7 28.8 34.0 41.8 59.3 74.4
2000 5999 1035 69 10.7 12.8 17.7 25.1 30.2 36.9 53.1 66.8
2001 2565 1158 76 9.8 12.0 16.9 25.2 31.8 39.2 57.8 73.2
MCAP Q3 12672 2786 121 12.0 15.3 22.2 32.5 39.0 48.1 69.9 87.2
1999 4210 2289 106 15.3 19.1 26.5 38.1 45.2 55.8 78.9 98.1
2000 5934 2914 133 11.6 14.7 21.1 30.4 36.5 44.3 65.0 82.4
2001 2528 3315 121 10.6 13.1 19.5 28.9 34.5 43.0 61.3 75.8
MCAP Q4 (large) 12983 24698 369 18.0 22.1 31.6 47.1 56.5 69.4 101.6 128.8
1999 4331 20016 261 23.0 28.2 38.9 55.7 64.2 79.0 111.6 136.6
2000 6056 26320 491 16.7 21.0 29.2 44.0 53.1 64.6 94.6 120.3
2001 2596 28727 263 15.7 19.9 27.8 41.1 51.5 61.5 96.6 125.9
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Figure 3.5 Average slope and volatility
The figure illustrates the relationship between the estimates of the average daily slope of the order book and the
contemporaneous daily price changes. The left axis measures the equally weighted average absolute return across
firms traded on the respective date. The right axis measures the slope estimate calculated as the daily equally
weighted slope, averaged over all companies that were traded during the trading day.
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As indicated by the correlation structure in table 3.7, our slope measure may also
proxy for liquidity. We therefore control for other liquidity measures in the regression
model. The estimated model can be written as;
| i,t |= β0Mi,t + β1Ni,t + β2AVi,t + β3MCAPi,t + β4SPRi,t+
β5OVi,t + β6SLOPEi,t +
12∑
j=1
ρi,j | i,t−j | +ηi,t.
(3.9)
where SLOPE is our slope estimate, MCAP is the market capitalization value (in mill.
NOK), SPR is the quoted percentage midpoint spread, and OV is the average order
book volume in thousand shares and ηi,t = νi + εi,t defines the error structure with νi
as the non-random fixed, firm-specific, effect. Results from the estimation for the full
sample period are provided in panel A of table 3.9. Model 1 is essentially the same
as in the analysis in section 3.5.1, but with the addition of the slope variable and the
results for the balanced sample.
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additional variables accounting for stock liquidity (SPR, MCAP, and OV). In model
2, we estimate the model excluding the two variables which are highest correlated with
the slope (SPR and MCAP), and in model 3 we exclude the trading activity (mixing)
variables. We also estimate the same regression equation across 3-month sub-periods.
The results from this estimation are reported in panel B of the table. Because we use
lagged versions of the dependent variable, | i,t−j |, as explanatory variables to adjust
for autocorrelations in volatility, we choose a fixed effects model.37
The first thing to note in Panel A in table 3.9 is that the slope variable (SLOPE)
is negative and highly significant across all three model specifications. Thus, volatility
increases the more gentle the slope are. This may be linked to differences of opinion
about public news, “noise trading” from uninformed investors38, or pick-off risk.39 We
will discuss several interpretations of our findings at the end of the section.
Both the number of trades (N) and the trade size (AV) have a positive significant
effect on volatility as we found earlier. When we remove trade size from the regression
model, the reduction in R-squared is small (not shown in the table). Thus, the Jones
et al. (1994) result that trade size does not include information that is not already
included in the number of trades, is also evident in the panel analysis after we have
controlled for additional liquidity variables. Moreover, the total volume in the order
book (OV) is shown to have a significant positive effect on volatility. This result is
consitent with the result in Biais et al. (1995) that more trades are executed when the
order book is thick. The correlations shown in table 3.7 between order book volume and
trade volume (45 percent) and between the order book volume and trades (19 percent)
also suggest that the volume-volatility relation depends on the incoming order flow and
the state of the order book. Finally, the estimation results show that larger firms are
less volatile and that higher spreads coincide with higher volatility.
One important issue to note is that there is an indeterminacy with respect to the
causality between volatility and several of the explanatory variables such as the average
order book volume, number of trades, the spread and the slope measure. Although this
probably is most important at the transaction level, several of our measures are averages
across hourly snapshots. Thus, dynamic interactions between order submissions and the
status of the order book, as examined in detail by Biais et al. (1995), is left out of our
regression model. For instance, Biais et al. (1995) find that a thin book attracts new
orders while a thick book increases trading activity. Another example is that a higher
37For a random-effects model to be applicable, the firm-specific constants, νi, must be uncorrelated
with the regressors. This requirement is likely to be violated by the lagged variables. Later in the paper,
we test whether we should use a random-effects model more formally by running Hausman tests.
38A problem could be that a steeper slope implies a less pronounced bid-ask bounce, and thus a lower
volatility. However, as outlined in section 3.5.1, we try to avoid measurement errors due to the bid-ask
bounce by calculating returns using the average of bid-ask prices.
39If some liquidity suppliers are informed about the volatility, as in the Foucault et al. (2003) model,
they may find it optimal to bid less aggressively when they know that the volatility is high.
106 Chapter 3 Order Book Characteristics and the Volume-Volatility Relation
volatility may reduce the number of orders coming into the market, which again lowers
the average slope of the book on that day. To examine this issues, we run simple
Granger causality tests between our slope measure and various order types and trading
activity variables, both on an hourly and a daily frequency. Overall, we are unable
to determine a clear one-way causality relation between the variables, rather we find a
two-way causality for most variable combinations.
The estimation results for models 2 and 3 are essentially the same as for model 1.
The important thing to note is that the parameter estimate for SLOPE is significantly
negative and relatively stable across the three model specifications. The slope parame-
ter is most negative and most significant in model 2, when we remove the spread (SPR)
and market capitalization (MCAP) variables. This suggests that the slope captures
liquidity effects captured by these variables. Both the F-test of no firm-specific effects
(firm-specific constants) and the Hausman specification test of whether a random-effects
model would be more appropriate relative to the fixed effects specification, are rejected
at the 1 percent level for all three models.40 This suggests that our firm-specific dummies
are correlated with the regressor, such that a fixed-effects specification is more appro-
priate. The reason for this is that we have lagged versions of the dependent variable,
which makes νi correlated with the regressors.
To examine the stability of the slope measure, we estimate model 1 for non-overlapping
sub-periods of three months through the entire sample period. The results from these
regressions are reported in panel B in table 3.9. We only report the parameter estimates
and tests for the slope variable, number of trades, and trade size. The SLOPE param-
eter is remarkably stable across the sub-samples. In addition, it is significant at the 1
percent level within all sub-samples, except for the first. Also, the number of trades is
highly significant across all sub-periods while the average trade size is significant at the
1 percent level only in half of the sub-sample regressions, suggesting that the number of
trades is the important component of volume in the volume-volatility relation, as also
suggested by our analysis in section 3.5.1. The parameter estimate for the number of
trades decreases over the sample period. This is most likely due to the fact that the
mean number of trades across companies increases through the sample period.
F-tests of no fixed effects within each sub-period regression is rejected at the 1
percent level.41 Our results suggest that both the order flow and the status of the
order book are significantly related to contemporaneous volatility in addition to trading
volume.
40The Hausman test compares an inefficient but consistent OLS estimator (the fixed effects case) to
an efficient GLS estimator (the random effects case). Thus, the Hausman test is a test of H0, that
random effects would be consistent and efficient, versus H1, that random effects would be inconsistent.
Rejecting H0 would suggest that we should use a fixed effects specification.
41In addition, the Hausman test rejects a random effects specification at the 1 percent level for each
sub-sample model.
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Table 3.9
A volume-volatility regression model including the (full) order book slope
The table shows the results from estimating a panel regression model with one-way fixed effects (least squares
dummy variable estimation) for the whole sample (Panel A) and for sub-periods of 3 months (Panel B). The
estimated model (model 1) is,
| i,t |= β0Mi,t + β1Ni,t + β2AVi,t + β3MCAPi,t + β4SPRi,t+
β5OVi,t + β6SLOPEi,t +
12∑
j=1
ρi,j | ^i,t−j | +ηi,t.
where ηi,t = νi + εi,t defines the error structure with νi as the non-random fixed, firm-specific, effects. | i,t |
is the absolute return adjusted for day of week effects and autocorrelation in returns. M is a dummy variable
for Monday, N is the number of transactions, AV is the average trade size in shares, MCAP is the market
capitalization (in mill. NOK), SPR is the relative spread (quoted spread as a percent of the midpoint price), OV
is the total number of shares in the order book (sum of all orders on bid and ask side of the order book) and
SLOPE is the average slope of the bid and offer side of the order book. Panel A, shows the parameter estimates
for 3 variations of the full model (model 1), t-values, and standard errors for the parameter estimates. In model 2,
we do not control for the market capitalization (MCAP) and spread (SPR) variables, and in model 3 we exclude
the trading activity (N) and trade size (AV) variables. The table shows the associated t-values as well as the R2
for each portfolio regression. The autoregressive estimates have been excluded from the table. For the F-tests, ∗∗
denotes significance at the 1 percent level. Panel B, shows the sub-period estimates for model 1 for the SLOPE,
N and AV variables with associated t-values. For each period, the model R-squared, F-test for fixed effects, and
number of cross-sectional observations (N) and number of time series observations (T) are reported in the last
four rows of the table.
PANEL A: Whole sample regression
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3
Variables Est. t-value std.err Est. t-value std.err Est. t-value std.err
M (Monday) 0.021 0.60 0.035 0.037 1.05 0.036 -0.014 -0.38 0.036
N (trades) 0.005 43.95 0.000 0.005 41.06 0.000 - - -
AV (tradesize) 0.025 6.18 0.004 0.023 5.68 0.004 - - -
MCAP (firmsize) -0.013 -2.79 0.005 - - - -0.001 -0.18 0.005
SPR (rel.spread) 0.234 24.65 0.009 - - - 0.181 18.86 0.010
SLOPE -0.007 -11.82 0.001 -0.009 -14.43 0.001 -0.008 -12.35 0.001
OV (ordervolume) 0.023 6.32 0.004 0.023 6.34 0.004 0.050 13.77 0.004
R2 21.8% 20.7% 18.3%
N (firms) 98 98 98
T (time series) 572 572 572
F-test 17.5∗∗ 15.13∗∗ 11.34∗∗
(no fixed effects)
PANEL B: Sub-period regression
SLOPE N (trades) AV (trade size) Model
Quarter β6 t-value β1 t-value β2 t-value R
2 F test N T
1999.1 -0.008 -1.39 0.016 4.90 0.082 1.50 37.6% 2.57∗∗ 61 14
1999.2 -0.005 -2.74 0.013 10.97 0.059 3.00 26.6% 4.31∗∗ 87 59
1999.3 -0.005 -3.19 0.011 11.24 0.061 3.99 36.7% 7.71∗∗ 96 66
1999.4 -0.006 -2.67 0.014 16.04 0.039 2.90 27.5% 5.54∗∗ 97 64
2000.1 -0.007 -3.22 0.013 26.42 0.032 1.65 31.0% 7.96∗∗ 98 65
2000.2 -0.006 -2.89 0.013 18.86 0.019 1.06 30.7% 5.23∗∗ 98 58
2000.3 -0.007 -4.36 0.010 20.86 0.004 0.52 29.6% 6.41∗∗ 98 65
2000.4 -0.009 -4.29 0.007 16.12 0.018 2.08 21.6% 4.11∗∗ 97 63
2001.1 -0.008 -4.41 0.003 6.26 -0.005 0.05 25.6% 5.17∗∗ 93 64
2001.2 -0.008 -4.63 0.002 8.92 0.027 2.08 25.9% 4.67∗∗ 88 54
Average -0.007 -3.38 0.010 14.06 0.034 1.88 29.3%
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A robustness check In a limit order market, most trades originate from limit orders,
i.e. there must be a strong relationship between order book shape, volatility and trading
volume. One interpretation of our slope measure is that it is essentially a liquidity
measure, and that the inner part of the order book is capturing the main effect on
volatility. A useful way to check this is to examine whether the slope calculated from
different sets of the order book contain different information about volatility. One way
of doing this is to calculate the slope based on truncated versions of the order book.
We re-calculate the slope measure based on two different subsets of the book. The
resulting estimate distributions are shown in figure 3.6. Figure 3.6a shows the frequency
distribution of slope estimates calculated from an order book which is truncated to 5
ticks away from the best quotes.42 Figure 3.6b shows the distribution of daily slope
estimates when we calculate the average slope based on twice as much of the order book
(+/- 10 ticks). Finally, figure 3.6c shows the frequency distribution when we base our
slope estimates on the entire order book (+/- 100 ticks). The slope decreases the more
of the order book we use. This is expected, if the supply and demand curves in the
order book are concave.43 The mean slope when we use the full order book is about 37
(median 28), while it increases to 57 (median 46) and 76 (median 62) when we calculate
it from the order book truncated to +/- 10 and +/- 5 ticks respectively.
To examine whether the inner part of the order book captures the relationship
between volatility and slope, we re-estimate the regression models in table 3.9 with
slope measures calculated from the two sub-sets of the order book. Panel A in table
3.10 reports the estimation results. The results when we use the slope calculated from
the order book truncated to +/- 10 ticks (SLOPE10) from the best quote on each side
are reported in model 1a, and the results when we truncate the order book to +/- 5 ticks
(SLOPE5) are reported in model 1b. All other variables are identical to the previous
analysis. Panel B of the table shows the correlation between each slope measure and
other variables. The main result from the estimation is that the slope parameter remains
negative and significant. In addition, the parameter estimates become smaller compared
to the case where we used the full order book. The decrease in parameter size is mainly
due to the fact that the mean of the slope estimates increases (as shown in figure 3.6)
while the dependent variable remains unchanged. Thus, the relationship seems to be
similar when we use only the inner levels of the order book to calculate the slope. Also
R-squared of the different models does not change when we change the slope variable.
Overall, our results suggest that the different slope measures capture mainly the same
relationship.
Panel B in table 3.10 shows the correlations between the three slope measures and
the activity and liquidity variables. One interesting thing to note is that the correlation
42That is, we use only the cumulative volume at the five first ticks on each side of the order book
when we calculate the average slope.
43Concave when we have price on the x-axis and volume on the y-axis.
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Figure 3.6 Frequency distribution of slope estimates
The figures show the frequency distributions for (average) daily equally weighted normalized slope estimates for
all firms for the entire sample period. In figure (a) the slope calculations are calculated using only the first 5
levels of the order book, in figure (b) we use the first 10 levels of the order book and in figure (c) we use the
entire order book up to 100 tick levels.
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between the slope and number of trades and between the slope and the trade volume
in shares increases substantially the more we truncate the order book. This may reflect
that the relationship found in Biais et al. (1995), that a thicker (more concentrated)
order book results in trades, is more pronounced when we evaluate the relationship
closer to the inner quotes.
Table 3.11 shows the estimation results when estimating the model using the trun-
cated slope measures across sub-periods. Similar to our findings when we estimate the
model over the whole sample period, we find that the size of the parameter estimate
as well as its significance declines the more we truncate the order book. For model 1b,
when we truncate the order book to 5 ticks, the slope estimate is only significantly dif-
ferent from zero for half of the sub-samples. Thus, the significance of the slope variable
is greatly reduced within sub-periods when we only use the inner part of the book. Note
also that when we use the slope based on the full order book, the relationship between
volatility and slope is stronger across sub-periods, as shown in panel B in table 3.9.
3.5.4 Number of trades and order book shape
In this sub-section, we examine the relationship between the slope and the contempo-
raneous trading volume.
In table 3.12 we estimate a cross-sectional time series regression with the number
of trades as the dependent variable. As before, we control for liquidity variables which
are expected to be important with respect to the number of trades. When we base our
slope measure on the the full order book (model 1 in panel A), a significant negative
relationship between the slope and the number of trades is documented. Thus, the more
gentle the order book slope, the higher the trading volume represented by the number
of trades. Models 2 and 3 in table 3.12 are estimated with slope measures calculated
from the truncated order books. Interestingly, we find that the parameter estimate
switches sign and becomes more positive the closer we get to the inner quotes. Thus,
the slope at the inner quotes is positively related to the number of trades, while the
average slope for the full book is negatively related to trade execution. In other words,
the relationship between liquidity and trading activity becomes more evident when we
restrict the analysis to the inner part of the order book.
We also find that the number of trades is lower on Mondays, that the average trade
size is unrelated to the number of trades, and that larger firms are more frequently
traded. In addition, we find that there is less trading when the quoted percentage
spread is large, and that there are more trades when the volume of shares in the order
book is high. Again, one caveat with respect to the analysis is that we do not take into
account the dynamic interactions between the order flow and status of the order book.
For example, as found by Biais et al. (1995), a thinner book may attract new orders
which in the next step increases the number of transactions. The most interesting result
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Table 3.10
The relationship between volatility and truncated order book
The table shows the results from the estimation of two panel regression models where we use slope measures
calculated from different sub-sets of the full order book. In model 1a in Panel A, the average slope variable is
calculated from the order book truncated to contain only the first 10 tick levels on the bid and ask side. In model
1b in Panel A, the slope is calculated from the order book truncated to quotes and volumes including the first
5 tick levels. All other variables are the same as the ones we use in the regression model described in table 3.9.
The models are estimated with one-way fixed effects for the whole sample. The estimated model is,
| i,t |= β0Mi,t + β1Ni,t + β2AVi,t + β3MCAPi,t + β4SPRi,t+
β5OVi,t + β6SLOPEi,t +
12∑
j=1
ρi,j | ^i,t−j | +ηi,t.
where ηi,t = νi + εi,t defines the error structure with νi as the non-random fixed, firm specific, effects. | i,t |
is the absolute return adjusted for day of week effects and autocorrelation in returns. M is a dummy variable
for Monday, N is the number of transactions, AV is the average trade size in shares, MCAP is the market
capitalization (in NOK mill.), SPR is the relative spread (quoted spread as% of the midpoint price), OV is the
total number of shares in the order book (sum of all orders on bid and ask side of the order book) and SLOPE is
the average slope of the bid and offer side of the truncated order book. The autoregressive estimates have been
excluded from the table. Panel B shows the correlation between various variables and the three slope measures
calculated from the full order book as well as the two slope measures calculated from the restricted order books.
∗∗ indicates that the F-test from a test of no fixed effects is rejected at the 1 percent level.
PANEL A: Whole sample regression
MODEL 1a Model 1b
(+/- 10 ticks) (+/- 5 ticks)
Variables Estimate t-value std.err Estimate t-value std.err
M (Monday dummy) 0.023 0.6 0.035 0.028 0.8 0.036
N (trades) 0.005 45.2 0.000 0.005 45.5 0.000
AV (avg. trade size) 0.023 5.7 0.004 0.022 5.5 0.004
MCAP (market capitalization) -0.010 -2.0 0.005 -0.009 -1.8 0.005
SPR (% quoted spread) 0.236 24.8 0.010 0.234 23.1 0.010
SLOPE10 (+/- 10 ticks) -0.005 -11.4 0.000 - - -
SLOPE5 (+/-5 ticks) - - - -0.003 -9.9 0.000
OV (order-book volume) 0.023 6.3 0.004 0.023 6.3 0.004
R2 21.8% 21.8%
N (cross section) 98 98
T (time series) 572 572
F-test no fixed effects 18.33∗∗ 17.93∗∗
PANEL B: Variable correlations
SLOPE SLOPE10 SLOPE5
(Full order-book) (+/- 10 ticks) (+/- 5 ticks)
N (trades) 0.13 0.25 0.28
Trade volume shares (V) 0.08 0.45 0.45
AV (avg. trade size) -0.08 -0.09 -0.11
MCAP (market capitalization) 0.44 0.42 0.41
SPR (% quoted spread) -0.32 -0.31 -0.33
OV (order-book volume) 0.04 0.04 0.03
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Table 3.11
The relationship between volatility truncate order book across sub-periods
The table shows the results from estimating the two panel regression model in table 3.10 for sub-periods of three
months. In model 1a, the average slope variable is calculated using an order book truncated to the first 10 tick
levels on the bid and ask side. In model 1b, the average slope is calculated using an order book truncated to
prices and volumes within the first 5 tick levels. All other variables are the same as the variables used in table
3.9. The models are estimated with one-way fixed effects for each sub-period. The estimated model is,
| i,t |= β0Mi,t + β1Ni,t + β2AVi,t + β3MCAPi,t + β4SPRi,t+
β5OVi,t + β6SLOPEi,t +
12∑
j=1
ρi,j | ^i,t−j | +ηi,t.
where ηi,t = νi + εi,t defines the error structure with νi as the non-random fixed, firm-specific, effects. | i,t |
is the absolute return adjusted for day of week effects and autocorrelation in returns. M is a dummy variable
for Monday, N is the number of transactions, AV is the average trade size in shares, MCAP is the market
capitalization (in NOK mill.), SPR is the relative spread (quoted spread as% of the midpoint price), OV is the
total number of shares in the order book (sum of all orders on bid and ask side of the order book) and SLOPE is
the average slope of the bid and offer side of the restricted order book. The table shows the parameter estimates
for 2 variations of model 1 in table 3.9 with the associated t-value, std.error of the estimate, the model R-squared.
∗∗ indicates that the F-test for no fixed effects is rejected at the 1 percent level.
Model 1a Model 1b
(+/- 10 ticks) (+/- 5 ticks)
Quarter SLOPE10 t-val. std.err R2 F-val. SLOPE5 t-val. std.err R2 F-val.
1999.1 0.000 -0.1 0.004 39% 3.4∗∗ -0.003 -1.1 0.003 31% 2.2∗∗
1999.2 -0.004 -2.4 0.002 27% 4.2∗∗ -0.001 -0.9 0.001 27% 4.5∗∗
1999.3 -0.002 -1.6 0.001 33% 5.2∗∗ -0.001 -0.7 0.001 34% 5.0∗∗
1999.4 -0.003 -1.7 0.002 28% 6.1∗∗ -0.001 -1.1 0.001 28% 6.5∗∗
2000.1 -0.004 -2.6 0.001 31% 8.4∗∗ -0.002 -1.9 0.001 31% 8.5∗∗
2000.2 -0.003 -2.4 0.001 30% 5.1∗∗ -0.002 -2.0 0.001 30% 5.1∗∗
2000.3 -0.003 -2.8 0.001 31% 6.9∗∗ -0.001 -1.2 0.001 31% 6.8∗∗
2000.4 -0.006 -4.6 0.001 24% 4.1∗∗ -0.005 -4.2 0.001 24% 4.0∗∗
2001.1 -0.004 -3.1 0.001 26% 5.2∗∗ -0.003 -2.6 0.001 26% 5.2∗∗
2001.2 -0.006 -4.0 0.001 25% 4.8∗∗ -0.004 -3.3 0.001 26% 4.8∗∗
Average -0.004 -2.5 0.002 29.4% -0.002 -1.9 0.001 28.8%
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from the estimation is that a slope measure calculated on the basis of the full order book
seems to provide different information compared to a slope measure calculated on the
basis of the volume at the inner quotes.
In the previous sub-section, we found that the relationship between price volatility
and the slope was well proxied by a slope measure based on the inner part of the book.
In this section, we have documented a significant difference between slope measures
based on different order book truncations.
3.5.5 Interpretation of the results
The relationships documented in this study are interesting in several respects. First,
although most of the activity occur at the inner part of the order book, the order
book data shows that the liquidity provided at the inner quotes in many cases reflect
only a modest part of the total liquidity supplied in the full order book. Second, the
characteristics of the order book vary systematically over the trading day as well as
across firms. Third, as far as we know, no previous studies have examined in detail the
relationship between the characteristics of the full order book and volume and volatility
in a cross-sectional time series setting.
One question is why orders persist further out in the book? One reason may be that
traders are slow in revising their orders in response to new information. Another reason
suggested by Sand˚as (2001) is that the placement of orders deep in the book are based on
strategic choices where, in a multi-period setting, the gains from obtaining price priority
of the orders further out in the book are traded off the costs of monitoring them. When
we examine the slopes of the order books across companies over time, we find that there
are marked differences across firms in the amount of volume provided throughout the
order book, and that these differences persist through time. As shown in table 3.8 some
firms have generally a very large fraction of their liquidity concentrated close to the best
quotes, while other firms have a relatively larger fraction of the order volume further
out in the book. A second question is why such differences in slope estimates across
firms appear? The systematic patterns found may indicate that the shape of the order
book capture some underlying characteristics of the the trading strategies of liquidity
suppliers across firms. One possible explanation is related to asymmetric information.
In general, we find that smaller firms have order books with a gentler slope than larger
firms, which is in line with the hypothesis that there is more private information in
smaller than in larger firms.
In summary, our main findings about the relationship between the slope of the book
and the volume-volatility relation are;
• A more gentle slope (more dispersed order book) coincide with a higher volatility
across firms and over time.
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Table 3.12
The relationship between the number of trades and the order book slope
The table shows the results when we estimate the relationship between different slope measures and the number
of trades. The model is estimated as a one-way fixed effects model. The estimated model is,
Ni,t = β0Mi,t + β1AVi,t + β2MCAPi,t + β3SPRi,t + β4SLOPEi,t + β5OVi,t + ηi,t.
where ηi,t = νi + εi,t defines the error structure with νi as the non-random fixed, firm specific, effects. The
dependent variable, N is the number of transactions, M is a dummy variable for Monday, AV is the average
trade size in shares, MCAP is the market capitalization SPR is the relative spread (quoted spread in% of the
midpoint price), OV is the total number of shares in the order book (sum of all orders on bid and ask side of
the order book) and SLOPE is the average slope of the bid and offer side from the full order book, SLOPE10
is the slope calculated from the order book truncated to +/- 10 ticks, SLOPE5 is the slope calculated from the
order book truncated to +/- 5 ticks. Panel A shows the estimation results from the whole sample, while panel
B shows the estimation results from sub-periods. ∗∗ indicate that the F-test for fixed effects is significant at the
1 percent level.
PANEL A: Whole sample regression
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3
Variables Est. t-val. std.err Est. t-val. std.err Est. t-val. std.err
M (Monday) -6.17 -4.0 1.55 -6.01 -3.9 1.56 -6.25 -3.9 1.59
AV (trade size) -0.06 -0.4 0.18 -0.17 -0.9 0.18 -0.14 -0.8 0.18
MCAP (firm size) 3.34 15.7 0.21 2.94 13.7 0.22 2.79 12.8 0.22
SPR (spread) -9.13 -22.0 0.41 -8.49 -20.3 0.42 -9.03 -20.0 0.45
SLOPE (full book) -0.30 -11.1 0.03 - - - -
SLOPE10 (+/- 10) - - - 0.14 6.9 0.02 -
SLOPE5 (+/- 5) - - - - - - 0.20 12.9 0.02
OV (order-book vol.) 5.15 32.3 0.16 5.17 32.4 0.16 5.16 32.0 0.16
R2 39.4% 39.3% 39.3%
N cross section 95 95 95
Time series 572 572 572
F-test 235.5∗∗ 214.3∗∗ 200.3∗∗
(no fixed effects)
PANEL B: Sub-period regression
Full order book +/- 10 ticks +/- 5 ticks
Quarter β4 t-val. R
2 F-val. β4 t-val. R
2 F-val. β4 t-val. R
2 F-val.
1999.1 -0.05 -0.77 84% 18∗∗ -0.06 -1.19 84% 18∗∗ -0.06 -1.48 83% 17∗∗
1999.2 -0.10 -3.72 77% 44∗∗ -0.09 -3.89 77% 44∗∗ -0.06 -2.95 76% 42∗∗
1999.3 -0.12 -4.95 83% 45∗∗ -0.09 -4.23 83% 45∗∗ -0.06 -3.40 83% 42∗∗
1999.4 -0.01 -0.28 71% 68∗∗ 0.06 2.17 71% 67∗∗ 0.07 3.35 71% 65∗∗
2000.1 -0.37 -5.82 56% 61∗∗ -0.18 -4.14 56% 60∗∗ -0.08 -2.12 56% 59∗∗
2000.2 -0.11 -2.16 73% 46∗∗ -0.06 -1.72 73% 44∗∗ -0.03 -1.00 73% 41∗∗
2000.3 -0.13 -2.70 72% 68∗∗ -0.08 -2.37 72% 63∗∗ -0.08 -2.89 72% 61∗∗
2000.4 -0.12 -2.02 70% 113∗∗ -0.05 -1.26 70% 101∗∗ -0.00 -0.02 70% 92∗∗
2001.1 -0.02 -0.42 85% 172∗∗ 0.03 0.72 85% 158∗∗ 0.04 1.32 85% 149∗∗
2001.2 -0.21 -1.70 69% 91∗∗ 0.08 0.81 69% 81∗∗ 0.15 1.98 69% 73∗∗
Average -0.13 -2.45 74% -0.05 -1.51 74% -0.01 -0.72 74%
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• The relationship between the number of trades and the slope of the book depends
on which subset of the order book is used.
– When we use the slope from the inner book (+/- 5 ticks) there is a positive
relationship in which a steep slope coincide with a high number of trades.
– When the entire order book is used (+/- 100 ticks), the relationship is re-
versed, i.e. a more gentle slope coincide with a higher number of trades.
One interesting interpretation of these results is that the differences in the limit order
books across firms reflect valuation uncertainty and heterogenous valuations among the
liquidity suppliers. Although no models exist that offer any predictions to how the
full limit order book would look like in a market with heterogenous liquidity suppli-
ers, models assuming strategic behavior of uninformed investors provide an interesting
framework which could motivate such an interpretation. Shalen (1993) shows that the
strategic behavior of liquidity traders may be an important contributor to both volume
and volatility in addition to information arrivals. In her model, when uninformed in-
vestors has dispersed beliefs about asset values, they are faced with a signal extraction
problem, making them react to all types of trades in the order-flow which may or may
not be related to informed trading. Due to this, they increase both trading volume and
price volatility above what would be expected in equilibrium. Thus, the relationship
between volume and volatility is not merely due to the information arrival process (as
in the mixture of distributions framework), but also due to strategic trading by unin-
formed traders. The higher the fraction of uninformed traders in the population, the
greater the dispersion of beliefs, and the greater the excess volume and excess volatility.
Valuation uncertainty (dispersion of beliefs) may to some degree be captured by the
shape of the order book, as different levels of the book reflect the reservation prices of
liquidity suppliers. This provides an interesting interpretation for why the order volumes
observed in the limit order book are more dispersed than predicted by theoretical models
such as Glosten (1994). If the uncertainty about the value of a firm is high and liquidity
traders differ in their private valuations, they may submit their orders across a wider
range of prices relative to the case when there is greater agreement about the true value,
cf the example in figure 3.2 where we show the difference in the average order books
between two companies which obviously differ in their valuation uncertainty.
If valuation uncertainty coincide with a more gentle order book slope, our results
support several predictions from Shalen (1993). First, increased dispersion of beliefs
is predicted to increase (excess) trading volume. Our finding that a more gentle slope
coincide with a greater number of trades is in line with this prediction. Second, a peak
volume and volatility is predicted at the beginning of the trading day because dispersion
of beliefs is greater when the price signal is more noisy. As shown in section 3.4, the
slope of the order book is relatively more gentle in the beginning of the trading day
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than later in the day. However, this feature of the data may also be due to adjustments
in liquidity demand.
There are also models that relate the status of the order book to the order submission
strategies of homogeneous liquidity providers and how they provide the limit order book
when there is a probability of informed trading. If one takes the one period model
by Glosten (1994) as a benchmark, the slope of the supply and demand schedules in
the order book results from the probability of informed trading. Sand˚as (2001) tests
the predictions in Glosten (1994) in the Swedish market which is very similar to the
Norwegian market. He finds strong evidence that there is insufficient depth in the
observed order book relative to the theoretical prediction. In other words, the slope of
the demand and supply schedules in the order book, at the inner quotes, is much too
gentle to be explained by theory.
Our results for the inner part of the order book are consistent with models where a
higher liquidity at the inner quotes increases the number of trades. However, our results
for the full order book provide some additional results that are not captured by any
theoretical model. Our finding that the volume and volatility in financial markets may
be affected by valuation uncertainty and heterogenous beliefs among liquidity suppliers
provides a motivation for future research on this topic. From a more practical point of
view, the discussions in the popular press about the value of companies, and sometimes
very different buy and sell recommendations by analysts for the same stock, suggest
that the differences in valuations may be an important factor driving trading activity
in financial markets.
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3.6 Conclusion
A positive correlation between price volatility and trading volume has been documented
in a variety of studies. Investigating plausible explanations for this relation is impor-
tant because it can enhance our understanding of how information is disseminated into
market prices.
There are two, mainly complementary, hypotheses relating trading volume and
volatility. The mixture of distributions hypothesis states that the volume-volatility
relation is driven by a directing process that can be interpreted as the flow of informa-
tion. The dispersion of beliefs hypothesis states that both trading volume and volatility
should be higher the greater the dispersion of beliefs about security values among in-
vestors. One explanation behind this statement is based on asymmetric information and
strategic investor behavior. Uninformed traders cannot distinguish informed trades from
liquidity trades, and by reacting to trades with no information content, they increase
both volume and volatility relative to equilibrium values in a situation with symmetric
information. A positive relation between dispersion of beliefs and the volume-volatility
relation can also be explained in a non-informational setting where investors have differ-
ent opinions about the value of the same news. Thus, while the mixture of distributions
hypothesis states that trading volume and price movements result from new information
arrivals, the dispersion of beliefs hypothesis also relates a part of the volume-volatility
relation to increased trading by uninformed traders or symmetrically informed investors
who disagree on the same news.
Using a detailed data sample from the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE), we examine
whether information about the volume-volatility relation is contained in the shape of a
limit order book. We first document that our data exhibit a standard volume-volatility
relation. Moreover, we show that the result in Jones et al. (1994), that the average size
of trades has little marginal explanatory power when volatility is conditioned on the
number of daily transactions, also applies in a limit order market. A unique feature of
our data sample is that we can rebuild the whole order book at any time during the
trading day. This enables us to investigate whether the characteristics of the limit order
book contain information about the volume-volatility relation.
Our main findings show that more gentle demand and supply schedules increases
volatility and trading volume in a cross-sectional time series setting. One possible
interpretation of this is that the number of trades is not a proxy for the mixing variable,
but the mixing variable itself as suggested in models with heterogenous agents.
118 Chapter 3 Order Book Characteristics and the Volume-Volatility Relation
3.A Calculating slope measures
To explain the slope calculation more specifically, let NA and NB be respectively the
total number of bid and ask prices (tick levels) containing orders. Let τ denote the
tick level, with τ = 1 representing the best quote with a positive volume. Furthermore,
let pB1 and p
A
1 be respectively the best bid and ask prices, and p
M denote the bid-
ask midpoint (which is the average of pB1 and p
A
1 ). Let v
B
τ and v
A
τ be respectively the
percentage of total share volume at each tick level on the bid and ask side of the book.
E.g. vAτ=1=0.1 would mean that 10% of the total number of shares supplied on the ask
side of the order book is located at the best ask quote at that point in time. Finally, let
ωBτ and ω
A
τ denote the weight of the local slope calculated at tick level τ for respectively
the bid and the ask side of the book. These weights are set equal in the case when we
equally weight the local slopes across all tick levels. In the case when we weight each
local slope differently, we use a simple linear weighting scheme where the weight at each
tick level, τ, is calculated as,
ωAτ =
|τmax| − |τ| + 1∑
τ(|τ
max| − |τ|) + 1
(3A.1)
for the ask side, and similarly for the bid side. τmax is the maximum tick level with
non-zero volume. Thus, the quotes which are the furthest out in the order book (e.g. at
τ=80) get a relatively smaller weight than orders closer to the midpoint (e.g. at τ=10).
The summation is done across all ticks with a non-zero volume. This ensures that the
weights sum to one on each side of the book.
The average elasticity for the supply curve, SE, on day t at snapshot time s ∈ [1..6]
for company i can then be represented as,
SEsi,t =
{
vA1
pA1 /p
M − 1
ωAi,1 +
NA∑
τ=1
vAτ+1/v
A
τ − 1
pAτ+1/p
A
τ − 1
ωAi,τ
}
(3A.2)
Similarly, the demand curve, DE, can be represented as,
DEsi,t =
{
vB1
| pB1 /p
M − 1 |
ωBi,1 +
NB∑
τ=1
vBτ−1/v
B
τ − 1
| pBτ−1/p
B
τ − 1 |
ωBi,τ
}
(3A.3)
The first term of both equations expresses the slope between the bid-ask midpoint and
the best bid and ask prices, while the second term of both equations expresses the sum
of the local elasticities for the rest of the order book. The average elasticity in the order
book at snapshot s is just the average of SEsi,t and DE
s
i,t,
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SLOPEsi,t =
SEsi,t +DE
s
i,t
2
(3A.4)
The order book is rebuilt at 10:30, 11:30, 12:30, 13:30, 14:30 and 15:30 each trading
day for each firm. We exclude order volume above/below 100 ticks away from the inner
quotes. For a stock trading at NOK 100 with a minimum tick size of NOK 0.5 this
would mean that orders above NOK 150 and below NOK 50 are excluded from our
calculations. Also, if we based our estimates of daily elasticities on one snapshot only
(e.g. at noon), they could be biased due to large trades having temporarily reduced the
liquidity of one side of the book or systematic time of day effects. To obtain a less noisy
representation of the average daily supply and demand curves for each firm on each
date, we therefore average the slopes across the 6 snapshots, i.e.
SLOPEi,t =
1
6
6∑
s=1
SLOPEsi,t (3A.5)
3.B Balanced sample estimation
To examine the robustness of our results, we restrict our sample to firms that were
traded every day through the sample period of 572 trading days. This leaves us with
a balanced sample of 25 firms with 572 time series observations each. In addition, the
filtering leaves us with a sample of the largest, most liquid and actively traded firms
on the exchange. If the previous results are mainly due to noise or outliers introduced
by small illiquid firms or the unbalanced dataset, the balancing of the sample should
reveal this. In table 3.B1 we re-estimate model 1 in panel A of table 3.9 and model 1a
and 1b in panel A of table 3.10 for the balanced sample. The estimation results are
quantitatively similar to the results when we use the full sample. Most interestingly,
the parameter estimate for SLOPE is negative and of similar size as before. In addition,
the SLOPE estimate becomes smaller (less negative) the more we truncate the order
book. As before, this is mainly due to the increase in the size of the slope estimates the
more the order book is truncated. The largest difference between the models estimated
for the balanced and unbalanced sample is that the R-squared of the models is much
higher for the balanced sample, suggesting that there is more noise in the unbalanced
sample.
In table 3.B2 we re-estimate the model for trading activity in panel A of table 3.12
for the balanced sample. Although the parameter estimates change more in size than
what was the case for the volatility models, the parameters are qualitatively similar.
Most importantly, the SLOPE parameter estimate is negative when it is calculated using
the full order book, and becomes increasingly more positive the more the order book
is truncated. Thus, also for the balanced sample, the results suggests that the more
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Table 3.B1
Volatility/slope regression with balanced data sample
The table shows the estimation results of a cross-sectional time series model for the relationship between different
slope measures and the daily volatility when using a balanced sample. The models are similar to those estimated
(for the unbalanced sample) in table 3.9 (Model 1) and table 3.10. The estimated model is,
| i,t |= β0Mi,t + β1Ni,t + β2AVi,t + β3MCAPi,t + β4SPRi,t + β5OVi,t + β6SLOPEi,t +
12∑
j=1
ρi,j | ^i,t−j | +ηi,t.
where ηi,t = νi + εi,t defines the error structure with νi as the non-random fixed, firm-specific, effects. | i,t |
is the absolute daily return, N is the number of transactions, M is a dummy variable for Monday, AV is the
average trade size in shares, MCAP is the market capitalization (in NOK mill.), SPR is the relative spread
(quoted spread as % of the midpoint price), OV is the total number of shares in the order book (sum of all
orders on bid and ask side of the order book) and SLOPE is the average slope of the bid and offer side from the
full order book, SLOPE10 is the slope calculated from the order book truncated to +/- 10 ticks, SLOPE5 is the
slope calculated from the order book truncated to +/- 5 ticks. | ^i,t−j | are lagged absolute returns to take into
account autocorrelations.
PANEL A: Volatility/slope regressions for balanced sample
Volatility/slope Volatility/slope Volatility/slope
(full book) (+/- 10 ticks) (+/- 5 ticks)
Variables Est. t-value std.err Est. t-value std.err Est. t-value std.err
M (monday dummy) -0.083 -1.5 0.057 -0.081 -1.4 0.057 -0.078 -1.4 0.057
N (trades) 0.004 34.6 0.000 0.004 35.6 0.000 0.004 35.7 0.000
AV (avg. trade size) 0.017 2.5 0.007 0.014 2.0 0.007 0.013 1.9 0.007
MCAP (market cap.) -0.015 -2.7 0.006 -0.009 -1.6 0.006 -0.008 -1.4 0.006
SPR (% quoted spread) 0.345 16.3 0.021 0.358 16.9 0.021 0.351 16.6 0.021
SLOPE (full book) -0.008 -10.0 0.001 - - - - - -
SLOPE10 (+/- 10 ticks) - - - -0.007 -10.6 0.001 - - -
SLOPE5 (+/-5 ticks) - - - - - - -0.005 -9.6 0.001
OV (order book volume) 0.011 3.1 0.004 0.010 3.0 0.004 0.011 3.0 0.004
R2 37.6% 37.6% 37.5%
N (cross section) 25 25 25
T (time series) 572 572 572
F-test (no fixed effects) 41.6∗∗ 41.2∗∗ 40.9∗∗
dispersed prices are across the order book, the more trades are executed. Furthermore,
when the slope is calculated from the truncated order book, only using the volume at
the inner levels of the book, the results suggests that a thick book coincides with high
trading activity.
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Table 3.B2
Volume/slope regression for balanced sample
The table shows the results from estimating the relationship between the slope measures based on different
truncations of the order book and the number of trades using a balanced sample. The models are similar to
those estimated for the full (unbalanced) sample in table 3.12. The estimated model in panel B is,
Ni,t = β0Mi,t + β1AVi,t + β2MCAPi,t + β3SPRi,t + β4SLOPEi,t + β5OVi,t + ηi,t.
where ηi,t = νi+ εi,t defines the error structure with νi as the non-random fixed, firm-specific, effects. N is the
number of transactions, M is a dummy variable for Monday, AV is the average trade size in shares, MCAP is
the market capitalization (in NOK mill.), SPR is the relative spread (quoted spread as % of the midpoint price),
OV is the total number of shares in the order book (sum of all orders on bid and ask side of the order book) and
SLOPE is the average slope of the bid and offer side from the full order book, SLOPE10 is the slope calculated
from the order book truncated to +/- 10 ticks, SLOPE5 is the slope calculated from the order book truncated
to +/- 5 ticks.
PANEL B: Volume/slope regressions for balanced sample
Trades/slope Trades/slope Trades/slope
(full book) (+/- 10 ticks) (+/- 5 ticks)
Est. t-value std.err Est. t-value std.err Est. t-value std.err
M (monday dummy) -15.05 -3.6 4.224 -14.01 -3.3 4.227 -13.98 -3.3 4.216
AV (avg. trade size) -0.50 -0.9 0.514 -0.49 -0.9 0.514 -0.34 -0.7 0.513
MCAP (market cap.) 8.10 19.7 0.411 7.41 17.8 0.417 6.89 16.4 0.420
SPR (% quoted spread) -32.39 -21.0 1.543 -32.47 -21.0 1.545 -32.07 -20.8 1.540
SLOPE (full book) -0.50 -8.1 0.062 - - - - - -
SLOPE10 (+/- 10 ticks) - - - 0.33 6.7 0.049 - - -
SLOPE5 (+/- 5 ticks) - - - - - - 0.44 11.3 0.039
OV (order book volume) 3.33 12.8 0.262 3.43 13.1 0.262 3.45 13.2 0.261
R2 33% 33% 34%
N cross section 25 25 25
Time series 572 572 572
F-test (no fixed effects) 233.2∗∗ 224.0∗∗ 211.9∗∗
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3.C An alternative slope measure and separating the bid/ask
side
As a final exercise, we examine whether the weighted slope estimate, where we weight
each local slope with the distance from the inner quote (tick-weighted slope)44, changes
our results. The two slope measures are highly correlated (98%) so we do not expect
to see any large differences. However, in addition to examining the alternative slope
estimate, we also estimate the effect of the slope of the bid and ask side of the order
book separately, both in the balanced and unbalanced case as well as for the various
truncations of the order book. In table 3.C1 we report slope estimates for the volatility
regressions, and in panel B we report slope estimates for the trading activity regressions.
To preserve space we only report the slope estimates for the average slope, the bid and
ask slope as well as the p-value from an F-test for equality between the slope estimate
for the bid and ask side.
Starting with the first column (slope calculated from the full order book), we see that
the estimate for both the equally weighted slope and the tick-weighted slope are negative
and significant both for in the balanced and unbalanced case. The main difference is
that the weighted slope estimate is more negative than for the equally weighted estimate.
Furthermore, when examining the slope estimates for the bid and ask side separately,
they are only significantly different at the 5% level for the tick-weighted slope in the
unbalanced case. In the two next columns (when we use the truncated order books for
calculating the slope) the results are essentially similar, in the sense that the parameter
estimate for the tick-weighted slope is more negative than for the equally weighted slope.
Both slopes become less negative the more the order book is truncated. With respect
to differences between the ask and bid slopes, the parameter estimates are significantly
different at the 5% and 10% level for both measures in the balanced case, while they
are not different in the unbalanced case.
In table 3.C2 we perform a similar analysis for the trading activity regressions.
Looking first at the first column (slope calculated from the full order book), we see
that the parameter estimate is significantly negative both for the equally weighted and
tick-weighted slope in the balanced and unbalanced case. Thus, in both cases a more
dispersed order book coincides with high trading activity. Interestingly, for the equally
weighted slope (both in the balanced and unbalanced case) the ask slope estimate is
significantly positive while it is significantly negative for the bid slope. For both slope
measures, the bid slope is more significant than the ask slope in explaining the number
of trades. This may reflect the asymmetry in the order book. With respect to our
interpretation of the slope as potentially proxying for dispersion, it may reflect that
the bid side of the market is more important with respect to dispersion of beliefs,
44See appendix 3.A for explanation.
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Table 3.C1
Alternative slope measures and the effect of bid and ask slope on volatility
The table shows slope estimates from the volatility/slope regressions for the equally weighted slope measure and
tick-weighted slope measure calculated from different order book truncations in the balanced and unbalanced
sample.
Volatility/slope Volatility/slope Volatility/slope
(full book) (+/- 10 ticks) (+/- 5 ticks)
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Balanced sample:
Equally weighted slope (SLOPE) -0.008 -10.0 -0.007 -10.6 -0.005 -9.6
-Ask slope -0.006 -4.0 -0.005 -6.2 -0.004 -6.2
-Bid slope -0.004 -8.8 -0.003 -7.3 -0.002 -5.2
p-value (bid-ask=0) 0.22 0.03 0.01
Tick-weighted slope -0.016 -9.5 -0.014 -9.8 -0.010 -8.9
-Ask slope -0.008 -1.8 -0.012 -4.8 -0.008 -4.8
-Bid slope -0.008 -9.0 -0.006 -7.6 -0.004 -5.9
p-value (bid-ask=0) 0.97 0.03 0.06
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Full sample:
Equally weighted slope (SLOPE) -0.007 -11.8 -0.005 -11.4 -0.003 -9.9
-Ask slope -0.002 -2.3 -0.003 -5.9 -0.002 -5.8
-Bid slope -0.004 -11.4 -0.002 -8.1 -0.001 -5.8
p-value (bid-ask=0) 0.07 0.54 0.23
Tick-weighted slope -0.015 -11.5 -0.010 -10.4 -0.006 -8.8
-Ask slope -0.001 -0.4 -0.004 -3.6 -0.003 -3.5
-Bid slope -0.008 -11.5 -0.005 -8.8 -0.003 -6.8
p-value (bid-ask=0) 0.02 0.62 0.60
while the ask side may be more related to liquidity supply. Furthermore, when we
examine the parameter estimates, both for the equally weighted and tick-weighted slope
estimates, for the slope measures calculated from the truncated order books (in the last
two columns), we see that the importance of the ask slope increases while the bid slope
becomes more positive and less significant. This is in line with an interpretation, that
the ask side is important in facilitating trading (and may capture increased trading
activity by impatient liquidity traders) while the bid side reflects valuation uncertainty.
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Table 3.C2
Alternative slope measures and the effect of bid and ask slope on trading activity
The table show slope estimates from the trading activity/slope regressions for the equally weighted slope measure
and tick-weighted slope measure calculated from different order book truncations in the balanced and unbalanced
sample.
Trades/slope Trades/slope Trades/slope
(full book) (+/- 10 ticks) (+/- 5 ticks)
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Balanced sample:
Equally weighted slope (SLOPE) -0.50 -8.1 0.33 6.7 0.44 11.3
-Ask slope 0.95 8.6 1.55 26.4 1.05 22.8
-Bid slope -0.40 -11.8 -0.29 -9.8 -0.15 -5.7
p-value (bid-ask=0) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tick-weighted slope -1.41 -11.0 -0.05 -0.4 0.54 6.4
-Ask slope -0.62 -1.8 2.48 13.0 1.54 12.7
-Bid slope -0.71 -10.6 -0.41 -6.9 -0.10 -1.9
p-value (bid-ask=0) 0.80 0.00 0.00
Full sample:
Equally weighted slope (SLOPE) -0.30 -11.11 0.14 7.0 0.20 12.9
-Ask slope 0.08 2.1 0.46 22.5 0.30 18.6
-Bid slope -0.19 -12.8 -0.12 -9.2 -0.02 -1.7
p-value (bid-ask=0) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tick-weighted slope -0.78 -13.9 -0.07 -1.8 0.21 6.3
-Ask slope -0.86 -7.1 0.29 5.3 0.19 5.16
-Bid slope -0.34 -11.3 -0.13 -5.2 0.07 2.91
p-value (bid-ask=0) 0.00 0.00 0.01
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Chapter 4
The Market Impact and Timing
of Open Market Share
Repurchases in Norway
Abstract
This paper examines a detailed dataset on open market repurchase announcements
and actual repurchases conducted by Norwegian firms during the period 1998-2001.
Firms that announce a repurchase plan experience a positive excess return around
the announcement date. However, these firms also experience an abnormal per-
formance after the announcement, suggesting that the market underreacts to the
positive signal conveyed through the announcement. When examining the sam-
ple of actual repurchases, we find that there is a positive price impact around the
execution dates, indicating that the market puts a positive value on the informa-
tion conveyed through the actual repurchases. In the long run, only announcing
firms that do not repurchase experience a significant abnormal performance, while
a portfolio tracking the repurchasing firms perform according to expectations. In
addition, announcing firms that do not repurchase are less liquid than repurchasing
firms. One suggested explanation for the finding is that firms by executing repur-
chases mitigate the undervaluation by confirming their initial signal through actual
transactions such that these firms perform as expected in the long run. Due to
the lower liquidity of non-repurchasing firms, they are likely to be constrained from
exploiting mispricing and unable to signal undervaluation to the market. If this
is the case, the price remains too low, and information surprises in later periods
contribute to the long term abnormal return drift for these companies.
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4.1 Introduction
Corporations distribute an increasingly larger amount of their cash to shareholders
through repurchases relative to cash dividends. Grullon and Michaely (2002) show
that, in the US, expenditures on share repurchase programs relative to total earnings
increased from 4.8% in 1980 to 41.8% in 2000. Moreover, they also report that the
number of firms repurchasing shares as a fraction of firms initiating a cash distribution
increased from 26.6% in 1972 to 82% in 2000, and that US firms used as much money
on repurchases as on cash dividends in 2000. This result suggests that share repur-
chases has become the preferred payout method for many firms in the US. Also outside
the US, in e.g. Canada, France, Australia and the UK, there has been a growth in
the repurchase activity. In recent years several countries where repurchases previously
were prohibited now allow firms to repurchase their own shares. Among these countries
is Norway, where share repurchases were allowed from 1999. The main objective of
this paper is to provide a detailed examination of the open market repurchase activity
among Norwegian firms from 1999 through 2001. Furthermore, we examine whether an
announcement effect and support for the underreaction hypothesis in Ikenberry et al.
(1995, 2000) is found in the Norwegian data. The underreaction hypothesis states that
the market treats the announcement of an open market share repurchase program with
scepticism, incompletely reacting to the information conveyed through the announce-
ment such that prices adjust slowly over time. One reason for this slow adjustment may
be that information is incorporated into prices at later points in time when the firm
disclose new information to the market. In line with results for other countries, we find
that announcing firms experience a positive announcement effect, and a long run drift
in abnormal returns in the same direction as the announcement effect relative to several
model specifications.
Due to the strict disclosure rules in Norway, we are also able to study the price
effect of actual repurchases at a daily level. By combining the announcement and
repurchase data, we investigate whether the abnormal performance after announcements
of repurchase programs depend on the repurchase activity of announcing firms. The
motivation for this is that if the market treats the initial announcement with skepticism,
the actual repurchases may be a more credible signal about undervaluation since it
involves real transactions by the firm. Thus, the actual repurchase may confirm the
initial signal such that the market adjust prices closer to the true value in response to
the actual repurchases.
Our results provide additional insight into the long term performance of announcing
firms. The findings suggest that the abnormal performance of announcing firms as a
group, to a large degree is related to firms that do not execute any repurchases after
they have announced. In addition, the results suggest that liquidity constraints may
restrict these firms from executing repurchases. One interpretation of this finding is
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that these firms experience excess returns when information is revealed to the market
through public information surprises in later periods, and that they are unable to con-
firm their initial signal through actual repurchases. On the other hand, the firms that
actually repurchase shares, may successfully confirm their initial signal of undervalua-
tion through real transactions such that subsequent returns (after the first repurchase)
fall to expected levels. If this is the case, requiring firms to report their repurchase ac-
tivity in a timely fashion, as in Norway, may help improve price discovery and efficiency.
An alternative interpretation of the result may also be that firms that actually repur-
chase shares are expected to do so. In other words, these companies may be those that
successfully (and most credibly) are able to signal that they are undervalued through
the announcement such that they are no longer undervalued after the announcement.
However, we would not expect these firms to repurchase shares for undervaluation rea-
sons after the announcement. In addition, we do not find that there is a significant
different announcement effect for announcements that result in subsequent repurchases
and those that do not.
Overall, in addition to providing evidence on open market share repurchases in a
market where repurchases has recently been allowed, we believe that repurchases in
Norway are particularly interesting to study due to the legal requirement that firms
report their repurchase activity on a daily basis. By exploiting these unique data, we
provide new evidence with respect to open market repurchases, and how the market
reacts to the actual repurchase executions.
Why firms choose to repurchase shares has gained a lot of attention, especially in
the US which has the longest history of repurchases. At a general level, a repurchase
is merely an alternative way of paying out cash to shareholders. Initially, whether a
firm chooses one payout method over the other should not matter for firm value, and
hence the shareholders of the firm. In a perfect world with no frictions or information
asymmetries, whether the firm chooses to pay out some of its cash pro rata through
dividends, or use the same cash to buy shares back from some shareholders should
not affect the value of the firm because a buyback reduces assets in a way that offsets
the reduced number of shares with cash flow rights, and should leave the price for the
remaining stocks unaffected. In addition, since investors allocate their funds relative
to their preferences and risk tolerances, any changes in the payout policy of the firm
can be offset by portfolio rebalancing. However, several studies (e.g. Vermaelen (1981),
Comment and Jarrell (1991), Ikenberry et al. (1995), Ikenberry et al. (2000)) find that
firms announcing a repurchase plan experience an abnormal price increase around the
announcement, indicating that the announcement must have some economical benefits
to shareholders. This is not surprising in the sense that we know that information
asymmetries are important with respect to the pricing of assets and that actions by the
firm (e.g. payout announcements) may help the market extract enough information to
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move the price closer to the full information value (Miller and Rock, 1985).
The literature on repurchases provides a vast amount of suggestions for why one
should expect a positive announcement effect. However, one of the most prevalent
hypotheses, which is the main topic of this paper, is the signalling hypothesis. The sig-
nalling hypothesis assumes that there is asymmetric information between the managers
and the market, and argue that the initiation of a repurchase plan is a positive signal
about the value of the firm that the market yet has failed to incorporate into prices. If
the managers of a firm have better information about the current earnings and future
prospects of the firm, and the firm is priced too low relative to their information set,
they can convey this to the market by announcing a repurchase plan. In short, a repur-
chase announcement indicates that the firm’s managers believe that the stock is trading
below fair value, such that the stock price should rise as the market reacts to the new
earnings information that it infers from the signal.1 If the signalling hypothesis is true,
and markets are semistrong efficient, the announcement of a repurchase plan should
induce the market to quickly correct the mispricing. To assess the market valuation of
the repurchase signal, the price impact of repurchase announcements have been stud-
ied across several countries and time periods. The results in Vermaelen (1981), Dann
(1981), Comment and Jarrell (1991), Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Ikenberry et al.
(1995, 2000) among others, find support for the signalling hypothesis in that there is a
significant abnormal return of about 2% around the announcement date.2
Although the signalling hypothesis is the most frequently mentioned explanation for
why firms announce repurchase programs, and the observed announcement effect, there
is also a vast amount of other explanations which will be discussed in more detail in
section 4.2. Among these are capital structure adjustments (Vermaelen, 1981; Opler
and Titman, 1996), disgorgement of excess cash (Jensen, 1986; Stephens and Weisbach,
1998; Jagannathan et al., 2000), substitution for cash dividends (Grullon and Michaely,
2002), takeover defense (Denis, 1990; Bagwell, 1991; Dittmar, 2000), shareholder ex-
propriation (Brennan and Thakor, 1990), to counter the dilution effects of employee
and management options (Fenn and Liang, 1997), personal taxes (Masulis, 1980; Lie
and Lie, 1999; Grullon and Michaely, 2002) and manipulating EPS figures (Bens et al.,
2002).
Although, support for the signalling hypothesis has been found for many markets
and time periods, one puzzle is that the market seem to underreact to the announce-
1In the early literature there is also a negative signal interpretation of stock repurchases which argue
that a repurchase is a signal that the firm does not have any profitable investment opportunities.
2Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Ikenberry et al. (1995) find an announcement effect in the US of
2.3% (for the period 1985-1988) and 3.5% (1980-1990) respectively. In addition Comment and Jarrell
(1991) examine Dutch auction repurchases and tender offer repurchases, which have a 11% and 8%
price impact respectively. They argue that tender offer repurchases have the strongest signalling ability
of the three. For Canada, Li and McNally (2002) find a announcement effect of 0.9% (for the period
1995-1999). Lasfer (2000) find the effect to be 1.64% in the UK, 1% for continental Europe, 0.78% in
France and 0.63% for Italy over the period 1985 to 1998.
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ment signal. This lines up with an emerging body of empirical literature suggesting
that the market underreacts to new information about firms cash flows. Events that
are likely to contain relevant information about current or future cash flow, such as
earnings surprises, dividend initiations and omissions, as well as the announcements of
repurchase plans, are followed by an abnormal stock-price drift in the same direction as
the initial announcement return. For repurchase announcements, this is documented by
Ikenberry et al. (1995) for the US, and for Canada by Ikenberry et al. (2000). Initially,
if the market efficiently, and in an unbiased fashion, adjusts the price as a response to
the announcement signal, these firms should not experience an abnormal performance
following the announcement. However, both studies find that firms announcing an open
market repurchase plan experience a positive drift in abnormal return in the long run
(up to 4 years) after the announcement. This finding suggests that the market under-
reacts to the initial signal by ignoring a large part of the signal value. In other words,
the observed positive price adjustment around the repurchase announcement is not suf-
ficient to correct the mispricing. In Ikenberry et al. (1995) the market’s valuation of the
signal conveyed through the repurchase announcement is about 3.5% while a portfolio
of the same firms experience a risk adjusted performance of 12.1% the years following
the announcement.
However, one problem with the signalling hypothesis is that, in the case of open
market repurchases, the announcement of a repurchase plan is not a commitment from
the firm to repurchase shares. Furthermore, as argued in Comment and Jarrell (1991),
the announcement of an open market repurchase plan is a weak signal since it does not
impose any costs to the manager if it is false. Thus, the apparent underreaction observed
for open market repurchases may be a rational reaction (as opposed to an irrational
underreaction) since the signalling power of the announcement is weak. Moreover, the
market is unable to distinguish truly undervalued firms from falsely signalling firms,
and treat the signal with skepticism. On the other hand, if managers owns shares in the
firm and commit themselves to retaining their shares during the repurchase period, the
power of the signal would be stronger.3 Such commitments are rarely observed for open
market repurchases. However, as discussed by Comment and Jarrell (1991), one type of
repurchase where managers often pre-commit to retaining their shares are tender offer
repurchases. In these cases, a false signal would be more costly to the manager since it
would reduce his wealth if the firm distributes cash to tendering shareholders above the
true value. Their findings support this as tender offer repurchases experience a much
stronger announcement effect than open market repurchases.
Further, tender offer repurchases are generally for larger volumes than open market
repurchases, and the repurchases are executed very close in time to the announcement.
3However, managers rarely commit to retaining their shares during the repurchase period such that
they may also use the repurchases to sell their own shares at a high price (Fried, 2002).
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Thus, there is no uncertainty with respect to whether the firm will repurchase or not.
In the case of open market repurchases, on the other hand, the actual repurchases may
occur a long time after the announcement, if at all. Since actual repurchase executions
reflect real transactions, they potentially reduce the manager’s wealth if he has a stake
in the company, retains his shares and execute repurchases when the firm is overvalued.
Thus, it is plausible that an actual repurchase may constitute a stronger signal (or
a confirmation of the initial signal) of undervaluation than the initial announcement.
This is one of the issues we will investigate in this paper. An additional motivation
for studying the actual repurchases in detail is a survey in Institutional Investor (1998),
which notes that less than one quarter of the companies that had announced a repurchase
plan during a specific period in the US had actually completed the amount that they
announced that they intended to repurchase. Furthermore, as discussed by Stephens
and Weisbach (1998), an issue that has not been addressed in the academic literature,
but has been a concern among practitioners and the popular press, is that the actual
repurchase activity among firms that announce a repurchase plan is small relative to
what the intention is at announcement.4 A concern that has been raised in the popular
press is that the announcement of a repurchase plan is a way for the management to
raise the stock price at little or no cost in the short run. In fact, Kracher and Johnson
(1997) argue that many firms in the US announce repurchase plans with no intention
of repurchasing. One of their arguments is that since the reporting standards in the
US, with respect to open market repurchases, are very loose, it is difficult for investors
to actually know whether announcing firms under normal circumstances are actually
going through with the repurchase plan. Their main suggestion is that US firms should
be required to report the progress of the repurchase plan such that they are motivated
to only announce a repurchase plan when their intentions are true. Interestingly, this
is exactly the case for Norwegian firms, in that they are required by law to report their
repurchases within the same trading day or before the trading session starts the next
day.
This brings us back to the main topic of the paper. If the market is concerned with
the announcements of repurchase plans being false signals due to the lack of commit-
ment to actually repurchase, it is interesting to examine whether the actual repurchases
is perceived by the market as valuable information, confirming the firms’s initial inten-
tions. It may be that requiring firms to report their repurchase activity help improve
price discovery and price efficiency when there is asymmetric information between the
managers of the firm and the market. Especially if the firm is unable to convey this
information through explicit announcements.
The paper has three contributions to the existing literature. First, we examine the
4They refer to two articles in The Wall Street Journal (March 7, 1995) and Fortune (September 4,
1995). More recent articles expressing the same concern are articles in Fortune (September 8, 1997)
and Forbes (June 21, 2001).
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announcement effect and long-term performance of repurchasing firms in a market where
repurchases recently has been allowed. The paper provides a descriptive examination
of the growth of repurchases in Norway for the period 1999 through 2001, and test
whether an announcement effect and a long term abnormal performance (underreaction)
is observed for Norwegian firms that announce a repurchase program.
The second contribution is that we are able to examine the actual repurchase ac-
tivity of announcing firms. While the literature to a large extent has focused on the
announcements of repurchase plans, we examine in more detail the market reaction to
actual repurchases transactions on a daily frequency as well. Due to the difficulty in mea-
suring actual repurchases in the US5 only a few studies examine the actual repurchase
activity of firms. Notable exceptions are Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Jagannathan
et al. (2000), Dittmar (2000), Ikenberry et al. (2000) and Chan et al. (2003).6 However,
since these papers only have access to monthly, quarterly and annual data, and use noisy
measures of the actual repurchase activity (for the US) they are unable to examine in
detail any price effects and the timing of these repurchases in the short term. Thus,
by exploiting detailed information on actual repurchases we are able study the timing
of repurchase executions and the price effect around these repurchases on a daily fre-
quency. Moreover, we are able to examine whether the repurchases represent trading
opportunities/undervaluations exploited by the managers of these firms, and whether
the market perceives the repurchase as a signal about firm value. In a related paper by
Stephens and Weisbach (1998), they examine the determinants of actual repurchases
during the repurchase period and find that managers repurchase more shares when the
stock price falls and that firms adjust their repurchase activity to their cash position.
The third contribution of the paper is to combine the announcement and actual
repurchase data to examine wether the long run performance of firms that actually
repurchase shares is different from firms that do not repurchase any shares.
The empirical section of the paper consists of four main parts. The first part pro-
vide a description of the repurchase activity among Norwegian firms during the first
three years that repurchases were allowed in Norway.7 The second part part examines
whether the empirical regularities (announcement effect and long term positive excess
performance) found in other studies (especially in the US and Canada) also are evident
in the Norwegian data. The third part of the paper examines whether the performance
of firms that actually repurchase are different from announcing firms that do not. The
fourth part of the paper examines in more detail the price impact and timing of actual
repurchases. Before we present the results we will in the next section go through the
5Due to the loose reporting requirements of repurchases in the US, previous studies have to rely on
estimating the repurchase activity based on financial statements or other data sources.
6In a recent paper by Brockman and Chung (2004) they exploit a similar dataset as examined in
this paper from Hong Kong where the disclosure requirements are similar as in Norway.
7Note that firms were allowed to announce repurchase programs before 1999, but were not allowed
to execute any repurchases before 1999.
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empirical and theoretical literature on repurchases in more detail to review the proposed
reasons for why one should expect a positive price impact at the announcement. In sec-
tion 4.3 we give an overview of the institutional and regulatory aspects of repurchases in
Norway. In section 4.4 we discuss the dataset, and explain the empirical methodology
in section 4.5 before the results from the various analyzes are presented in section 4.6
and a summary is provided in section 4.7.
4.2 Theoretical predictions
The decision taken by the firms to initiate a repurchase program is a strategic choice
between debt and equity as well as a choice of how much dividend to pay out. In a
Miller and Modigliani (1961) setting where capital markets are perfect, this choice does
not matter for the value of the firm. However, as the perfect market assumption is re-
laxed, one gains the insight that capital market imperfections and taxes are important
determinants of corporate financial policies. Although this study mainly focus on the
signalling hypothesis, we also review some of the most commonly proposed hypothe-
ses aimed at explaining the price impact and its direction with respect to repurchase
announcements. Many of the hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, and most of the
hypotheses predict a positive price impact.
Asymmetric information explanations
The traditional signalling hypothesis is motivated by asymmetric information between
the managers of a firm and the market place. Since managers through their positions
in the firm are expected to have important private information, they, based on their
information set, may assess the true value of the firm to be different than the current
market valuation. It is important to note that this relate to information that is not easy
or impossible to convey to the market through a public disclosure. For example, the
company may not want to explicitly disclose the information for competitive reasons
or because it is constrained by confidentiality agreements. This information may both
indicate that the current market valuation is above or below what the manager perceives
as the true value of the firm. Vermaelen (1981), Dann (1981) and Comment and Jarrell
(1991) among others, argue that the announcement of a repurchase plan is a valuable
signal to the less informed marketplace about undervaluation because the managers of a
firm potentially know more about the future prospects of the firm, current earnings and
current investment opportunities. Thus, a repurchase is a vehicle for communicating
valuable information to shareholders and the market, and is perceived by investors as a
signal of managements assessment of company value. Furthermore, in Brav et al. (2003),
managers often mention undervaluation as an important motive for why they repurchase
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shares. As a consequence, the observed stock-price increase around the announcement
of a repurchase program is often interpreted as support for the signalling hypothesis.
Alternatively, a repurchase announcement may also be interpreted by the market as if
the firm do not have any profitable use of its internally generated funds. Thus, the
direction of this signal may be ambiguous, but is most commonly hypothesized to be
positive.
However, there are a few sensitive issues with respect to the signalling hypothesis,
especially with respect to open market repurchase announcements. First, for a signal
about undervaluation to be credible, it needs to impose substantial costs on the man-
ager. If managers could commit to retaining their shares through the repurchase period,
as well as committing the firm to actually execute repurchases, the credibility of the
signal would be stronger the greater the ownership of the manager or other primary
insiders. Through such commitments, it would be costly to the manager if the firm
initiates a repurchase program when the firm is overvalued since the repurchase would
increase the managers ownership in the overvalued firm. However, since firms seldom
commit to actually repurchasing any shares (unless in the case of tender offer repur-
chases), and managers rarely commit themselves to retaining their own shares through
the repurchase period, the credibility of the open market repurchase announcement may
be questionable.
As discussed in Fried (2002), there is a theoretical inconsistency with respect to
the signalling hypothesis in the sense that it requires managers to sacrifice their own
wealth to increase that of shareholders. If managers act opportunistically, Fried (2002)
argue that they will use open market share repurchases in two situations. First, they
do not use repurchases to signal undervaluation, but rather initiate repurchases when
the firm is undervalued with the motivation of transferring wealth to themselves (and
the remaining shareholders). This however this is still consistent with the signalling
hypothesis since the market will observe the repurchase announcement (and subsequent
repurchases) and interpret this as the firm being undervalued. Moreover, while the
signalling hypothesis predicts that managers attempts to credibly communicate that
the stock is underpriced, the managerial opportunism theory predicts that managers
try not to reveal that the stock is underpriced. However, this may be difficult or
even impossible since repurchases, at least in Norway, are observable (the day after
the repurchase) to the rest of the market.8 In the US on the other had, the firm is
not required to report their repurchase activity, such that it would be easier for the
the manager to repurchase shares without revealing this to the market. Furthermore,
Fried (2002) argue that the second situation in which opportunistic managers announce
repurchase plans is to increase the price before they sell their own shares.
8Fried (2002) do not discuss another alternative in which an opportunistic manager instead buy
undervalued shares on his own account without initiating a repurchase plan.
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A model that directly addresses the credibility issue related to open market share
repurchase announcements is Isagawa (2000). In that model, the credibility of the
announcement is restored when the manager’s monetary compensation depends on the
future stock price (either through share-ownership or options). Whether the manager
chooses to invest free cash in an unprofitable project or not depends on the private
benefits to the manager. Moreover, if the private benefit of investing in the unprofitable
project (and decreasing the firm value) is smaller than the monetary compensation from
increased firm value, he will repurchase shares instead of investing in the unprofitable
project. Thus, the announcement of the repurchase program conveys information about
the managers private benefits and signals to the market that the manager is committed
not to waste cash on unprofitable projects. Thus, in firms where the manager has a high
ownership stake or options, the announcement of a repurchase plan may be a credible
signal to the market. In this model, the manager does not signal undervaluation, but
rather convey information that agency costs of free cash is less likely to occur.
Another theoretical contribution related to asymmetric information between the firm
and the market is a paper by Barclay and Smith (1988) who argue that the implicit
costs of trading the stock in the market increases after the firm has announced a re-
purchase plan. The main motivation of their model is to explain why firms in the US
distribute more cash through dividends relative to repurchases despite the tax benefit
of repurchases relative to dividends. Their main argument is that the adverse selection
component of the bid ask spread increases due to the increased probability of trading
with an informed investor, the firm. The wider spread raises the required rate of return,
reduces corporate investments and lowers firm value. Because of this they argue that
firms prefer to use dividends to pay out cash. The early literature on repurchases in the
US was puzzled by the fact that so few firms repurchased shares. However, later years
there has been a large increase in cash distributed through share repurchases relative
to dividends in the US (Grullon and Michaely, 2002).
In a model by Brennan and Thakor (1990), they argue that different incentives of
becoming informed among shareholders, when information gathering is costly, is im-
portant when firms decide to repurchase shares. They argue that share repurchases
causes a wealth redistribution from small, uninformed, shareholders to large, informed
shareholders. The main assumption is that information gathering is costly, inducing
only large shareholders to becoming informed. Thus, informed investors are able to bid
for undervalued stocks and avoid over-valued ones. Since the small investors are unable
to condition their trading on the trading of the better informed investors, they will be
left with a higher stake in overvalued firms and a lower stake in undervalued firms.
Since dividends do not have this problem because they are pro-rata, the Brennan and
Thakor (1990) model predicts that large shareholders will prefer cash to be distributed
through repurchases, while small investors prefer cash dividends. Thus, an implication
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of their model is that the choice of cash distribution method depends on the ownership
composition in the firm, and that firms with high ownership concentration would be
more likely to use repurchases.
Free cash-flow hypothesis
As discussed in Jensen (1986), repurchases is an alternative to increasing dividends, or
issue new debt, to pay out excess cash to mitigate agency costs of free cash.9 In line with
the suggestions in Jensen (1986), both Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Dittmar (2000)
and Jagannathan et al. (2000), among others, find that firms in fact uses repurchases
to pay out cash flows that have a low probability of being sustainable, while dividend
increases reflect higher expected permanent cash flows. Moreover, since firms seem to
smooth dividends, and are reluctant to reducing dividends (Lintner, 1956; Brav et al.,
2003), a repurchase is a way for firms with volatile cash flows to distribute temporary
cash without increasing dividends. Thus, since a repurchase may mitigate agency costs
of free cash, one would expect a positive price impact from a repurchase announcement.
In addition, as discussed earlier, in firms where the manager has an ownership in the
firm, the announcement of a repurchase plan may be a credible signal that the manager
do not want to waste free cash on unprofitable projects (Isagawa, 2000).
Personal taxes
The personal tax hypothesis argues that firms repurchase their own shares so that the
shareholders can benefit from the tax advantage of a repurchase, which (in the US) is
taxed at capital gains rates, relative to dividends, that are taxed at higher ordinary
income tax rates. Thus, if the cash payout is kept fixed, personal taxes are reduced if
the firm uses repurchases instead of dividends to distribute cash. This argument im-
plies that the announcement should have a positive effect on the stock price due to the
relative tax advantage to shareholders. However, there are several problems with this
hypothesis. First, for the US, the tax differential is not necessarily the main explanation
due to the US tax code which states that repurchases only qualify as capital gains if
the distribution is essentially not equivalent to paying dividend. Thus, if the repurchase
program is of the same magnitude and at the same frequency as dividend payments,
the repurchase is not classified as capital gains, but instead taxed at ordinary income
tax rates. On the other hand, as mentioned by Allen and Michaely (2003), they are not
9As defined by Jensen (1986), free cash flow is the remaining cash within a firm after all projects with
positive net present values have been funded. Alternative ways of reducing the agency cost of free cash
flow is through e.g. new debt, dividends or repurchases. Debt is the most credible method to counter
the free cash flow agency problems since it is a binding commitment whereas repurchase announcements
and dividend increases are not.
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aware of any cases where the IRS has taxed a repurchase as ordinary income. Secondly,
studies from countries where there is no tax advantage to repurchases, find a positive
announcement effect of the same magnitude as in the US. Thirdly, Black and Scholes
(1974) argue that in an equilibrium where companies have adjusted their payout poli-
cies to match the payout policies demanded by investors with different tax schedules, a
further adjustment in payout policy should not affect the stock price. Finally, results
in Brav et al. (2003) suggest that the relative taxation of capital gains and dividends
is unimportant when mangers choose between dividends and repurchases. Thus, the
predicted effect of the personal tax argument is not clear, and empirical results does
not show strong support for it.10
Leverage hypothesis
Another explanation for the announcement effect is that the repurchase can be financed
by an issue of debt. The leverage argument is that due to the tax subsidy from interest
payments, and that a part of this subsidy is passed on to the shareholders, the price of
the stock is expected to rise in connection to the repurchase. Thus, the firm will exploit
the benefits of higher leverage by altering its capital structure and this will affect the
value of the firm and the wealth of the remaining shareholders. Repurchases may also
be used to obtain an optimal leverage ratio. As discussed in e.g. Vermaelen (1981) and
Opler and Titman (1996), repurchases are used by firms firms to reduce its equity and
increase its leverage ratio. When firms are below their target ratio, firms are more likely
to repurchase stock. A related hypothesis is the bondholder expropriation hypothesis
discussed in Dann (1981), where a repurchase reduces the assets of the company in such
a way that the value of the claims of the bondholders is reduced. Thus, if this potential
expropriation of the bondholders has not been taken into account in the pricing of the
bond issues, there will be a wealth transfer from bondholders to the stockholders of the
firm.
Takeover defense
A repurchase may also be used by a firm as a defensive payout in response to hostile
takeover attempts. Denis (1990) examine defensive changes in corporate payout pol-
icy11 for a sample of firms in the US. The main finding is that repurchases is an effective
device for countering hostile takeovers, as there is a high probability of the target firm
maintaining independence.12 The effect of a firm announcing a defensive repurchase
10Much of the earlier literature on repurchases in the US were motivated by the puzzle that despite
the relative tax advantage of repurchases to dividends, firms preferred dividends as the main payout
method.
11Denis (1990) examine defensive share repurchases and special dividends.
12Those firms that remain independent show a significantly lower abnormal returns after the takeover
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is highly negative which suggests that defensive repurchases are associated with losses
for the shareholders of the target firm. This in the sense that defensive repurchases
reduce the probability that there will be a valuable restructuring within the firm that
could lead to a more efficient use of firm resources. Bagwell (1991) proposes a model
with heterogenous valuations among current shareholders and an upward sloping supply
curve for for the company shares. A repurchase removes current shareholders with the
lowest valuations such that a more expensive pool of shareholders are left. Also Bagnoli
and Lipman (1989) propose a model where there is asymmetric information between
the manager and the marketplace, and that repurchases convince current shareholders
that the firm value is higher, revising their price upwards, such that a takeover attempt
becomes more costly for the bidder.
Other hypotheses
There are also several other hypotheses that aim at explaining why firms repurchase
shares as well as the positive price effect associated with (non defensive) repurchase
announcements. Dittmar (2000) find evidence that repurchases are used to counter
the dilution effect of management- and employee options, while Fenn and Liang (1997,
2001) find evidence that repurchases are used to increase the value of such stock options
and that the increase in management stock options may explain the increased use of
repurchases. Bens et al. (2002) argue that repurchases are used to increase earnings per
share (EPS) figures and Grullon and Michaely (2002) find evidence that dividends are
substituted for repurchases due to several of the issues discussed above.
4.3 Repurchases in Norway
4.3.1 Repurchase methods
There are mainly three methods for firms to repurchase their own shares; through tender
offers (fixed price offers), open market transactions or via Dutch auction repurchases.
The two first methods are used to a larger extent than the latter, and in the US, open
market transactions are observed more frequently than tender offers. In fact, 90% of the
cases between 1985 and 1993 were open market transactions as discussed in Ikenberry
et al. (1995) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998). Open market repurchase programs,
where there is an upper limit on how much shares the company can repurchase, are often
referred to as “Normal Course Issuer Bids”, whereas fixed price tender offers which do
not have any limit to the amount of stock that can be repurchased is commonly called
“Substantial Issuer Bids”. In a tender offer, the reacquiring firm offers to repurchase
a fraction of its shares at a specific price, usually at a premium to the market price.
attempt than those that were successful takeovers.
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In an open market repurchase, on the other hand, the purchase is executed through
brokers in the open market at normal commissions rates, and no premium is paid.13
Thus, open market repurchases may be viewed as a sequence of tender offer repurchases,
where the bid price of the order is the tender price. Since tender offers are generally
larger in magnitude than open market repurchases, the alternative of trading the shares
directly in the market may induce a price impact to the firm that would exceed the
premium offered through the tender price. With respect to Dutch auction repurchases,
the repurchasing firm set a range of prices at which it is willing to repurchase shares.
Then, each shareholder informs the firm of their supply at these price levels. When
all price schedules are collected, the firm has an aggregate supply curve, and chooses
the lowest price that will fill their demand, and the transactions are executed at this
clearing price.
The 1st of January, 1999, the Securities Act of June 13 1997 (Aksjeloven) went into
effect, and Norwegian firms were allowed to repurchase their own shares. The Securities
Act states that firms are not allowed to hold more than 10% of their issued shares at
any point in time. In addition, the firm’s total equity value in excess of the firm’s
own stock-holdings must at all times be higher than NOK 1 mill. For a company to
be able to initiate a repurchase plan, it requires 2/3 of the voting shares represented
at the shareholder meeting to vote in favor of the repurchase plan.14 In addition, the
maximum length that a repurchase plan can be in effect before it requires a new vote
is 18 months, and a shorter time if specified. After the Securities Act went into the
effect, Norwegian firms were allowed to announce a repurchase plan, but not execute
any repurchases before January 1999. When a firm has repurchased shares, the shares
are first assigned as treasury stock with no voting or cash flow rights as long as the
company owns them. Firms may then reduce the number of treasury stock by retiring
these shares or as a payment in various transactions. What firms do with the shares
after the repurchase varies, but commonly firms use them as payment in acquisitions,
sell them in the market or distribute them to employees or managers as a part of a
bonus plan etc. The dataset also contain data on the sale of treasury stock. However,
the paper only consider the part of the sample related to the repurchases. Table 4.B1
in appendix 4.B show some aggregate statistics for the sale/reduction of treasury stock.
There are about six times as many repurchase transactions as sales. However, the
number of shares in the repurchases are only twice that of the sales, and the average
repurchase is about 1/3 of the size of a reduction in treasury stock. This is probably
because firms accumulate treasury stock through many smaller transactions, and use
13At least no direct premium is paid. As argued by Barclay and Smith (1988), the announcement of
a repurchase plan may lead to increased implicit transaction costs in the market due to an increased
adverse selection component in the spread. Thus, by announcing a repurchase plan, the firm itself may
experience higher trading costs in the primary market.
14It also requires 2/3 vote of all shares represented at the meeting (including non-voting shares).
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the repurchased shares as payment in relatively large transactions or retire relatively
large amounts of shares in a single event.
The sample examined in this paper only includes announcements of open market
share repurchase programs and actual repurchases related to these announcements.
Other types of repurchases are rarely observed during the sample period.15 Recall
that open market share repurchase programs also are the most frequently observed re-
purchase method in the U.S. and Canada as well. Furthermore, Norwegian listed firms
do not have to receive approval from the stock exchange before initiating a repurchase
program. In the U.S. the same rule applies as in Norway. However, Canadian firms
(see Ikenberry et al. (2000)), must receive approval from the exchange before they can
initiate a repurchase program. When a firm actually execute an open market repur-
chase the law requires the firm to report this to the OSE on the same day or before the
trading starts the following day. This is very different from the US, where firms are not
required to report their actual repurchase activity. Moreover, several studies note that
firms actual repurchase activity in the US is very hard to measure (see e.g. Jagannathan
et al. (2000)). Canadian firms are required to report their aggregate repurchase activity
every quarter.
4.3.2 The Norwegian tax system
Dividends distributed from a Norwegian tax resident public- or private limited company
were taxed fully on the investor’s hand until 1992. As a result of an extensive tax-reform
in 1992, dividends became tax-exempt while the capital gains tax was set at a flat rate
of 28%, both for individuals, companies and private pension funds.16 However, share-
holders in firms that retain a part of their after tax earnings, may experience that some
of the capital gains when the shares are sold reflect a price increase due to the retained
earnings. To eliminate the double taxation this would imply, an adjustment is made.
The retained earnings per share is added to the cost basis (usually the purchase price)
such that the capital gain/tax basis is reduced accordingly (RISK adjustment).17 Thus,
during the period 1992 until 2001, dividends were not taxed on the investor’s hand at
all, and tax on capital gains linked to retained earnings was eliminated. However, in
2001, personal tax on dividends was re-introduced, at a rate of 11%, while the capital
gains tax and corporate tax remained at 28%. With respect to the dividend taxation,
a basic deduction of NOK 10 000 was introduced. Thus, small investors in dividend
15One example is Storebrand (STB) which at the beginning January 1999 gave an offer to shareholders
that owned less than 8 shares to sell their shares back to the company. Of the total 74000 shareholders
at the time, 39000 owned less than 8 shares.
16labor unions, non-profit organizations and public pension funds are exempt from taxation.
17RISK is the acronym for ”Regulering av Inngangsverdien med Skattlagt Kapital”. Translated, it
means that there is an adjustment of the cost basis by the retained earnings after corporate tax. To be
eligible to the RISK adjustment within a given year, the shareholder must have owned the shares over
the turn of the year.
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paying firms were not directly affected by the tax increase. However, for larger investors
the total taxation on dividends increased from 28% to 35.92%, due to the double taxa-
tion of parts of the earnings. In 2002 the personal taxation of dividends was removed.
With respect to foreign shareholders, dividends distributed from a Norwegian tax resi-
dent public or private limited company to its non-resident shareholders are subject to
25% withholding tax. Tax treaties may make the withholding tax deductible in the
shareholder’s home country. Non-resident shareholders gain on a sale of shares in a
Norwegian company is not subject to any Norwegian taxation, unless the shares form
part of a permanent establishment in Norway or the seller is an individual who fulfill
certain conditions that would make the gain taxable at a rate of 28%.
With respect to the relative tax treatment of dividends and repurchases in Norway,
we see that there has been a change during our sample period from 1999 through 2001.
However, in 1999 and 2001, dividend distributions were not taxed. On the other hand
repurchases where the shareholder sell shares above the tax basis was taxed at 28%.
Thus, in cases where the firm uses already taxed earnings for repurchasing shares at
a price above the tax basis, the shareholder that sell shares back to the firm would
experience a double taxation on the excess capital gains. In 2000, when a dividend
tax of 11% was introduced, the tax differential between capital gains and dividends was
reduced, favoring repurchases. With respect to foreign investors, they have been subject
to 25% withholding tax on dividends through the entire sample period. However, since
the capital gains for foreigners is subject to the tax in the home country, the preference
between dividends and repurchases may vary between foreign investors depending on
the tax treatment in their home country.
4.4 Data description
4.4.1 Announcements of repurchase programs
In panel A of table 4.1, we report some general statistics for the announcement data.
Over the entire period period from 1998 through 2001 there were 318 announcements
of repurchase plans by 163 different firms. Of these firms, 70 announced one repurchase
plan, 46 announced two plans, 32 announced 3 plans and 15 announced 4 repurchase
plans during the sample period. Over the different sample years, the number of announc-
ing firms increased from 30 to 109, while the maximum number of announcements by a
single firm in one year was two. For the individual years, we also show statistics on the
announcement frequencies in the middle section of panel A. In column n=1, the num-
bers represent the number of firms that announced for the first time in the respective
year, column n=2 report the number of firms that announce for the second time in the
respective year and so on. Thus, in 2001 32 firms announced for the first time, 30 for
the second time, 35 for the third time and 12 for the fourth time. When looking at the
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distribution of authorized repurchase amounts across firms, we see that they are highly
skewed with a maximum (and median) amount of 10% and a mean amount of 9.5%
while the lowest repurchase amount announced by a firm was 1% of outstanding shares.
Thus, the majority of the announcements was for the maximum legal limit of 10%.18
Panel B in table 4.1 report the completion rates across firms that announced a re-
purchase plan. For the whole sample about 60% (100 firms) of the announcing firms
repurchased at least some shares following at least one of their announcements, while 63
of the firms that announced a repurchase program never repurchased any shares within
the repurchase period.19 With respect to the firms that actually executed repurchases,
the mean fraction of outstanding shares that was repurchased was 2.9%, while the me-
dian firm repurchased 1.8%. The maximum accumulated fraction repurchased by any
firm during a repurchase period was 22.1%. This is above the legal limit of 10%. And
for some firms there is an apparent breach of the legal limit, but this is probably because
these firms during the repurchase period used some of the repurchased shares as pay-
ment in transactions, wrote down some of the repurchased shares or distributed them
to employees, managers as part of a bonus program or other events that is not captured
in our data.20 The median number of days between the announcement of a repurchase
plan and the first repurchase was 169 days, while the mean number of days was 198.
Thus, on average it seems like the repurchase plan is put in place not for immediate
executions. However, the minimum number of days indicate that some firms also repur-
chase shares immediately after the announcement has been made. For announcements
in 1998 these numbers are biased upwards because firms were not allowed to execute
repurchases before 1999, but could announce a repurchase plan in 1998. Across months
(not reported), there is some degree of clustering in May and June. The reason for this
is that many repurchase plans are voted on at the annual shareholders meetings, which
for many firms are conducted during spring.
4.4.2 Actual repurchases
The sample of actual repurchases reported to the OSE from January 1999 through
December 2002 was obtained from the Oslo Stock Exchange. In addition, the dataset
was updated and cross checked using detailed records from the equity feed database of
Oslo Exchange Information (OBI).21
Panel A in table 4.2 show various statistics for the actual repurchase activity across
18Since some firms do not explicitly report a maximum amount to be repurchased, we assume that
these firms are subject to the maximum legal limit of 10%.
19The repurchase period is defined as the period in which the shareholders give the manager autho-
rization to repurchase shares.
20The Securities Act (Aksjeloven) only require the holding of treasury shares to be no more than 10%
of the firms outstanding shares.
21More specifically, Record E 19, Trading in Company Shares, in the Equity Feed data from Oslo
Exchange Information (OBI) was used to track companies repurchase activity.
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Table 4.1
Descriptive statistics of announcements
Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the announcements of repurchase plans for the entire sample
period from 1998 through 2001 as well as for separate years. The first column report the number of
announcements, the second column report the number of different firms that announced at least one
repurchase plan, and the third column report the maximum announcements by one firm within the
specified period. The next four columns decompose the frequency of repurchase announcements. For
the whole sample, n=1 counts the number of firms that announce once, and n=4 counts the number of
firms that announce 4 times. For the separate years, n=1 counts the number of firms that announce for
the first time in the respective year, while n=2 counts the number of firms announcing for the second
time etc. For example, in 2001 there were 32 firms that announced for the first time, 30 firms that had
announced once in one of the previous three years, 35 firms that had announced a repurchase plan in two
of the previous three years and 12 firms that had announced four times during the previous four years.
The last three columns of the table report the cross-sectional minimum, mean and maximum amount of
shares that the firm was authorized to repurchase by the current owners. Panel B shows statistics with
respect to the completion rates where ”Repo” denotes the number of firms that actually repurchase
after an announcement, and ”Norepo” denote the number of firms that announce a repurchase plan but
do not execute any repurchases. The median, mean and max completion rates are calculated relative
to the number of shares repurchased divided by the total number of outstanding shares. The last four
columns report distribution of days between announcement of a plan and the first repurchase.
Panel A: Announcement statistics
Number of firms (i) Authorized
announcing n times repurchase amount
Announce- Different Max
Period ments firms (i) ann. n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4 Min. Mean Max.
Whole sample 318 163 4 70 46 32 15 1.0% 9.5% 10.0%
1998 28 28 1 28 - - - 2.5% 9.1% 10.0%
1999 85 85 1 70 15 - - 1.0% 9.5% 10.0%
2000 93 90 2 33 47 10 - 1.0% 9.4% 10.0%
2001 112 109 2 32 30 35 12 3.3% 9.6% 10.0%
Panel B: Completion rates for announcing firms
Repurchasing firms Completion rates Days until first repurchase
Period Repo Norepo Median Mean Max Min Median Mean Max
Whole sample 100 63 1.8% 2.9% 22.1% 1 169 198 502
1998 15 13 1.9% 2.9% 10.0% 20 364 326 469
1999 41 44 1.9% 3.2% 19.0% 9 203 216 502
2000 65 25 1.8% 2.9% 16.1% 2 217 206 498
2001 60 49 1.3% 2.7% 22.1% 1 123 138 459
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firms for the whole sample as well as for separate years. The firms that repurchased
shares executed a total of 1719 repurchases including all repurchases executed in 2002
(denoted as 2002a in the table). When excluding repurchases in 2002 that were not
related to repurchase plans initiated in 2001 or earlier22 (denoted as 2002b in the table),
the total number of repurchases related to announcements in 1998-2001 was 1375. In
the rest of the paper we will examine the repurchases related to these announcements
and ignore the 344 repurchases that was executed due to repurchase plans announced in
2002 since we do not have this information yet. The median firm executed 7 repurchases
for the entire sample period, while the maximum number of repurchases executed by
a single firm was 197. The average size of the repurchases was 166 thousand shares or
about NOK 7.8 mill. Overall, the repurchases related to plans announced in 1998-2001
resulted in Norwegian firms repurchasing 210 million shares worth more than NOK
15 bill. During the same period, the total market value of all firms on the OSE was
about NOK 600 bill. on average. The total dividends paid out by all firms at the OSE
(including firms that did not announce) during the same period amounted to about
NOK 60 bill.23 Since Norwegian firms were first allowed to repurchase shares in 1999,
they have increased their spending on repurchases as a percentage of cash dividends
to 25% in 1999 and to 44% in 2000 and 2001. However, for 2002 there was a drop
in the repurchase activity, while dividend payments was high compared to the other
years. Examining the other statistics across different years, the first thing to note is
the increase in repurchasing firms and repurchases (N) from 1999 through 2001, and
then a significant drop in repurchase activity in 2002. This trend is also evident when
looking at the total number of shares and the NOK volume of all repurchases. One main
reason for this drop in repurchases in 2002 may be related to the fact that the personal
tax on dividends, which was introduced in 2001, was removed in 2002 which made
it relatively more attractive for private investors to get cash paid out as dividends.24
Another interesting observation is that, while the repurchase volume increased from 1999
through 2001, the average NOK size of each repurchase decreased while the average
number of shares in each repurchase increased. Panel B in table 4.2 report monthly
summary statistics of our repurchase sample. The table shows the number of different
firms that executed repurchases, the number of repurchases conducted by these firms,
as well as the aggregate share volume and NOK volume of these repurchases for each
sample month. As can seen from the table there is an increasing trend until September
2001. In fact, for the entire sample, September 2001, was the month in the sample that
most firms executed repurchases and the share volume of repurchases was the highest.
22These repurchases are repurchases up until 18 months after the most recent announcement in
2000/2001, or until a new announcement in 2002.
23Note that these dividend numbers are aggregates for all companies listed on the OSE, not only
for the firms executing repurchases. The dividend statistics are official numbers from the Oslo Stock
Exchange.
24This reasoning require that firms take into account the tax schedule of their investors.
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This is probably related to the large drop in share-prices due to the terrorist attacks
in the US on September 11th. In fact, when looking more closely on the amount of
repurchases that were executed within that specific month, there was a huge increase in
repurchases just after the terror events. More than 75% of the repurchases and 65% of
the share-volume that month occurred in the week after the attacks. This is similar to
what was observed in the US when a large amount of US firms increased their repurchase
activity to supply liquidity and support their share prices. In fact, on September 13th,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) suspended regulations on repurchases
allowing firms to repurchase shares without any volume limits. About 75 corporations
responded during the first day of trading after the attacks by announcing the initiation
or renewal of a repurchase plan, and the dollar value of their buybacks on the opening
day was estimated at more than USD 45 billion.25
4.5 Estimation methodology
4.5.1 Measuring abnormal announcement returns
In the paper we investigate the short term price impact related both to the announce-
ment of repurchase plans as well as when the market learns that the firm actually has
repurchased shares. For these purposes, we apply a standard event study methodology.
To investigate the short term effect around an event, we examine various event windows
surrounding the event. We use daily returns which are indexed relative to an event, and
define τ as the event time, with the event date at τ=0. The event date is the date at
which the event (the repurchase plan or actual repurchase) is announced to the market.
For the various event windows we denote the beginning of the event window as τ1 and
the end of the event window as τ2. We apply three model specifications to characterize
normal returns; the market model, the Fama and French (1993) three factor model and
the Carhart (1997) four factor model. All benchmarks models are calibrated during the
estimation period running from two years prior (τ=-571) to the event until the start of
the event period at τ1 for each firm, i.26 Since many of the companies at the OSE, and
hence in our sample, are not traded every day, our OLS beta estimates may be biased
due to the intervaling effect. To reduce the potential bias, we also estimate adjusted
betas for the market model as suggested by Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson
(1979). In the regular market model, normal returns are expressed as,
̂E[Riτ] = αi + βiRmτ (4.1)
25Also during the market crash in 1987 there was a surge in repurchase activity after the market col-
lapse. During the fourth quarter of 1987 Stephens and Weisbach (1998) report that 995 firms announced
a repurchase plan.
26Some firms have a shorter price history. However, since none of these firms have less than half a
year of price observations, we do not exclude them from the analysis.
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where Riτ is the return on security i on event date τ, Rmτ is the value weighted total
return on the OSE all share index, and E[εi,τ] = 0 and Var[εi,τ] = σ2εi . In the Dimson
(1979) specification, we run an multivariate version of eq.(4.1) of securities returns
against lagged (Rmτ−1), contemporaneous (R
m
τ ) and leading (R
m
τ+1) market returns. As
proposed in Dimson (1979), we obtain a consistent estimate of beta by summing the
slope coefficients from this regression. The Scholes and Williams (1977) procedure is
similar, but instead of estimating the β’s simultaneously, the three betas are estimated
separately and the aggregated beta estimate is adjusted for the autocorrelation in the
market return to obtain a consistent estimate of β. Thus, by denoting the lagged-,
matching- and leading beta estimates as β+i , βi and β
−
i respectively, the consistent
beta estimate, relative to the Scholes/Williams approach, is calculated as,
β^SWi =
β^+i + β^i + β^
−
i
1+ 2ρ^M
(4.2)
where ρ^M is the autocorrelation coefficient of the market index, and β^SWi denotes the
Scholes/Williams estimate. In addition to applying the market model, we use the Fama
and French (1993) three factor model as well as the four factor model suggested by
Carhart (1997) adding momentum to the Fama/French factors.27 With respect to the
four factor model, expected returns are described as,
̂E[Riτ] = αi + βmi Rmτ + βhi Rhmlτ + βsiRsmbτ + βmomi Rmomτ (4.3)
where Rmτ , R
hml
τ , R
smb
τ and R
mom
τ are the returns on the market-, the book to market-,
the size- and the momentum factors respectively, and the β’s are the factor exposures.
The book-to-market and size factor returns are calculated as the difference between two
value weighted portfolios containing firms with a book to market value (or size) above
the median and below the median. All firms at the OSE are assigned to one of the
two portfolios at the beginning of each year. With respect to the momentum portfolios,
firms are assigned to one of two portfolios based on the return over the previous year.28
The exposures are estimated over the same post-event period as the market model in
eq.4.1.
Having estimated the parameters in the various model specifications described above,
we measure the daily abnormal returns as the daily prediction errors relative to the
27However, Brown and Weinstein (1985) and Campbell et al. (1997) argue that the use of more
sophisticated models has little practical advantages relative to an unrestricted market model when we
examine the short term market impact. The main reason is that the marginal explanatory power of
additional factors to the market factor is usually relatively small, and therefore there is little reduction
in the variance of abnormal returns.
28A number of filters are applied before a stock can enter the portfolios. Minimum number of trading
days of 20, minimum price of 10 and minimum firm value of 1 mill NOK.
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expected return, ̂E[Riτ] as,
ÂRiτ = Riτ − ̂E[Riτ] (4.4)
where ̂E[Riτ] is the expected return of security i, defined by either the market model,
the Fama and French (1993) model or the Carhart (1997) model, on date τ given the
return on the market and the contemporaneous factor returns. For each firm in the
sample, we calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) across the event window from
τ1 to τ2. By cumulating the ÂRiτ from τ1 up to, and including, τ2 for the different time
windows, for each firm, we can calculate the the estimated average ĈAR across all firms
as,
ĈAR(τ1, τ2) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
τ2∑
τ=τ1
ÂRiτ (4.5)
where N is the total number of firms/events.
The main null hypothesis to be tested is that the cumulative abnormal return during
the main event-window across firms is equal to zero. We use the standard test statistic
proposed in Brown and Warner (1985) who argue that standard procedures are typically
well-specified even when special daily data characteristics are ignored. The test statistic
we apply is the ratio of the average cumulative abnormal return, across firms, to its
estimated standard error, which can be expressed as,
t =
ĈAR(τ1, τ2)
[σ2ε(τ1, τ2)]
1/2
(4.6)
where σ2ε(τ1, τ2) is the average estimated variance for the abnormal returns across firms.
Two estimators of the variance is commonly used in event studies. The most frequently
applied estimator uses the standard deviation of abnormal returns from the expected
return model estimated in the estimation period prior to the event. The second estimator
uses the standard deviation of the cross-sectional CARs from the event window. The
latter estimator is generally used when the event is expected to change the risk of the
firm, and the pre-event estimator for the variance may be biased. In our case, we
use the first estimator for variance when examining the announcement effect, since the
announcement itself is not expected to affect the risk of the firm. When we later in the
paper (section 4.6.4) examine the abnormal returns around the actual repurchases, on
the other hand, we provide results using the second approach, since the transactions
potentially change the riskiness of the firm.29
29If the ARτ are independent identically distributed and normal, the test statistic is distributed
Student-t under the null hypothesis.
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4.5.2 Measuring long run performance
Portfolio creation
We also examine the long run performance of portfolios of announcing firms and for
portfolios conditional on whether the firm actually execute repurchases or not. To
facilitate this we apply a calendar time approach used in e.g. Ikenberry et al. (1995),
Womack (1996) and Ikenberry et al. (2000) among others. To explain how this applied
in this paper, we will use the case when we construct a portfolio of firms conditional on
that they have announced a repurchase plan.30
More specifically, we create a portfolio of firms given that they have announced a
repurchase plan and calculate the daily returns of this portfolio through calendar time,
t. We rebalance the portfolio the first day of every month. Moreover, all firms that
have announced a repurchase plan in the previous month are added to the portfolio, and
all firms are rebalanced to equal weights. We write the return on the equally weighted
portfolio, Rp,t on date t as,
Rpt =
∑
i
witRit (4.7)
where wi,t denotes the weight of each firm in the portfolio which in our case is just
1/Ni,t where Ni,t is the number of securities in the portfolio at date t. To minimize the
idiosyncratic risk in our portfolio, we do not start our portfolio construction before 10
companies have announced a repurchase plan. We also examine several holding periods,
where firms are kept in the portfolio for one year, two years and three years as well as
for the remaining sample period (buy and hold). For e.g. the yearly holding period, a
firm is removed from the portfolio after one year. These portfolio strategies represents
simple and realistic trading strategies, where the inclusion of stocks depends on whether
they have announced a repurchase period in the previous month. It should be noted
that we do not take into account transaction costs, but since we rebalance the portfolio
on a monthly basis, these costs would not be very large.31
Benchmark models
The long term abnormal performance may to a large degree depend on the benchmark
model against which we compare our portfolio returns. In addition, several papers
note that long-term abnormal performance tests may be due to misspecification rather
than mispricing. Thus, as argued by Kothari and Warner (1997) among others, caution
30However, later in the paper we will also use the same methodology when measuring the performance
of portfolios conditional on the actual repurchase activity of the announcing firms.
31The transaction costs would in reality depend on the size of the portfolio. For a small portfolio,
the total commissions related to the rebalancing could constitute a large fraction of invested wealth.
For a large portfolio, on the other hand, the commissions would be a smaller part of invested amount,
while the implicit costs related to price impact and delay when the portfolio is rebalanced is likely to
constitute a larger fraction of total costs.
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should be used when interpreting the results.32 We try to reduce this problem by
measuring our sample portfolio returns generated from the trading strategy relative to
several models. We evaluate the performance of our repurchase portfolio by estimating
Jensen’s alpha relative to a one factor CAPM model as well as the Fama and French
(1993) model and the Carhart (1997) model, E.g. for the Carhart model we run the
following regression,
Rpt − R
f
t = α+ β
m(Rmt − R
f
t) + β
hRhmlt + β
sRsmbt + β
momRmomt + εt (4.8)
where Rp,t is the return on the equally weighted portfolio of announcing firms created
through calendar time, Rft is our proxy for the risk free rate,
33 Rmτ , R
hml
τ , R
smb
τ and R
mom
τ
are the returns on the market-, the book to market-, the size- and the momentum factors
respectively, and the β’s are the factor exposures. The factor returns are calculated
similarly as in eq. 4.3 and α measures the average daily excess performance of the
portfolio.
4.6 Results
Our empirical analysis consists of four parts. The first part in section 4.6.1 evaluate
the short term market reaction around the announcement of repurchase plans. The
second part, in section 4.6.2, tests the underreaction hypothesis in Norway by examining
the long term performance of a portfolio of firms that have announced a repurchase
plan. The third part, in section 4.6.3, combines the announcement data with the actual
repurchase data and examine whether the long-run performance depend on whether
firms repurchase or not. The fourth part, in section 4.6.4, examines the short term
market impact of the actual repurchases.
4.6.1 The short term effect of announcing a repurchase plan
In table 4.3 we report the average cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the an-
nouncement of repurchase plans. For all announcements, the table shows the average
excess return relative to the market model (unadjusted and adjusted as proposed in
Dimson (1979) and Scholes and Williams (1977)), the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. In the table we also show
the average announcement effect for separate years and when split the sample into an-
nouncements that specify that the firm will repurchase more or less than 5% of their
32Kothari and Warner (1997) argue that bootstrapping procedures may help mitigating the potential
biases in long-term performance measurement. With respect to bootstrapping, it is important to have
a large number of firms to match against. One problem in Norway is that there are very few similar
companies, in addition to that we want to match against non-announcing firms, which makes this
approach difficult to implement in a satisfactory way in this study.
33As the risk free rate we use the 3 month Norwegian interbank offered rate (NIBOR).
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outstanding shares. In these cases we report results only from a Carhart (1997) specifi-
cation for normal returns. In the table we use an event window staring two days before
the announcement and ending two days after the event. The main reasons for why we
use a relative large event window is that the announcements of the outcome of the vote
on the repurchase plans are in some cases on the same day as the shareholder meeting,
while it in other cases is announced up to a few days after the shareholder meeting.
Thus, for those announcements that are delayed, the outcome of the vote is likely to be
known to the market before the announcement. In fact, when looking at the cumulative
abnormal return from 60 days prior to the announcement of the repurchase plan through
60 days after the announcement in figure 4.1, there is some indication that there is a
positive impact starting before the announcement. Thus, the relatively large window
reduces the power of the tests, but since we want to capture the entire market reaction
we use a relatively large window. In addition, the table report the average cumulative
abnormal return from 60 days prior to the announcement and until 60 days after the
announcement.
The first thing to note from the table is that the announcement effect is positive
and significant for the whole sample, with an average significant announcement effect of
about 2.5%. This is very similar to what is found for other markets and time periods in
e.g. Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Ikenberry et al. (1995, 2000). With respect to the
different model specifications, the results are quantitatively similar. We do not, however,
find a significantly negative CAR for the 60 day period prior to the announcement for all
announcements of for announcements within separate years. This is in contrast to other
studies that find a significant negative abnormal return prior to the announcement.
Thus, in the Norwegian market, it does not seem that firms decision to announce a
repurchase plan is influenced by the (risk adjusted) prior performance of the firm at
least relative to the three months prior to the announcement. This may be explained
by the findings in panel B in table 4.1, where we found that the number of days between
the announcement of the plan and the first repurchase execution was almost 200 days.
Thus, the announcement does not, on average, seem to be triggered by a negative drift
prior to the announcement.
When examining the announcement effect for different years, we find a positive
effect for all years, but the announcement effect is only significantly different from
zero for announcements in 1999 and 2001. In addition, only firms that announce that
they are planning on repurchasing more than 5% of their outstanding shares experience
a significant abnormal price impact, while the excess return for firms that announce a
lower repurchase fraction is positive but insignificant. Table 4.A1 in appendix 4.A shows
the results from a robustness check where all firms with an announcement CAR below
the 5th and above the 95th percentile are removed from the sample. The announcement
effect falls to about 1.9%, but is still significant at the 1% level.
4.6 Results 155
Table 4.3
Abnormal returns around announcements of repurchase plans
The table shows the abnormal return (in percent) around announcements of repurchase plans. The abnormal
return is measured relative to a one factor market model (unadjusted and adjusted for biases induced by infrequent
trading as proposed in Dimson (1979) and Scholes and Williams (1977)), Fama and French (1993) three factor
model and the Carhart (1997) four factor model, with the value weighted OSE general index as the market
portfolio. The sub-sample regressions and the repurchase% regressions are cumulative excess returns relative to
the Carhart four factor model. Numbers in bold represent numbers significantly different from zero at the 1%
level, and numbers in parenthesis are the associated t-values.
Days relative to announcement date τ1 to τ2
n -60 to -3 -2 to +2 +3 to +60
Whole sample (1998-2001)
Unadjusted market model 318 -0.23 (-0.29) 2.52 (3.72) 0.51 (0.62)
Dimson (1979) 318 -0.06 (-0.07) 2.43 (3.53) 0.24 (0.29)
Scholes and Williams (1977) 318 -0.25 (-0.32) 2.44 (3.58) 0.20 (0.24)
Fama and French (1993) 318 -0.31 (-0.41) 2.52 (3.72) 0.63 (0.77)
Carhart (1997) 318 -0.25 (-0.34) 2.62 (3.86) 0.62 (0.75)
Subsamples (year)
1998 28 1.59 (0.85) 1.25 (0.57) 1.47 (0.89)
1999 85 -0.68 (-0.56) 2.79 (2.66) 2.35 (1.53)
2000 93 -1.97 (-1.63) 1.36 (1.30) 0.42 (0.25)
2001 112 1.03 (0.66) 3.86 (2.72) -0.80 (-0.56)
Announced repurchase limit (%)
<0%- 5%] 42 -2.93 (-1.85) 3.37 (1.30) -0.81 (-0.46)
<5%-10%] 276 0.16 (0.19) 2.50 (3.70) 0.84 (0.92)
Figure 4.1 Cumulative average abnormal return
The figure shows the CAR relative to a Carhart (1997) model across all 318 announcements that occurred in the
period 1999 through 2001. The CAR is the accumulated average abnormal returns starting 60 days prior to the
announcement of the repurchase plan and ending 60 days after the announcement.
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To examine in more detail what factors are important with respect to the size of
the announcement effect, we run the following regression with the cumulative abnormal
return across the event window for each announcement, ĈARi(τ1, τ2), as the dependent
variable,
ĈARi(τ1, τ2) = α+ β1ĈARi,τ1−k + β2SPRi,τ1−k + β3MCAPi,τ1−1
+ β4BMi,τ1−1 + β5PERCi,τ +DIVi,τ1−360 +QuickRatioi,τ + i
(4.9)
where α is the intercept term, CARi,τ1−k is the cumulative abnormal return over the
k days prior to the event window, SPRi,τ1−k is the average relative spread
34 across the
k days prior to the event window, MCAPi,τ1−1 is the natural log of the firms market
capitalization on the last date before the event window, BMi,τ1−1 is the book to market
value on the last date before the event window, PERCi,τ is the size of the repurchase plan,
DIVτ1−360 is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm has paid any cash dividends
during the previous year and QuickRatioi,τ is the most recently reported quick ratio35
before the firm announces a repurchase plan.
Panel A in table 4.4 shows the results from the cross sectional regression when τ1=-
2, τ2=2 and k=20, and panel B shows the correlations between the variables. As can
be seen from panel B, the average pre-event spread (SPRi,τ1−k) is strongly negatively
correlated with market capitalization (MCAPi,τ1−1). This is because large firms gener-
ally are more liquid and has lower spreads. In addition, as noted by Vermaelen (1981),
small firms may have a greater degree of asymmetric information since they are less
closely followed by analysts and the popular press. Thus, both the spread and market
capitalization variables capture to a large degree these same characteristics. The second
highest correlation is between the book to market (BMi,τ1) variable and the pre-event
(20 days) cumulative abnormal return, which has a significant positive correlation of
0.26. To reduce the multicolinearity problem when including all these variables in the
regression, we orthogonalize both the market capitalization against the relative spread
measure as well as the book to market variable against the pre announcement CAR
(CARi,τ1−k).
36 Panel C in the table shows some descriptive statistics for the indepen-
dent variables. Note that the MCAPi,τ1−1 is in natural logs and that the ĈARi,τ1−k is
not in percentage terms.
We estimate two models. Model 1 include all variables, and in model 2 the vari-
ables related to firm liquidity are omitted. The first thing to note is that the greater
34The relative spread for a security for a day, τ, is calculated as SPRτ = (askτ − bidτ)/[(askτ +
bidτ)/2], where askτ and bidτ is the best ask and bid quotes at the close of day τ.
35The quick ratio is calculated as the sum of cash and deposits, total short-term financial investments
and total short-term receivables divided by total short-term debt
36When estimating the regressions with the original (nonorthogonalized) variables the results are
quantitatively similar.
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(lower) the cumulative excess performance (ĈARi,τ1−k) during the 20 days prior to the
announcement, the lower (greater) is the price impact at the announcement date. Al-
though we did not find support for a negative drift in cumulative abnormal returns before
the announcement on average in table 4.3, this indicates that some firms may announce
a repurchase plan as a response to a price decline. From an undervaluation viewpoint,
this suggests that the market perceives it as more likely that the firm is undervalued the
worse the pre-event performance has been, and put more weight on the signal the worse
the prior performance of the stock. This finding is similar to what is found in Comment
and Jarrell (1991) and Chan et al. (2003) who argue that the credibility of the signal
(proxied by the announcement effect) increases with the underperformance of the firm
relative to the general market in the period prior to the announcement of the repurchase
program. Furthermore, firms with larger spreads (SPRi,τ1−k) experience a greater price
impact at the announcement date than firms with smaller spreads. If the spread proxy
for market liquidity, this result is expected in the sense that the market price moves more
for a less liquid stock. If the announcement results in an excess demand for the stock,
at the announcement, the supply side of the order book will be exhausted more easily
for a less liquid stock than a more liquid stock. In addition, since the spread may also
proxy for asymmetric information, the announcement of a repurchase plan may have a
stronger signalling value for a security where there is a higher uncertainty about firm
value and potentially more private information is revealed through the announcement.
With respect to the market capitalization variable (MCAP) we find that larger firms
experience a lower abnormal price impact than smaller firms. As mentioned earlier,
the reason for this may be that smaller firms are generally less liquid and that an an-
nouncement is more valuable to the market for small firms if there is larger information
asymmetries in smaller firms.
Further, we also find that value stocks, with a high book-to-market value, experience
a stronger price impact than growth stocks. One interpretation for this is that value
firms are more likely to be undervalued relative to growth firms, and that the announce-
ment of a repurchase plan may confirm the markets perception of undervaluation. With
respect to the size of the repurchase plan, it does not explain any variation in the an-
nouncement effect. Initially, one would expect that a larger repurchase plan would be a
stronger signal about undervaluation. However, as discussed earlier, a large fraction of
the announcements are for the maximum allowed size of 10%. Thus, there may be too
little variation in this variable to account for any variation in the CAR. Wether the firm
has paid any dividend the previous year is not related to the announcement effect. With
respect to the dividend variable, one could initially expect this to be negative if firms
that has paid dividends the previous year is expected to continue paying dividends in
the future (dividend smoothing). If firms are expected to continue using excess cash to
pay dividends, this lowers the probability that they will repurchase, and the potential
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Table 4.4
Cross-sectional CAR regression
Panel A in shows the results from the cross sectional regression of CARi(τ1, τ2) on various variables. Model 1 is
estimated as,
ĈARi(τ1, τ2) = α + β1ĈARi,τ1−k + β2SPRi,τ1−k + β3MCAPi,τ1−1
+ β4BMi,τ1−1 + β5PERCi,τ + β6DIVi,τ1−360 + β7QuickRatioi,τ + i
(4.10)
where i denotes the announcements, α is the intercept, ĈARi,τ1−k is the cumulative abnormal return over the
k days prior to the event window, SPRi,τ1−k is the average spread across the k days prior to the event window,
MCAPi,τ1−1 is the natural log market capitalization on the last date before the event window, BMi,τ1−1
is the book to market value on the last date before the event window, PERCi,τ is the size of the repurchase
plan and DIVτ1−360 is a dummy indicating whether a firm has paid any dividends during the last year and
QuickRatioi,τ is the most recent quick ratio before the announcement. In the regression τ1=-2, τ2=2 and
k=20. Note that the market capitalization is orthogonalized against the spread measure, and the book-to-
market variable is orthogonalized against the ĈARi,τ1−k variable. Panel B shows the Pearson’s correlations
coefficients between the variables used in the regressions in panel A. The correlations for MCAP and SPR are
before they are orthogonalized. Numbers in bold refer to correlations significantly different from zero at the 5%
level. Panel C shows some descriptive statistics for the variables.
Panel A: Cross sectional CAR regression
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Est. std.err. p-val. Part.R2 Est. std.err. p-val. Part.R2
Constant 0.041 0.034 0.228 - 0.026 0.036 0.463 -
ĈARτ1−k -0.165 0.046 <0.001 0.027 -0.151 0.049 0.002 0.027
SPRτ1−k 0.338 0.067 <0.001 0.060 - - - -
MCAPτ1−1 -0.013 0.005 0.008 0.016 - - - -
BMτ1−1 0.023 0.006 <0.001 0.051 0.028 0.006 <0.001 0.051
PERCi -0.179 0.350 0.609 0.000 0.054 0.364 0.882 0.000
DIVi,τ1−360 -0.031 0.017 0.067 0.008 -0.035 0.018 0.045 0.012
Quick ratioτ -0.007 0.002 0.002 0.026 - - - -
adj.R2 0.171 0.078
N 318 318
Panel B: Variable correlations
ĈARτ1−k SPRτ1−k MCAPτ1−1 BMτ1−1 PERCi,τ DIVτ1−240
SPRτ1−k 0.06
MCAPτ1−1 -0.05 -0.52
BMτ1−1 0.26 0.13 -0.07
PERC − i, τ 0.07 0.12 -0.15 -0.08
DIVτ1−360 0.00 -0.01 0.08 0.12 -0.07
Quick ratioi,τ 0.01 0.08 -0.13 -0.03 0.08 -0.02
Panel C: Variable statistics
Variable Mean std.dev min max
ĈARτ1−k -0.003 0.132 -0.43 0.33
MCAPτ1−1 (log) 20.602 1.512 16.13 25.12
BMτ1−1 1.328 1.111 0.24 8.54
PERCi 0.095 0.018 0.01 0.10
SPRτ1−k 0.064 0.093 0.01 0.81
DIVi,τ1−360 0.164 0.370 0 1
Quick ratioτ 2.078 2.668 0.26 31.79
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positive effects related to repurchases discussed in section 4.2 are less likely to occur.
Finally, the most recent quick ratio before the announcement, is negatively related to
the announcement effect. Initially, one would expect this variable to be positive in the
sense that liquid firms may be expected to actually execute repurchases such that the
signal is more credible when firms are liquid. On the other hand, the announcement
may to a greater extent be expected by the market in these cases.
4.6.2 Long-term performance of firms announcing a repurchase plan
In this section we examine the long term performance of firms announcing a repurchase
plan. The main hypothesis to be investigated is the underreaction hypothesis of Iken-
berry et al. (1995) who argue that, if a repurchase announcement is a positive signal,
this signal should be, in an efficient market, incorporated into prices completely and
in an unbiased fashion when the firm announces the repurchase plan. In the previous
section we found a significant positive announcement effect of about 2.5%. In panel
A of table 4.5 we report the results from evaluating the long term abnormal perfor-
mance of a calendar time portfolio of announcing firms. The portfolio is rebalanced
every month. All stocks that announce a repurchase plan during a month are added to
the portfolio the first day of the following month. At the beginning of each month, all
firms receive equal weights in the portfolio. We also examine in panel B of table 4.5 the
performance of our portfolio with respect to various fixed holding periods from 1 to 4
years in addition to a buy-and-hold strategy (“whole sample”) where the stock remains
in the portfolio for the rest of the period. When a stock has been in the portfolio for
the duration of the respective holding period, it is removed from the portfolio until it
announces a new repurchase plan. To reduce the idiosyncratic risk of the portfolio, we
require there to be at least 10 firms that has announced a repurchase plan before we
start the portfolio.37
Panel A in table 4.5 shows that for a buy-and-hold portfolio, with no limit on the
holding period, the portfolio significantly outperforms the market by about 0.9% per
month, or 11% per year, when we adjust for the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart
(1997) risk factors. This is in line with results in Ikenberry et al. (1995, 2000) who finds
an abnormal performance of 12.1% in the US and 7% per year in Canada respectively.
Relative to the CAPM, the excess performance is almost 2% per month, or almost
27% per year, illustrating the importance of adjusting the portfolio performance for
additional risk factors in addition to the market risk. When restricting the holding
period in panel B, we find, for the Fama/French and Carhart models, that there is a
significant excess performance when the holding period is longer than 1 year. With
respect to a CAPM specification, the portfolio outperforms regardless of the chosen
37When we use the entire sample period, this result in our portfolio starting in October 1998, when
10 firms had announced a repurchase plan.
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holding period.
One important point with respect to evaluating the long term abnormal performance
in this type of study is that the expected return model may be misspecified. As shown by
Kothari and Warner (1997), in a random sample of 200 firms, about 35% of the firms,
independent of the benchmark model used, show an abnormal positive and negative
abnormal performance over a 36 month period. Although they do not examine these
issues in the context of calendar time portfolios (only with respect to the long run
performance through event time), they argue that a calendar time approach may involve
similar issues. In this study we do not attempt to adjust for such biases, but instead
examine several model specifications for expected returns. An alternative approach
could be to create a matching portfolio of non announcing firms. However, since there
are relatively few listed companies at the OSE,38 implementing a matching procedure
in a satisfactory way may be difficult. As noted by Kothari and Warner (1997), it
is not necessarily enough to match on size and book to market, but also other firm
characteristics as well.
To examine the robustness of the results in table 4.5 we also estimate the excess
returns when we start the portfolio construction in different years throughout the sample
period (1999, 2000 and 2001) and vary the holding period from 1 to 4 years. The results
from this analysis, relative to a Carhart (1997) specification is reported in table 4.5.
We also note that the results when we start the portfolio construction in 1999 are very
similar to the results in table 4.5. The reason for this that we do not start the portfolio
construction in 1998 before at least 10 firms have announced a repurchase plan, which
is in October 1998. Thus, the portfolio construction only starts 3 months later for
the portfolio starting in 1999. In addition, since the time series becomes longer the
earlier we start our portfolio, the data used in later years are subsets of the data we use
when starting the portfolio in earlier years. However, the main point of the analysis is to
check to what degree the results change when we change the starting point of the sample.
The results are similar to those in panel B in table 4.5. There is no significant excess
performance for the announcement portfolio for holding periods of one year. However,
for holding periods of two years or longer, there is a significant abnormal performance
regardless of the year when we start the portfolio construction.
To summarize the analysis so far, both the results in table 4.5 and 4.6 support
the underreaction hypothesis of Ikenberry et al. (1995, 2000). The reaction to the an-
nouncement of repurchase plans found in table 4.3 seem to be incomplete relative to
the true value of the signal conveyed through the announcement proxied by the long
term excess performance following the announcement. The subsequent abnormal perfor-
mance for announcing firms may be related to information surprises through e.g. public
announcements or unexpected earnings reports that occur after the announcement of
38In the end of 1999, 2000 and 2001 there were respectively 215, 214 and 212 listed firms at the OSE.
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Table 4.5
Long term performance of the announcement portfolio
The table shows the excess performance of a calendar time portfolio of firms announcing a repurchase plan. The
excess return on the portfolio is both measured relative to a one-factor CAPM model (i), a three factor Fama
and French (1993) model (ii) and a four factor Carhart (1997) model (iii),
(i) Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βm(Rm,t − Rf,t) + εt
(ii) Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βm(Rm,t − Rf,t) + βhmlRhml,t + βsmbRsmb,t + εt
(iii) Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βm(Rm,t − Rf,t) + βhmlRhml,t + βsmbRsmb,t + βmomRmom,t + εt
where Rp,t is the return on the equally weighted portfolio of announcing firms, Rft is our proxy for the risk
free rate, Rmτ , R
hml
τ , R
smb
τ and R
mom
τ are the returns on the market-, the book to market-, the size- and the
momentum factors respectively, and the β’s are the factor exposures. The factor returns are calculated similarly
as in eq. 4.3 and α measures the average daily abnormal performance of the portfolio relative to the excess return
on the factor portfolios. The portfolio is rebalanced at the beginning of every month, and firms that announced
a repurchase plan during the previous month is included in the portfolio. Panel A shows the results for our
buy-and-hold portfolio when stocks are not sold (the stocks in the portfolio are hold through the entire sample
from when they enter), and Panel B shows the results when we vary the holding period from 1 months to the
entire sample period. In both panel A and panel B the average daily excess return, α, is reported in percent.
Panel A: Buy-hold portfolio performance (no limit on holding period)
Fama/
CAPM t-value French t-value Carhart t-value
α (%) 0.10 4.71 0.04 2.29 0.04 2.30
βm 0.58 33.79 0.72 38.88 0.72 37.94
βsmb - - 0.27 13.51 0.27 13.38
βhml - - 0.06 3.74 0.05 2.90
βmom - - - - -0.02 -0.98
adj.R2 0.523 0.602 0.602
N 1041 1041 1041
Panel B: Various holding periods
Holding CAPM Fama/French Carhart
period
α(%) t-value α(%) t-value α(%) t-value
1 year 0.064 2.18 0.008 0.28 0.008 0.27
2 years 0.087 4.49 0.036 1.98 0.036 1.99
3 years 0.100 4.61 0.046 2.28 0.047 2.29
4 years 0.099 4.73 0.045 2.31 0.045 2.32
Whole sample 0.098 4.71 0.044 2.29 0.045 2.30
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the repurchase plan. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the excess per-
formance may be due to miss-specification of the expected returns model as discussed
in Kothari and Warner (1997) among others. We try to reduce the misspecification
by using several model specifications for expected returns. Including the size, book to
market and momentum factors, reduces the excess performance estimate relative to a
CAPM specification. However, for horizons longer than one year, there is still evidence
that the portfolio of announcing firms experience an excess performance after having
accounted for the portfolios exposure to these risk factors.
Table 4.6
Long term performance of announcement portfolio - varying starting year
The table shows the excess performance of a calendar time portfolio of firms announcing a repurchase plan for
various starting years and holding periods. The excess return on the portfolio is measured relative to a four
factor Carhart (1997) model,
Rpt − R
f
t = α + βm(R
m
t − R
f
t) + β
hRhmlt + β
sRsmbt + β
momRmomt + εt
where Rpt is the return on the equally weighted portfolio of announcing firms, Rft is our proxy for the risk
free rate, Rmτ , R
hml
τ , R
smb
τ and R
mom
τ are the returns on the market-, the book to market-, the size- and the
momentum factors respectively, and the β’s are the factor exposures. The factor returns are calculated similarly
as in eq. 4.3 and α measures the average daily abnormal performance of the portfolio after having adjusted for
the Carhart risk factors. The portfolio is rebalanced at the beginning of every month, and firms that announced
a repurchase plan during the previous month is included in the portfolio. The results when starting the portfolio
construction in 1998 and 1999 are quite similar. This is mainly because we do not start the portfolio in 1998
before enough firms (10 firms) have announced a repurchase plan which is in October 1998.
Year when starting portfolio construction
1999 2000 2001
Holding
period α(%) t-value α(%) t-value α(%) t-value
1 year 0.009 0.31 0.008 0.23 0.02 0.46
2 years 0.038 2.11 0.044 2.09 0.07 2.59
3 years 0.049 2.40 0.059 2.38 - -
4 years 0.048 2.44 - - - -
4.6.3 Long term performance conditional on repurchase activity
In the previous section we found support for the underreaction hypothesis in the Nor-
wegian market. In this section we examine more closely the nature of the excess perfor-
mance. Moreover, we study whether the fact that a firm actually execute a repurchase
or not is important for the subsequent performance.
This is motivated by the fact that a repurchase announcement itself is not a commit-
ment to actually repurchase shares. Furthermore, the announcement does not impose
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any costs on the managers in the announcing firms if the announcement is false.39 Thus,
as discussed in Fried (2002) and Comment and Jarrell (1991), the credibility of the signal
may be questionable. On the other hand, when a firm actually executes a repurchase,
this may be perceived as a stronger signal about undervaluation since it involves real
transactions. Especially, if the manager or other insiders owns a stake in the company,
since if they repurchase when the firm is overvalued, the managers will increase their
ownership in an overvalued firm (assuming that they retain their shares). Thus, when
the market observes that the firm executes a repurchase it may be interpreted as a signal
(or confirmation of the initial signal) that the the firm is actually undervalued.
Given that undervaluation is the main motivation for why firms repurchase shares,
the actual repurchase executions should be a positive signal to the market about firm
value. Moreover, one would expect the firm to execute repurchases until the firm is no
longer undervalued. If this is the case we expect the market to react positively to the
actual repurchases, and increase prices closer to the true value. Furthermore, if the firms
repurchase activity increases the price closer to the true value, reducing the mispricing,
this should also reduce the subsequent long run excess performance for these firms.40
Announcements that do not result in subsequent repurchases, may be because of
several reasons. First of all, the firm may simply not be mispriced after the announce-
ment. If these firms are more able to credibly signal that they are undervalued through
the announcement of a repurchase plan, and the market fully reacts to the information
conveyed by the announcement, one would not expect these firms to repurchase any
shares after the announcement (at least not for undervaluation reasons). If this is the
case, we would expect announcements that do not result in subsequent repurchases to
experience a greater announcement effect than announcements that result in subsequent
repurchases. To check this, we examine, in table 4.7, whether announcements that do
not result in subsequent repurchases experience a stronger announcement effect than
announcements that result in repurchases. The results suggest that the announcement
effect (as well as the pre- and post-announcement CAR) is similar for the two groups.
Thus, there is no evidence that announcements which result in subsequent repurchases
experience a greater underreaction than announcements that do not result in repur-
chases. Rather, the market reaction in the two cases are remarkably similar.
Another reason for why firms do not execute any repurchases may be because of
liquidity reasons. This can be due to low profitability or that they do not have any
excess cash available for repurchasing shares. Thus, from an undervaluation perspective,
the managers may want to repurchase shares due to undervaluation, but are unable to
do so.41 An additional reason for why firms do not repurchase shares during the course
39As proposed by Fried (2002), if managers act opportunistically they may also announce a repurchase
plan when the firm is not undervalued to boost the stock price when selling.
40As discussed in section 4.2, firms also repurchase shares for many other reasons than undervaluation.
However, our main discussion will be centered around the undervaluation hypothesis.
41The managers could also issue debt to finance the repurchases, but this may be costly if the firm
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Table 4.7
Announcement CAR given subsequent repurchase activity
The table shows the abnormal returns (in percent) for different periods around the announcement of repurchase
programs that resulted in actual repurchases versus announcements that did not result in subsequent repurchases.
The table also show the p-value from a test that the means between the two groups are equal.
Days relative to
announcement date (τ1 to τ2)
n -60 to -3 -2 to +2 +3 to +60
Announcement, no repurchase 133 -0.05% 2.39% 0.89%
Announcement, repurchase 185 -0.40% 2.78% 0.43%
Test for difference
in means (p-value) 0.54 0.75 0.62
of a repurchase program is discussed in Ikenberry et al. (2000). Findings in Ikenberry
et al. (2000) indicates that managers are sensitive to price movements. Thus, if the
price increases, such that the stock potentially becomes overvalued, the manager may
choose not to execute repurchases.
Our main hypothesis is that if managers execute repurchases to exploit undervalu-
ation, and the market efficiently reacts to the signal conveyed through the actual re-
purchases, the repurchase activity should mitigate the mispricing. Moreover, the price
should increase towards the ”true” value if the actual repurchases signal undervaluation.
This should further reduce the subsequent excess returns closer to expected levels for a
portfolio of these firms. In other words, we should observe a lower subsequent abnormal
performance for repurchasing firms if the initial repurchases are successful in reducing
the mispricing. In addition, we should also see a positive, and permanent price impact
from the actual repurchases if the market respond favorably to the information that the
firm has executed repurchases (this will be examined more closely in section 4.6.4).
Relative to what we expect to see for the group of non-repurchasing firms, this is
not clear. As discussed earlier, these firms may both choose to repurchase because they
are not mispriced which imply that these firms should perform as expected. Alterna-
tively, these firms may experience a price increase after the announcement such that the
managers choose not to repurchase any shares (Ikenberry et al., 2000), in which case
we expect these firms to show an abnormal performance if the price increase is related
to new information. Also, if these firms are undervalued after the announcement, but
are unable to execute repurchases due to e.g. liquidity constraints, we would also expect
these firms to show an long run abnormal performance if prices are adjusted in response
to favorable information arrivals in later periods. On the other hand, if these firms
choose not to repurchase because they are overvalued, we would expect these firms to
underperform in the long run.
already have a high leverage ratio or that the undervaluation is to small to justify an issue of debt.
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To examine these questions in more detail, we construct a portfolio through calendar
time in the similar fashion as we did when we examined the long term performance of
announcing firms in the previous section. However, instead of only selecting our portfolio
stocks conditional on whether the firm has announced a repurchase plan, we now also
condition our stock selection on whether a firm has executed its first repurchase as well.
More specifically, we create two portfolios, assigning firms based on whether they have
repurchased shares in the previous period or not. In the first portfolio (P1) we include
a firm the first day of the month following the month when it announced a repurchase
plan (similar to the portfolio created in the previous section). Next, if a firm in P1
executes a repurchase, we remove the firm from P1 the following day and include it in
a second portfolio (P2) the first day of the following month after it for the first time
has executed a repurchase.42 Thus, P1 will at any point in time only contain firms that
have announced a repurchase plan, but not yet repurchased, while P2 contains firms
that have executed at least one repurchase following an announcement. The combined
portfolio of the firms in P1 and P2, is the portfolio that was analyzed in section 4.6.2,
such that P1 and P2 represent a decomposition of the announcement portfolio.43 The
fraction of firms actually repurchasing and the fraction of outstanding shares actually
repurchased among Norwegian firms is reported in table 4.1. Thus, at the end of the
sample period in the scenario with no limit on the holding period, and we start the
portfolio construction at the beginning of the sample, we will be left with 63 firms in
P1 and 100 firms in P2 at the end of the sample period.
In table 4.8 we estimate the performance of the two portfolios relative to the CAPM,
Fama and French (1993) three factor model and the Carhart (1997) four factor model.
On average the portfolio of firms that has not repurchased, P1, consists of 45 firms while
the portfolio firms that execute at least one repurchase, P2, contains on average 69
firms. For diversification reasons, we do not start our portfolio construction before both
portfolios each contain at least 10 firms, which is in May 1999. Estimating Jensen’s alpha
with respect to the CAPM, both portfolios show a significant abnormal performance of
2% (P1) and 1.6% (P2) per month. However, relative to the Fama/French and Carhart
specifications, the results indicate that P2 does not experience an abnormal performance
while P1 experience a significant abnormal performance of about 1.2% per month. In
other words, the portfolio tracking the portfolio of repurchasing firms (after they have
executed their first repurchases) perform as expected while the portfolio of firms that
announces, but do not repurchase, experience an excess performance.
This result may indicate that actual repurchases provide useful information to the
42Firms may execute several repurchases before it is included in P2. However, the potential price
effect of these repurchases will not be included in either P1 or P2. Only the effect of the first repurchase
will be included in the return of P1.
43One difference however, is that since firms are removed the day after they repurchase and not
included in P2 before the first day of the next month, there is a window where a repurchasing firm is
excluded from both portfolios.
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Table 4.8
Long term performance conditional on repurchase activity
The table shows the excess performance of two calendar time portfolios. P1 is the portfolio with announcing
firms that do not execute any repurchases, only announces. P2 is a portfolio of repurchasing firms where a firm
is included in the portfolio the month after it has executed its first repurchase. The firm is excluded from P1
one day after it has repurchased for the first time. Thus, at any point in time, P1 consists of firms that has
announced a repurchase plan, but has not executed any repurchases, while P2 consists of firms that has executed
at least one repurchase. The excess returns on the two portfolios are estimated relative to a one-factor CAPM
model (i), a three factor Fama and French (1993) (ii) and a four factor Carhart (1997) model (iii),
(i) Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βm(Rm,t − Rf,t) + εt
(ii) Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βm(Rm,t − Rf,t) + βhmlRhml,t + βsmbRsmb,t + εt
(iii) Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βm(Rm,t − Rf,t) + βhmlRhml,t + βsmbRsmb,t + βmomRmom,t + εt
where Rp,t is the return on the equally weighted portfolio of announcing firms, Rft is our proxy for the risk
free rate, Rmτ , R
hml
τ , R
smb
τ and R
mom
τ are the returns on the market-, the book to market-, the size- and the
momentum factors respectively, and the β’s are the factor exposures. The factor returns are calculated similarly
as in eq. 4.3 and α measures the average daily abnormal performance of the portfolio relative to the excess return
on the factor portfolios. The table shows the results for buy-and-hold portfolios for which stocks are not sold (the
stocks in the portfolio are held through the entire sample from when they enter the portfolio). The estimated
average daily excess return, α, is reported in percent, and numbers in bold denote an α estimate significant at
the 5% level.
CAPM Fama/French Carhart
P1 (norep) P2 (rep) P1 (norep) P2 (rep) P1 (norep) P2 (rep)
α (%) 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.20 0.03 0.20
βm 0.58 0.56 0.68 0.72 0.67 0.73
βsmb 0.20 0.31 0.20 0.32
βhml 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.06
βmom -0.08 0.03
adj.R2 0.39 0.37 0.42 0.45 0.43 0.45
Avg. firms 45 69 45 69 45 69
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market which may be related to the confirmation of the initial announcement signal,
permanently increasing the price such that mispricing is mitigated, and subsequent
returns are reduced to expected levels. However, we cannot exclude the possibility
that these firms do not repurchase shares for undervaluation reasons. In addition, the
result may also indicate that managers repurchase shares when their underperforms,
such that the average performance of this portfolio is lower than the portfolio where
managers do not execute any repurchases. We will examine the abnormal price impact
of the actual repurchases in the next section to investigate whether it is likely that the
actual repurchases mitigate mispricing.
Our results are also consistent with earlier findings. Stephens and Weisbach (1998)
find, using quarterly repurchase data for Canada, that repurchases during one quarter
appear to be negatively related to unadjusted returns in the previous (and contem-
poraneous) quarter. This suggests that managers respond to previous price changes
when determining whether to repurchase or not. In addition, they find that subsequent
returns is lower in the quarters after the firm has repurchased. This finding is also
confirmed in, Ikenberry et al. (2000), using monthly repurchase data from Canada. In
addition, Ikenberry et al. (2000) find that stock performance in the year following the
announcement of a repurchase plan decreases with the repurchase activity. They argue
that this is because managers time their repurchases to times when the firm is perceived
by the manager of the firm as being undervalued, such that these firms experience a
lower excess performance on average.
This points to an issue that is not examined in the paper. The decision to repurchase
is likely to be related to events occurring after the announcement of the repurchase
program, such that the repurchases (or non repurchases) observed ex post were not
necessarily intended ex ante. This is an important and interesting issue since announcing
firms are likely to “self select” into being repurchasers or non-repurchasers. Furthermore,
this may explain the finding that repurchasing firms has a lower abnormal performance
than non repurchasing firms. It may be that firms choose not to repurchase because the
price of their stock has increased reflected by the abnormal performance of P1, while
non-repurchasers choose to repurchase because their stock has performed poorly. An
interesting extension would be to examine this self selection in more detail to study what
are the important decision variables that induce announcing firms to execute repurchases
or not.44
Since the results in table 4.8 are for the whole sample period for a buy-an-hold
strategy, we also check the robustness of our results by creating portfolios starting in
different years as well as with various holding periods. The results from this analysis
is reported in table 4.9. With respect to the different starting years, the results are
44In the introduction of the thesis, in section 1.1.2, this is proposed as a future research topic or as
an improvement of the current paper.
168 Chapter 4 Open Market Share Repurchases in Norway
Table 4.9
Long term performance conditional on repurchase activity - varying starting year and holding
period
The table shows the excess performance of two calendar time portfolios for varying starting years and holding
periods. P1 is the portfolio with announcing firms that do not execute any repurchases, only announces. P2
is a portfolio of repurchasing firms where a firm is included in the portfolio the month after it has executed its
first repurchase. Thus, at any point in time, P1 consists of firms that has announced a repurchase plan, but has
not executed any repurchases, while P2 consists of firms that has executed at least one repurchase. The excess
returns on the two portfolios are both measured relative to a four factor Carhart (1997) model,
Rpt − R
f
t = α + βm(Rm,t − R
f
t) + βhmlRhml,t + βsmbRsmb,t + βmomRmom,t + εt
where Rpt is the return on the equally weighted portfolio of announcing firms, Rft is our proxy for the risk
free rate, Rmτ , R
hml
τ , R
smb
τ and R
mom
τ are the returns on the market-, the book to market-, the size- and the
momentum factors respectively, and the β’s are the factor exposures. The factor returns are calculated similarly
as in eq. 4.3 and α measures the average daily abnormal performance of the portfolio relative to the excess return
on the factor portfolios. The average daily excess return, α, is reported in percent, numbers in parentheses are
p-values for the α estimates, and numbers in bold represent a significance at the 5% level.
Year when starting portfolio construction
Max. 1999 2000 2001
holding
period α(P1) α(P2) α(P1) α(P2) α(P1) α(P2)
1 year 0.045 0.013 0.069 -0.007 0.134 0.028
(0.191) (0.727) (0.128) (0.86) (0.039) (0.655)
2 years 0.066 0.012 0.089 -0.006 0.121 0.017
(0.046) (0.658) (0.033) (0.832) (0.034) (0.665)
3 years 0.063 0.028 0.083 0.016 · ·
(0.036) (0.231) (0.027) (0.533) · ·
4 years 0.061 0.029 · · · ·
(0.025) (0.308) · · · ·
qualitatively the same as in table 4.8, but quantitatively stronger in the later part of the
sample. When we also vary the holding period, we find that the abnormal performance
for P1 is significant for holding periods longer than one year. This is similar to the
results when we examined the performance for all firms in table 4.5.
So far we have not discussed in detail what may contribute to the abnormal perfor-
mance of P1. As discussed in the beginning of this section, the abnormal performance
of this portfolio may be due to several reasons. However, one issue that may affect
the excess performance of P1 is that a stock is removed after it has repurchased shares
for the first time after the announcement. If there is an strong abnormal price impact
related to the first repurchase execution, this may affect the performance of P1.
To examine to what degree this contributes to the abnormal performance of P1, we
re-estimate the models in table 4.8, but exclude each firm from P1 five days before it
execute its first repurchase. Thus, the excess returns related to the initial repurchases
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Table 4.10
Long term performance conditional on repurchase activity - removing initial repurchase in P1
The table shows the excess performance of two calendar time portfolios. P1 is the portfolio with announcing firms
that do not execute any repurchases, only announces. To examine whether the the effect of the initial repurchase
contribute to the excess performance of P1, we exclude a firm five days before it executes its first repurchase. P2
remains identical as in the previous analysis where firms are included in the first day of the month after it has
executed its first repurchase. Thus, at any point in time, P1 consists of firms that has announced a repurchase
plan, but has not executed any repurchases, while P2 consists of firms that has executed at least one repurchase.
The excess returns on the two portfolios are both measured relative to a one-factor CAPM model (i), a three
factor Fama and French (1993) (ii) and a four factor Carhart (1997) model (iii),
(i) Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βm(Rm,t − Rf,t) + εt
(ii) Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βm(Rm,t − Rf,t) + βhmlRhml,t + βsmbRsmb,t + εt
(iii) Rp,t − Rf,t = α + βm(Rm,t − Rf,t) + βhmlRhml,t + βsmbRsmb,t + βmomRmom,t + εt
where Rp,t is the return on the equally weighted portfolio of announcing firms, Rft is our proxy for the risk
free rate, Rmτ , R
hml
τ , R
smb
τ and R
mom
τ are the returns on the market-, the book to market-, the size- and the
momentum factors respectively, and the β’s are the factor exposures. The factor returns are calculated similarly
as in eq. 4.3 and α measures the average daily abnormal performance of the portfolio relative to the excess return
on the factor portfolios. The table shows the results for buy-and-hold portfolios for which stocks are not sold (the
stocks in the portfolio are held through the entire sample from when they enter the portfolio). The estimated
average daily excess return, α, is reported in percent, and numbers in bold denote an α estimate significant at
the 5% level.
CAPM Fama/French Carhart
P1 (norepo) P2 (repo) P1 (norepo) P2 (repo) P1 (norepo) P2 (repo)
α (%) 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.24 0.04 0.20
βm 0.58 0.56 0.68 0.72 0.66 0.73
βsmb 0.20 0.31 0.19 0.32
βhml 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.06
βmom -0.08 0.03
adj.R2 0.39 0.37 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.45
Avg. firms 45 69 45 69 45 69
should then not be included in the performance of P1. The results from this analysis is
reported in table 4.10, and it does not change the results greatly relative to the results in
table 4.8. However, the estimated alpha for P1 decreases slightly, as well as its p-value,
but the alpha is still significant at the 5% level for P1. Thus, the initial repurchase
seem to have an impact on the performance of P1, but it does not explain the overall
abnormal performance of P1.
An alternative reason for why firms choose not to repurchase shares may be that
the stock price increases such that the manager choose not to repurchase any shares
(Ikenberry et al., 2000). This may clearly be a potential reason for why P1 experience
a long term abnormal performance. However, another explanation for why these firms
do not execute any repurchases may be that the firms do not have any cash available to
repurchase shares. Thus, if these firms experience an underreaction when they announce
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the repurchase plan, such that they are undervalued after the announcement, it may
be that they are unable to signal to the market that they are mispriced through actual
repurchases due to liquidity constraints. Moreover, given that the market underreacts to
the signal conveyed through the initial announcement, and the firm is undervalued after
the announcement, the lack of repurchase activity keeps the price at a low level, resulting
in abnormal returns when the market is faced with positive information surprises in later
periods.
To examine more closely whether low liquidity is a likely reason for why firms do
not repurchase, we examine measures of liquidity from accounting data. The liquidity
measures we use are the most recently reported quick ratios and current ratios prior to
the announcements of the repurchase plans. The current ratio is calculated as the total
short-term assets divided by total short-term debt, and the quick ratio is calculated as
the sum of cash and deposits, total short-term financial investments and total short-term
receivables divided by total short-term debt. In table 4.11 we examine the difference
in liquidity between the firms in the two groups. The “no repurchase” group contains
firms that do not repurchase shares during the sample (the firms in portfolio P1 in the
above analysis). The first column of the table also contain the average liquidity mea-
sure for all firms listed at the OSE.45 The results suggests that non-repurchasing firms
are on average significantly less liquid than repurchasing firms. Although this varies
somewhat across the years, the overall difference in liquidity between non-repurchasing
and repurchasing firms support a hypothesis that at least some announcing firms do
not execute repurchases due to lack of liquidity. Furthermore, it also substantiates our
story that since these firms are constrained from repurchasing, and more credibly sig-
nal undervaluation, they experience a long-term abnormal drift due to e.g. information
surprises in later periods.
To summarize, the results in this section indicates that the long term abnormal
performance experienced by firms that announce a repurchase plan, mainly is due to
firms that do not repurchase shares (P1). These results does not provide an explana-
tion for the underreaction hypothesis proposed by Ikenberry et al. (1995). However,
it offers an alternative interpretation in that the market rationally underreacts at the
announcement date due to the low credibility of the signal. If a firm actually executes a
repurchase, this may be a stronger signal of undervaluation, such that the market price
is increased and the subsequent performance is reduced to expected levels. With respect
to why the firms that do not repurchase experience a long term abnormal performance,
we propose several explanations. This may be because these firms experience a price
increase after the announcement reflected in the excess performance for this group, such
that the manger chooses not to execute any repurchases. An additional interpretation,
45Before averaging across all the firms, we filter away the extreme observations in the upper 99%
percentile. This removes 6 observations (within different years) with the largest having a quick ratio of
more than 1000.
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Table 4.11
Liquidity difference
The table shows the average liquidity of firms announcing a repurchase plan conditional on whether they execute
repurchases for the duration of the repurchase plan or not. Results are supplied for the whole sample (All years)
as well as for announcements occurring within separate years. The first column report the average across all
firms at the OSE. The proxies used to measure liquidity are the ”current ratio” calculated as total short-term
assets divided by total short-term debt, and the ”quick ratio” calculated as the sum of cash and deposits, total
short-term financial investments and total short-term receivables divided by total short-term debt. The liquidity
measure is the most recently reported by the firm before it announces the repurchase plan. We perform t-tests
for differences in means between firms that announce a repurchase plan but do not repurchase (1) and firms that
execute repurchases (2). The first test is a one sided test with the null that non-repurchasing firms has a higher
or equal liquidity to firms that repurchase. The second test is a two sided test with the null hypothesis that the
two means are equal. The p-values are adjusted conditional on whether the variance of the two distributions are
significantly different at the 5% level or not.
All
OSE firms No repurchase (1) Repurchase (2) Test for difference in means
Mean Mean Std.err N Mean Std.err N (2) <= (1) (1) = (2)
p-value p-value
Quick ratio
All years 2.32 1.66 0.14 63 2.47 0.24 100 <0.01 <0.01
1998 2.48 1.97 0.38 13 1.91 0.31 15 0.54 0.91
1999 2.31 1.55 0.22 44 2.23 0.31 41 0.04 0.08
2000 2.36 1.41 0.18 25 2.88 0.43 65 <0.01 <0.01
2001 2.14 1.84 0.31 49 2.37 0.49 60 0.18 0.37
Current ratio
All years 2.65 1.98 0.14 63 2.72 0.23 100 <0.01 0.01
1998 2.96 2.31 0.35 13 2.10 0.29 15 0.68 0.63
1999 2.62 1.86 0.21 44 2.56 0.21 41 0.03 0.05
2000 2.63 1.74 0.22 25 3.13 0.42 65 <0.01 <0.01
2001 2.36 2.16 0.33 49 2.58 0.49 60 0.24 0.47
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may be that these firms are unable to signal undervaluation, such that they on average
experience a positive drift when positive information about the firms are announced in
later periods.
4.6.4 The timing and price impact of the actual repurchases
In the previous sections we found evidence that the market on average underreacted to
the announcement of a repurchase plan, suggesting that the information in the initial
signal was slowly incorporated into prices over time. In addition, we found that the ap-
parent underreaction seemed to be mainly related to firms that announced a repurchase
plan, but did not execute any repurchases during the course of the plan.
In this section we look closer at the short term effect in the days surrounding the
actual repurchases. Moreover, we examine whether and to what degree the actual
repurchases are interpreted by the market as informative to the value of the firm. If the
repurchase is interpreted as a valuable positive signal, we should observe on average a
positive abnormal return on the repurchase date, and that there is no reversal in the
CAR after the repurchase. This would be in line with our interpretation of the results
in the previous section that the repurchases mitigate mispricing. Alternatively, an effect
from the repurchase may also be related to trading activity of the firm, in which case
we would expect to see only a temporary effect.
Initially, in the extreme case where undervaluation is the only motive for why a firm
announces a repurchase plan, undervaluation should also be the main motivation for why
firms actually execute repurchases. However, as discussed in Ikenberry et al. (2000), the
manager may also repurchase because he perceives the firm to be undervalued after large
price declines. Relative to the initial announcement, the actual repurchases reflect real
transactions and may be more credible signals to the market than the announcement
of the plan when there is no commitment to repurchase. Furthermore, when a firm an-
nounces a repurchase plan, this may not be related to the firm being undervalued at the
time, but rather to give the managers the flexibility to exploit windows of opportunity
some point in the future. Thus, examining the price impact of the actual repurchases
may give us more information about whether undervaluation is a potential explanation
for why firms repurchase shares and how the market react to the actual repurchase.
If managers successfully identify when the firm is undervalued, one would expect their
timing to coincide with a preceding negative drift in abnormal returns. Results in Iken-
berry et al. (2000) suggest that this is the case, but are unable to examine the pattern
in excess return around the repurchase date since they only have monthly repurchase
aggregates. However, their results indicate that firms repurchase more in periods when
the stock price falls.
To examine the effect of actual share repurchases, we apply a similar event study
methodology to the one used in section 4.6.1, and use the actual repurchase announce-
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Figure 4.2 CAR around actual repurchases - unfiltered
The figure shows the CAR from 50 days before the actual repurchase until 50 days after the repurchase. In the
figure we average across all 1375 event dates.
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ment date as the event. This date is either the same day as the repurchase or before the
trading session starts the next day. One main problem with analyzing the actual repur-
chases is that there are about 1375 repurchase events over a 4 year period. Since firms
often repurchase shares on several days in a row, this clustering of events is problematic
in several respects. First of all, if a firm execute several repurchases in sequence, the
event dates will be overlapping and dependent. This results in the post and pre-event
excess returns being averaged across overlapping periods. Thus, if firms repurchase
when there is a negative drift in excess returns, the average negative excess return will
be exaggerated. Figure 4.2 shows the average cumulative abnormal returns from 50
days before to 50 days after the repurchase when we ignore these problems and use all
1375 repurchase events. Although the numbers used in the figure are subject to several
problems related to the clustering of events, and that firms that repurchase more gain
a larger weight, it illustrates that repurchases are executed in periods when the stock
experience a downward drift in abnormal performance. In addition, there seem to be a
temporary increase in the stock price around the repurchases date. Thus, the normal
performance of the repurchase portfolio (P2) in the previous section, may be because
these firms perform worse on average than non-repurchasing firms in (P1).
To reduce the bias related to the clustering of repurchases discussed above, we
calculate short term excess returns for two main cases. First, for each firm, we restrict
repurchases to be 40 days apart to be included in the sample. Although this reduces
the bias related to overlapping, the excess returns both before and after the repurchase
contain potential abnormal price movements related to repurchases that are not included
174 Chapter 4 Open Market Share Repurchases in Norway
in the sample, but are still reflected in the returns. We also examine excess returns
surrounding only the first repurchase executed by a firm, leaving us with 100 repurchase
events. The results from this analysis is illustrated in figure 4.3. In both cases, there
seem to be a negative drift in CAR prior to the repurchase and a price impact on the
event date. However, pre event CAR is not significant at any conventional levels. The
most important thing to note is that the price impact is permanent, in the sense that
there is no reversal in CAR at least 20 days after the repurchase. If the impact was
mainly a liquidity effect, we would expect to see a reversal in the day after the actual
repurchase. Thus, the abnormal permanent price impact is in line with the market
interpreting the repurchase as a positive signal and/or a confirmation of the initial
announcement of the repurchase plan. This support our interpretation of the results in
the section 4.6.3, in the sense that repurchases permanently increase prices, and mitigate
the undervaluation.
Figure 4.3 CAR around actual repurchases - filtered
The figure shows the CAR from 20 days before the firm announces that it has repurchased until 20 days after
the announcement, when we restrict repurchases not to be within 40 trading days of each other (40 day filter)
and when we only look at the first repurchase executed by a firm (first repurchase).
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One concern with the argument in section 4.6.3 is that many of the firms that
have executed their first repurchase, execute several repurchases. In fact 81% of the
firms execute two repurchases, and 26% of the firms execute 10 repurchases. Thus, if
each repurchase has an impact on excess returns, we would expect to see an abnormal
performance related to these subsequent repurchases which should create a positive
drift in the repurchase portfolio (P2). On the other hand, it may be that most of the
signalling value of the repurchase activity is related to the first repurchase conducted by
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a firm, since it conveys to the market that the firm is committed to actually repurchasing
shares. If so, most of the price correction occurs before the stock is included in the second
portfolio (P2), such that the subsequent performance is not affected by the continuing
repurchase activity. To examine this in more detail we estimate the CAR for the three
day period surrounding the actual repurchase, from τ1=-1 (when the firm actually
execute the repurchase), through τ2=1 (one day after the firm has announced that it
has repurchased). We do this for each n’th repurchase event. In table 4.12 ”Repurchase
number” denotes the sequence number of the repurchase. Thus, 100 firms executed one
repurchase, 81 firms execute a second repurchase etc. For each subsequent repurchase
event we report the percentage CAR for the event window, the standard deviation of the
CARs related to the event and the associated t-value. As opposed to the event study in
section 4.6.1 where we estimated the variance for the excess returns prior to the event,
we use the event window standard deviation when we examine the abnormal returns
related to actual repurchases. This estimator of the variance takes into account the
possibility that the event itself increases the risk of the firm, as suggested in Campbell
et al. (1997). In addition, the two last columns of the table shows the average fraction
that firms repurchase during the n’th repurchase, both with respect to the total number
of shares they repurchase in the program as well as as a percentage of outstanding
shares. The results in the table indicate that the first repurchase executed by firms
has the greatest price impact of about 0.88% which is highly significant. This may
suggests that the first repurchase contains the most value to the market. After the first
repurchase there seem to be a decrease in the effect from the subsequent repurchases.
It is also interesting to note that firms on average repurchase about 38% of their
total repurchase amount during their first repurchase. This is also evident when looking
at the repurchase volume as a fraction of outstanding shares, with about 1.1% of the
firm shares bought back during the initial repurchase. Thus, the largest impact from
the initial repurchase may be due to a liquidity effect. On the other hand, a larger
average volume may also be perceived as a stronger signal in the market. From figure
4.3 there is no evidence of reversal, but rather that the CAR is relatively stable in the
20 days following the repurchase.
Overall it seems like the actual repurchases are greeted by the market as a positive
signal, and that the first repurchase executed by firms is perceived as the most valuable
signal.
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Table 4.12
CAR for subsequent repurchase events
The table shows the average cumulative abnormal return from τ1=-1 to τ2=1 for the 15 first repurchases executed
by firms. The first column (”Repurchase number”) denotes whether it is the first, second, third etc. repurchase
executed by the sample firms. Thus, we see from the table that 100 firms executed one repurchase, 81 firms
executed a second repurchase, 66 firms executed a third repurchase and so on. %CAR(τ1, τ2), is the average
CAR around the n’th repurchase executed by firms. The table also report the t-value from a test that the CAR
is equal to zero, the average fraction of the total volume repurchased by firms in the n’th repurchase and the
average% of outstanding shares repurchase by firms in the n’th repurchase.
Repurchase %CAR avg.fraction
number Firms (τ1, τ2) std.dev t-value of rep.vol of outs. shares
1 100 0.877 0.023 3.83 38.1% 1.1%
2 81 0.388 0.021 1.69 16.1% 0.6%
3 66 0.398 0.018 1.77 13.1% 0.7%
4 65 0.045 0.017 0.22 11.6% 0.5%
5 54 0.012 0.015 0.06 8.7% 0.6%
6 51 0.449 0.021 1.55 8.0% 0.6%
7 41 0.298 0.019 1.00 6.6% 0.6%
8 38 0.599 0.020 1.84 6.9% 0.7%
9 33 0.218 0.018 0.68 3.1% 0.2%
10 26 -0.051 0.017 -0.16 3.9% 0.3%
11 22 0.365 0.023 0.75 2.8% 0.3%
12 22 0.186 0.021 0.42 3.8% 0.4%
13 18 0.154 0.043 0.15 3.8% 0.8%
14 16 -0.116 0.014 -0.33 6.0% 0.7%
15 15 -0.129 0.019 -0.26 4.4% 0.4%
Figure 4.4 CAR for subsequent repurchase events
The figures plots the standardized CAR (t-values) calculated in table 4.12 for the 15 first repurchases by firms.
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4.7 Conclusion
This paper examines a sample of announcements of repurchase plans and actual repur-
chases by Norwegian firms in the period 1998 through 2001. In addition to providing
evidence on open market share repurchases in a market where repurchases recently has
been allowed, we believe that repurchases in Norway are particularly interesting to study
because of the legal requirement that firms report their repurchase activity on a daily
basis. By exploiting these unique data, we improve the understanding of repurchases,
and how the market reacts to the actual repurchase executions.
Even during this short period, repurchases has become an important tool for Nor-
wegian firms. With respect to the actual repurchase activity of Norwegian firms, we
find that about 60% of the firms that announces a repurchase plan execute at least one
repurchase during the repurchase period authorized by the shareholders. In addition,
the cash distributed through repurchases as a fraction of dividends was 25% in 1999
and 44% in 2000 and 2001. Furthermore, these firms repurchased on average 2.9% of
their outstanding shares during the repurchase period.
We find support for the underreaction hypothesis investigated in Ikenberry et al.
(1995) also in Norwegian data. The excess performance around the announcement of
a repurchase plan is on average about 2.5%, while a calender time portfolio of the
same firms experience a significant long term excess performance of about 0.9% per
month, or about 11% a year, relative to a Fama and French (1993) three factor model
specification. Thus, although the market puts a positive value on the signal conveyed
through the announcement, this indicate that it is not completely and immediately
incorporated into prices.
In the long run, when creating two portfolios of firms that have announced a re-
purchase plan and condition the portfolio construction on whether the firm actually
execute any repurchases, we find that the portfolio consisting only of announcing firms
that has not yet repurchased show a significant excess performance of about 1.2% per
month. The portfolio of firms that actually execute repurchases does not experience a
significant abnormal performance. We interpret this as the market assessing the actual
repurchases as a valuable signal, increasing the stock price and aligning the subsequent
long term returns to expected levels.
For the firms that do not repurchase, we argue that their excess performance may
be related to several issues. First, it may be that these firms do not repurchase simply
because their stock price increases after the announcement such that the manager no
longer assess the firm as being undervalued. However, an additional explanation may be
that these firms are restricted from repurchasing due to liquidity reasons. And by being
unable to signal undervaluation to the market through real transactions, their stock
price experience excess performance as the information is conveyed through positive
information surprises in later periods. Consistent with this interpretation we find that
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firms that do not execute any repurchases are less liquid than firms that actually execute
repurchases.
When examining in more detail the timing and price impact around the actual
repurchase executions, we find that there is a negative drift in excess returns during the
20 days prior to the actual repurchase. This suggests that managers execute repurchases
in periods when the stock underperforms relative to several model specifications for
expected returns. When examining the market impact of the repurchases itself, we find
that there is a significant excess return on the day when the firm execute the repurchase.
In the period after the repurchase, there is no reversal in excess returns suggesting that
market puts a positive value on the signal that the firm has actually repurchased shares.
Overall, our findings offer additional evidence for the underreaction hypothesis.
Overall, the market seem to underreact to the initial announcement. However, the
abnormal performance of announcing firms is to a large degree driven by firms that
are unable to execute repurchases. If these firms are still undervalued after the an-
nouncement, and unable to signal undervaluation due to liquidity constraints, the price
remains too. This result indicate that requiring repurchasing firms to announce their
repurchases immediately may help improve price discovery.
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4.A Robustness check for announcement effect
To check that the results in table 4.3 in section 4.6.1 are affected by extreme obser-
vations, firms with CARs below the 5th percentile and above the 95th percentile are
removed from the sample. Table 4.A1 shows the results from this analysis. Truncat-
ing the sample reduces the average announcement CAR to about 1.9% for the Carhart
specification.
Table 4.A1
Abnormal returns around announcements of repurchase plans - a robustness check
The table shows the abnormal return (in percent) around announcements of repurchase plans when the 5% lowest
and 5% highest CARs are removed from the sample. The abnormal return is measured relative to a one factor
market model (unadjusted and adjusted for biases induced by infrequent trading as proposed in Dimson (1979)
and Scholes and Williams (1977)), Fama and French (1993) three factor model and the Carhart (1997) four factor
model, with the value weighted OSE general index as the market portfolio. The sub-sample regressions and the
repurchase% regressions are cumulative excess returns relative to the Carhart four factor model. Numbers in
bold represent numbers significantly different from zero at the 1% level, and numbers in parenthesis are the
associated t-values.
Days relative to announcement date
n -20 to -3 -2 to +2 +3 to +20
Whole sample regressions
Unadjusted market model 286 -0.56 (-1.20) 1.845 (4.39) 0.51 (0.62)
Dimson(1979) 286 -0.32 (-0.67) 1.806 (4.21) 0.00 (0.01)
Scholes/Williams(1977) 286 -0.51 (-1.08) 1.807 (4.23) -0.12 (-0.21)
Fama/French 3 factor model 286 -0.74 (-1.54) 1.814 (4.28) 0.16 (0.29)
Carhart 4 factor model 286 -0.60 (-1.27) 1.901 (4.44) 0.14 (0.26)
Subsample regression (year)
1998 25 1.61 (1.18) 1.360 (0.74) 1.12 (0.86)
1999 77 -0.59 (-0.69) 2.198 (2.82) 1.46 (1.19)
2000 83 -1.55 (-1.62) 1.042 (1.30) -0.17 (-0.17)
2001 101 -0.37 (-0.47) 2.515 (3.62) -0.87 (-0.96)
Max.repudchase %
<0%-5%] 23 -4.27 (-2.08) 4.235 (1.00) -1.80 (-0.67)
<5%-10%] 263 -0.33 (-0.69) 1.893 (4.48) 0.24 (0.41)
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4.B Additional data for the sale of treasury stock
The paper only examines the gross repurchase activity by firms. However, the dataset
also contains the sale of repurchased shares (treasury stock). Table 4.B1 shows aggre-
gate statistics for both repurchases as well as for the sale of treasury stock (“reverse
repurchases”). The reduction in treasury stock may be due to e.g. sales of shares in the
open market, as payment in various transactions, management/employee option exer-
cises, stock bonuses, stock dividends or that the treasury stock is retired. As can be
seen from the table, there are almost six times as many repurchase executions as sales,
and the number of repurchased shares are more than twice of what was sold. However,
the size of the repurchases are on average about 1/3 of the amount that was sold. This
indicate that firms aggregate treasury stock through many smaller repurchases, and
reduce treasury stock in much larger volumes.
Table 4.B1
Aggregate statistics for repurchases and sale of treasury stock
The table shows aggregate statistics for both stock repurchases as well as for “reverse” repurchases (sale of
treasury stock). The table shows the number of transactions, the total number of shares traded and the average
size of the transactions for repurchases and sales during the period from 1999 to 2002. The last part of the table
shows the fraction of buys to sales.
Size of
Number of Shares transactions
transactions (mill.) (1000 shares)
Repurchases
Whole period 1719 247.2 143.8
1999 205 35.3 172.2
2000 463 64.6 139.5
2001 659 107.4 163.0
2002 392 40.6 103.5
Sales
Whole period 293 109.4 373.5
1999 19 2.8 145.0
2000 68 26.2 385.0
2001 105 40.6 386.9
2002 101 39.9 394.9
Fraction of buys/sales
Whole period 5.87 2.26 0.38
1999 10.79 12.82 1.19
2000 6.81 2.47 0.36
2001 6.28 2.64 0.42
2002 3.88 1.02 0.26
BIBLIOGRAPHY 181
Bibliography
Allen, F. and Michaely, R. (2003). Payout Policy, in Handbooks of the Economics of
Finance, volume 1A, chapter 7, pages 337–429. Elsevier.
Bagnoli, M. and Lipman, B. I. (1989). Stock repurchases as a takeover defense. Review
of Financial Studies, 2:423–443.
Bagwell, L. (1991). Share repurchases and takeover deterrence. RAND Journal of
Economics, 22:72–88.
Barclay, M. J. and Smith, C. W. (1988). Corporate payout policy. Journal of Financial
Economics, 22:61–82.
Bens, D. A., Nagar, V., and Wong, M. H. F. (2002). Real investment implications of
employee stock option exercises. Journal of Accounting Research, 2:359–393.
Black, F. and Scholes, M. (1974). The effects of dividend yield and dividend policy on
common stock prices and returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 1:1–22.
Brav, A., Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., and Michaely, R. (2003). Payout policy in the
21st century. NBER Working Paper No.9657.
Brennan, M. J. and Thakor, A. V. (1990). Shareholder preferences and dividend policy.
Journal of Finance, 45:993–1018.
Brockman, P. and Chung, D. Y. (2004). Managerial timing and corporate liquidity: Ev-
idence from actual share repurchases. forthcoming in Journal of Financial Economics.
Brown, S. and Warner, J. (1985). Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies.
Journal of Financial Economics, 14:3–31.
Brown, S. and Weinstein, M. (1985). Dervied factors in event studies. Journal of
Financial Economics, 14:491–495.
Campbell, J., Lo, A., and MacKinlay, A. C. (1997). The Econometrics of Financial
Markets. Princeton.
Carhart, M. (1997). Dervied factors in event studies. Journal of Finance, 52:57–82.
Chan, K., Ikenberry, D., and Lee, I. (2003). Economic sources of gain in stock repur-
chases. Working Paper.
Comment, R. and Jarrell, G. A. (1991). The relative signalling power of dutch-auction
and fixed-price tender offers and open-market share repurchases. Journal of Finance,
46:1243–1271.
Dann, L. Y. (1981). Common stock repurchases: An analysis of returns to bondholders
and stockholders. Journal of Financial Economics, 9:113–138.
Denis, D. J. (1990). Defensive changes in corporate payout policy: Share repurchases
and special dividends. Journal of Finance, 45:1433–1456.
182 Chapter 4 Open Market Share Repurchases in Norway
Dimson, E. (1979). Risk measurement when shares are subject to infrequent trading.
Journal of Financial Economics, 7:197–226.
Dittmar, A. K. (2000). Why do firms repurchase stock? Journal of Business, 73:331–
355.
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks
and bonds. Journal of Financial Economics, 33:3–56.
Fenn, G. W. and Liang, N. (1997). Good news and bad news about share repurchases.
Working Paper, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Washington D.C.
Fenn, G. W. and Liang, N. (2001). Corporate payout policy and managerial stock
incentives. Journal of Financial Economics, 60:45–72.
Fried, J. M. (2002). Open market repurchases: Signaling or manegerial opportunism?
UC Berkeley Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, no. 64.
Grullon, G. and Michaely, R. (2002). Dividends, share repurchases, and the substitution
hypothesis. Journal of Finance, 57:1649–1684.
Ikenberry, D., Lakonishok, J., and Vermaelen, T. (1995). Market underreaction to open
market share repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics, 39:181–208.
Ikenberry, D., Lakonishok, J., and Vermaelen, T. (2000). Stock repurchases in canada:
Performance and strategic trading. Journal of Finance, 55:2373–2397.
Institutional Investor (1998). The buyback track.
Isagawa, N. (2000). Open-market stock repurchase and stock price behavior when man-
agement values real investment. The Financial Review, 35:95–108.
Jagannathan, M., Stephens, C. P., and Weisbach, M. S. (2000). Financial flexibility and
the choice between dividends and stock repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics,
57:355–384.
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers.
American Economic Review, 76:323–329.
Kothari, S. P. and Warner, J. B. (1997). Measuring long-horizon security performance.
Journal of Financial Economics, 43:301–339.
Kracher, B. and Johnson, R. R. (1997). Repurchase announcements, lies and false
signals. Journal of Business Ethics, 16:1677–1685.
Lasfer, M. A. (2000). The market valuation of share repurchases in europe. Working
Paper, City University Business School.
Li, K. and McNally, W. J. (2002). The decision to repurchase, announcement returns
and insider holdings: A conditional event study. University of British Columbia,
Working Paper UBCFIN01-2.
Lie, E. and Lie, H. J. (1999). The role of personal taxes in corporate descisions: An
empirical analysis of share repurchases and dividends. Journal of Financial and Quan-
titative Analysis, 34:533–552.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 183
Lintner, J. (1956). Distribution of incomes of corporations among dividends, retained
earnings, and taxes. American Economic Review, 46:97–113.
Masulis, R. W. (1980). Stock repurchase by tender offer: An analysis of the causes of
common stock price changes. Journal of Finance, 35:305–319.
Miller, M. and Modigliani, F. (1961). Dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of
shares. The Journal of Business, 34:411–433.
Miller, M. H. and Rock, K. (1985). Dividend policy under asymmetric information.
Journal of Finance, 40:1031–1051.
Opler, T. and Titman, S. (1996). The debt-equity choice: An analysis of issuing firms.
Working Paper, Ohio State University.
Scholes, M. and Williams, J. (1977). Estimating betas from nonsynchronous data.
Journal of Financial Economics, 5:309–327.
Stephens, C. P. and Weisbach, M. S. (1998). Actual share reacquisitions in open market
repurchase programs. Journal of Finance, 53:313–333.
Vermaelen, T. (1981). Common stock repurchases and market signalling. Journal of
Financial Economics, 9:139–183.
Womack, K. (1996). Do brokerage analysts’ recommendations have investment value?
Journal of Finance, 51:137–167.
184
Chapter 5
Ownership Structure and Open
Market Share Repurchases
Written with Bernt Arne Ødegaard
Abstract
This paper provides an examination of the ownership structure in Norwegian firms
that initiated repurchase programs during the period 1999 through 2001, as well as
for groups of these firms conditional on whether they actually executed repurchases
or not. By using detailed information on various ownership variables that can
be related to corporate governance mechanisms, the paper also examines whether
the propensity for firms to announce a repurchase program during a given period
depends on the ownership composition in these firms. Some interesting patterns
are found which are consistent with models where firms with potentially the high-
est agency problems use repurchases to mitigate agency costs. However, a very
high insider ownership in these firms also suggest that asymmetric information,
shareholder expropriation and entrenchment may also be motivations for why firms
initiate repurchase programs.
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5.1 Introduction
An open market share repurchase is an event where the repurchasing firm indirectly
distributes cash to some of its shareholders and gets in exchange a fraction of its out-
standing equity.1 Compared to dividends, which generally are pro-rata distributions at
regular points in time, an open market repurchase distributes cash to shareholders in an
non-proportional fashion at varying points in time. Although a repurchase, at a general
level, merely is an alternative mechanism for the firm to distribute cash, it also changes
the composition of assets held by the firm, the financing mix and alters the ownership
proportions of the remaining shareholders. Furthermore, a repurchase is also a more
flexible way for firms to distribute excess cash if they have volatile cash streams and
aim at smoothing their dividends.
Although there is a large amount of research aimed at explaining the price effect
of repurchase announcements and why firms choose to initiate a repurchase plan, there
are few studies that explicitly examine the relationship between ownership structure
and share repurchases. This despite the fact that the initiation of a repurchase plan is
an important corporate event that in some cases can alter the ownership composition
significantly and in the long run potentially affect the value of a firm through corporate
governance mechanisms. The ownership composition in a firm may also be an important
motivation for firms to initiate a repurchase plan in the first place. As suggested by
Jensen (1986) a repurchase can help reduce the probability of incurring agency costs
related to free cash.2 Thus, in firms with potentially severe agency problems, repur-
chases may be a way for managers to convey to the market that they are committed
to distribute excess cash back to the owners.3 A repurchase may also help improve the
governance of the firm through other mechanisms as well. For example, in firms where
there is insufficient monitoring of management,4 a repurchase may change the owner-
ship composition such that the incentives to monitor management becomes greater for
some shareholders if their proportional cash-flow rights and voting rights increases. As
noted by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), open market share repurchases are not equivalent
to dividends, because they may change the share of the firm held by the large share-
holder which has greater incentives to monitor. At the same time, a repurchase may
also increase the manager’s ownership proportion in the firm such that there is a con-
1The shares owned by the company is accounted for as Treasury shares and has no cash-flow or voting
rights attached to them. These shares can later be removed to decrease the shares in the company, sold
back to the market, used in acquisitions, distributed to employees as a part of a bonus plan etc.
2Jensen (1986) defines free cash as the remaining cash within the firm after all projects with positive
net present values have been funded. Other suggested mechanisms for reducing agency costs of free
cash is also new debt and dividends.
3This reasoning assumes that the managers actually have incentives to impose a disciplinary mech-
anism on themselves.
4One example could be liquid firms with few investment opportunities, dispersed ownership and
where management has a low stake in the firm.
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vergence of interest between the inside and outside shareholders (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). On the other hand, a repurchase may also intensify the conflict between large
shareholders and minority shareholders. For example, if large shareholders stronger in-
centives to becoming informed, a repurchase may be used to increase their ownership
(and the remaining shareholders ownership) in an undervalued company by retaining
their shares, or alternatively decrease their ownership in a overvalued company at the
expense of less informed owners (Brennan and Thakor, 1990). A repurchase may also
contribute to the conflict between inside- and outside owners since insiders have incen-
tives to secure their position in the firm. By repurchasing shares from the owners with
the lowest valuations (Bagwell, 1991) they increase the cost to a bidding firm. Thus, a
repurchase can be used to reduce the probability of a value creating takeover occurring,
which would benefit shareholders, but potentially make the manager loose control over
the firms resources. Also, certain types of owners may prefer one type of payout policy
to another for tax reasons. For example certain investors such as pension funds and
non-profit organizations are in many countries exempt from taxes on dividends and cap-
ital gains, while other investors are not. Thus, if dividends and capital gains are taxed
differently, firms may attract different types of investors through their payout policy.
Grullon and Michaely (2002) suggest that one reason for the growth in repurchases in
the US, is due to relative tax disadvantage of dividends. On the other hand, findings
in Brav et al. (2003) indicate that taxes are, at best, of second order importance when
firms choose whether to repurchase or not.
The main focus of this paper is to investigate these issues in more detail, and to
examine whether firms that initiate repurchase programs5 have any systematic patterns
in ownership that may be related to theory. In this respect, the paper has several
objectives. The first objective is to provide a descriptive analysis of the ownership
structure of firms that announce repurchase plans, as well as for subgroups of these
firms conditional on whether they actually execute repurchases or not. The second
objective is to examine whether and how the ownership changes over time in firms that
actually execute repurchases. The third objective is to study whether the propensity for
firms to initiate a repurchase program may be motivated by ownership characteristics
prior to the event.
Recent studies indicate that repurchases has become an increasingly important
means for firms to distribute cash. In a study on repurchase activity in the US, Grullon
and Michaely (2002) find that firms gradually have substituted repurchases for divi-
dends during the period from 1980 through 2000, and that US firms in 2000 spent as
much money on repurchases as on cash dividends.6 This is also in line with findings in
5With “initiate” we mean that the firm announces a repurchase plan, which has received a super-
majority vote at the general shareholder meeting. This gives the managers of the firm the opportunity
to repurchase shares when they see fit over a pre-specified period. The maximum legal length of this
period in Norway is 18 months, but the firm is not committed to repurchase any shares.
6Grullon and Michaely (2002) find that dividend payouts grew at an annual rate of 6.8% during the
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Fama and French (2001) who find that the number of dividend paying firms has fallen
dramatically since 1980 until today. Similarly, in Norway, there has been an increase
in spending on share repurchases, although for a much shorter time period. Since Nor-
wegian firms for the first time were allowed to repurchase shares in 1999, they have
increased their spending on repurchases as a percentage of cash dividends starting at
25% in 1999 and increased this to 44% in 2000 and 2001. During the same time period,
there has been a growth in aggregate dividends as well.
At a general level, a share repurchase is essentially a dividend payment, and thus
an alternative way for a firm to distribute excess cash back to its shareholders. In
a world where markets are perfect and complete, whether a firm distributes its cash
through dividends or repurchases should be equivalent according to the propositions in
Miller and Modigliani (1961). Given the firms investment policy, no rational investor
has a preference for either payout policy, and through arbitrage arguments the choice
of payout policy is shown to be irrelevant with respect to the value of the firm. On
the other hand, empirical results suggest that the information inherent in repurchase
announcements have some economical benefits to shareholders in the sense that these
firms on average experience an abnormal price increase when they announce that they
are planning on repurchasing shares. Among others, Vermaelen (1981), Dann (1981),
Comment and Jarrell (1991), Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Ikenberry et al. (1995,
2000), find strong support for a positive announcement effect, and that this effect is
about 2%.7 These findings are comparable to what has been found with respect to
unexpected dividend initiations/increases and dividend omissions/decreases (Asquith
and Mullins, 1983; Michaely et al., 1995).
The dominating theoretical explanation for both of these announcement effects rests
on a signalling framework, in which there is asymmetric information between the man-
agers and outside investors, and the announcement communicates valuable information
about current earnings and the future prospects of the firm. As shown in Miller and
Rock (1985), if there is asymmetric information between investors and the managers of
a firm, changes in dividends can result in revaluations. Similarly for repurchases, models
by Vermaelen (1981), Ofer and Thakor (1987), Constantinides and Grundy (1989), Mc-
Nally (1999) and others, show that a repurchase announcement may be a valuable signal
to investors about current undervaluation and the future prospects of the firm, which
period 1980 to 2000, while cash used on share repurchases grew at an annual rate of 26.1% during the
same period. From 1980 to 2000 share repurchases as a percentage of dividends increased from 13.1%
in 1980 to 113.1% in 2000.
7Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Ikenberry et al. (1995) find an announcement effect in the US of
2.3% (for the period 1985-1988) and 3.5% (1980-1990) respectively. In addition Comment and Jarrell
(1991) examine Dutch auction repurchases and tender offer repurchases, which have a 11% and 8%
price impact respectively. They argue that tender offer repurchases have the strongest signalling ability
of the three. For Canada, Li and McNally (2002) find a announcement effect of 0.9% (for the period
1995-1999). Lasfer (2000) find the effect to be 1.64% in the UK, 1% for continental Europe, 0.78% in
France and 0.63% for Italy over the period 1985 to 1998.
5.1 Introduction 189
should command a higher stock price. In addition to the signalling hypothesis, other
suggested reasons for why firms repurchase shares include, capital structure adjustments
(Vermaelen, 1981; Opler and Titman, 1996), disgorgement of excess cash (Jensen, 1986;
Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Jagannathan et al., 2000), substitution for cash dividends
(Grullon and Michaely, 2002), takeover defense (Denis, 1990; Bagwell, 1991; Dittmar,
2000), shareholder expropriation (Brennan and Thakor, 1990), to counter the dilution
effects of employee and management options (Fenn and Liang, 1997), personal taxes
(Masulis, 1980; Lie and Lie, 1999; Grullon and Michaely, 2002) and manipulating EPS
figures (Bens et al., 2002).
With respect to the topic in this paper, the amount of research that examine the rela-
tionship between ownership structure and share repurchases is much more scarce. How-
ever, some exceptions include Ginglinger and L’Her (2002) who examine the relationship
between ownership structure and the announcement effect for French firms, Howe et al.
(2003) who examine the relation between insider ownership and the announcement effect
of various cash distributions in the US, including tender offer repurchases, and Li and
McNally (2002) who examine the insider holdings of repurchasing firms. The results in
Ginglinger and L’Her (2002) suggests that the announcement effect of controlled firms is
stronger than for widely held firms, that the presence of foreign institutional investors
yield a more positive reaction and that family controlled firms experience a negative
price effect when a repurchase program is announced. They also find that firms with
a low likelihood of takeover and low risk of minority shareholder expropriation experi-
ence a stronger positive announcement effect, and that the effect is highly unfavorable
when the market participants interpret the repurchase as a takeover defense.8 Howe
et al. (2003) find that there is a positive relationship between the excess return around
various cash distribution events9 and the insider ownership for a sample of US firms.
Their overall conclusion is that when managers owns a larger stake in the firm, their
wealth depends stronger on the success of corporate decisions and strategy such that
the signals conveyed through payout announcements becomes more valuable/credible in
firms where the inside ownership is large. Li and McNally (2002) also study the insider
holdings of repurchasing firms and find that insiders have a larger stake in firms that
initiate repurchase plans, and that these firms experience a greater announcement effect.
Their main argument for this is that insiders use repurchases to signal that they are
committed to distribute excess cash back to the shareholders. In addition, Denis (1990)
examines the price effect of defensive changes in corporate payout policy and how the
ownership changes in firms that remain independent after the takeover contest. The
results indicate that these firms experience large structural changes after the takeover
8Ginglinger and L’Her (2002) proxy potential target firms as firms where the largest shareholder
owns 20% of the voting rights and the float is higher than 50%.
9The cash distributions they examine are dividend increases and decreases, dividend initiations and
tender offer repurchases.
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attempt in which there are large changes in capital- and ownership structure in addition
to a high turnover rate among top management. Finally, Grinstein and Michaely (2001)
examine the effect of institutional ownership on the choice of payout policy among firms.
Their main finding is that institutions increase their ownership in firms that repurchase,
but that they do not actively affect firms payout policy or cause firms to increase their
overall payout.
There are also earlier studies on the ownership structure of Norwegian firms that are
important to mention. Bøhren and Ødegaard (2000, 2004) provide a detailed description
of the ownership structure of Norwegian firms listed on the Oslo Stock exchange for the
period 1989-1997. In addition, using the same dataset, Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001)
examine whether ownership structure matters for economic performance. Their main
findings are that insider ownership enhances firm value while ownership concentration
is negatively related to firm value.10 They also point to Norway being an atypical case
relative to the ownership structure in other countries in Europe due to very high state
ownership as well as relatively high foreign ownership (about 30%). In addition, the
ownership by personal investors is found to be the smallest compared to any European
country, and the largest shareholder owns much less while the second and third largest
owner has a relatively high stake indicating that the power structure is very flat.
The analysis in this paper uses similar ownership data as used in Bøhren and Øde-
gaard (2000, 2001, 2004), but for a more recent period and with monthly share-holdings
of all shareholders in all public Norwegian firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange
(OSE). The paper combines this dataset with a sample of repurchase announcements and
actual repurchases conducted by Norwegian firms for the period 1999 through 2001.11
There are several things to note about the dataset. First of all, there are few papers
that examine the actual repurchase activity of announcing firms. One reason for this
is that a large amount of studies on open market repurchases has been for US data.
Due to the loose disclosure rules in the US, where firms are not required to disclose the
actual repurchase executions, this has made it difficult to obtain detailed data on actual
repurchases in the US.12 By combining the repurchase dataset with a detailed ownership
database containing the monthly equity holdings of all shareholders in all listed Norwe-
gian firms, we are able to study in detail the ownership characteristics of these firms.
In addition, we are able to examine to what degree the composition changes during the
repurchase program and whether ownership characteristics affect firms propensity to
10While their results are robust in single-equation models, the relationships are rendered insignificant
when they apply simultaneous equations models taking into account the causalities between governance
and performance.
11The repurchase sample starts in 1999 because Norwegian firms were not allowed to repurchase shares
earlier. However, firms were allowed to announce repurchase plans prior to 1999.
12One exception is Stephens and Weisbach (1998) who estimate the actual repurchase activity by US
firms based on the change in outstanding shares. In addition, during the last few years, studies on
actual repurchase activity outside the US has emerged for markets where firms are subject to stricter
disclosure rules, such as Canada.
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initiate such programs.
To summarize our main findings, we find that firms that announce at least one
repurchase program during our sample period, have a significantly lower ownership
concentration (both when concentration is measured as the aggregate ownership of the
five largest owners and by the Herfindahl index) than firms that do not announce a
repurchase plan. With respect to the number of owners, announcing firms have about
twice as many owners as non-announcing firms, while the average size of these firms
are similar. This is in line with a story in which firms with dispersed ownership has a
stronger incentive to disgorge cash to mitigate agency costs related to free cash. On the
other hand, our results also suggest that insiders own on average a significantly higher
fraction (20%) in announcing firms than in non-announcing firms (8%), and that this
difference is most pronounced in firms that actually repurchase shares. This, however,
is not consistent with a monitoring story for repurchases, since agency theory predicts
that the insider and outsider interests are better aligned in these firms. Moreover, there
would be a lesser need for additional mechanisms to avoid agency costs of free cash in
these firms.
This finding would instead be more in line with models where insiders have incentives
to initiate a repurchase program either to maximize the future value of their personal
wealth (Isagawa, 2000), expropriate outside shareholders or to entrench themselves.
Moreover, Isagawa (2000) argue that if managers have stock options or ownership in
the firm, the managers objective function depends on the stock price as he gets a mon-
etary compensation based on the future value of the firm. By repurchasing, this reflects
that the manager has no profitable projects to invest in, and that his private benefits
from increasing the value of the firm outweighs the personal benefit from investing in
negative net present value projects, which would depress the stock price in the long run
and reduce his wealth. Thus, Isagawa (2000) propose an explanation for the announce-
ment effect which resolves the credibility issues, in addition to offering a prediction that
repurchasing firms have a high insider ownership. Our finding may also be consistent
with an mispricing story where there in asymmetric information between the inside- and
the outside shareholders as suggested in models by Barclay and Smith (1988) as well as
Brennan and Thakor (1990) when large shareholders are better informed than smaller
shareholders. From this point of view, the insiders may use repurchases to transfer
wealth from selling shareholders to themselves (and remaining shareholders) by retain-
ing their shares when the firm repurchase. Our results also indicate that the dividend
payments of announcing firms are lower than for non-announcing firms, which is con-
sistent with a hypothesis where firms substitute repurchases for dividends (Grullon and
Michaely, 2002). When examining the changes in ownership variables during the periods
when firms repurchase shares the results confirm that the concentration increases. How-
ever, although there is an increase in the insider ownership, it is not significant. With
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respect to the different ownertypes, the results further indicate that the ownership by
institutions and individuals falls, while the state ownership increases. Interestingly, this
is opposite from what Grinstein and Michaely (2001) find for institutional investors in
the US. Grinstein and Michaely (2001) argue their results are inconsistent with models
in which firms use dividends to attract institutional investors. Our results may indicate
an opposite effect for Norway.
In the second part of the paper, we estimate binary models for the probability of
observing a firm announcing a repurchase plan during each sample year given the own-
ership characteristic at the beginning of the year. The results from these estimations
reflect to a great degree the findings in the descriptive part of the analysis, but provide
some additional results. With respect to the insider ownership, we find that the propen-
sity to initiate a repurchase program increases with insider ownership. This is in line
with findings in Li and McNally (2002) for Canada. In addition, while ownership concen-
tration seem to be unimportant, a large controlling shareholder reduces the propensity
for firms to initiate a repurchase program. This is the opposite of what is the predic-
tion in the model by Brennan and Thakor (1990). One implication from their model
is that large shareholders will prefer repurchases to dividends, while small shareholders
will prefer dividends. Our findings instead suggests that a controlling shareholder op-
poses the initiation of a repurchase program. Alternatively, it may also reflect a lower
need for additional mechanisms to mitigate agency costs of free cash when there is a
large shareholder in place with sufficient incentives to monitor the management. We
also examine whether the identity13 of the largest shareholder is important, but find no
systematic evidence. The estimation results also provide evidence that firms that paid
dividends in the previous year have a lower propensity to initiate a repurchase plan.
This is likely related to dividend smoothing, and that firms are reluctant to cutting
dividends as suggested by findings in Lintner (1956) and Brav et al. (2003).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss
theoretical and empirical results that motivate why there could be a relationship between
ownership structure and firms choice of repurchasing. Then we give an overview of the
repurchase methods and history of repurchases in Norway, the Norwegian tax system as
well as some information about the corporate legal environment in Norway. In section
5.4 we discuss the datasets and provide some general statistics, before we in in section
5.5 and section 5.6 present and discuss our results and conclude in section 5.7.
5.2 Ownership structure and repurchases
In this section, we try to motivate why there could be a relationship between ownership
structure and the choice by firms to initiate a repurchase program. Although the main
13We have information on five types of owners. These are “state” owners, “foreigners”, “financial”,
“non-financial” and “individuals”.
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purpose of the paper is to provide a descriptive analysis of repurchasing firms, it is
necessary to have a theoretical framework in which we can interpret the results and
guide the analysis as well to motivate various variables used when we estimate a model
for the propensity for firms to announce a repurchase plan. However, as discussed in
Bøhren and Ødegaard (2000, 2001) corporate governance has still an underdeveloped
theoretical foundation. This also affect the present paper in the sense that there are
few models directly relating firms choice of repurchases to ownership structure and
corporate governance. In other words, there are few models with clear predictions with
respect to what patterns we should expect to see. Due to the lack of a testable theory,
the discussion of the results will to a large degree be partial. However, some models
provide implicit theoretical prediction for the relationship between ownership structure,
corporate governance mechanisms and stock repurchases which we will discuss below.
At a general level, it is useful to distinguish between agency- and signalling models
used in the literature to explain why firms repurchase shares and experience a positive
announcement effect. In the agency models, the principal (shareholder) wants to ensure
that the agent (manager) do not waste internal resources to benefit themselves. In
these models, repurchases may be used as a mechanism to discipline the manager and
reduce the cash available to him. The agency explanations however require that the
shareholders can force the manager to actually repurchase or that the manager has
incentives to do so. Also, if large shareholders or insiders own a large stake in the firm,
it may be difficult to initiate a repurchase plan in the first place, since it in most cases
requires a supermajority vote which can be blocked by a large shareholder. In addition,
to ensure that the manager actually execute repurchases when there are no profitable
investment opportunities may require excessive monitoring. As discussed by Jensen and
Meckling (1976), it is generally impossible for the principal to costlessly ensure that the
agent will act optimally from the principals viewpoint. Thus, even though a repurchase
is a cash distribution mechanism that initially could help reduce agency costs, it may not
be very effective unless the manager has incentives to disgorge free cash. In the signalling
models, the manager may use repurchases to signal that they are committed to not
wasting cash, or to convey information to the market about their private information.
However, as will be discussed below, the credibility of the signal is not always clear, since
the costs to the manager for signalling falsely may be questionable. This is especially
important with respect to open market share repurchases.
Free cash flow
Agency theory predicts that non-owner managers will tend to divert parts of the firm’s
free cash flow to value-destroying projects that provide private benefits to themselves.14
14As discussed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) such diversion by insiders may be theft, dilution of
outside investors through share issues to insiders, salary increases, below market value share issues to
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More specifically, as discussed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), if there is low or zero
insider ownership, and consequently a separation of ownership from control, there may
be a need for monitoring by outside shareholders to avoid that management uses internal
resources in a fashion that does not maximize firm value.15 However, active monitoring
by outside owners may not occur if there are no outside owners with strong incentives
to monitor the management.
In those cases payout policy is a mechanism that may help to mitigate agency costs
related to cash. As suggested by Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) a firm may use
cash distributions to reduce the agency cost of free cash by reducing the amount of cash
available to the manager. Agency theory predicts that both debt financing, repurchases
and dividend payments are mechanisms that help mitigating agency costs. With debt
financing, the cash flow of the firm must be used to pay creditors which potentially
could force a bankruptcy if not paid. Dividend payments are also a way for the firm to
distribute excess cash that could potentially be miss-allocated by management. The use
of repurchases is potentially less costly to the firm than using dividends for distributing
non-sustainable excess cash. As proposed by Lintner (1956), managers prefer to increase
dividends regularly and avoid cutting dividends if possible.16 Substantiating the finding
in Lintner (1956), 94% of the company executives interviewed in Brav et al. (2003),
state that they strongly try to avoid dividend cuts, and 65% answered that they would
raise external funds before they would cut dividends. This suggest that managers view
dividend cuts as costly. One reason for this is that dividend decreases generally are
punished by the market as found in Denis et al. (1994) among others.17 Thus, firms
may be reluctant to increasing dividends if the cash-flow is non-sustainable. In addition,
studies suggests that firms aim at a target ratio and tries to smooth dividends. Thus,
an unexpected dividend increase may be a stronger signal about permanent future
earnings, while a repurchase announcement may convey to the market that management
is committed to not wasting temporary cash on private benefits and value destroying
activities.
With respect to the relationship between repurchases and ownership structure, a firm
with plenty of cash, few investment opportunities, low insider ownership and dispersed
outside ownership may benefit from using repurchases in distributing excess cash to
mitigate agency costs. This in the sense that a repurchase announcement could be a
signal to the market from the primary insiders that they are committed to not wasting
insiders etc.
15A crucial assumption with respect to outside monitoring is that outside shareholders are competent
and that their monitoring in fact improve the quality of managerial decisions.
16These arguments predict that dividend increases will be made by firms with higher and more stable
cash flows, that dividend increases will be related to permanent but not necessarily to temporary com-
ponents of cash flow, and that dividend decreases will be less frequent than increases and accompanied
by very poor performance.
17Some proposed explanations for this has been signalling, overinvestment and dividend clienteles.
5.2 Ownership structure and repurchases 195
excess cash. Overall, from an agency perspective, if repurchases are motivated by poor
monitoring, we would expect to see more dispersed ownership and lower ownership
concentration in firms that announce repurchase plans. In addition, one would also
expect to see a lower insider ownership in these firms, since high insider ownership
initially would reduce the need for monitoring. On the other hand, for the managers to
support the initiation of a repurchase program as a self-imposed disciplinary mechanism,
the manager must have incentives to do so. In a model by Isagawa (2000), the initiation
of a repurchase program is argued to be credible despite the fact that the announcement
of a repurchase plan is not a commitment to actually repurchase shares. The model
by Isagawa (2000) assumes that the managers objective function depends on the stock
price, as he gets a monetary compensation based on the future price of the firm (the
manager may have stock options or own a part of the firm), in addition that he has
a private benefit from growing the size of the firm. By announcing a repurchase plan,
this reflects that the manager has no profitable investment opportunities, and that the
cost to him for wasting internal cash is greater than returning cash to the shareholders
and increasing the value of the firm. Thus, the announcement of a repurchase plan
reveals information about the managers private benefits when there are no profitable
investment opportunities available to the firm. Li and McNally (2002) find support for
this model in that insiders have a larger stake in firms that announce repurchase plans.
Empirical results in Fenn and Liang (2001), suggest that there is a negative relation-
ship between management stock ownership and the amount of cash distribution. They
find that firms in which managers has a low ownership stake, few investment opportuni-
ties (or high free cash flow) pays out more cash. These are firms that potentially have the
highest agency problem. However, although higher insider ownership is one mechanism
that align managers interests with shareholders, it is also argued that greater ownership
by institutional owners or other large shareholders may improve outside monitoring of
the management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Grinstein and Michaely (2001) investi-
gate the relationship between firms payout policy and institutional ownership in the
US, for the period 1980 through 1996, and find evidence that firms attract institutions
through their payout policy. More specifically, their results suggests that institutions
increase their holdings in firms that repurchase more shares, and decrease their holdings
in firms that pay more dividends. In addition, when examining the causality between
institutional ownership and payout policy, their results indicate that institutions do not
actively change dividend policy or repurchase policy.
The signalling/undervaluation hypothesis
The traditional signalling hypothesis with respect to repurchases proposed by Vermaelen
(1981, 1984) and Dann (1981), among others, is motivated by asymmetric information
between the managers of a firm and the market. If the managers of the firm has su-
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perior information about the future prospect of the firm, and know that the firm is
undervalued, they can initiate a repurchase plan to convey this information. Due to the
new information about future earnings, implied by the announcement, a positive price
impact on the announcement day is expected, as prices adjusts to the new information.
Since the undervaluation hypothesis supposes that the managers of the firm has supe-
rior information about the true value of the firm, and that the managers successfully
announce repurchase plans when the firm is truly undervalued, one would also expect
the insiders of the firm to have a higher ownership fraction in these firms if they are
able to trade in the firms shares.18
However, there is a problematic issue related to the signalling hypothesis and the
incentives of the managers of a firm discussed in Fried (2002). The signalling hypothesis
implies that managers signal only when the firm is undervalued, and thereby sacrifice
their own wealth on behalf of the shareholders.19 The proposition in Fried (2002) is that
it is more likely that managers act opportunistically, and announce repurchase plans to
maximize their own wealth. One prediction of the model is that managers announce a
repurchase plan both when the firm is undervalued as well as when it is overvalued. The
main intuition behind this is that when the firm is undervalued, the manager uses the
announcement of a plan, as well as actual repurchases, to transfer wealth to themselves
and the remaining shareholders. On the other hand, when the manager want to sell
a large part of her shares due to overvaluation, the repurchase announcement can be
used to temporarily boost the stock price. Another argument against the signalling
hypothesis is that for the signal conveyed through the announcement of a repurchase
plan to be credible, there should be an explicit commitment by the managers of the
firm.20 However, for open market share repurchases, it is rarely the case that insiders
of a firm explicitly states that they are going to retain their shares for the course
of the repurchase plan. Fried (2002) argue that managers could more credibly signal
undervaluation by committing to retaining their shares over a period of time.
Thus, in the managerial opportunism case of Fried (2002), the prediction with re-
spect to the level of insider ownership relative to non-announcing firms is not clear
since the managers may choose to announce a repurchase plan both when the firm is
undervalued and overvalued. With respect to the signaling hypothesis, however, one
would expect insider ownership to be greater in announcing firms if the managers in
these firms exploit their private information.21
18Primary insiders are generally constrained from trading in company shares around major informa-
tion disclosures. However, a repurchase announcement is not generally considered as an information
release where the firm announce fundamental information. In these cases, it is up to the firm to define
a “blackout” period for the insiders in which they are not allowed to trade company shares.
19The main argument for this is that the announcement reduces the managers financial flexibility as
well as limits the potential profits that they can reap from the information.
20At least, there should be an implicit commitment in the sense that the initial signal is backed by
actual repurchases at a later point in time.
21An behavioral interpretation could be that insiders have a higher ownership in announcing firms
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Management stock options
Fenn and Liang (2001) find evidence that managers substitute repurchases for dividends
to increase the value of their stock options. More specifically, they find a strong negative
relationship between dividend payouts and management stock options and a positive
relationship between repurchase activity and stock options. Their main interpretation
of this finding is that managers will have incentives to reduce dividends and increase
repurchases (or retain more cash) because the value of the managers stock options are
negatively related to expected future dividend payments. However, as noted by Fenn
and Liang (2001), there are alternative explanations for a positive relationship between
share repurchases and stock options. One explanation could be that options increase
the managers incentives to maximize the value of the firm, and therefore also increase
profits that is distributed to the shareholders. Another explanation may be that firms
use repurchases to counter the dilution effects of employee and management options,
such that the increased repurchase activity in firms with large amounts of management
options is a direct result of option exercises.
With respect to how stock options relate to the ownership structure of repurchasing
firms, one might expect there to be higher insider ownership in repurchasing firms if
repurchases are substituted for dividends to maximize stock option values. However the
prediction is not clear in the sense that risk averse managers with already a stake in
the firm, through stock ownership as well as labor income, may want to reduce their
ownership fraction when they are granted more options for diversification reasons.
Expropriation of minority shareholders
So far our discussion has centered around the the potential conflict between the man-
agement in a firm and the outside shareholders. However, as argued by Shleifer and
Vishny (1997), if large controlling shareholders participate in, or is closely connected
to, the firms management,22 or have enough power to influence the decision process
within the firm, there may also be a conflict between controlling shareholders and mi-
nority shareholders. For example, large shareholders may use the resources of a firm
to benefit themselves on the expense of minority shareholder. If large shareholders
are better informed than smaller shareholders, repurchases may be used by controlling
shareholders to increase their ownership further (by retaining their shares) on behalf
of smaller shareholders when they have favorable information about the firm. When
a firm executes repurchases in the market, the sellers are current shareholders who,
unknowingly, are trading with the firm in the open market. Thus, the cash distribution
because these managers are over-optimistic with respect to their own abilities in generating value as
well as to the firms future prospects.
22Gomes and Novaes (2002) shows that the conflict between controlling shareholders and minority
shareholders may increase when the controlling shareholders also participate in the management of the
firm.
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is essentially involuntary23 in the sense that the sellers may not have wanted to sell any
shares at the current price if they had known that the firm was the buyer. If there is
asymmetric information between the managers of the firm and the market place, and
the managers are able to correctly time their repurchases accordingly, the selling share-
holders execute trades against an informed investor and sell shares at a price below
fair value. Thus, if large controlling shareholders has superior information about firm
value either through their potentially closer connection to the management or through
their greater incentives to collect information, they are also more likely to retain their
shares relative to small shareholders when the firm actually execute repurchases due to
mispricing. Brennan and Thakor (1990) develop a theory for firms choice among several
ways of paying out cash to shareholders in which there is a wealth distribution from
small uninformed shareholders to large, better informed, shareholders. Their model
assumes that the collection of information by investors is costly, and that stock prices
does not reflect all information. Since large shareholders have greater incentives to be-
coming informed, small shareholders may face the risk of being expropriated by large
shareholders. Thus, small uninformed shareholders has a co-ordination problem and are
unable to keep their ownership fraction constant in the event when a firm repurchases
shares. Moreover, they tend to be left with a greater ownership fraction in overvalued
firms (when insiders or larger shareholders sell), and a lower ownership fraction in un-
dervalued firms (when the firm and better informed investors buy). The center of their
argument is that non-proportionate share repurchases forces shareholders to collect in-
formation and incur the gathering costs or alternatively run the risk of expropriation by
better informed investors. As a result of this, large shareholders prefer cash to be paid
out through repurchases instead of dividends, while small, potentially less informed,
investors prefer dividends since these are paid pro-rata and do not bear such adverse
selection costs.
The model of Brennan and Thakor (1990) is also related to the hypothesis of Barclay
and Smith (1988) who argue that there is a implicit cost associated with repurchases.24
Their main hypothesis is that a repurchase plan increases the adverse selection com-
ponent of the spread in the market, which again may increase the cost of capital for
the firm. If this effect is large enough, firms would prefer to use dividends instead of
repurchases. In line with their hypothesis, they find that the spread increases after the
firm has announced a repurchase plan, and decreases to its pre-announcement level after
the repurchase plan is completed. In other words, the increased bid-ask spread captures
the increased probability of trading with an informed investor (the firm or the insiders
23As opposed to a tender offer repurchase where the selling shareholders know beforehand that they
are selling shares back to the firm. In addition, tender offer repurchases are generally executed at a
premium to the market price, while own market share repurchases are executed at the prevailing market
price.
24Their motivation was initially to explain why firms use dividends instead of repurchases to pay out
cash despite the relative tax advantage of capital gains to dividends in the US.
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of the firm).
Takeover defense and entrenchment
Another motivation for management to support the initiation of a repurchase plan, as
well as actually execute repurchases, is to reduce the probability of takeovers. This
because a hostile takeover, if successful, could result in the manager being replaced and
loose control over the firms resources. In a hostile takeover, the acquiring firm makes
an offer to the shareholders of the firm. Thus, if the firms ownership is dispersed it is
more likely that the bidding firm will be able to successfully take control. Repurchases
is one25 effective measure for managers to reduce the probability that a takeover will
be successful. Stulz (1988), argues that a stock repurchase increases the proportion of
shares held by the manager and stockholders supporting him, such that it becomes more
difficult to obtain enough shares to take control of the firm. Bagwell (1991) propose a
model with heterogenous valuations among current shareholders and an upward sloping
supply curve for the company shares. Thus, by repurchasing shares at the current
market price, the shareholders with the lowest valuations are removed, such that a
more expensive group of shareholders are left, implying that the cost of acquiring shares
is increased. Also, Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) develop a model where they assume
asymmetric information between the managers and the market. By signalling the quality
of their firm through repurchases, this convinces the current shareholders that the value
of the company is higher such that a takeover becomes more costly. However, as shown
in Denis (1990), when a repurchase announcement is interpreted as a takeover defense,
the announcement effect is highly unfavorable.
Thus, while managers have incentives to oppose takeovers, firms with characteristics
that make them likely takeover candidates is expected to be more likely to announce re-
purchase plans and execute repurchases. The characteristics of a takeover candidate may
depend on many factors, but generally, undervalued firms, with low managerial owner-
ship and low ownership concentration (dispersed ownership) may be more likely takeover
candidates. Thus, managers in firms with these characteristics may have stronger in-
centives to entrench themselves and use repurchases to increase their ownership as well
as to remove shareholders with the lowest valuations.
5.3 Regulatory and institutional aspects
5.3.1 Repurchase methods
There are mainly three methods for firms to repurchase their own shares; through tender
offers, open market transactions or via privately negotiated transactions, also referred
25Among other things, managers can also adapt anti-takeover amendments, ”poison pills”, increase
their ownership proportion etc. to oppose takeover attempts.
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to as Dutch auction repurchases. The two first methods are used to a larger extent
than the latter, and in the US, open market transactions are observed more frequently
than tender offers. In fact, 90% of the cases between 1985 and 1993 were open market
transactions as discussed in Ikenberry et al. (1995) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998).
However, the size of an open market share repurchase is in general of much smaller
magnitude than a tender offer repurchase. In a tender offer, the reacquiring firm offers
to repurchase its shares at a specific price, usually at a premium to the market price
(fixed price tender offers). In an open market repurchase, on the other hand, the
purchase is executed through brokers in the open market at normal commissions rates,
and no premium is paid.26 Thus, open market repurchases is the same as a sequence
of tender offer repurchases, where the bid price is the tender price. Since tender offers
are generally larger in magnitude than an open market repurchases, the alternative
of trading the shares directly in the market through open market repurchases, would
potentially incur a price impact cost to the firm that would exceed the premium offered
through the tender price, making tender offers more attractive for large distributions.
5.3.2 The introduction of repurchases in Norway
The 1st of January, 1999, the Securities Act of June 13 1997 went into effect, and
Norwegian firms were allowed to repurchase their own shares. The Act states that firms
are allowed to repurchase up to 10% of the outstanding shares as long as the firm’s total
equity value in excess of the firm’s own stockholdings is higher than 1 mill. NOK. Such
limited open market repurchase programs are often referred to as ”Normal Course Issuer
Bids”, whereas fixed price tender offers which do not have any limit to the amount of
stock that can be repurchased is commonly called ”Substantial Issuer Bids”.
In Norway, as in the US and other countries, the most frequently observed repurchase
method is open market repurchases executed as a part of a Normal Course Issuer Bid,
simply because Substantial Issuer Bids are only observed in a few instances. In this
paper, we only examine open market shares repurchases. Furthermore, the OSE listed
firms do not have to receive approval from the exchange before initiating a repurchase
program. In the U.S. the same rule applies as in Norway. However, Canadian firms
(see Ikenberry et al. (2000)), must receive approval from the exchange before they can
initiate a repurchase program. In Norway, as in most countries, the managers must be
authorized by the stockholders to initiate a repurchase program. Such an authorization
is effective for the time period stated in the plan, or at most 18 months which is the legal
limit. After the repurchase period has expired, there must be a new vote before the firm
can continue to repurchase shares. When a firm carries out an open market transaction
26At least no direct premium is paid. As argued by Barclay and Smith (1988), the announcement
of a repurchase plan may lead to increased spread in the market due to an increased adverse selection
component in the spread. Thus, by announcing a repurchase plan, the firm itself may experience higher
implicit transactions costs in the primary market when it executes repurchases.
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announcement rules apply, i.e. the firm must inform the OSE before the trading starts
the following day. However, if the trade is considered as being informative, the general
rule is that it must be announced to the OSE immediately.
5.3.3 The corporate environment
The main laws regulating corporations in Norway are Aksjeloven (the corporate law),
Verdipapirhandelsloven (the securities law) and Børsloven (Oslo Stock Exchange reg-
ulations).27 With respect to the board structure, all listed firms with more than 200
employees is required to have a supervisory board which elects the board. The supervi-
sory board consists of 1/3 from the employees and 2/3 owners, and the board consists
by 1/3 of the employees candidates and 2/3 consists of the owners candidates. With
respect to to open market share repurchase programs, any owner can suggest that an
repurchase program is put on the agenda for the ordinary stockholder meeting. In ad-
dition, an owner, or group of owners, representing at least 5% of the cash flow rights
can force an extraordinary stockholder meeting. A repurchase program is defined as
a change in the corporate charter, and requires a super-majority vote of 2/3 from the
voting shares represented at the shareholder meeting. In addition, it requires a 2/3 vote
from all shareholders (including holders of non-voting shares) to be passed. Thus, non-
voting shares may be important when it comes to proposals for changing the corporate
charter. There are also a set of regulations in place to protect minority shareholders.
First, any shareholder has to report to the firm and the Oslo Stock Exchange when it
passes through various thresholds.28 If a stockholder passes 40% of the voting rights in
a firm, he has to give a tender offer (Mandatory Bid) to the remaining shareholders,
and if he owns at least 90% of the shares he is required to buy from any shareholder
that wants to sell shares.
There are also insider trading rules that first of all restrict all insiders from trading
on firm specific information that is important for the pricing of the stock. Furthermore,
primary insiders, such as board members and the management team, are restricted from
trading around various corporate events. For example, they are not allowed to trade two
months before the publication of annual reports. In periods when they are allowed to
trade, strict disclosure rules apply as the insider must report the transaction to the OSE
within the trading starts the next day (10 am). Primary insiders are defined as members
of the management team, board members and substitutes. The broader definition of
all insiders also include company auditors, and the primary insiders immediate families.
With respect to open market share repurchases, similar disclosure rules apply, as the
firm is required to report their transactions before the market opens the next day.
27A detailed description of the regulatory environment in Norway can be found in Bøhren and Øde-
gaard (2000).
28These thresholds were 10%, 20%, 33%, 50%, 67% and 90% during the sample period.
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5.3.4 The Norwegian tax system
Dividends distributed from a Norwegian tax resident public- or private limited company
were taxed fully on the investor’s hand until 1992. As a result of an extensive tax-
reform in 1992, dividends became tax-exempt while the capital gains tax was set at a
flat rate of 28%, both for individuals, companies and private pension funds.29 However,
shareholders in firms that retain a part of their after tax earnings, may experience that
some of the capital gains when the shares are sold reflect a price increase due to the
retained earnings. To eliminate the double taxation this would imply, an adjustment is
made. The retained earnings per share is added to the cost basis (usually the purchase
price) such that the capital gain/tax basis is reduced accordingly (RISK adjustment).30
Thus, during the period 1992 until 2001, dividends were not taxed on the investor’s
hand at all, and tax on capital gains linked to retained earnings was eliminated.31
The result of this was that there were essentially was no preference in the tax system
between capital gains or regular cash distributions. However, in 2001, a personal tax on
dividends was re-introduced, at a rate of 11%, while the capital gains tax and corporate
tax remained at 28%. With respect to the dividend taxation, a basic deduction of
NOK 10 000 was introduced. Thus, small investors in dividend paying firms were not
directly affected by the tax increase. However, for larger investors the total taxation
on dividends increased from 28% to 35.92%, due to the double taxation of parts of the
earnings. In 2002 the personal taxation of dividends was again removed. For foreign
investors, dividends distributed from a Norwegian tax resident public or private limited
company to its non-resident shareholders are subject to 25% withholding tax. Tax
treaties may make the withholding tax deductible in the shareholder’s home country.
Non-resident shareholders gain on a sale of shares in a Norwegian company is not subject
to any Norwegian taxation, unless the shares form part of a permanent establishment
in Norway or the seller is an individual who fulfill certain conditions that would make
the gains taxable at a rate of 28%.
With respect to the relative tax treatment of dividends and repurchases in Norway,
there has been a change during our sample period from 1999 through 2001. In 1999 and
2000, dividend distributions were not taxed. On the other hand repurchases where the
shareholder sells shares above the tax basis is taxed at 28%. Thus, in cases where the
firm uses already taxed earnings for repurchasing shares at a price above the tax basis,
the shareholder that sell shares back to the firm would experience a double taxation on
the excess capital gains. In 2001, when a dividend tax of 11% was introduced, the tax
29labor unions, non-profit organizations and public pension funds are exempt from taxation.
30RISK is the acronym for ”Regulering av Inngangsverdien med Skattlagt Kapital”. Translated, it
means that there is an adjustment of the cost basis by the retained earnings after corporate tax. To be
eligible to the RISK adjustment within a given year, the shareholder must have owned the shares over
the turn of the year.
31The Norwegian tax system is a full imputation system, in which a double taxation is eliminated. In
the UK, there is a partial imputation system, while the US has a classical company tax system.
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differential between capital gains and dividends was reduced, favoring repurchases.32
With respect to foreign investors, they have been subject to 25% withholding tax on
dividends through the entire sample period. However, since the capital gains for for-
eigners is subject to the tax in the home country, the preference between dividends and
repurchases may vary between foreign investors depending on the tax treatment in their
home country.
5.4 Data description and general statistics
The repurchase data
The sample was formed by collecting all the announcements of open market share re-
purchase programs for the period 1998 through 2001. In addition, the actual repurchase
executions related to these announcements reported to the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE)
from January 1999 through December 2001 were collected.33 Panel A of table 5.1 shows
statistics for repurchase plan announcements for the whole sample period as well as
separate years for our repurchase sample. The second column in panel A shows the
number of repurchase plans announced and the second column shows the number of
separate firms that announced. Thus, through the sample there were 318 repurchase
plans announced by 163 different firms. This is about 55% of the firms that were listed
on the OSE during the sample period. The fourth column report the maximum number
of announcements for the whole period and separate years. The firm that announced the
largest number of times during the sample period announced once every year. Within
each year, no firms announced more than once in 1998 and 1999, while there was at
least one firm that announced twice during 2000 and 2001. The next three columns
in panel A report the minimum, average and maximum amount authorized to be re-
purchased during the repurchase period. For the whole period, the minimum amount
announced by a firm was 1% of the outstanding shares at announcement. The average
amount announced was 9.5% while the maximum was 10%, which also the upper le-
gal limit. The median announcement was for 10%, and 281 of the announcements was
for 10% of the outstanding shares in the firm. Thus, the default amount announced
seemed to be the maximum legal limit.34 The last 5 columns of panel A in table 5.1
shows the number of announcing firms that actually bought shares during the repur-
chase period, the number of announcing firms that did not execute any repurchases,
the median, mean and maximum fraction of outstanding shares repurchased during the
32The dividend taxation was removed again in 2002.
33Firms could announce a repurchase plan before 1999, but were not allowed to execute any repurchase
before January 1999.
34Several firms does not state a limit on the shares to be repurchased. In those cases, we assume that
the legal limit of 10% apply. However, firms are not required to announce the size of their programs,
such that these numbers may be too high relative to their intentions.
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announced repurchase periods. For the whole period there were 100 firms that actually
executed at least one repurchase during the course of the program, while 63 firms did
not. For the separate years, the number of repurchasing firms reflect the number of
firms that announced a repurchase plan in the respective year, and repurchased shares
during the announced repurchase period (with a maximum length of 18 months). Thus,
of the 85 firms that announced a repurchase plan in 1999, 41 firms executed at least
one repurchase, while 44 did not. For the firms that actually repurchased shares, the
median amount of outstanding shares repurchased was 1.8% while the mean amount
was 2.9%. The maximum amount repurchased was 22.1% which is more than twice the
legal limit of 10%. The maximum legal limit is exceeded by a few firms in every year in
the sample except for repurchases related to announcements in 1998. This may be due
a renewal of some repurchase plans which is not captured in our announcement records.
In addition, it may be because these firms have used repurchased shares as payments
in transactions, bonus plans to employees or managers or simply reduced the number
of outstanding shares such that their holding of treasury shares is kept below 10% at
any point in time, but that the accumulated repurchases exceeds the limit. Overall,
the table shows that the first years after repurchases were introduced in Norway, there
has been a large increase in the number of firms announcing that they have initiated a
repurchase program. Of these firms, about 60% actually executed repurchases.
Panel B of table 5.1 shows statistics for the actual repurchase activity by the firms in
our sample for the whole sample period as well as for separate years. The second column
in panel B report the total number of executed repurchases, while the third to sixth
column report the cross-sectional distribution for the number of repurchases, column
seven and eight show the average repurchase size in number of shares and Norwegian
kroner (NOK), while the two last columns provide numbers for the total repurchase
volume in shares and NOK. The median firm executed 10 repurchases through the
sample period while the average number of repurchases across firms was almost 17. The
firm that repurchased the most, executed 197 repurchases through our sample period.35
For the separate years, the number of repurchases more than tripled from 1999 to 2001,
while it decreased in 2002. On the other hand, the average number of repurchases
across firms doubled through the period. One interesting thing to note about the trend
in repurchases is that there was that the repurchase volume was the highest in 2001,
both with respect to the number of repurchases, the total number of shares repurchased
as well as the NOK value of all repurchases. One reason behind this may be that there
was introduced an 11% personal tax on dividends in 2001. However, a large amount
of the repurchases in 2001 was also triggered due to the large price drop in September
2001 after the terrorist attacks in the US, as about 20% of the repurchases in 2001 was
35The specific firm is Pan Fish ASA (PAN). The company is engaged in the farming, processing, sale
and distribution of salmon and trout at a global level. It has more than 2300 employees and operations
in 10 countries (numbers from 2002 annual report).
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executed in September.
With respect to the size of the repurchases, the average size in number of shares
increased from 1999 to 2001 and decreased in 2002, while the size in Norwegian kroner
(NOK) steadily decreased through the period. This may indicate that firms that expe-
rienced a decline in their stock price repurchased more, wile firms with a high price or
that experienced an increase in their price repurchased less. With respect to the two
last columns in the table, we see that the number of shares in all repurchases tripled
from 1999 to 2001, and fell in 2002. The same trend is evident when looking at the
aggregate volume of repurchases in NOK.
The ownership data
The ownership dataset was obtained from the Norwegian Central Securities Depository
(Verdipapirsentralen, VPS), and contains detailed monthly data on the ownership of
firms listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange spanning the same period as our repurchase data,
1999-2001.36 More specifically, for each month, the data contain variables describing
the ownership structure of each firm with respect to the number of shares owned by
each owner, the number of owners, and the type of owners (state, foreigners, financials,
nonfinancials and individuals).
We also use data on insider ownership. The insider data is constructed based on the
reports published by the OSE when an insider trades in company stock. The disclosure
rules at the OSE state that an primary insider is required to report any transactions to
the OSE within 10 am the next day. This report contains the insider’s name, position,
number of shares transacted and the resulting total holding which makes it possible to
estimate the stake held by primary insiders. One important problem with the insider
data is that insiders who leave the firm has no obligation to report this event to the
OSE. Thus, when tracking the insider ownership fractions in firms, we are unable to
remove insiders that are no longer insiders. Thus, the insider ownership is potentially
overstated due to this. With respect to price and accounting data, we obtained this
from OBI.37 This data contain daily stock prices (at the close with best bid and ask
prices) and adjustment factors (for dividends, stock splits etc.).
To give a general overview of the ownership structure for firms listed at the OSE
for the period we are studying, table 5.2 report some general statistics across time and
market capitalization quartiles. In part (a) of the table we report statistics for the
number of listed firms, the average market capitalization, market/book, price and divi-
dend payment (per share) for the whole sample and for separate years. With respect to
the number of firms, these numbers are higher than the official ”end of year” number
36The ownership data actually covers a longer period. For a monthly frequency, the ownership data
starts in 1997 through 2002. For end of year data, the ownership data goes back to 1989.
37Oslo Børsinformasjon
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reported by the OSE. This is due to new listings, de-listings, mergers and de-mergers oc-
curring within each year.38 Overall, the average market capitalization increased through
the period from NOK 2.3 bill. to NOK 3.4 bill, while the total market capitalization of
all listed firms increased from NOK 582 bill. in 1999 to NOK 677 bill. in 2001.39 The
average market-to-book value was 1.15 for all firms through the sample period. Across
MCAP quartiles, the market-to-book value was 1.2 for the firms with a market capital-
ization below the median and 1.1 for the above median firms. Further, the average cash
dividend per share was the lowest in 1999, with NOK 6.1 per share, and the highest in
2000 with NOK 7.6 per share. The total cash dividends paid by all firms for the period
was NOK 40 bill., distributed across years as NOK 14 bill. in 1999, NOK 12 bill in 2000
and NOK 14 bill. in 2001.40 Thus, despite the increased tax on dividends in 2001, this
did not seem to affect the average or aggregate dividend payments by Norwegian firms.
In part (b) of table 5.2 we summarize the average ownership fraction by each of the
five largest owners. In addition, the average total fraction owned by the 5 largest owners
combined and the Herfindahl index is reported. The first thing to note about the table
is that the average ownership fraction each of the largest owners has been relatively
constant through the period, with the largest owner owning about 33% on average. In
addition, the five largest owners decreased their mean ownership from 55.5% in 1999
to 54.9% in 2001, while the median ownership by the five largest owners remained un-
changed. These numbers are similar to what is found in Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001)
for 1997 when the average stake for the largest owner was 29%, and the total ownership
by the five largest owners was 53%. However, relative to their study, the stake of the
largest owner has increased by 1.8 percentage points from 1997 to 1999, wile the aggre-
gate ownership of the five largest owners increased by 2.5 percentage points. Compared
to what is common among European firms the ownership by the largest owners is very
low in Norway. Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) report that the average ownership by the
largest owner for European countries in 1997 was 44%. When looking at the Herfindahl
index,41 this measure suggests that there was an increase in concentration from 1999 to
2000, and a decrease in concentration from 2000 to 2001. However, the median concen-
tration has increased through the period. For 1997 Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) report
an average Herfindahl index of 0.15. Across market capitalizations, the most evident
pattern is that the mean fraction owned by the five largest owners is the largest in firms
with a market capitalization in the second and third quartile. This is also evident when
looking at the Herfindahl index. With respect to the ownership of each of the largest
38The official number companies listed at the OSE at the end of each year was 215 (1999), 214 (2000),
212 (2001), 203 (2002).
39In 2002 the total market capitalization of the OSE fell to NOK 503 bill.
40In 2002 Norwegian firms paid out more than NOK 19 bill. in dividends.
41The Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of squared ownership fractions of all owners in a
firm. The Herfindahl index is highly correlated (more than 0.8) with the aggregate ownership of the
five largest owners.
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Table 5.2
Ownership concentration and insider ownership at the OSE
Part (a) of the table shows some general statistics for the listed firms at the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE)
across the whole sample period, separate years and market capitalization quartiles. The number of firms
also contain de-listed and firms that are listed during the sample period. Thus, this number is larger
than the number of listed firms at officially reported by the Oslo Stock Exchange at the end of the
year. The average market capitalization, Market/Book and price are monthly averages across firms.
The dividend per share is the average dividend paid by firms across the whole sample period or within
each calendar year. Part (b) of the table shows the mean and median fraction owned by the five largest
owners separately, the mean and median accumulated fraction owned by the five largest owners as well
as the Herfindahl index. Part (c) of the table shows the mean and median fraction owned by all insiders
in the firm and the primary insiders (board members and management team). Note that we only have
insider data until June 2001.
Separate years Market capitalization quartiles
All years 1999 2000 2001 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
(a) General statistics
Firm/year obs. 301 271 261 245 75 75 75 75
MCAP (mill.NOK) 3112 2326 2818 3353 93 354 1106 11394
Market/Book 1.15 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1
Price 76.0 81.6 92.3 71.2 61.2 51.0 91.4 132.0
Dividend/share 6.5 6.1 7.6 7.1 8.6 7.1 8.0 5.1
(b) Ownership concentration
Largest owner
mean 0.326 0.308 0.318 0.306 0.259 0.299 0.315 0.293
stddev 0.236 0.232 0.253 0.238 0.180 0.235 0.219 0.223
median 0.243 0.226 0.230 0.240 0.236 0.222 0.212 0.213
2nd largest
mean 0.103 0.106 0.101 0.108 0.107 0.104 0.106 0.098
stddev 0.067 0.071 0.072 0.075 0.056 0.075 0.065 0.066
median 0.090 0.091 0.085 0.094 0.097 0.094 0.094 0.080
3rd largest
mean 0.060 0.063 0.059 0.061 0.065 0.062 0.062 0.057
stddev 0.034 0.037 0.036 0.042 0.031 0.039 0.034 0.034
median 0.053 0.055 0.052 0.053 0.059 0.057 0.056 0.048
4th largest
mean 0.042 0.044 0.041 0.042 0.048 0.042 0.045 0.040
stddev 0.022 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.026 0.019
median 0.041 0.042 0.040 0.041 0.043 0.044 0.042 0.039
5th largest
mean 0.032 0.034 0.032 0.032 0.036 0.033 0.033 0.032
stddev 0.016 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.018 0.014
median 0.032 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.035 0.035 0.032 0.032
Sum 5 largest
mean 0.563 0.555 0.551 0.549 0.515 0.540 0.562 0.520
stddev 0.229 0.234 0.243 0.240 0.208 0.240 0.231 0.212
median 0.557 0.557 0.552 0.558 0.557 0.550 0.554 0.454
Herfindahl index
mean 0.206 0.187 0.201 0.184 0.130 0.181 0.187 0.170
stddev 0.228 0.218 0.250 0.232 0.146 0.226 0.201 0.203
median 0.099 0.095 0.098 0.103 0.096 0.096 0.099 0.081
(c) Insider ownership
All insiders
mean 0.136 0.144 0.149 0.146 0.153 0.171 0.155 0.139
stddev 0.253 0.264 0.273 0.269 0.279 0.287 0.262 0.266
median 0.011 0.005 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.024 0.013
Primary insiders
mean 0.079 0.081 0.085 0.089 0.100 0.103 0.095 0.054
stddev 0.192 0.198 0.210 0.216 0.241 0.239 0.215 0.122
median 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.002
Data from all listed firms at the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) over the period 1999-2002. Data source: Verdipa-
pirsentralen (VPS).
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owners across market capitalizations, the average ownership is generally the highest for
firms in the third size quartile. However, the median ownership is the largest in the
lowest size quartile.
In part (c) of table 5.2 we report similar statistics for the fraction owned by insiders
in firms listed on the OSE. Before we continue, it should be noted that we only have
insider data until the first half of 2001. For the entire sample period, all insiders owned
about 14% in Norwegian firms on average, while primary insiders (the management team
and board members) owned on average about 8%. Comparably, Bøhren and Ødegaard
(2001) report that all insiders owned on average 10% in 1997 while primary insiders
owned about 3%. Thus, relative to their numbers, there has been an increase in the
insider ownership at the OSE. However, some caution should be used when interpreting
these numbers since the larger insider fractions in this study may be because of the data
problem related to the insider holdings discussed earlier. With respect to the median
insider, all insiders owned about 1.1%, while primary insiders owned about 0.1%. Thus
the distribution of inside ownership is highly skewed. This is caused by a large part of
the sample firms having a very low or a close to zero fraction owned by insiders of the
firm, in addition to several firms having a very high insiders ownership. Furthermore,
across market capitalization quartiles, the average insider ownership is the highest in
the lowest size quartiles.
5.5 Descriptive analysis of ownership in repurchasing firms
In this section we combine the data on announcements of repurchase plans, actual
repurchases and the ownership data to examine whether there are differences in the
ownership composition in announcing versus non-announcing firms. In addition, we
examine whether firms that actually repurchase shares during the repurchase period
and those that do not are different from firms that do not announce a repurchase plan.
To facilitate this, we split all the firms at the OSE into 4 subgroups. When looking at
the whole sample period, the first group consists of all firms that do not announce a
repurchase plan during our sample period from 1999 through 2001. The second group
consists of firms that do announce at least one repurchase plan during our sample
period. The third group consists of firms that announce a repurchase plan, but do
not repurchase any shares during the repurchase period, and the fourth group consists
of announcing firms that actually execute repurchases during the repurchase period.42
Similarly, when looking at separate years, we split firms into groups based on whether
they have announced a repurchase plan or not during the respective year. To determine
whether a firm has repurchased any shares after it has announced within in a specific
year, we track whether it has repurchased within the announced time limit, or within
42The repurchase period is the period for which the firm has announced that it may repurchase shares.
The maximum legal limit is 18 months.
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the legal limit of 18 months. For example, a firm that announces a repurchase plan in
May of 1999 is considered a repurchasing firm (for that year) if it executes at least one
repurchase before December 2000.
5.5.1 Ownership concentration in repurchasing firms
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986), among others, suggest that
ownership concentration is an important mechanism for disciplining and monitoring non-
owner managers. This because large outside owners potentially both have the incentives
to monitor through high cash flow rights as well as the power to affect corporate decisions
through their voting rights. If there are no large shareholders with these incentives,
there may be insufficient monitoring of managers. In those cases, payout policy is one
mechanism that can help reduce the agency problems as suggested by Jensen (1986).
Although cash dividends and new debt also reduce the amount of free cash within a
firm, more flexible repurchases may be especially attractive for firms with volatile cash
flows that want to smooth dividends.
In this section we examine the ownership concentration of repurchasing firms to
investigate whether firms with potentially higher agency problems tend to use more
repurchases. Table 5.3 shows the concentration statistics across firm-groups for the
whole period as well as for separate years. We do not distinguish between voting and
non-voting shares in any part of the analysis, but instead calculate the statistics at the
company level.43 We calculate average statistics for the groups discussed above, where
“All OSE firms” are all listed firms at the OSE. These firms are further divided into
“Non-announcing firms” and “Announcing firms” depending on whether the firm has
announced a repurchase plan during the sample period or not. The “Announcing firms”
group is then further divided into two sub-groups depending on whether the firms have
executed any repurchases during the repurchase period (“Repurchase”) or not (“No
repurchase”). The second column in the table report the number of firms in each group
and sub-group.44 Column three to seven show the average fraction owned by the largest
(ranking 1) to the fifth largest (ranking 5) owner. The eight and ninth column report
the ownership concentration measures which is the combined fraction owned by the 5
largest owners and the Herfindahl index respectively. Finally, the three last columns
report the average market capitalization (in NOK mill.), the average dividend (in NOK
per share) paid out by the firms, and the market to book value. We run tests for
differences in means between the group of announcing firms and non-announcing firms.
In addition, for the two subgroups of repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms we run a
test for differences in means against the group of non-announcing firms. Thus, all tests
43Only 13 firms had non-voting (B-shares) shares at the end of 1999. During the sample period, many
firms chose to merge these together into a single share-class.
44Note that the number of firms within each group is lower than in table 5.1. This is because the
numbers are at company level, which reduces the number of observations with about 10.
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are relative to the non-announcing group.45
Looking at the statistics for the whole period first, there are several things to note.
The largest owner has a significantly lower stake in announcing firms (30%) than in non-
announcing firms (43%). On the other hand, the second- to fifth largest owners owns a
significantly larger fraction in announcing firms than in non-announcing firms. This is
also reflected in the concentration measure in column eight (“Sum 5 largest”), where we
see that the average fraction owned by the five largest owners is significantly lower in
announcing firms than in firms that do not announce a repurchase plan. This difference
is mainly due to the lower ownership by the largest owner in these firms. With respect
to the Herfindahl index the difference becomes even more pronounced. When examining
the group of announcing firms in more detail, we see that the differences in ownership
concentration is the largest for firms that actually repurchase shares. Looking at the
fraction owned by the five largest shareholders together, we see that while the firms
that announce, but do not repurchase has on average a combined ownership of about
58% which is not significantly different from firms that do not announce a repurchase
plan (63%). However, firms that announce and repurchase has a combined ownership of
about 53%, which is significantly lower than the group of non-announcing firms. This is
also evident when looking at the Herfindahl index. However, relative to that measure,
both repurchasing and non repurchasing firms have a significantly lower concentration.
For the separate years, the differences seem to be more pronounced in the last part of
the sample, except for the ownership of the largest owner and the Herfindahl index.
These findings is in line with a story where firms with dispersed ownership have
greater incentives to initiate a self-disciplinary mechanism to ensure their shareholders
that they are committed to mitigate agency costs of free cash. This because the largest
shareholder also has potentially lower incentives to monitor management, as well as less
power to intervene, compared to non-announcing firms where the largest shareholders
own a significantly higher fraction of the firm. In addition, the shareholders in these
firms may also be more likely to support a proposal that the firm wants to initiate a
repurchase program if it is expected to reduce agency costs.
Furthermore, the results also suggest that these differences in concentration is the
strongest in firms that actually repurchase shares. This results may however also be in
line with managers using repurchases to reduce the probability of a successful hostile
takeover, and aim at increasing the ownership concentration over time in the hands of
themselves and/or the most “manager-loyal” shareholders. In addition, as discussed
45The test depends on whether the population variances of the two groups are equal or not. If the
variances are equal, then the t-stat is calculated as t = (x¯a − x¯b)/
√
s2(1/na + 1/nb) where x¯a and x¯b
are the means for the two groups respectively, na and nb are the number of firms in each group while
s2 is the pooled standard deviation calculated as s2 = [(na − 1)s
2
a + (nb − 1)s
2
b]/[na + nb − 2], where
s2a and s
2
b are the standard deviation of the ownership variable for the non-announcing and announcing
firms respectively. We use the SAS v.8.2 package to perform all tests. If the variances are significantly
different, the standard approximation (Satterwaite) supplied in SAS is used.
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earlier, those shareholders selling their shares in the market would also be those with
the lowest valuations effectively increasing the price to a bidder. This may indicate that
firms where the incentives to monitor are the lowest and the probability of a successful
takeover is the highest, are more likely to actually repurchase. We will also come back
to this issue when we later examine the number of owners in these firms.
The finding that the 2nd-5th largest owners have a higher ownership fraction in
announcing firms seem to be the case both for non-repurchasing and repurchasing firms.
This indicates that announcing firms have a flatter power structure than non-announcing
firms. Furthermore, dispersion in ownership among the largest shareholders is even
more pronounced in firms that actually repurchase shares. In non-announcing firms,
the largest shareholder has about 2 times the stake of the combined ownership of the
2nd-5th largest owners, while this ratio is 1.5 in firms that announce a repurchase
plan, and closer to 1 in firms that actually repurchase shares indicating that the largest
owner has a similar stake as the 2nd-5th owners combined. The difference between
announcing and non-announcing firms may reflect that it is easier to obtain enough
votes for initiating a repurchase plan in these firms than in non-announcing firms in the
sense that it would be more difficult for a large shareholder to block a proposal of a
repurchase program when his relative ownership is low. With respect to why firms that
actually repurchase shares has the flattest structure, this may reflect that managers
have stronger incentives to actually repurchase shares in these firms. For example, the
manager may benefit from concentrating the ownership in these firms to reduce the
probability of experiencing a successful takeover. Alternatively, it may also reflect that
managers in fact are committed to distribute excess cash in firms with the potentially
highest agency costs.
With respect to the size of the firms in the different groups, there is no significant
difference in market capitalization between announcing and non-announcing firms for
the whole sample or separate years. Also with respect to dividends, the difference is
only significant at the 10% level for the whole sample period. For the separate years
however, firms that announced repurchase plans paid significantly lower dividends both
in 1999 and 2001, but not in 2000. Looking at the subgroups of announcing firms within
each year, firms that actually repurchased shares paid significantly lower dividends than
non-announcing firms within each year. This is what one would expect to see if firms
substitute repurchases for dividends as suggested by Grullon and Michaely (2002). In
addition, for announcing firms that did not repurchase, the lower dividend payments
may be explained by these firms being less liquid, and thus less likely to pay either
dividends or repurchase shares.46 In addition, as discussed earlier in the paper, an 11%
dividend tax was introduced in 2001. This does not seem to have an impact on the
46In a previous paper on repurchases in Norway, we find that announcing firms that do not repurchase
shares has a significantly lower quick ratio and current ratio than firms that actually repurchase shares.
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average dividend payment by firms. With respect to the market to book values, these
are not significantly different for firms in any of the groups.
Overall, there seem to be systematic differences in the ownership concentration of
firms that initiate a repurchase program relative to firms that do not. Repurchasing
firms generally have a much lower concentration and a flatter power structure between
the five largest owners. This may support several theories. One interpretation may be
that these firms may suffer from insufficient monitoring such that a repurchase plan
is used to mitigate agency problems related to free cash. In addition, shareholders in
these firms may be more likely to vote for a repurchase program if they believe this
will help mitigate agency problems when there is insufficient monitoring. However, it
may be difficult to force a manager to actually repurchase shares if he prefers to keep
cash within the firm. On the other hand, as suggested by Isagawa (2000), if managers
have a stake in the firm, through share ownership or stock options, it may be optimal
for them to disgorge excess cash through repurchases instead of investing in negative
net present value projects that would decrease the value of the firm in the long run.
Another interesting finding is that firms that actually repurchase shares have a much
flatter power structure among the five largest owners compared to any other group. This
may suggest that managers have the strongest incentives to actually execute repurchases
in firms with low concentration.
5.5.2 Ownership by owner-types and number of owners in repurchas-
ing firms
The type of owner may also have important implications for the corporate governance of
a firm. As discussed in Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001), agency theory predicts that per-
sonal owners are better monitorers than non-personal owners such as other corporations
or the state. This because, personal owners have direct private cash flow interests, while
non-personal owners, being an agent representing the ultimate owner, do not. Thus,
the incentives for monitoring management may be stronger for personal owners. On the
other hand, personal owners are generally much smaller, and has less power in affecting
the decisions unless they co-ordinate their interests. In addition, it may be that some
types of owners that have a stronger preference for one type of payout policy due to
e.g. tax reasons. As suggested in Brav et al. (2003), executives do not believe that insti-
tutional investors have a preference between dividends or repurchases, but that personal
shareholders have a preference towards dividends despite the tax disadvantage to this
payout method in the US. On the other hand, their study suggest that institutions often
have an important influence with respect to initiating a repurchase program.
In this section we examine the ownership by different owner types both with respect
to their proportional ownership as well as to the number of owners by different types.
Our dataset has information on 5 main types of owners; State owners that represent
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investments by the central or local government, foreign owners47 which reflect owner-
ship by non-resident organizations or individuals, financial owners reflects institutional
ownership such as private banks, insurance firms, pension funds and investment trusts,
Nonfinancial owners are domestic firms, and individuals which are Norwegian personal
investors.
In table 5.4 we calculate the average ownership fractions owned by these owner-
types for the same groups that we used in the previous section. For all firms at the
OSE, the largest average owner is non-financial, which is also the result in Bøhren
and Ødegaard (2001). With respect to the difference in ownership fraction between
announcing and non-announcing firms, there are only two types that have a significantly
different ownership in announcing firms for the whole period. These are foreigners
which has a significantly lower stake in announcing firms, while non-financial owners
has a significantly higher stake in announcing firms. In both cases this is mainly due to
their ownership in firms that actually execute repurchases. In addition, the difference
is strongest for firms announcing and repurchasing in the beginning of the sample.
Whether these differences are because certain ownertypes has a preference for or
against repurchases, or that firms with these types of owners initiate repurchases is
difficult to say. However, one may speculate that one reason for this might be that
foreign owners are mutual funds or other foreign investors that are invested in Norway
for diversification reasons. As we saw in table 5.3 for the whole sample period, announc-
ing firms seemed to have a slightly smaller (although insignificantly different) market
capitalization than non-announcing firms. If foreign investors are tracking the value
weighted return on the OSE, they are also likely to be invested in the largest firms on
the exchange. A potential reason for why nonfinancial owners has a greater stake in re-
purchasing firms may be that some firms use their repurchased shares (treasury shares)
as payment in transactions with other firms. In addition, the reason may simply be
that the treasury stock is captured in this measure such that the numbers also reflect
that firms own their own stock.48
Another statistic that represent an alternative measure of concentration is the num-
ber of owners. One problem with the average ownership fraction by different owner
types, examined in table 5.4, is that it may to a large degree capture the ownership by
the largest owners of a type. The number of owners by different owner types may give
additional information with respect to the preferences of different shareholder groups.
In table 5.5 we examine the average number of owners by owner type across the different
firm groups as well as the mean total number of owners. Compared to the previous table
47The number of foreign owners is understated because it contain both registered individuals as well
as nominee accounts which may reflect several different owners.
48We do not examine in what degree the firms own stock contribute to the difference. Since the
owners in the VPS data are anonymized and represented by a unique number, it is difficult to remove
the repurchasing firms own shareholdings.
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Table 5.4
Ownership by owner types for repurchasing vs. non-repurchasing firms
The table shows the average ownership fraction for 5 different types of owners. We split firms into five
groups. “All OSE firms” are all firms listed on the OSE. These firms are divided into two groups. The
first group is “Non announcing firms” containing all firms listed at the OSE that does not announce
a repurchase plan during our sample period. The second group is “Announcing firms” which consists
of firms that announce a repurchase plan. This group is further divided into firms that announce,
but do not repurchase any shares (“No repurchase”) and firms that announce and repurchase shares
(“Repurchase”). Tests for differences in means between the different groups of announcing firms are
performed relative to the group of non-announcing firms. A significant difference at the 1%, 5% and
10% is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively.
Ownership fraction by type
Non-
Firm group Firm/year State Foreign Financial financial Individual
Whole period
All OSE firms 301 0.043 0.210 0.165 0.373 0.206
Non announcing firms 152 0.045 0.239 0.159 0.336 0.216
Announcing firms 149 0.042 0.180∗∗ 0.172 0.411∗∗ 0.196
-No repurchase 54 0.029 0.208 0.181 0.400 0.184
-Repurchase 95 0.049 0.164∗∗∗ 0.166 0.418∗∗∗ 0.203
Year 1999
All OSE firms 271 0.041 0.201 0.166 0.368 0.222
Non announcing firms 193 0.038 0.217 0.165 0.339 0.235
Announcing firms 78 0.049 0.159∗∗ 0.202∗ 0.404∗∗ 0.187∗∗
-No repurchase 39 0.053 0.177 0.224∗∗ 0.375 0.173∗∗
-Repurchase 39 0.045 0.141∗∗∗ 0.181 0.433∗∗ 0.201
Year 2000
All OSE firms 261 0.041 0.202 0.166 0.370 0.223
Non announcing firms 181 0.025 0.245 0.227 0.305 0.203
Announcing firms 80 0.061 0.181 0.169 0.379 0.211
-No repurchase 20 0.036 0.204 0.159∗∗ 0.374 0.228
-Repurchase 60 0.052 0.197 0.184 0.361 0.209
Year 2001
All OSE firms 245 0.043 0.203 0.154 0.378 0.222
Non announcing firms 145 0.047 0.203 0.150 0.359 0.243
Announcing firms 100 0.039 0.203 0.161 0.406 0.193∗∗
-No repurchase 47 0.049 0.231 0.170 0.370 0.182∗∗
-Repurchase 53 0.030 0.178 0.153 0.438∗∗ 0.203
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there are a few interesting things to note. First of all, firms that announce a repurchase
plan seem to have a larger number of owners than firms that do not announce a plan.
However, the difference is not significant when looking at the total number of owners.
This is mainly because the cross sectional variation in these numbers are very large.
Also when testing for differences in medians there is no significant difference between
announcing and non-announcing firms.49 However, the difference seem to be mainly
due to those firms that actually execute repurchases, which on average had more than
4000 owners, while non-announcing firms had about 2400 owners.
Initially one could expect there to be a higher number of owners in repurchasing
firms. First, a greater number of owners in announcing firms is expected in the sense
that we found that the ownership concentration is lower in these firms. Thus, one
explanation discussed before could be that dispersed ownership result in insufficient
monitoring, such that firms initiate repurchases to distribute cash and mitigate the
agency costs of cash. However, a high number of potentially small owners may also be
a reason for why firms want to repurchase shares in the first place. For example, by
reducing the number of owners, and increasing the concentration, the firm may improve
the external monitoring of the firm by increasing the proportional ownership of some
owners, or reduce the likelihood of a successful takeover. In addition, some firms in
Norway explicitly state that they intended to repurchase shares to remove “odd-lot”
owners.50 Compared to the results when we examined the fraction owned by each
owner-type, some additional patterns appear. The average number of owners of all
types, except individuals, is significantly higher in announcing firms.
Overall, the number of state owners, foreigners, financial and non-financial owners
is significantly higher in announcing firms. This reflects the finding that firms that
announce repurchase plans have a lower concentration than non-announcing firms. Fur-
thermore, the differences are the largest in firms that actually repurchase shares, which
may be a strong motivation for why these firms repurchase shares.
5.5.3 Insider ownership in repurchasing firms
One very important owner is the insider which is potentially better informed about
current earnings and the future prospects of the firm. In addition, although the general
stockholder meeting has voted for initiating a repurchase plan, the manager is the one
that decides if and when to execute repurchases. Agency theory predicts that a firm
with a large outside shareholder may help mitigate agency costs through his incentives
49The median number of owners in non-announcing firms is 816, while it is 1473 for announcing firms
for the whole sample period.
50One example of this is Storebrand (STB) which at the beginning January 1999 gave an offer to
shareholders that owned less than 8 shares to sell their shares back to the company. Of the total 74000
shareholders at the time, 39000 owned less than 8 shares. Since this is a targeted repurchase it is left
out of the analysis, since we only examine open market repurchases.
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Table 5.5
Number of owners by owner type for repurchasing vs. non-repurchasing firms
The table shows the average number of owners for 5 different types of owners. We split firms into five
groups. “All OSE firms” are all firms listed on the OSE. These firms are divided into two groups. The
first group is “Non announcing firms” containing all firms listed at the OSE that does not announce
a repurchase plan during our sample period. The second group is “Announcing firms” which consists
of firms that announce a repurchase plan. This group is further divided into firms that announce,
but do not repurchase any shares (“No repurchase”) and firms that announce and repurchase shares
(“Repurchase”). Tests for differences in means between the different groups of announcing firms are
performed relative to the group of non-announcing firms. A significant difference at the 1%, 5% and
10% is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively.
Average number of owners
Non-
Firm group Firms All State Foreign Financial financial Individual
Whole period
All OSE firms 301 2901 4 131 43 159 2564
Non announcing firms 152 2371 3 79 32 118 2138
Announcing firms 149 3443 6∗∗ 185∗∗∗ 53∗∗∗ 201∗∗∗ 2998
-No repurchase 54 2136 4 143 48∗∗∗ 168∗∗ 1773
-Repurchase 95 4185∗ 7∗∗∗ 208∗∗∗ 57∗∗∗ 219∗∗∗ 3695∗
Year 1999
All OSE firms 271 2813 4 137 44 171 2456
Non announcing firms 193 2274 3 114 37 143 1976
Announcing firms 78 4147∗∗ 6∗∗ 196∗ 60∗∗∗ 240∗∗∗ 3645∗∗
-No repurchase 39 2142 4 149 53∗ 178 1758
-Repurchase 39 6153∗∗ 8∗∗ 243∗ 67∗∗∗ 303∗∗∗ 5532∗∗
Year 2000
All OSE firms 261 2808 4 137 46 172 2447
Non announcing firms 181 2080 3 88 37 139 1813
Announcing firms 80 4454∗∗∗ 6∗∗ 250∗∗∗ 66∗∗∗ 248∗∗∗ 3884∗∗
-No repurchase 20 6865∗∗∗ 10∗∗∗ 448∗∗ 87∗∗∗ 361∗∗∗ 5959∗∗∗
-Repurchase 60 3650∗ 5∗ 183∗∗ 60∗∗ 210∗∗ 3192
Year 2001
All OSE firms 245 3328 6 156 47 175 2944
Non announcing firms 145 3320 5 114 40 157 3004
Announcing firms 100 3341 7 219∗∗ 58∗∗ 200 2858
-No repurchase 47 2441 5 173∗ 53 175 2035
-Repurchase 53 4139 8∗ 259∗ 62∗∗ 222∗ 3588
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to monitor and power to intervene in the decision process. Similarly, when the manager
has a stake in the firm, the agency problem may also be lower as there is a convergence
of interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) between the inside- and outside owners. How-
ever, as discussed in section 5.2, there may also be a conflict between inside- and outside
owners. First of all, the manager may not have any incentives to actually execute re-
purchases even though the shareholders have voted for a repurchase plan. Alternatively,
the manager may have incentives to secure their position in the firm by increasing their
ownership fraction (entrenchment) through repurchasing. One example would be to
resist hostile takeovers that, if successful, would threaten their position in the firm and
make them loose control over the firms resources. As argued by Bagwell (1991) and
others, a repurchase may be used as an effective measure to to reduce the probability of
takeovers. For the outside owners, this would reduce their wealth if the takeover is ex-
pected to be a valuable restructuring within the firm that could lead to a more efficient
use of firm resources. As shown by Denis (1990) the price effect for a firm announcing
a defensive repurchase is highly negative which suggests that defensive repurchases are
associated with losses for the shareholders of the target firm.
A large part of the literature also focus argue that insiders use repurchases to convey
private information to the market, and that this is a potential reason for why a positive
announcement effect is observed. Ignoring the credibility issues related to announce-
ments motivated by undervaluation, discussed in Fried (2002) among others, one would
expect insiders to have a higher ownership in firms announcing a repurchase plan due
to mispricing, than firms that do not. Furthermore, in models by Brennan and Thakor
(1990) and Barclay and Smith (1988) the manager also use repurchases to increase his
ownership in an undervalued firm and thereby transfer wealth from uninformed share-
holders to himself and the remaining shareholders. The model in Isagawa (2000) more
explicitly focus on the credibility issues related of open market repurchase, and argue
that when the manager has stock options or own shares in the firm, it may be optimal
for him to initiate a repurchase program and substitute repurchases for dividends. The
prediction of these models is that firms with high insider ownership are more likely to
initiate repurchases, or that the insider ownership is expected to increase in undervalued
firms. In line with the predictions in Isagawa (2000), Li and McNally (2002) find that
repurchasing firms in Canada have a higher insider ownership on average. In addition,
Fenn and Liang (2001) find that repurchase activity is positively related to the amount
of management options in Canadian firms. They argue that their results suggest that
managers use repurchases to increase the value of these options by substituting repur-
chases for dividends.
Further, as argued by Fried (2002), managers motivation for repurchasing shares
may also be related to managerial opportunism. This in the sense that managers may
want to initiate an open market repurchase both when the firm is undervalued and
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overvalued, which is in contrast to the undervaluation hypothesis where the managers
want to initiate a repurchase plan only in the cases when the firm is undervalued.
Relative to the undervaluation hypothesis, the manager opportunism hypothesis does
not have any clear-cut predictions with respect to the insider ownership in repurchasing
firms unless these firms are systematically undervalued.
To investigate these issues further, table 5.6 provide statistics on the average insider
ownership for all insiders as well as for primary insiders for the same groups of firms as
before. We find a large difference in average insider ownership in firms that announce
a repurchase plan relative to non-announcing firms. On average for the whole sample
period, insiders in announcing firms own more than twice (20%) the fraction of insiders
in non-announcing firms (8%). This difference is also systematic and significant for
the separate years. However, when we examine more closely the groups of announcing
firms that actually repurchase or not, some differences appear. The results suggests the
firms that actually repurchase seem to have the highest total insider ownership of the
two groups. This may indicate that insiders retain their shares in repurchasing firms,
increasing their ownership proportion.
When looking at only the ownership by the primary insiders (managers and members
of the board), the results are similar for the whole sample period. Moreover, primary
own on average 11.5% in firms that initiate a repurchase program, but only 4.5% in
non-announcing firms. For the subgroups of announcing firms, primary insiders have
a higher ownership in firms that do not repurchase any shares, which is the opposite
as the result for all insiders. The difference becomes even more apparent when looking
at the separate years. We do not have a good explanation for this difference between
primary insiders and all insiders. When looking at separate years, the difference in
primary ownership is not significantly different for announcing firms in 2001.
Relative to the different models and hypotheses discussed earlier, this finding is con-
sistent both with mispricing, entrenchment, expropriation and the model of Isagawa
(2000). Relative to an agency story, where repurchases is used to mitigate agency costs,
we would expect to see a lower insider ownership in announcing firms. Thus, combined
with the findings earlier, where firms with low concentration and more dispersed own-
ership initiate repurchase programs, the high insider stake may suggest that mitigation
of agency costs is a less important motivation for why firms repurchase. On the other
hand, it might be that both are important reasons for why firms initiate repurchase
programs, but that this differ among firms.
To further investigate the difference in insider ownership between announcing and
non-announcing firms we examine the distribution of insider ownership in more detail.
The main reason for examining this more closely is that the insider data may overes-
timate the true insider holdings. The construction of the insider data is based on the
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Table 5.6
Ownership by insiders
The table shows descriptive statistics for the total and primary insider ownership across the same groups
as in table 5.3. The ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes a significant difference in means between the non-announcing
firms and the announcing firms at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. We also test whether
the mean insider ownership in the sub-groups of repurchasing/non-repurchasing firms are significantly
different from the non-announcing firms. The test depends on whether the population variances of
the two groups are equal or not. If the variances are equal, then the t-stat is calculated as t =
(x¯a − x¯b)/
√
s2(1/na + 1/nb) where x¯a and x¯b are the means for the two groups respectively, na
and nb are the number of firms in each group while s
2 is the pooled standard deviation calculated
as s2 = [(na − 1)s
2
a + (nb − 1)s
2
b]/[na + nb − 2], where s
2
a and s
2
b are the standard deviation of the
ownership variable for the non-announcing and announcing firms respectively.
Mean insider fraction
Whole Separate years
sample 1999 2000 2001
All insiders
All OSE firms 0.139 0.144 0.149 0.146
Non announcing firms 0.079 0.110 0.110 0.099
Announcing firms 0.199∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
-No repurchase 0.177∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗ 0.228∗ 0.109
-Repurchase 0.211∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗
Primary insiders
All OSE firms 0.081 0.081 0.085 0.089
Non announcing firms 0.045 0.059 0.065 0.077
Announcing firms 0.115∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.105
-No repurchase 0.131∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.053
-Repurchase 0.106∗∗∗ 0.094 0.114∗ 0.151∗∗
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actual reports from the transactions reported by insiders to the OSE.51 However, since
insiders are not required to report to the OSE when leaving the firm, or his subsequent
transactions, the holdings of these insiders persist in the data. One effect of this is that
the insider fraction in some instances may become very high, and in some instances
100%. This is of course not possible since the firm in that case would not be listed on
the OSE. Despite this bias, we do not expect there to be more extreme insider firms
among the announcing firms than among the non-announcing firms except if insiders
are more active in on of the groups. However, we want to examine the effect of this bias
more closely. To do this, we remove all firms with more than 90% insider ownership,
and recalculate the insider statistics.
The results from the truncations are reported in table 5.7. In panel A of the table,
we examine the cross-sectional distribution of the total insider ownership for the whole
period. If there is a systematic bias towards one of the groups removing the extreme
observations should make the two distributions more similar. Doing this decreases the
mean total insider fraction for the non-announcing firms from 8% to 7%, and for the
announcing firms from 20% to 14%. However, the difference in means is still significant
at the 1% level. Also for the separate years, there is a decrease in the mean for both
groups. For 1999 the difference in insider ownership becomes insignificant, but for 2000
and 2001 it is still significant at the 1% level. When we perform the the same exercise
for the primary insiders the results go in the same direction, but the change is less
pronounced since there is fewer firms with extreme primary insider ownership.
Removing the insider fractions above 90% seems to reduce both averages similarly
for the two groups, such that there is no systematic bias towards the announcing firms.
However, an insider fraction>90% is still not uninteresting, because it captures a feature
in the data in that insiders are more active in these firms. Thus, we do not remove them
from the rest of the analysis, but acknowledge that there is a potential bias relative to
the insider data.
5.5.4 Changes in ownership in repurchasing firms
So far, we have examined the average ownership in firms that announces a repurchase
plan. We now turn to examining how the various ownership variables change during the
course of the repurchase program. This is done by examining the ownership character-
istics one month before firms executes their first repurchases, relative to the ownership
characteristics for the same firms 12 months and 24 months afterwards. Thus, for each
ownership variable we have a cross section of values before the firms execute their first
repurchase and a cross section of values 12 (and 24) months after the firms initial re-
purchase. Note that the months vary across firms, such that the analysis is essentially
similar to an event study where firms that experience an event at different points in
51An insider is required to report any transaction to the OSE before 10 am the following day.
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Table 5.7
Distribution of total insider ownership
The table shows the distribution of total insider ownership across the two groups of announcing and
non-announcing firms. In first part of panel A (“Full sample”), we use all firms in the sample. In the
second part (“Truncated”) we remove all firms that have an average insider ownership greater than 90%
for both groups. We test whether the means of the cross sectional distributions are equal with ∗, ∗∗ and
∗∗∗ denoting a significant difference at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The tests are adjusted
for differences in variances between the two distributions if the variance is significantly different. In
panel B we examine the distribution of insider ownership across firms that announce/do not announce
within each year.
Panel A: Cross sectional distribution of insider ownership - whole period
Insider ownership distribution std.dev
Firms p25 Median Mean P75 p90 max mean
Full sample
-Non-announcing 152 0.000 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.26 1.00 0.19
-Announcing 149 0.002 0.04 0.20∗∗∗ 0.27 0.70 1.00 0.30
Truncated sample
-Non-announcing 144 0.000 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.24 0.88 0.16
-Announcing 139 0.001 0.03 0.14∗∗∗ 0.21 0.59 0.87 0.22
Panel B: Cross sectional distribution of insider ownership - separate years
Insider ownership distribution std.dev
Firms p25 Median Mean P75 p90 max mean
Year 1999
Full sample
-Non-announcing 193 0.000 0.00 0.11 0.08 0.39 1.00 0.22
-Announcing 78 0.001 0.05 0.23∗∗∗ 0.33 0.93 1.00 0.33
Truncated sample
-Non-announcing 182 0.000 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.34 0.88 0.17
-Announcing 69 0.001 0.03 0.13 0.17 0.43 0.87 0.20
Year 2000
Full sample
-Non-announcing 181 0.000 0.00 0.11 0.06 0.41 1.00 0.24
-Announcing 80 0.003 0.06 0.23∗∗∗ 0.40 0.81 1.00 0.32
Truncated sample
-Non-announcing 169 0.000 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.30 0.88 0.16
-Announcing 73 0.003 0.04 0.16∗∗∗ 0.24 0.51 0.85 0.23
Year 2001
Full sample
-Non-announcing 145 0.000 0.00 0.10 0.05 0.26 1.00 0.24
-Announcing 100 0.003 0.06 0.21∗∗∗ 0.34 0.69 1.00 0.29
Truncated sample
-Non-announcing 135 0.000 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.21 0.88 0.16
-Announcing 94 0.002 0.04 0.16∗∗∗ 0.29 0.51 0.88 0.22
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time are aligned in event time. One concern with this is that there may have been a
trend in the ownership variables through the sample period, and that the change reflect
these trends. However, in table 5.2 there is not any indication that there has been a
large change in the average for any of the variables across all firms at the OSE dur-
ing the sample period. In addition, since different firms execute their first repurchase
throughout the entire sample period, this will mitigate the effect from a trend in the
ownership variables.
To examine whether there is a change in the various ownership variables before and
after the initial repurchases, we run a paired test for differences in means, where the
null hypothesis is that the cross sectional mean for each variable is equal before and
after the initial repurchase. The results from this analysis is shown in table 5.8. The
left section of the table shows the results when we examine the change over a 12 month
period after the firms execute their first repurchase, while the right part of the table
shows the results for changes over a 24 month period. For each variable the table shows
the cross sectional mean one month before firms repurchase for the first time (“before”),
and the mean 12 or 24 months after the initial repurchase (“after”), the p-value from
the paired test, and an indicator for the change in the mean (“direction”). Note that
the means before are different when we use a 12 month period from when we use a
24 month period. This is because we loose observations when we examine the longest
period since we only have ownership data through 2002 such that firms repurchasing
for the first time in 2001 drop out of the sample.
As would be expected, the repurchases increase the concentration both relative to
the total fraction owned by the 5 largest owners as well as relative to the Herfindahl
index. However, the change in the Herfindahl index is only significant at the 5% level
when we consider the 24 month change in the index. Relative to the separate ownership
fractions of the five largest owners, only the largest owner has a significant increase
in the fraction, which suggests that the change in concentration is to a large degree
is due to the increased ownership of the largest owner. The ownership fraction of all-
and primary insiders increases, but not significantly. The fraction owned by the state
increases significantly both for the 12 and 24 month periods. One reason for this may
be that the state often is a long-term investor, and are more likely to retain its shares
through the repurchase period, increasing its proportional ownership when the firm re-
purchase. On the other hand the ownership of institutional (financial) and individual
investors decreases when firm repurchase shares. There may be several reasons for this.
If personal investors are afraid of being expropriated (Brennan and Thakor, 1990) or
has a preference for dividends they may reduce their ownership in repurchasing firms.
Alternatively, since both institutional and personal investors probably are those owners
that trade most frequently (as opposed to the state, foreigners and other companies)
among the different owner types, they are more likely to sell their shares back to the
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company when it purchase shares in the open market. Interestingly, the decrease in
institutional ownership is opposite of what Grinstein and Michaely (2001) find for a
sample of public firms in the US. Why this difference appear is difficult to say. How-
ever, it may be argued that this is something one would expect to see. Shleifer and
Vishny (1986) argue that firms pay dividends to attract institutions. In addition, many
institutional investors also have restrictions with respect to investing in non-dividend
paying firms. From this point of view, one would expect institutions to reduce their
ownership if firms that substitute repurchases for dividends.
Finally, when we examine the change in the number of owners of the different owner
types, we find that the average total number of owners declines during both periods,
and that there is a decrease in the number of financial, non-financial and individual
owners, while the number of foreign owners is relatively stable. In addition, the number
of state owners increase during the 24 month period which reflect that these owners not
only retain their shares, but that repurchasing firms may attract investors of this type.
5.6 The probability of announcement
Having examined the ownership structure characteristics of firms that use repurchases,
we now examine whether the ownership structure affect the propensity for a firm to an-
nounce a repurchase plan. Thus, in this section we examine in more detail whether there
are systematic relation between the ownership structure of firms and the probability of
seeing a firm announcing a repurchase plan during the following period, conditional on
ownership variables at a fixed point in time. To do this we estimate a binary regression
model for estimating the effect of various ownership variables on the propensity for firms
to announce (Ann) a repurchase program. The general model to be estimated is,
Prob(Ann) = F(β ′x) (5.1)
where β ′x is the index function, with x containing the explanatory variables for each
firm, β is a vector of coefficients and F(·) is the cumulative distribution function. The
model is estimated as a binary regression model by assuming that a variable Ann∈ {1, 0},
which is the event of a firm announcing a repurchase plan or not, is related to a set
of explanatory variables x.52 We estimate models based on both a probit and logit
specification by maximum likelihood.53 However, since the results the two specifications
are very similar, we report only results from the logit estimation.54
52A more detailed explanation is provided in appendix 5.A.
53The proc logistic, proc probit in addition to the proc mixed procedures, provided in SAS v.8.2 are
used for the numerical optimizations.
54Also as noted in Greene (2000), the difference between a logit and probit specification is generally
very small unless for very large samples.
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Table 5.8
Changes in ownership in repurchasing firms
The table show the results from a paired test for differences in means for the 12 month and 24 month
period after firms repurchase shares for the first time. For each period, the table shows the average for
the respective variable one month before the firms execute their first repurchase (“before”), 12 (or 24)
months afterwards (“after”), the p-value from the test for the mean before and after being equal, as
well as a column showing the direction of the change (“direction”). The numbers in parentheses below
each mean show the standard deviation of the mean for the respective variable.
12 month period (N=90) 24 month period (N=67)
Concentration before after p-value direction Before After p-value direction
Herfindahl index 0.138 0.166 0.09 + 0.110 0.160 0.02 +
(0.177) (0.236) (0.085) (0.194)
5 largest owners 0.522 0.545 0.04 + 0.509 0.565 <0.01 +
(0.205) (0.218) (0.174) (0.212)
12 month period (N=90) 24 month period (N=67)
Ownership before after p-value direction before after p-value direction
fraction
1st largest 0.265 0.288 0.10 + 0.242 0.288 0.02 +
(0.193) (0.231) (0.143) (0.207)
2nd largest 0.108 0.106 0.58 - 0.113 0.118 0.38 +
(0.065) (0.067) (0.06) (0.066)
3rd largest 0.066 0.067 0.97 + 0.066 0.071 0.18 +
(0.036) (0.038) (0.029) (0.039)
4th larges 0.047 0.048 0.50 + 0.049 0.050 0.48 +
(0.025) (0.027) (0.022) (0.024)
5th largest 0.036 0.036 0.66 + 0.039 0.038 0.53 -
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
All insiders 0.227 0.235 0.60 + 0.228 0.235 0.71 +
(0.336) (0.336) (0.328) (0.319)
Primary insiders 0.107 0.115 0.56 + 0.106 0.121 0.46 +
(0.23) (0.24) (0.225) (0.247)
State 0.043 0.048 0.01 + 0.053 0.060 <0.01 +
(0.114) (0.118) (0.13) (0.137)
Foreigners 0.167 0.176 0.49 + 0.181 0.220 0.09 +
(0.183) (0.208) (0.188) (0.251)
Financials 0.176 0.158 0.05 - 0.186 0.140 <0.01 -
(0.152) (0.141) (0.127) (0.102)
Non-financials 0.410 0.426 0.16 + 0.378 0.397 0.29 +
(0.248) (0.258) (0.223) (0.244)
Individuals 0.206 0.193 0.04 - 0.203 0.185 0.05 -
(0.172) (0.171) (0.161) (0.162)
12 month period (N=90) 24 month period (N=67)
Number of before after p-value direction before after p-value direction
owners
All owners 4521 4219 0.35 - 5410 4892 0.25 -
(9044) (8543) (10312) (9519)
State 7 7 0.16 + 7 10 <0.01 +
(11) (13) (12) (15)
Foreigners 219 214 0.84 - 262 262 0.99 +
(484) (479) (553) (553)
Financials 60 57 0.20 - 66 57 0.02 -
(65) (67) (69) (65)
Non-financials 242 215 <0.01 - 276 222 <0.01 -
(314) (283) (352) (277)
Individuals 3993 3725 0.37 - 4799 4341 0.26 -
(8340) (7849) (9515) (8765)
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5.6.1 Variable selection
Before we continue, we need to select variables (x) that may be argued to be important
for why firms initiate a repurchase plan. Since the set of ownership variables available
to us has been examined earlier in the paper, the estimation results are likely to reflect
many of the patterns found in the descriptive part. However, by estimating a model we
are better able to address the relative importance of the various variables.
The first variable we include in the analysis is the insider fraction. As discussed
earlier, agency theory predict that higher insider ownership align the interests of inside-
and outside owners such that the need for external monitoring is reduced. In that case,
the need for cash distribution to mitigate agency costs would be lower such that firms
with high insider ownership should not be expected to initiate repurchase programs
as often as firms with low insider ownership. Alternatively, insiders may also want to
initiate a repurchase plan to maximize their future wealth, to increase the value of their
options, entrench themselves, counter takeovers or to expropriate outside shareholders.
To examine whether a very high insider ownership has any effect on the propensity
for firms to initiate a repurchase program, we also create a dummy variable (“High
insider ownership”) which is equal to 1 if the insider stake is larger than 33% and zero if
not.55 If the insiders have a large stake in the firm, they may vote against the initiation
of a repurchase program, effectively stopping it. Alternatively, they may also force a
repurchase program through, if they have a strong preference for repurchases.
Another variable that is predicted by agency theory to be important for the quality of
corporate governance is ownership concentration. A higher concentration is expected to
improve monitoring such that the need for additional mechanisms to restrict managers
to waste cash, such as repurchases, are reduced. In addition, we create a dummy variable
to examine whether firms with a large controlling shareholder are more or less likely to
announce a repurchase plan. The dummy variable (“Largest owner >67%”) is equal to
one if the largest shareholder has a super-majority (ownership fraction > 2/3). A very
large owner may have very strong incentives to monitor the management of the firm,
reducing the need for additional mechanisms to discipline management. Alternatively,
a large controlling shareholder can also effectively block the proposal of a repurchase
plan by voting against it.
We also have information about the type of the largest owner. Moreover, we know
whether the largest owner is a state-, foreign-, financial-, nonfinancial- or individual
owner. Since the identity of the largest owner may be important with respect to the
incentive to monitor, we create dummies, which are interacted with the fraction owned
by the largest owner to examine this. For example, it might be that personal owners are
better monitorers than other owners, such as large corporations or the state, because
55The threshold is not related to any theoretical predictions, but merely reflect whether insiders has
a super minority (1/3).
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the quality of the firm affect their wealth more directly. On the other hand, it may be
that institutional investors are more competent with respect to how the firm should be
run and have a preference for dividend payments which would make them more inclined
to vote against the proposal of a repurchase program.
Another variable which may affect the motivation for why a firm announces a re-
purchase plan is the dividend history of a firm. If firms are reluctant to reduce their
dividends and engage in dividend smoothing, as suggested by Lintner (1956) and Brav
et al. (2003), a firm that has paid dividends previously may be less likely to initiate
a repurchase plan if it plans on maintaining its dividend rate. In addition, the size
of the firm may be important since larger firms generally have more shareholders and
potentially a more dispersed ownership.
In addition, we examine various model specifications to investigate whether the total
number of owners, the number of owners by the different owner-types as well as their
ownership proportions affect the propensity for firms to announce a repurchase plan.
With respect to the discussion earlier, a high number of owners may be a motivation
for firms to repurchase shares in the first place.
5.6.2 Estimation results
We estimate the models in the beginning of 1999, 2000 and 2001 with a prediction
period of 12 months. Thus, for each year we use the most recent information before we
estimate the models.56 Furthermore, all firms that were not yet listed at the beginning
of the estimation year is excluded from the estimation for the respective year.
Table 5.9 report the correlations between various variables in, 1999 and 2000, that
we examine in the various models. The lower triangular part of the table show the
correlations for January 1999 and the upper triangular part of the table shows the
correlations for January 2000. For each pair of variables, the table shows the correlation
with the associated p-value from a test of the correlation being equal to zero. First of all,
most of the correlations are of the same magnitude and sign for the two years which is
because most of the ownership variables are very persistent across time. In addition, the
correlations for 2001 are similar to those shown for 1999 and 2000. As expected, several
of the variables are highly correlated. First of all, the insider fraction (all insiders) has
the highest correlation with the fraction owned by nonfinancial owners (although only
significant for 1999) and the second largest owner.57 Although not shown in the table,
the correlation between primary insider ownership and the total insider ownership is
about 0.85, and highly significant. The Herfindahl index58 has a correlation of more
than 0.8 with the concentration measure (sum of fraction owned by the five largest
56For 1999 we use data from December 1998, for 2000 we use data for December 1999 and so on.
57This points to one problem with the data. We are unable to distinguish cases where the largest
owners also are primary insiders.
58The Herfindahl index is the sum of the squared ownership fractions of all owners in a firm.
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owners) and a correlation of 0.96 with the fraction owned by the largest shareholder in
1999, and a negative correlation with the 3rd-5th largest shareholders.
Furthermore, the ownership fraction owned by the largest owners both in aggregate
and separately is not correlated with the size of the firm (MCAP). Also, relating to the
previous discussion on the ownership of foreign investors, we see that their ownership
fraction is significantly positively correlated with the size of the firm indicating that
they are mainly investing in the largest companies to track the OSE all share index
for diversification reasons. Furthermore, the fraction owned by individual owners are
negatively correlated with the concentration measures, the ownership of the largest
owner as well as the fraction owned by the other owner types. Another correlation
that is not shown in the table, is the correlation between the dividend other variables.
The dividend has the highest correlation with market capitalization, with correlation of
about 0.22, which indicate that larger firms pay more dividends. However, the dividend
variable is not highly correlated with any other variables.
Table 5.10 report the estimation results when we estimate the propensity for firm
to announce a repurchase plan during each year given the ownership characteristics at
the beginning of the year.59
For each year we estimate three different models with various variable combinations
that are not highly correlated. In model (1) for each year, we examine the concentration
(fraction owned by the 5 largest owners), the insider ownership fraction, the firm size
(natural log of the market capitalization), a dummy variable for whether the firm paid
dividends in the previous year. In model (2) we examine whether the identity of the
largest owner is important by including the ownership fraction of the largest owner con-
ditional on whether he is a state-, foreign-, financial-, nonfinancial- or individual owner.
In addition we include the the dividend dummy and the market capitalization. In model
(3) we examine the effect of a large controlling owner and high insider ownership.60
The results from the estimation reflect to a large degree what was found in the
descriptive part of the analysis. However some new results appear. First, looking at
model (1), the concentration does not seem to be important for any year with respect
to whether the firm announces a repurchase plan, while the propensity for firms to
announce is positively related to the insider ownership for all years. In addition, the
59Since we model the probability of announcement, the sign of the parameter estimates reflect the
direction that the independent variable affect the probability of announcement. To evaluate the effect
of a variable on the probability of announcement, one can calculate the change in the probability
Prob(Ann) = exp(x ′β)/[1+ exp(x ′β)] by keeping the other variables fixed at their sample means, and
vary the mean of the variable under study. The term exp(x ′β), with all x’s at the sample means is the
odds ratio. For example, in model (1) for 1999, and increase in the insider ownership from 0% to 20%
increases the probability of announcement by 5%.
60The number of firms with an insider ownership greater than 33% is 35 in 1999, 43 in 2000 and 42
in 2001. For the large shareholder dummy, 18 firms had a controlling shareholder in 1999, 34 in 2000
and 36 in 2001. These two variables has an insignificant negative correlation of -0.03 for 1999 and 2000,
and 0.04 for 2001.
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results also suggest that large firms are more likely to announce, at least for 2000 and
2001. Since the correlation between concentration and firm size is very low, it does
not reflect that large firms announce because they have a more dispersed ownership.
Furthermore, whether the firm has paid dividends the previous year is a very important
decision variable across all years and model specifications. This indicates that firms
that historically has paid dividends are smoothing dividends, and reluctant to reduce
dividends to facilitate a repurchase program. Relative to the identity of the largest
owner, we do not find any systematic significant relationship across the years.
In model (2), we examine whether the identity of the largest owner may contribute
to the announcement of a repurchase program. For 1999, the results indicate that firms
where the largest owner is another firm (nonfinancial) or an institutional owner are more
likely to initiate a program. However, across different years, there is no evidence that
the identity of the largest owner is important.
Although, the identity of the owner is not important, the size of the owner might be.
To check this, model (3) examines whether a controlling owner or a large insider is im-
portant with respect to whether a firm announces a repurchase plan. The result indicate
that a large controlling shareholder reduces the probability of observing an announce-
ment. As discussed earlier, this may be because firms with a very large shareholder are
closely monitored such that additional mechanisms to discipline management are not
needed. Alternatively, large owners are may also resist the proposal of a repurchase
plan. Thus, if a large owner prefers dividends, or has a preference against repurchases,
he can effectively block any proposal of a repurchase program. The dummy for high
insider ownership is positive for all years, but less significant in 1999. In table 5.11 we
extend the estimation period to 24 months, and estimate the models for 1999 and 2000.
The results are similar, but somewhat stronger than the results in table 5.10.
We also estimate models examining whether the quick ratio as a proxy for liquid-
ity affect the propensity for firms to announce a repurchase plan. However, it is not
significant. Appendix 5.B show additional model estimations where we also investigate
the total number of owners and the number of owners by different owner-types. Be-
fore interpreting these results, it is important to note that the number of owners is
highly correlated with the size of the firm. In addition, the number of owners in each
category is also highly correlated with eachother. Thus, in tables 5.B1 and 5.B2 in
the appendix we see that the market capitalization is rendered insignificant due to the
multicolinearity. Additional models, with each ownertypes ownership fraction are also
estimated, but not shown in a table. The results for the ownership fractions by type
of owner are not significant except for the fraction owned by individuals which is has a
negative effect. For models with the separate ownerships of the five largest owners, the
results are ambiguous. This because the ownership proportions of the largest 3rd-5th
owners are strongly negatively correlated with the the ownership of the largest owner,
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Table 5.11
The probability of announcement - 24 month interval
The table shows the results from the estimation of a logit model, Prob(Ann) = F(β ′x), with the table
showing the β estimates for the independent variables for four different model specifications starting in
1999 and 2000. The models are estimated at the beginning of each year, with the dependent variable
equal to 1 if the firm announces a repurchase plan during the year, and equal to zero if it does not.
The table shows the estimation results when we estimate the model looking 24 months forward from
January each year. The models are estimated in January each year. The independent variables are the
total fraction owned by the five largest owners (concentration), the fraction owned by the insiders of
the firm (insider fraction), the natural log of the market capitalization, a dummy for whether the firm
paid dividend the previous year, the total number of owners (“number of owners”) and the number
of owners by various owner-types, a dummy for whether the insiders owns more than 33% of the firm
(High insider ownership) and a dummy for whether the largest owner has a super-majority (Largest
owner >67%).
Model 1999 Model 2000
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept -5.22∗∗ -5.53∗∗∗ -5.42∗∗ -6.33∗∗∗ -6.81∗∗∗ -6.84∗∗∗
Concentration -0.02 · · -0.88 · ·
Insider fraction 1.59∗∗∗ · · 1.76∗∗∗ · ·
MCAP (log) 0.30∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
Dividend -1.12∗∗∗ -0.98∗∗∗ -1.12∗∗∗ -1.66∗∗∗ -1.66∗∗∗ -1.69∗∗∗
largest state · -0.81 · · -1.18 ·
largest foreigner · -2.05 · · -0.93 ·
largest financial · 4.91∗ · · 4.78 ·
largest nonfinancial · 0.71∗∗ · · 1.45∗ ·
largest individual · 2.71∗ · · 2.26 ·
Largest owner >67% · · -1.57∗∗ · · -2.47∗∗∗
High insider ownership · · 1.10∗∗∗ · · 0.94∗∗
N(Announcing) 117 117 117 118 118 118
N(Non announcing) 94 94 94 74 74 74
Pseudo R square 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.19
AIC 281 287 280 231 241 229
Likelihood ratio (p value) <.001 <.001 0.02 <.001 <.001 <.001
Hosmer/Lemeshow 0.45 0.39 0.92 0.91 0.67 0.86
% concordant 66.2 66.7 68.4 74.8 71.2 76.7
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and positively correlated with eachother. However, when estimating separate models,
we find that the ownership of the largest owner has a negative effect on the propensity
to initiate a repurchase program, consistent with the result for the dummy variable for
the controlling shareholder in table 5.10.
One thing to note about the estimations is that we do not remove firms that has
previously announced a repurchase plan. Since several of the variables are highly per-
sistent, firms that are more likely to announce every year, will be included in the model
estimation every year. To study the effect of this, we also estimate models where all
firms that has announced in previous years are removed from the sample. For example,
when estimating the model for 2000, we remove all firms that announced before 2000.
Although the results for 1999 remains the same, the results for 2000 becomes weaker
while the estimation in 2001 is problematic since we are left with very few firms in both
categories. However, it is not obvious that we should remove firms that has announced
the previous year since it is the characteristics of these firms that we are interested in.
To summarize, the results from the model estimations above is not supportive of
an agency story where firms initiate a repurchase program to mitigate agency prob-
lems. Although announcing firms have more shareholders, and a lower concentration
on average, other variables seem more important in explaining the propensity for firms
to initiate a repurchase program. The variables that are the most important decision
variables are the previous dividend history of the firm, the insider ownership, and the
existence of a large, controlling, shareholder. Another interesting finding is that the
identity of the largest owner, or the identity of owners in general, is not important for
the decision to initiate a repurchase program.
Although these findings may be interpreted in several ways, the results are in line
with models where insiders have incentives to support a repurchase program to maximize
their future wealth when they have a stake in the company (Isagawa, 2000), expropriate
outside shareholders or to entrench themselves and reduce the probability of takeovers.
On the other hand this interpretation is not unambiguous as the existence of a con-
trolling shareholder decreases the probability of announcement. This is the opposite of
what is the prediction in the model by Brennan and Thakor (1990). One implication
from their model is that large shareholders will prefer repurchases to dividends, while
small shareholders will prefer dividends. Our results instead suggest that controlling
shareholders oppose repurchases or that additional mechanisms for distributing excess
cash is not needed when a large shareholder is in place to monitor the management.
5.7 Conclusion
This study provide a detailed examination of the ownership in Norwegian firms that
initiates repurchase programs. The main motivation is that a repurchase is an important
5.7 Conclusion 235
corporate event, which has the effect of altering the ownership structure. In addition, few
studies study in detail the ownership in firms that initiate repurchase programs. Since a
repurchase is a flexible way for firms to distribute cash, it may be used by managers as
a self imposed disciplinary mechanism which reduce cash holdings and mitigate agency
costs when other corporate governance mechanisms are not in place. On the other
hand, theoretical models also suggest that managers can use repurchases to pursue
their own objectives. For example, if there is asymmetric information between the
manager and outside shareholders, a repurchase can be used to increase his ownership in
undervalued firms transferring wealth from outside owners to himself and the remaining
shareholders. In addition, a repurchase may decrease the probability of value enhancing
takeovers which would benefit shareholders, but threaten the position of the manager
and potentially make him loose control over the firms resources.
The paper documents some interesting patterns in the ownership structure of Nor-
wegian firms that initiate repurchase plans. Moreover, the descriptive statistics indicate
that the ownership concentration in firms that announce repurchase plans is much lower
than in non-announcing firms. This is to a large degree because the largest shareholder
in these firms has a much lower stake in the firm. In addition, announcing firms also
have a much higher number of shareholders across all owner-types. These findings
are consistent with an agency theoretical explanation for why firms repurchase shares.
Because owners in these firms potentially have a much lower incentives to monitor man-
agement, repurchases can be used as an additional mechanisms to mitigate agency costs
(Jensen, 1986). However, the large number of shareholders may also be the main reason
for firms repurchasing shares in the first place. By removing the smallest shareholders,
the concentration potentially increases, such that monitoring quality improves as the
remaining shareholders increases their cash-flow and voting rights.
When examining the insider ownership in announcing firms, another picture emerges.
The results suggest that repurchasing firms have a much higher insider ownership than
non-announcing firms. This finding is not consistent with an interpretation where firms
with dispersed ownership uses repurchases to mitigate agency costs of free cash. Agency
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) predicts that the interests of inside- and outside
shareholders converge when the insider ownership increases. Thus, from a monitoring
perspective, we would expect repurchasing firms to instead have a lower insider owner-
ship. This finding support models where firms with high insider ownership is expected
to repurchase shares. These models predict that managers with a stake in the firm
(through stock ownership or options) use repurchases to increase their expected future
payoffs (Isagawa, 2000). In addition, the manager can use repurchases to increase his
(and remaining shareholders) ownership proportion in an undervalued firm or to deter
takeovers (Bagwell, 1991).
When examining how the ownership composition changes in firms that repurchase
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shares, we find that the concentration increases as would be expected. This increase in
concentration, seem to be mainly driven by an increased ownership of the largest owner.
In addition, the fraction owned by institutions and personal investors decreases. This
may both be because these investors trade more actively than the other owner types
such that they have a higher probability of selling shares back to the firm. Alternatively
they may have a preference for dividends, making them reduce their ownership in firms
that substitute dividends for repurchases.
The paper also examines whether ownership variables can be used to say something
about firms propensity to initiate a repurchase program. This is done by estimating
a binary model for the probability of observing a firm announcing a program during
each year, given the ownership composition at the beginning of the year. The results
reflect to a large degree the findings in the descriptive analysis. Moreover, the findings
would be in line with models where insiders have incentives to support the initiation
of a repurchase program either to maximize the future value of their wealth (Isagawa,
2000), expropriate outside shareholders or to entrench themselves.
On the other hand the finding that the existence of a controlling shareholder de-
creases the probability of observing the introduction of a repurchase program. There
are several interpretations for this finding. One is that a controlling shareholder may
oppose a repurchase program. Alternatively, additional mechanisms for distributing
excess cash is not needed when a large shareholder is in place with strong incentives to
monitor the management. Interestingly, this finding is the opposite of what is the pre-
diction in the model by Brennan and Thakor (1990). In their model, large shareholders
prefer repurchases to dividends, while small shareholders has a preference for dividends.
With respect to the identity of the largest owner in general, we find no evidence that
the type of this owner is important for the decision to initiate a repurchase program.
Finally, the results also strongly suggest that firms that paid dividends in the previous
year are less likely to initiate a repurchase program. This is likely related to dividend
smoothing, and that firms are reluctant to cutting dividends as suggested in studies by
Lintner (1956) and Brav et al. (2003).
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5.A The probability of observing an announcement
At a general level, the model for the probability of announcement (Ann) can be written
as,
Prob(Ann) = F(β ′x) (.2)
where β ′x is the index function, with x as a matrix of explanatory variables for each
firm, β is a vector of coefficients and F(·) is the cumulative distribution function. The
model is estimated as a binary regression model by assuming that a variable Ann∈ {1, 0},
which is the event of a firm announcing a repurchase plan or not, is related to a set of
explanatory variables x. A linear combination of these variables constitute an index A∗
which is related to Ann in the following way,
A∗ = β ′x+ i = β0 + β1xi1 + β2xi2 + ....+ βkxik + i (.3)
and Ann = 1 if A∗ > 0 (.4)
Ann = 0 if A∗ ≤ 0 (.5)
where β ′x is the index function, and the error term i has a logistic or normal distri-
bution with mean 0 and variance 1. Finally, we can write the probability that Ann= 1,
the probability of observing the announcement of a repurchase plan during the next M
months, as,
Prob(Ann) = Prob(A∗ > 0) = Prob(β ′x) > 0 = Prob(i > −β ′x) (.6)
Since both the normal and logistic distributions are symmetric, this can be expressed
as,
Prob(Ann) = Prob(A∗ > 0) = Prob( < β ′x) = F(β ′x) (.7)
where F(·) defines the cumulative distribution function for . If F(·) is assumed to be a
logistic distribution, the model is referred to as a logistic model, and if assumed to be
the normal distribution, the model is referred to as a probit model.
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Table 5.B2
The probability of announcement (number of owners) - 24 month interval
The table shows the results from the estimation of a logit model, Prob(Ann) = F(β ′x), with the table
showing the β estimates for the independent variables for four different model specifications starting in
1999 and 2000. The models are estimated at the beginning of each year, with the dependent variable
equal to 1 if the firm announces a repurchase plan during the year, and equal to zero if it do not. The
table shows the estimation results when we estimate the model looking 24 months forward from January
each year. The models are estimated in January each year. The independent variables are the total
fraction owned by the five largest owners (concentration), the fraction owned by the insiders of the
firm (insider fraction), the natural log of the market capitalization, a dummy for whether the firm paid
dividend the previous year, the total number of owners (“number of owners”) and the number of owners
by various owner-types, a dummy for whether the insiders owns more than 33% of the firm (High insider
ownership) and a dummy for whether the largest owner has a super-majority (Largest owner >67%).
Model 1999 Model 2000
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept -5.05∗∗ -1.95 -1.26 -6.47∗∗∗ -5.54 -5.27
Concentration 0.54 · -0.18 -0.48 · -0.90
Insider fraction 1.48∗∗∗ · 1.50∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗ · 1.46∗∗
MCAP (log) 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.35∗∗∗ 0.28∗ 0.30∗
Dividend -1.21∗∗∗ -0.82∗∗ -0.95∗∗∗ -1.62∗∗∗ -1.51∗∗∗ -1.48∗∗∗
Number of owners 0.31∗∗ · · 0.14 · ·
State owners · -0.14 -0.14 · -0.42 -0.32
Foreign owners · 0.54∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ · 0.37∗ 0.38∗
Financial owners · -0.34 -0.25 · 0.03 -0.06
Nonfinancial owners · 0.58 0.70 · 0.19 0.23
Individual owners · -0.35∗ -0.36∗ · -0.10 -0.14
N(Announcing) 117 117 117 118 118 118
N(Non-announcing) 94 94 94 74 74 74
Pseudo R-square 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.19
AIC 278 280 272 232 239 235
Likelihood ratio (p-value) <.001 <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01
Hosmer/Lemeshow 0.12 0.74 0.85 0.25 0.45 0.39
% concordant 68.3 70.1 73.4 74.4 74.7 75.9
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